

DISCUSSION: "ACTIVE OWNERS AND FIRM POLICIES" BY AGUILERA, BERMEJO, CAPAPÉ, AND CUÑAT


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SUMMARY

- November 2012 "Note": NBIM unexpectedly declares its portfolio firms should meet certain "corporate governance expectations".
- Based on "Management Scores" of EIKON: Overall governance index of NBIM's portfolio firms increases post Note.
 - Increased (decreased) investments in firms with better (worse) governance.
 - More effect through discretion.
 - 2) Improved firm governance.
 - Both in the extensive and intensive margins.
 - 3) Governance and investment weight changes become more correlated post Note.
- The most salient element: Firms' reaction to Note.

• Figure 1: Governance Index differences among NBIM and non-NBIM firms



• Three step decomposition: $\Delta G_{it} = \sum_{i=0}^{I} w_{it+1}g_{it+1} - \sum_{i=0}^{I} w_{it}g_{it} \qquad (1)$ $\Delta G_{it} = \sum_{i=0}^{I} \Delta w_{it}g_{it} + \sum_{i=0}^{I} (w_{it}\Delta g_{it}) + \sum_{i=0}^{I} \Delta w_{it}\Delta g_{it} \qquad (3)$ Weight_{it} = Investment_{it} / $\sum_{i=I}^{i=1} (Investment_{it})$ Investment_{ict} =I(Ethics_{it}=1) x I(Engage_{it}=1) x $(FTSE Global_{it} x Country_c x Stance_{it})$

COMMENTS – FROM WHERE I STAND

1. Active Ownership – Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (RFS-2015)

- G-Index increases for firms successfully engaged by an ESG activist.
- Reputational concerns and collaboration are key for success and impact.

2. Coordinated Engagements – Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (WP-2019)

- Investor's exposure to and holdings in target increase success/impact.
- Is the effect solely attributable to NBIM, or could (some of) it be due to coordinated/collaborative/correlated efforts?


COMMENTS – **RELATED** (NBIM) LITERATURE

- 3. BlackRock vs Norway Fund at Shareholder Meetings: Institutional Investors' Votes on Corporate Externalities – Briere, Pouget, and Ureche (WP-2018)
 - NBIM opposes management more often than BlackRock does.
 - NBIM is more active on Environmental and Social issues than Governance issues.
 - Delegated philanthropy stronger than universal ownership in addressing negative externalities via institutional investors' engagement.
- 4. Corporate Ethical Behaviours and Firm Equity Value and Ownership: Evidence from the GPFG's Ethical Exclusions Atta-Darkua (WP-2019)
 - Dual-Problem: Analyses the changes in firms excluded by NBIM.
 - Documents a negative return impact on the exclusion announcements, and a modest divesting behaviour by some ethics sensitive investors.

COMMENTS — ANALYSIS 1/3

5. Announcement of the Note

- November 2012: Biggest reaction seems to be over 2011-2012 (e.g., Figure 1).
 - Could firms respond to the Note in a month?




- Year 2011: Unusually high number of discretionary exits (Table A4).
 - Are these exclusions driving results?
 - Could (some of the) firms/investors have anticipated the Note in 2011?

	-	Exits	Entries	Exits (Discretionary)	Entries (Discretionary)
	2009	70	150	50	77
	2010	31	169	25	73
	2011	228	157	219	52
	2012	70	205	64	149
	2013	60	279	50	177
	2014	81	235	76	105

COMMENTS – ANALYSIS 2/3

6. EIKON index scores

- Detailed discussion/analysis of the scores would be helpful.
- Could other indices be exploited?
 - Environmental, Social, Governance (Shareholders and CSR).



Source: Thomson Reuters ESG Scores (February 2019)

COMMENTS – ANALYSIS 3/3

7. NBIM Investment Strategy

- Investment_{ict} =I(Ethics_{it}=1) x I(Engage_{it}=1) x (FTSE Global_{it} x Country_c x Stance_{it}) Weight_{it} = Investment_{it} / $\sum_{i=I}^{i=1}$ (Investment_{it})
- "The benchmark index is set by the Ministry of Finance on the basis of indices from FTSE Group and Bloomberg Barclays Indices.
- "The equity allocation in the strategic benchmark index has been set at 62.5 percent ... decided to increase ... to 70 percent. The increase will be implemented gradually."
- "If the equity allocation in the actual benchmark index moves significantly higher or lower than the strategic allocation ... there are ... rules on rebalancing of the equity allocation in the actual benchmark index."

(Source: https://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/how-we-invest/investment-strategy/)

SUGGESTIONS/QUESTIONS

- Which <u>components</u> (out of 34) of governance score improve after NBIM involvement?
- How did the value/performance, risk, and ownership of NBIM firms change after the announcement?
- Is equation 1 (and related analyses) forward-looking?
- Proxy voting agencies (e.g., ISS) may also serve a similar function by setting/announcing certain ESG standards, and voting accordingly.
- It would be great if the analysis in Section 6.5 could be explained/discussed further.

POTENTIAL TYPOS

• Abnormal returns are mentioned at p.10, but I am not sure in which analysis they are utilized.

• I suspect:

- "Soverign" at p.6 is "Sovereign".
- "NBIMportfolio" at p.14 is "NBIM portfolio".
- "Table A5" at p.16 is "Table A4".
- "in 2012" at p.16 is "in 2011".
- "governaance" at p.19 is "governance".
- "Table A8" at p.20 is "Table A10".
- "yeat" at p.49 is "year".