

#### **Cost Shielding in Executive Bonus Plans**

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
> Bar Ilan University December 16, 2019



## **Motivation**




#### **Financial Performance Measures in Executive Bonus Plans**



### **Motivation**



#### **Financial Performance Measures in Executive Bonus Plans**



# **Motivation**



- Most variation in performance measure choice is *within* the income statement
- What explains these *ex ante* performance measure choices?
- We examine agency-theoretic predictions on the role of "cost shielding"
  - The primary distinction between different income statement measures is the extent to which they exclude various expenses

# **Cost Shielding**





**Net income** = Sales minus Expenses

**EBT** = Net income *excluding tax expense* 

**EBIT** = EBT *excluding interest expense* 

**EBITDA** = EBIT *excluding depreciation* 

Sales excludes all expenses

# **Cost Shielding**



Macy's 2017 proxy:

"The [compensation committee] selected EBIT as the performance metric to ensure that the maximum potential payout is determined as a percentage of controllable profit.

Excluding interest and taxes ensures that profit is defined based on operating results that the Named Executives can directly influence."





# **Primary Questions**

- Do boards use cost shielding to improve contracting efficiency and resolve issues with:
  - 1. Noisy costs?
    - Incentive contracts should place relatively smaller weights on noisier performance measures (Banker and Datar, 1989; Lambert, 2001)
    - Helps validate our empirical cost shielding measures
  - 2. Temporal mismatches between costs and benefits of investments?
    - Performance measures that include investment-related expenses can encourage myopic behavior (e.g., Stein, 1989)
  - 3. Costs resulting from previous management's actions?
    - Executives should be evaluated on measures that are informative about their actions (e.g., Holmström, 1979; Antle and Demski, 1988)

# **Main Findings**



- Noisy costs:
  - We find more cost shielding when expenses are more volatile
- Temporal mismatches between costs and benefits:
  - We find more cost shielding for firms with more growth opportunities/focus on new product launches
- Costs resulting from previous management's actions:
  We find cost shielding decreases with executive tenure



# **Measuring Cost Shielding**

- We create a categorical variable for each performance measure within a given firm-year:
  - Net income = 0
  - EBIT = 1
  - EBITDA = 2
  - Sales = 3
- Our summary cost shielding measure (*Cost Shield*) is the firm-year mean of these categorical variables.
  - Firm using only net income: Cost Shield = 0
  - Firm using only sales: *Cost Shield* = 3
  - Firm using sales and net income: *Cost Shield* = 1.5

# **Research Design**



Cost Shield<sub>i,t</sub> =  $\alpha + \beta_1$  Contracting Value<sub>i,t-1</sub> +  $\beta_2 Ln(MVE)_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Idio Vol_{i,t-1}$ 

+  $\beta_4 BTM_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 Free Cash Flow_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 Ln(Delta)_{i,t-1} + \beta_7 Ln(Tenure)_{i,t}$ 

$$+\delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t},$$
 (1)

 $Measure_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Contracting Value_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 Ln(MVE)_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Idio Vol_{i,t-1}$ 

+  $\beta_4 BTM_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 Free Cash Flow_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 Ln(Delta)_{i,t-1} + \beta_7 Ln(Tenure)_{i,t}$ 

+ 
$$\Gamma$$
 Other Measures<sub>i,t</sub> +  $\delta_t$  +  $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ , (2)

- Contracting value measures:
  - Noisy costs: Volatility of depreciation, R&D, interest, and effective tax rate (ETR)
  - Temporal mismatches between costs and benefits: Sales growth, book-to-market, % of new products, firm age
  - Costs from previous management: Executive tenure, turnover

# **Noisy Costs**



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Cost	Sales	EBITDA	EBIT	Earnings
Dependent Variable:	<u>Shield</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	$\underline{Metric_t}$
Depreciation Volatility <sub>t-1</sub>	8.977***	4.219***	1.998*	-3.228**	-4.282***
	(3.62)	(2.83)	(1.82)	(-2.55)	(-3.27)
<i>R&amp;D Volatility</i> <sub>t-1</sub>	5.178***	5.295***	-3.041***	-0.677	-1.639**
	(3.88)	(6.56)	(-6.04)	(-0.91)	(-2.11)
Interest Volatility <sub>t-1</sub>	7.252*	-4.663*	11.663***	-0.032	-3.391*
	(1.87)	(-1.91)	(6.12)	(-0.02)	(-1.65)
ETR Volatility <sub>t-1</sub>	0.024	-0.008	0.025***	0.019*	0.012
	(1.23)	(-0.67)	(2.85)	(1.83)	(1.06)
Firm Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Metric Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year
Ν	7,318	7,318	7,318	7,318	7,318
<b>R</b> <sup>2</sup>	0.107	0.095	0.276	0.215	0.257

# **Timing of Costs and Benefits**



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	Cost	Sales	EBITDA	EBIT	Earnings	
Dependent Variable:	<u>Shield</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	$\underline{Metric_t}$	
Sales Growth <sub>t-1</sub>	0.164***	0.055	0.008	-0.118***	-0.117***	
	(2.67)	(1.43)	(0.26)	(-3.42)	(-2.97)	
Book-to-Market <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.309***	-0.187***	-0.032	0.001	0.089***	
	(-6.77)	(-6.04)	(-1.32)	(0.03)	(2.96)	
Firm Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Other Metric Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Fixed Effects	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	
N	8,005	8,005	8,005	8,005	8,005	
<b>R</b> <sup>2</sup>	0.088	0.059	0.209	0.204	0.240	

# **Timing of Costs and Benefits**



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	Cost	Sales	EBITDA	EBIT	Earnings	
Dependent Variable:	<u>Shield</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric<sub>t</sub></u>	<u>Metric</u> t	
% New Products <sub>t</sub>	0.173***	0.132***	0.041**	0.008	0.047	
	(3.84)	(4.43)	(1.97)	(0.28)	(1.55)	
$Ln(Firm Age_t)$	-0.238***	-0.108***	-0.029*	-0.033	0.079***	
	(-6.29)	(-4.13)	(-1.71)	(-1.34)	(3.31)	
Firm Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Other Metric Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Fixed Effects	Year	Year	Year	Year	Year	
N	6,498	6,498	6,498	6,498	6,498	
<b>R</b> <sup>2</sup>	0.121	0.076	0.191	0.198	0.243	

# Controllability



	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Cost	Sales	EBITDA	EBIT	Earnings
Dependent Variable:	<u>Shield</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t	<u>Metric</u> t
CEO Tenure Years $0-2_t$	0.132***	0.054**	0.052***	0.026	0.045*
	(3.34)	(2.02)	(2.93)	(1.10)	(1.80)
CEO Tenure Years 3-5 <sub>t</sub>	0.102***	0.044*	0.045***	0.012	0.040
	(2.63)	(1.66)	(2.61)	(0.55)	(1.64)
CEO Tenure Years 6-8 <sub>t</sub>	0.062*	0.032	0.021	-0.015	0.016
	(1.86)	(1.36)	(1.39)	(-0.70)	(0.72)
Firm Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other Metric Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	year	year	year	year	year
Ν	8,009	8,009	8,009	8,009	8,009
R <sup>2</sup>	0.087	0.059	0.208	0.202	0.239

# Controllability



	(1)	(2)
Sample Restriction:	External $Hire_t = 0$	<i>External</i> $Hire_t = 1$
Dependent Variable:	Cost Shieldt	Cost Shield <sub>t</sub>
CEO Tenure Years $0-2_t$	0.089**	0.319***
	(2.14)	(2.79)
CEO Tenure Years 3-5 <sub>t</sub>	0.075*	0.230**
	(1.83)	(2.29)
CEO Tenure Years 6-8 <sub>t</sub>	0.052	0.124
	(1.44)	(1.40)
Firm Controls	Yes	Yes
Other Metric Controls	No	No
Fixed Effects	year	year
Ν	6,949	1,060
R <sup>2</sup>	0.082	0.126

# **Additional Analyses**



- CEO turnover as a "shock" to contracting value
- Role of the board's financial expertise
- Robustness tests and alternative variable construction

# **CEO Turnover**



- We examine two complementary CEO turnover settings:
  - 1. We hand-collect data on CEO turnover due to death or health-related reasons
    - Likely unrelated to firm/manager characteristics that influence bonus plan design (plausibly "exogenous")
  - 2. We examine forced CEO turnover (Peters and Wagner, 2014)
    - Suggests board has rejected the previous CEO's actions and the incoming CEO may require greater cost shielding
- We find significant increases in cost shielding following both types of turnover

# **Financial Expertise**



- We examine whether our results differ between boards with relatively high and low financial expertise
- Findings for *noisy costs* and *controllability* are more pronounced among boards with greater financial expertise
  - Results primarily from substitution between different earnings-based measures
- Findings for temporal mismatches of costs and benefits *do not differ* based on financial expertise
  - Results primarily from inclusion of sales measures

# **Robustness Tests**



- Our inferences are unchanged if we:
  - Define *Cost Shield* based on other firm-year summary measures than the mean (e.g., median, max)
  - Define *Cost Shield* using actual weights on individual performance measures
    - For example, for a bonus based 75% on sales (3) and 25% on net income (0), *Cost Shield* = 75% x 3 + 25% x 0 = 2.25
  - Exclude loss firms
  - Include fixed effects for number of performance measures
  - Examine the firm's lowest-paid NEO, rather than the CEO
- Collectively, these results suggest our findings are not an artifact of specific research design choices



# **Summary**

- We show substantial heterogeneity in performance metrics within "earnings-based" pay
- We provide evidence that boards use bonus plans to focus executives' attention on specific, more controllable objectives
- Boards appear to recognize the limitations/deficiencies of specific income statement measures and design bonus plans accordingly
- Our findings highlight an unexplored benefit of directors' financial expertise



# **Thank you!**



# Sample

- Incentive Lab
  - Annual cash incentive plans
  - Sample period: 2006-2017
  - 8009 firm-years, 1442 distinct firms
- Other firm-level data:
  - Financial (Compustat)
  - Stock returns (CRSP)
  - Compensation/tenure (Execucomp)
  - New/existing products (Factset)


# **Descriptive Statistics**

				Std.		•	
Variable		Ν	Mean	Dev.	25	th 50th	75th
CEO Bonus Plan Measu	ires:						
Cost Shield		8,009	0.73	0.73	0.0	0.67	1.25
# Sales Metrics		8,009	0.50	0.80	0.0	0.00 0.00	1.00
# EBITDA Metrics		8,009	0.18	0.50	0.0	0.00 0.00	0.00
# EBIT Metrics		8,009	0.44	0.80	0.0	0.00 0.00	1.00
# EBT Metrics		8,009	0.09	0.35	0.0	00.0 0.00	0.00
# Earnings Metrics		8,009	1.01	1.18	0.0	00 1.00	1.00
Total Income Statement Metrics		8,009	2.27	1.68	1.0	00 2.00	3.00
	⊿ #	⊿ #	⊿ #	Δ	#	⊿ #	⊿ #
	Sales	EBITDA	EBIT	E E	BT	Earnings	Total
Variable	Metrics	Metrics	Metrics Metrics		trics	Metrics	Metrics
∆ # Sales Metrics	1.00					•	
$\Delta$ # EBITDA Metrics	0.0700*	1.00					
∆ # EBIT Metrics	0.1093*	-0.0952*	1.00				
$\Delta$ # EBT Metrics	0.0505*	-0.0356*	-0.0982	2* 1.0	00		
$\Delta$ # Earnings Metrics	0.1458*	-0.0387*	-0.115	5* -0.0	)336*	1.00	
∆ Total Metrics	0.6119*	0.2665*	0.373	5* 0.1	457*	0.6194*	1.00




# **Performance Measure Usage**

(2006 = 100)



# **Performance Measure Usage**



# **Cost Shielding**

