

Short-Termism, Shareholder Payouts and Investment in the EU

(https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3706499)

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November 2020

EY's "evidence" of short-termism, examining listed EU firms 1992-2019

(1) Sh'holder payouts (dividends + repurchases) increasing & high

Fact: EY ignores equity issuances which far exceed repurchases; *net* sh'holder payouts moderate; small EU firms are net equity issuers.

(2) CAPEX & R&D intensity has declined

Fact: Investment intensity has increased (EY uses flawed sample).

(3) Shareholder payouts deprive firms of resources for future investment

Fact: Cash balances increasing.

Facts should matter

Is Harvard partly to blame?

William Lazonick:

“Corporate profitability is not translating into widespread economic prosperity. The allocation of corporate profits to stock buybacks deserves much of the blame. Consider the 449 companies in the S&P 500 index that were publicly listed from 2003 through 2012. During that period those companies used 54% of their net income—a total of \$2.4 trillion—to buy back their own stock, almost all through purchases on the open market. Dividends absorbed an additional 37% of their net income. That left very little for investments in productive capabilities or higher incomes for employees.”

Harvard
Business
Review

FIRST PLACE

2014 HBR McKinsey Awards



“Profits Without Prosperity”

SEPTEMBER 2014

A meticulously researched study by **William Lazonick**, a professor at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, suggests that executives are using massive stock buybacks to manipulate share prices and boost their own pay—at great cost to innovation and employment.


(1) Measuring Sh'holder-Firm Capital Flows

- EY looks at *gross* sh'holder payouts (dividends + buybacks)
 - ignoring equity issuances
- But including equity issuances dramatically changes picture


Need to Account for Equity Issuances


- Buybacks & dividends = capital moving from firm to shareholders
- Must account for capital moving to firm from shareholders **via equity issuances**
- Direct equity issuances to shareholders
 - E.g., rights offering
- Indirect equity issuances to shareholders
 - E.g., employee-paying
- All equity issuances functionally equivalent from sh'holder-firm capital-flow perspective (Fried & Wang, RCFS 2019)

Sh'holder payouts by EU public firms (1992-2019)




65% of net income
during 2010-2019
(like EY finding)






Sh'holder payouts & net sh'holder payouts by small EU public firms (1992-2019)




Cumulative excess income available for investment by EU public firms (1992-2019)



(2) Properly Measuring Investment


- EY “finds” investment intensity has fallen
 - by arbitrarily and inconsistently dropping firms from its samples
- Looking at all EU public firms, we show that
 - CAPEX, R&D levels each increased over 1992-2019, and over 2010-2019
 - Combined CAPEX+R&D intensity increased over these periods
 - CAPEX intensity fell over 2010-2019, but R&D intensity increased by higher amount



EU public firm investment levels (1992-2019)


- ||||| R&D
- ■ ■ ■ CAPEX + R&D
- CAPEX + R&D + Net Acquisition

Investment intensity at EU public firms (1992-2019)



(3) Properly Measuring Remaining Investment Capacity

- EY Study, at 9
 - “Increasing payments to shareholders will decrease the available resources to invest in R&D, human capital, or other kinds of capital expenditures, thus jeopardizing future productivity growth”
- But cash balances in EU public firms are rising.



Plus, firms can
always issue more
equity—as many
do

Conclusion

- Contrary to EY,
 - actual capital flows to shareholders, net of equity issuances, are modest
 - investment intensity is not declining, but rather rising
 - firms not starved of cash for future investment—cash balances are rising
- EU policymakers should not rely on the EY Study

Thank you!