## Discussion of EY Report by Roe/Spamann/Fried/Wang (ssrn.com/abstract=3711652) Part 4: Reform Proposals

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## Preliminary remarks

- 1. Corporate Gov. system is complex, not broken  $\rightarrow$  tune with care!
  - Short-termism:
    - EY report's "evidence" is inapposite (Fried & Wang 2020)
    - More subtle evidence: side effect, not main problem (?)
  - Externalities: *mainly* addressed by regulation/taxation
- 2. Short-termism is not a valid rationale for mandatory EU regulation
  - Unlike externalities, short-termism is primarily a problem for investors
  - $\rightarrow$  let investors decide (opt-in)
  - $\rightarrow$  at a minimum, let national regulators decide (subsidiarity!)

## EY's 7 Proposals (Option C: Mandatory)

- 1. Directors' duties  $\rightarrow$  stakeholders
- 2. [Incentivize LT holdings; prohibit earnings guidance & QR]
- 3. Sustainability strategy
- 4. Director remuneration:
  - a) long-term
  - b) sustainability metrics
- 5. Director nominations: "consider" sustainability
- 6. Stakeholder involvement
- 7. Stakeholder lawsuits for violation of duties