

Divesting University Endowments

Law Working Paper N° 907/2026

August 2026

Max M. Schanzenbach

Northwestern University

Robert H. Sitkoff

Harvard University and ECGI

© Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff
2026. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted
without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
<https://www.ecgi.global/publications/working-papers>

ECGI Working Paper Series in Law

Divesting University Endowments

Working Paper N° 907/2026
August 2026

Max M. Schanzenbach
Robert H. Sitkoff

Abstract

The brutal conflict between Hamas and Israel convulsed higher education. Student protesters have demanded that university endowments "divest" from Israel. University leaders have largely resisted those demands on grounds of fiduciary obligation, institutional neutrality, or both. In response, protesters have pointed to prior instances of purported divestment. Confusion abounds over the applicable fiduciary principles and the scope of prior divestments. This paper synthesizes the law and finance of endowment divestment and applies that analysis to past divestments and present divestment demands. We show that endowment divestment for nonfinancial reasons is permissible under prevailing law only if: (1) the divestment is consistent with the university's charitable purpose of research and education, and (2) the divestment's effect on the portfolio is reasonable in light of that purpose. Applied to the current state of university endowment management, this is a highly restrictive standard. The charitable purpose of most secular universities is research and education, full stop. Moreover, contemporary endowment practice relies on external managers, making a divestment today more costly to implement than in the past. Under current endowment practice, therefore, even a de minimis divestment, whether from Israel or otherwise, would likely be a fiduciary breach, potentially exposing university trustees to out-of-pocket damages for any resulting loss to the endowment. We also examine current divestment policies and purported prior divestments, including South Africa under apartheid, tobacco, Sudan during the Darfur war, and fossil fuels. Consistent with our legal analysis, but contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that universities have generally not engaged in broad divestments, not even from South Africa under apartheid. Instead, most large university endowments do not divest or adhere to a narrow divestment policy for "moral abhorrence" that has rarely been invoked. We show that a divestment for moral abhorrence could pass fiduciary muster as consistent with the public benefit principle of charity law if supported by clearly established public policy.

Max M. Schanzenbach

Northwestern University

Robert H. Sitkoff

Harvard University and ECGI

DIVESTING UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS

MAX M. SCHANZENBACH* & ROBERT H. SITKOFF**

ABSTRACT

The brutal conflict between Hamas and Israel convulsed higher education. Student protesters have demanded that university endowments “divest” from Israel. University leaders have largely resisted those demands on grounds of fiduciary obligation, institutional neutrality, or both. In response, protesters have pointed to prior instances of purported divestment. Confusion abounds over the applicable fiduciary principles and the scope of prior divestments. This paper synthesizes the law and finance of endowment divestment and applies that analysis to past divestments and present divestment demands.

We show that endowment divestment for nonfinancial reasons is permissible under prevailing law only if: (1) the divestment is consistent with the university’s charitable purpose of research and education, and (2) the divestment’s effect on the portfolio is reasonable in light of that purpose. Applied to the current state of university endowment management, this is a highly restrictive standard. The charitable purpose of most secular universities is research and education, full stop. Moreover, contemporary endowment practice relies on external managers, making a divestment today more costly to implement than in the past. Under current endowment practice, therefore, even a de minimis divestment, whether from Israel or otherwise, would likely be a fiduciary breach, potentially exposing university trustees to out-of-pocket damages for any resulting loss to the endowment.

We also examine current divestment policies and purported prior divestments, including South Africa under apartheid, tobacco, Sudan during the Darfur war, and fossil fuels. Consistent with our legal analysis, but contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that universities have generally not engaged in broad divestments, not even from South Africa under apartheid. Instead, most large university endowments do not divest or adhere to a narrow divestment policy for “moral abhorrence” that has rarely been invoked. We show that a divestment for moral abhorrence could pass fiduciary muster as consistent with the public benefit principle of charity law if supported by clearly established public policy.

* Seigle Family Professor of Law, Northwestern University.

** Austin Wakeman Scott Professor of Law and John L. Gray Professor of Law, Harvard University.

The authors thank Stephen Bainbridge, Zachary Clopton, Jill Fisch, Jesse Fried, Jill Horwitz, Howell Jackson, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Macey, John Morley, Jide Nzelibe, Steve Shavell, Nadav Shoked, Robert Wallace, and workshop participants at Cornell, George Mason, Northwestern, Harvard, and Texas A&M for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, and Christian Carson, Ryan DelGaudio, Mollie Guba, Emily Hansen, Sophia Lam, Mickey McMahon, Akhil Rajasekar, Lisa Lilliot Rydin, and Ankita Satpathy for excellent research assistance. In accordance with Harvard Law School policy on conflicts of interest, Sitkoff discloses certain outside activities, one or more of which may relate to the subject matter of this paper, at [<https://perma.cc/MHC6-R69R>].

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	452
I. CHARITIES, UNIVERSITIES, AND ENDOWMENTS	459
A. <i>What is a Charity?</i>	459
B. <i>Universities as Charitable Organizations.</i>	460
C. <i>The Charitable Purpose of a University</i>	463
1. Organizational Documents	463
2. Federal Tax Returns (Form 990)	464
3. Mission and Policy Statements	466
4. Charitable Purpose, Public Benefit, and Public Policy	467
D. <i>University Governance and Endowment Management.</i>	468
1. Academic Operations Versus Endowment Management	468
2. What is an Endowment?	470
3. Why an Endowment? Prevailing Theories	471
4. The Rise of the "Yale Model"	472
5. The Rise of Outside Managers	475
II. APPLICABLE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES.	476
A. <i>Standing to Sue</i>	478
B. <i>Trustee Liability</i>	479
1. Trust Law.	480
2. Corporate Law.	481
C. <i>The Duty of Loyalty (and Ultra Vires).</i>	483
1. Sole Interest Rule	483
2. Best Interest Standard	484
3. Ultra Vires and Charitable Purpose	485
D. <i>The Duty of Care or Prudence</i>	486
1. Endowment Management	486
2. The Charitable Program	488
E. <i>Fiduciary Principles and Endowment Divestment</i>	490
1. The Duty of Loyalty and Divestment	491
a. Within the Charitable Purpose: Mission-Related Investing	491
b. Public Benefit, Public Policy, and Moral Abhorrence	492
c. Outside the Charitable Purpose: "Sole" versus "Best" Interest	493
2. The Duty of Prudence and Divestment	495
a. Assessing the Costs of a Divestment	496
b. Assessing the Benefits of a Divestment	497
3. Reputation and Constituency Management.	499

2026]	<i>Divesting University Endowments</i>	451
	<i>F. Fiduciary Principles and Academic Disassociation</i>	501
	1. Academic Disassociation	501
	2. Accepting and Rejecting Gifts	502
	3. Distinguishing Investment and Programmatic Assets	504
III.	UNIVERSITY DIVESTMENT IN PRACTICE: PAST AND PRESENT. . . .	505
	<i>A. Historic Divestment: South Africa, Tobacco, and Sudan</i>	506
	1. South Africa.	506
	2. Tobacco	510
	3. Sudan.	514
	<i>B. The Spread of Formal Divestment (and ESG) Policies</i>	517
	1. Non-Divestment	520
	2. Abhorrence: Rare Divestment in Extreme Cases	521
	3. “Direct Holdings” Divestment	524
	4. Significant Divestment	525
	<i>C. Modern Divestment Controversies: Fossil Fuels</i>	
	<i>and Israel</i>	525
	1. Fossil Fuels	525
	a. Rejecting Fossil Fuels Divestment or	
	Minimally Divesting	526
	b. Divesting from “Direct” Fossil Fuels	
	Investments	528
	c. Nonfinancial Fossil Fuel Divestment	530
	2. Israel	533
	CONCLUSION	536

INTRODUCTION

The brutal conflict between Hamas and Israel convulsed higher education.¹ Student protests and encampments roiled many university campuses.² A common demand of the protesters was for “divestment” from Israel. University leadership has largely resisted such demands on grounds of fiduciary obligation, institutional neutrality on political and social questions (that is, refusing to “speak with the endowment”), or both.³ In response, protesters invoked as contrary precedents earlier instances in which universities appeared to speak on social issues by divesting from South Africa under apartheid, tobacco, Sudan during the Darfur war, and fossil fuels.⁴ University constituencies, including faculty, students, and alumni, are deeply divided on the merits of divestment and justifiably confused about applicable law and policy.

This is no small fight. Aggregate university endowment value is nearly \$1 trillion.⁵ These funds are highly concentrated among a small number of schools. Although there are over 4,000 institutions of higher education,⁶ the twenty-five largest university endowments account for nearly half of

¹ See, e.g., Theo Baker, *The War at Stanford*, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2024), <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2024/03/stanford-israel-gaza-hamas/677864/> [<https://perma.cc/SP7T-M2JF>] (detailing tensions on Stanford’s campus, including use of racially charged language against Jewish students); Stephen Carter, *College Is All About Curiosity. And That Requires Free Speech*, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2024), <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/24/magazine/college-free-speech.html> [<https://perma.cc/3YCN-VDZ8>] (“I have served happily as a professor at Yale for most of my adult life, but in my four-plus decades at the mast, I have never seen campuses roiled as they’re roiling today.”).

² See Robert Kelchen & Marc Novicoff, *Are Gaza Protests Happening Mostly at Elite Colleges?*, WASH. MONTHLY (May 24, 2024), <https://washingtonmonthly.com/2024/05/24/are-gaza-protests-happening-mostly-at-elite-colleges/> [<https://perma.cc/94NK-G94U>] (finding that both encampments and protests “are overwhelmingly an elite college phenomenon,” not a public-private distinction, based on a database on public protests and disruptions).

³ See *infra* Part III.C.2.

⁴ See, e.g., HARV. UNIV., PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING ANTI-MUSLIM, ANTI-ARAB, AND ANTI-PALESTINIAN BIAS 51 (2025) [<https://perma.cc/D2SA-2WB2>] (“Moreover, students pointed to what they understood to be Harvard’s historical precedent of divesting from certain industries and companies for non-financial reasons, such as ethical, social, or political considerations.”); *Harvard’s Endowment and Financial (In)justice*, HARV. CRIMSON 2 (Apr. 27, 2025) [<https://perma.cc/RNX7-RUQB>] (anonymous student newspaper parodying *Harvard Crimson* distributed by student activists pointing to Palestine-related divestment as “modeled after the successful movement to end South African apartheid”); *As it Happened: More Than 1,000 Stage Walkout at Harvard Commencement Ceremony*, HARV. CRIMSON (May 23, 2024), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2024/5/23/harvard-commencement-live-updates/> [<https://perma.cc/5GDE-5NAK>] (recounting how student activists distributed pamphlets at Harvard’s commencement including a timeline of Harvard’s past divestments from controversial investments).

⁵ See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., *Table 333.90. Endowment Funds of the 120 Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions with the Largest Endowments, by Rank Order: Fiscal Year 2021*, INST. EDUC. SCI. (2022), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_333.90.asp [<https://perma.cc/NLZ5-NR2V>] (data as of end of fiscal year 2021).

⁶ Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., *Fast Facts: Educational Institutions*, INST. EDUC. SCI. (2022), <https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=1122> [<https://perma.cc/QW7A-9EN3>].

all endowment assets, and the top 120 account for almost 75 percent of the total.⁷ The endowments of these universities provide critical financial support and stability. Indeed, the financial importance of endowments has grown, especially at private universities, for which endowments fund an average of 11 percent of university operations as of 2024.⁸ The payouts for the twenty-nine largest university endowments (those over \$5 billion) cover almost 18 percent of their operating expenses, and the payouts for the next largest 115 endowments (\$1 billion to \$5 billion) cover nearly 19 percent of their operating expenses.⁹ The most vociferous demands for divestment have been at these elite schools, both public and private.¹⁰ The trustees at these schools bear commensurately large risk. In addition to the risk to their own reputations, these trustees face personal out-of-pocket liability for damages if they approve a divestment contrary to applicable fiduciary law.¹¹

Despite the high stakes, confusion over the law, finance, and history of university divestment abounds, even among sophisticated actors. For example, former Harvard President Lawrence Bacow moved in the span of just six months from asserting that fossil fuel divestment would be a breach of fiduciary duty (March 2021)¹² to claiming it was a fiduciary obligation (September 2021).¹³

Even the scope of what is meant by “divestment” is unclear. For simplicity, we will refer to the use of a nonfinancial factor in investing an endowment as a divestment. Demands by students and others for a university to consider nonfinancial factors typically take the form of calls to avoid investment in a particular firm, industry, or country on moral or ethical grounds (that is, to

⁷ See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Stat., *Table 333.90. Endowment Funds of the 120 Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions with the Largest Endowments, by Rank Order: Fiscal Year 2021*, INST. EDUC. SCI. (2022), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d22/tables/dt22_333.90.asp [https://perma.cc/NLZ5-NR2V] (data as of end of fiscal-year 2021).

⁸ NAT'L ASS'N OF COLL. & U. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., THE NACUBO ENDOWMENT STUDY: A 50-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 5 (2024) [hereinafter NACUBO 50-Year Retrospective] [https://perma.cc/328T-3WWA].

⁹ NAT'L ASS'N OF COLL. & U. BUS. OFFICERS & COMMONFUND INST., 2024 NACUBO-COMMONFUND STUDY OF ENDOWMENTS 44 (2024) [hereinafter NACUBO 2024 Study] (on file with authors).

¹⁰ See Kelchen & Novicoff, *supra* note 2.

¹¹ See *infra* Part II.B.

¹² Kelsey J. Griffin & Kevin A. Simauchi, *Divest Harvard Meets with Mass. Attorney General's Office Over Complaint Against University*, HARV. CRIMSON (May 4, 2021), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2021/5/4/divest-meets-healeys-office/> [https://perma.cc/TA4K-CYA7] (“University President Lawrence S. Bacow defended Harvard’s fossil fuel investments in a March 18 interview, stating he believes the holdings are ‘consistent with our charitable mission as well as our fiduciary obligations.’”).

¹³ Jasper G. Goodman & Kelsey J. Griffin, *Harvard Will Move to Divest its Endowment from Fossil Fuels*, HARV. CRIMSON (Sep. 10, 2021), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2021/9/10/divest-declares-victory/> [https://perma.cc/PSE8-ZYMK] (quoting Bacow as stating, “Given the need to decarbonize the economy and our responsibility as fiduciaries to make long-term investment decisions that support our teaching and research mission, we do not believe such investments are prudent.”).

“divest” from such an investment).¹⁴ But nonfinancial factors can also skew the portfolio in favor of a nonfinancial purpose, a strategy that is sometimes called “impact investing.” Because portfolio allocation is a zero-sum enterprise, there is no distinction in law or economics between a positive and a negative skew. We will use the term “divestment” to refer to any reliance on a nonfinancial factor in managing a university’s endowment.¹⁵

At the same time, we recognize that sometimes a call for “divestment” might refer to prohibiting the university’s research or educational activities from contact with an objectionable firm, industry, or country.¹⁶ For clarity, we will refer to this practice as “academic disassociation,” to differentiate it from endowment divestment. The current divestment protests appear to be aimed primarily at endowment divestment, but there have also been calls for academic disassociation.¹⁷

The goal of this paper is to synthesize the fiduciary principles surrounding the question of university (or other charitable nonprofit) endowment divestment. We also consider the fiduciary principles applicable to academic disassociation. These fiduciary principles are the law’s answer to the agency costs inherent to the structure of a university or other charitable organization.¹⁸

¹⁴ See, e.g., Osama Alkhawaja, *Anti-BDS Laws and the Politics of Political Boycotts*, 26 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 211, 215–16 (2023) (discussing the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions Movement’s calls for endowment divestment); Neil Gunningham, *Divestment, Nonstate Governance, and Climate Change*, 39 L. & POL’Y 309, 310 (2017) (discussing the fossil free divestment movement’s “primary strategy” to encourage endowment divestment).

¹⁵ Similar questions about nonfinancial divestment have arisen in the context of public pension funds. See generally Jill Fisch & Jeff Schwartz, *The Singular Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance*, 104 TEX. L. REV. 735 (2026).

¹⁶ See, e.g., *Student Statement in Solidarity with Palestinian Liberation*, NAT’L STUDENTS FOR JUST. IN PAL. (May 18, 2021), <https://www.nationalsjp.org/statement-12> [<https://perma.cc/96CP-NEDB>] (demanding “an end to university partnerships” and “institutional relationships”); Amanda Chu & Andrew Jack, *Princeton Reverses Ban on Fossil Fuel Companies Funding Research*, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2024), <https://www.ft.com/content/6aeabf1-bfb6-4dbe-86be-ccc476578add> [<https://perma.cc/2FR6-P882>] (noting criticism of Princeton’s decision to stop dissociating its research from fossil fuel company funding).

¹⁷ See, e.g., PRINCETON ISRAELI APARTHEID DIVEST, PROPOSAL FOR PRINCETON UNIVERSITY’S DIVESTMENT AND DISSOCIATION FROM ISRAEL’S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2024) (“Princeton University divested and dissociated from South Africa in 1987 and Darfur in 2006, citing human rights violations, and from fossil fuels in 2022, citing companies’ disinformation; the University must do the same in response to Israel’s conflicts with values of human rights and trust-seeking scholarship.”) [<https://perma.cc/NQW6-7PGX>]; Jack Perry, *RISD Protesters Demand Divestment Saying, ‘We will not bend an inch’*, VOW STAY IN BUILDING, PROVIDENCE J. (May 8, 2024), <https://www.providence-journal.com/story/news/2024/05/08/risd-protesters-demand-divestment-vowing-to-stay-in-building/73611974007/> [<https://perma.cc/8EDF-SU7K>] (demanding that the RISD university president “[commit] to a holistic divestment from companies, corporations and institutions that are implicated in sustaining Israeli Apartheid”); *Open Letter From SJP to American Universities*, NAT’L STUDENTS FOR JUST. IN PAL. (Apr. 21, 2024), <https://www.nationalsjp.org/statement-17> [<https://perma.cc/6DR4-TZFM>] (urging universities “[t]o completely divest our tuition dollars from—and to cut all institutional ties to—the Zionist entity as well as all companies complicit in the colonization of Palestine”).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, *Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s Kiss-Off*, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 781–82 (2008).

Our primary contribution is to show that endowment divestment for non-financial reasons is permissible under applicable fiduciary principles only if two conditions are both satisfied: (1) the divestment is consistent with the university's research and educational purpose that qualifies it as a charitable non-profit, and (2) the divestment's effect on the endowment portfolio as a whole is reasonable in light of that purpose. Divestment for a reason outside of the university's charitable research and educational purpose may be disloyal, ultra vires, or both. Even if a divestment is within the university's research and educational purpose, it must still be prudent, which entails a balancing of the costs to the endowment portfolio with the anticipated benefits from the divestment. Such a balancing includes comparison against alternative means within the university's program to achieve those benefits. A useful heuristic is to ask whether a direct distribution of university funds for the same purpose would have been permissible. If not, the divestment could not plausibly satisfy the even stricter fiduciary duties applicable to endowment management.

Endowment divestment, in other words, is an act of fiduciary discretion subject to a meaningful fiduciary review derived from trust law. Investing solely for prudent risk and return, by contrast, is all but a fiduciary safe harbor. Moreover, the law grants universities much greater deference in implementing their academic programs, which are reviewed under more relaxed fiduciary standards derived from corporate law. The applicable legal structure thus pushes universities toward addressing social issues in the context of their academic rather than investment programs.

Our analysis also makes four secondary contributions. *First*, as best we can given the fragmentary public record, we clarify past divestment practices by recovering the lost history of what in fact transpired in the purported divestment precedents of South Africa under apartheid, tobacco, and Sudan during the Darfur war.¹⁹ What emerges from our excavation of the history of university divestment is a significant difference between perception and reality.

In general, and consistent with our analysis of the applicable fiduciary principles, American universities for the most part have not engaged in broad or costly divestments. To the contrary, it appears that only one of the twenty-five largest endowments implemented a complete divestment from South Africa, divestments from Sudan involved only a handful of firms (and thus were likely *de minimis*), and only five endowments undertook a significant divestment from tobacco (and four of the five have since reversed course). For the most part, universities have adhered to the fiduciary principles canvassed below, although a few divestments likely involved fiduciary breach. For example, Harvard appears to have divested from tobacco in the 1990s at the direction of its president, Derek Bok, who on his own telling was heeding

¹⁹ See *infra* Part III.A.

the suggestion of his spouse, implementing her recommendation later that day without further fiduciary analysis.²⁰

Second, because the applicable fiduciary principles are so heavily dependent on context, we provide a foundational overview of university governance, the structure of university endowments, and the evolution of endowment management. This overview includes the rise of the “Yale Model,” which emphasizes illiquid investments and outside managers. The shift from internal managers who picked individual publicly traded investments to external managers and illiquid investments has increased the administrative and portfolio costs of a divestment. In today’s endowment practice, a divestment constraint would tend to reduce the pool of available managers, lessen diversification, and impede the use of low-cost index funds.

A further complication is that what in common parlance is called an “endowment” is in law a mix of two types of funds. One is unrestricted funds that the university has chosen to set aside. In the law of charities, these funds are called the “quasi-endowment” or “unrestricted endowment.” The unrestricted endowment may be spent at the university’s discretion on any purpose within the university’s charitable mission. The other is funds that trace to gifts restricted by their donors to a prescribed timeframe or to support a more specific purpose within the university’s charitable mission, such as academic chairs or student scholarships. In the technical legal jargon, these restricted funds are the “endowment.”²¹

To avoid confusion, we will follow the vernacular and use the term “endowment” to refer to a university’s combined pool of unrestricted and restricted endowment funds. We will refer to “restricted” and “unrestricted” endowment funds when we need to distinguish between them. The main relevance of the distinction is that a typical university holds its unrestricted and restricted endowment funds subject to different fiduciary duties of loyalty. Most universities are organized as nonprofit corporations, in which capacity they hold unrestricted endowment funds and to which a less rigorous corporate “best interests” duty of loyalty applies. By contrast, restricted gifts to a university are generally held by the university in trust with the university as trustee,²² and trust law imposes a stricter “sole interest” duty of loyalty.²³ A typical university endowment is thus a pooling of unrestricted and restricted endowment funds subject to differing corporate and trust law loyalty rules.²⁴

²⁰ See DEREK BOK, *ATTACKING THE ELITES: WHAT CRITICS GET WRONG—AND RIGHT—ABOUT AMERICA’S LEADING UNIVERSITIES* 57 (2024).

²¹ See *infra* Part I.D.2.

²² See *infra* notes 62–63 and accompanying text.

²³ See *infra* Part II.C.1.

²⁴ Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, *The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility*, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 435 (1960) (“At present in this area there is no unified law of charities. Rather there is a branch of trust law applicable to charitable trustees, and an entirely separate set of rules governing officers and directors of incorporated charities.”).

Third, we canvass the current divestment policies, stated or inferred from conduct, of the twenty-five largest university endowments. We find that most disclaim divestment, either categorically or with a narrow exception for “morally abhorrent” circumstances. The divestment policies that contain a moral abhorrence exception tend to emphasize the rarity of such circumstances, and some call for consideration of the likely effectiveness of a divestment in achieving its social purpose.

We conclude that a divestment for moral abhorrence could pass fiduciary muster as consistent with the public benefit principle of charity law if supported by a clear public policy. Establishing such a public policy, however, would typically require external validation by well-defined social consensus, such as governmental actions, rather than just the viewpoint of a vocal university constituency or vague allusions to avoiding reputational harm. For example, federal and state actions encouraged divestment from Sudan during the Darfur war, and South African apartheid was likewise subject to legislative action and near-universal condemnation.²⁵

Fourth, we examine the handful of contemporary divestments from fossil fuels and current calls for divestment from Israel. With respect to fossil fuels, we find that not more than three of the top twenty-five university endowments have openly and broadly divested from fossil fuels for nonfinancial reasons.²⁶ We conclude that these three are likely in breach of both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. Several other universities in the top twenty-five claim that they have divested from “direct” ownership in fossil fuel companies, are winding down their private fossil fuel investments, or have divested from specific forms of fossil fuel, mainly thermal coal or tar sands oil. This group typically asserts that their limited divestments are taken for sound financial reasons as well as to fight climate change. These claims are muddled and therefore difficult to assess from the outside. A lurking irony is that several schools that claim to have divested from “direct” holdings in fossil fuel or to be winding down their private investments, including Harvard and Dartmouth, reportedly operate dirtier-than-typical fossil fuel energy plants for campus heat or electricity.²⁷ Under a strict fossil fuel divestment policy, these universities could not invest in themselves.

With respect to Israel, we show that such a divestment is unlikely to pass fiduciary muster whatever one’s beliefs about the facts on the ground

²⁵ See *infra* Part III.C.1.

²⁶ See *infra* Part III.C.1.c.

²⁷ Tim McLaughlin & M.B. Pell, *U.S. Colleges Talk Green. But They Have a Dirty Secret*, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-pollution-universities/> [<https://perma.cc/9L4G-5VZE>] (“Harvard. Dartmouth. NYU. UNC. These and other American colleges stress their green credentials. They also use some of the dirtiest fuels to power their campuses—and crank out carbon dioxide or smog-forming gases at higher rates than the typical commercial power plant.”).

in Gaza.²⁸ To begin with, a secular university will have difficulty fitting such a divestment within its research and educational charitable purpose, particularly if it maintains (as is typical) broad contacts and investments across the world, including in China and petrostates in the Middle East. Moreover, in contrast to South Africa and Sudan, ongoing federal and state government support of Israel—including statutes that specifically discourage divestment from Israel—undermine the claim that divestment would be consistent with the public benefit principle of charity law. Finally, effectuating such a divestment would likely entail excluding large sectors of the economy, lowering risk-adjusted returns and increasing costs. Even a minor divestment, such as from a few firms that sell arms to Israel, could result in significant administrative costs given contemporary reliance on external managers and pooled funds.

* * *

Unique among the questions of free speech, academic freedom, and institutional neutrality made salient by the recent protests and encampments, the question of university endowment divestment is subject to a misunderstood fiduciary law constraint. Accordingly, setting aside those other fraught matters, our focus is on understanding the fiduciary principles applicable to endowment divestment.²⁹ Although endowments have not yet been the subject of much litigation, until recently standing to sue has been limited to state attorneys general and dissenting board members, who have been hesitant to litigate these matters. However, given increasing political polarization and the recent recognition in modern trust law of donor standing,³⁰ there is good reason to suppose that endowment litigation risk is greater today than in the past.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Part I reviews the governance and endowment structure of a typical university, including the charitable purpose of most universities and the evolution from direct to indirect investment in endowment management. Part II provides an overview of the relevant fiduciary principles, which include a host of relatively strict rules for endowment divestment derived from trust law and more relaxed rules for academic disassociation derived from corporate law. Part III canvasses historical university divestment practices, recovering the lost history of what in fact transpired in the purported divestment precedents as well as the rise of formal divestment policies across the last fifteen years. It also assesses the fiduciary issues that pertain to the current calls for divestment from fossil fuels

²⁸ See *infra* Part III.C.2.

²⁹ We offer our normative views on the prudential soundness of divestment elsewhere. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, *University Trustees Should Say No to Divestment*, GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2026).

³⁰ See *infra* Part II.A.

and Israel, emphasizing the barriers of fidelity to charitable purpose and the prevailing practice of externalized management. A short conclusion follows.

I. CHARITIES, UNIVERSITIES, AND ENDOWMENTS

A. *What is a Charity?*

A charity is an organization that operates for one or more charitable purposes. The list of what qualifies as a charitable purpose, which derives from a codification by the English Parliament more than 400 years ago,³¹ is “the relief of poverty; the advancement of knowledge or education; the advancement of religion; the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes; and other purposes that are beneficial to the community.”³² Because the “fundamental distinction” between a charitable organization and other organizations is the “necessity of a charitable purpose with a public benefit,”³³ the concept of charitable purpose and public benefit is foundational.³⁴

In return for the public benefit conferred via its charitable purpose, a charity is granted several legal advantages: (1) a charity can have perpetual existence (a charitable trust, for example, is exempt from the rule against perpetuities³⁵); (2) the fiduciary duties of the persons who administer a charity run to the charitable purpose, not to shareholders or individual beneficiaries;³⁶ and (3) a charity’s revenue is ordinarily exempt from federal and state taxation and donations to the charity are generally entitled to income or transfer tax deductions.³⁷ As the Supreme Court has observed, these advantages “are justified on the basis that the [charity] confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues.”³⁸

³¹ Charitable Uses Act 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (Eng.). On the reception of this statute into American law, see *Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs*, 43 U.S. 127, 192–96 (1844).

³² RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.01(b) (A.L.I. 2021) (enumeration removed); see also UNIF. TR. CODE § 405(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (similar); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (A.L.I. 2003) (similar).

³³ ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 768 (12th ed. 2026).

³⁴ The very first section of the Restatement of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations, for example, defines “charitable purposes” and ties the meaning of a “charity” to an organization with “exclusively charitable purposes.” RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.01 (A.L.I. 2021).

³⁵ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 769.

³⁶ See *infra* Part II.A.

³⁷ Although the tax law definition of “charity” is subtly different from that under state law, “[t]he vast majority of nonprofit organizations enjoy both federal and state income tax exemption.” RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.01 cmts. i–j (A.L.I. 2021).

³⁸ *Bob Jones Univ. v. United States*, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983).

A charity can be organized as a trust, nonprofit corporation, unincorporated association, or other form.³⁹ A person who administers a charity is a fiduciary.⁴⁰ The ultimate fiduciary responsibility for the charity is normally in the hands of the charity's board of directors (often called a board of trustees).⁴¹ The board's fiduciary duties run to the charitable purpose,⁴² giving rise to obvious enforcement difficulties.⁴³ The state attorney general is the traditional enforcer of charities,⁴⁴ though recent law reform has recognized additional parties with standing, as discussed below.⁴⁵ This contrasts sharply with a for-profit corporation, in which the board's fiduciary duties run to the corporation, with direct or derivative enforcement by its shareholders,⁴⁶ and a personal trust, in which the trustee's fiduciary duties run to and are enforceable by the beneficiaries.⁴⁷

B. Universities as Charitable Organizations

Universities are some of the largest and most complex charities today. Their purpose falls comfortably within the venerable charitable purpose of benefiting the public via "the advancement of knowledge and education."⁴⁸ But within that purpose they carry out an astonishingly diverse program. They educate students across hundreds of fields; maintain athletic programs; support research across a wide array of subjects; maintain professional schools in law, medicine, and other fields; and run large hospital systems.

Most universities are organized as nonprofit corporations. Today a nonprofit corporation is easy to form under applicable state law, such as the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (MNCA),⁴⁹ a version of which has been adopted in

³⁹ See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.02 (A.L.I. 2021).

⁴⁰ See *id.* § 2.01.

⁴¹ See *id.* § 2.05.

⁴² See, e.g., *id.* ("A board . . . has a duty to adopt policies to advance the purposes of the charity . . . and oversee implementation of those policies."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (A.L.I. 2007) (providing that a trustee of a charitable trust "has a duty to administer the trust . . . solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose").

⁴³ See *infra* Part II.A.

⁴⁴ See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.01 cmts. a–b (A.L.I. 2021).

⁴⁵ See *infra* Part II.A.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.01 (A.L.I., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2022) ("A director or officer has a duty to act in the good-faith belief that such actions are in the best interests of the corporation."); STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW §§ 8.1–8.2 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing enforcement of directors' duties to the corporation by shareholder direct and derivative suits).

⁴⁷ See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (A.L.I. 2007) (providing that "a trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries"); *id.* § 94 (recognizing beneficiary standing to enforce a trust).

⁴⁸ RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.01(b)(2) (A.L.I. 2021).

⁴⁹ See, e.g., Willard L. Boyd III, *The New Model Nonprofit Corporation Act*, A.B.A. (Oct. 16, 2023), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/resources/business-law-today/2023-october/the-new-model-nonprofit-corporation-act/ [<https://perma.cc/FE4P-9PGF>].

most states.⁵⁰ The University of Chicago, for example, was originally incorporated in 1890 and today operates under articles of incorporation last amended in 2010.⁵¹

Older universities founded prior to the spread of enabling corporate acts in the late nineteenth century were commonly incorporated by special acts of incorporation.⁵² Harvard is the oldest corporation in the Western Hemisphere,⁵³ having been incorporated by a charter from the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in 1650,⁵⁴ which was last amended in 1976.⁵⁵ Some universities still operate under their special act charters. Columbia operates under its charter of 1754 as amended in 1784, 1787, and 1810,⁵⁶ and Northwestern operates under its special act charter of 1851 as amended in 1855, 1861, and 1867.⁵⁷ Stanford is something of a hybrid between a trust and corporation, organized under a deed of trust in 1885 but also granted corporate powers by an enabling statute that had been enacted earlier that year.⁵⁸

Because a typical university operates as a nonprofit corporation, on the operational side the board owes corporate-like fiduciary duties to the university's charitable purpose.⁵⁹ Even if a university (or other charity) is organized as a nonprofit corporation, however, trust law remains relevant to

⁵⁰ See MARILYN E. PHELAN, *NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS, AND ASSOCIATIONS* § 1:11, at 1–31 (2000).

⁵¹ See U. CHI, *RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO* (2010), <https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/d/1262/files/2018/07/UniversityOfChicagoGoverningDocuments-t7nb6l.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/BY7Z-GM8B>].

⁵² Delaware, the leading corporate jurisdiction, did not have a general enabling corporate statute until 1875. See Joel Seligman, *A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899*, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 249–50 (1976).

⁵³ See *Harvard Corporation*, HARV. UNIV., <https://www.harvard.edu/about/leadership-and-governance/harvard-corporation/> [<https://perma.cc/HB6B-MD4L>] (noting that “the Harvard Corporation is the oldest corporation in the Western Hemisphere”).

⁵⁴ See *Harvard Charter of 1650*, HARV. UNIV., <https://guides.library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=880222&p=6323072> [<https://perma.cc/QV8N-YXDP>] (last updated Sep. 9, 2025, 16:27 ET).

⁵⁵ See *Charter of the President and Fellows of Harvard College*, HARV. UNIV., [<https://perma.cc/VGW5-6T58>].

⁵⁶ See *Charters and Statutes*, COLUM. UNIV., https://secretary.columbia.edu/sites/secretary.columbia.edu/files/content/University%20Charter_Statutes_May2024.pdf [<https://perma.cc/QW7S-RSH4>].

⁵⁷ Northwestern was incorporated in 1851 by an act of the Illinois legislature. The act of incorporation—the charter—uses both trust and corporate terminology, granting “trust” powers to the board of trustees but still characterizing Northwestern as an incorporated entity. See *AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE NW. UNIV. (1851)* [<https://perma.cc/S9WG-TJUF>].

⁵⁸ See *STANFORD UNIVERSITY: THE FOUNDING GRANT, WITH AMENDMENTS, LEGISLATION, AND COURT DECREES* 2, 31–32 (1987) [<https://perma.cc/RUQ7-KMF7>] (describing Stanford's founding and the legislation “under which universities might be founded, endowed, and maintained in California through an ordinary deed of trust”).

⁵⁹ See *infra* Part I.D.1. Courts have long recognized that a university and its board do not owe fiduciary duties to students except in rare circumstances. In general, the “educational malpractice doctrine” shields a broad range of university decisions from student fiduciary lawsuits; contract law, not charity fiduciary law, is thus at the center of the university-student relationship. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, *THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION* 597–98, 600–03 (6th ed. 2020) (noting rare exceptions and collecting cases).

its endowment management. As we shall see, virtually all states apply the prudent investor rule from trust law to endowment management.⁶⁰ Moreover, when a university accepts a restricted gift,⁶¹ as compared to a gift immediately expendable on research or education in general, a charitable trust arises with the university as trustee subject to trust rather than corporate fiduciary principles. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts explains:

An outright devise[] or donation to a . . . university . . . to be used for its general purposes[] is charitable but does not create a trust[.] . . . A disposition to [a university] for a specific purpose, however, such as to . . . establish a scholarship fund in a certain field of study, creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the trustee.⁶²

Indeed, estate planners sometimes advise clients to make a restricted gift specifically to cause the gift to be subject to the rules governing a charitable trust.⁶³

Accordingly, a typical university is subject simultaneously to nonprofit corporation law with respect to its operations and certain aspects of its unrestricted endowment, and to charitable trust law with respect to other aspects of its unrestricted endowment and its entire restricted endowment. We will return to the ramifications of this fiduciary duality later.⁶⁴ For now, it is enough to observe that the fiduciary lodestar in either case is fidelity to the university's charitable purpose. The question thus arises, what is the charitable purpose of a university?

⁶⁰ See *infra* Part II.D.1.

⁶¹ See, e.g., *Harvard Law School Receives \$15 Million to Launch Emmett Environmental Law Center*, HARV. L. TODAY (May 16, 2024), <https://hls.harvard.edu/today/harvard-law-school-receives-15-million-to-launch-emmett-environmental-law-center/> [<https://perma.cc/LKR3-5FTM>] (gift for environmental law to Harvard); *UCLA Law Philanthropy Program Receives \$8 Million from Lowell Milken*, CANDID (Jan. 16, 2024), [<https://perma.cc/3APE-54E6>] (gift for philanthropy law to UCLA).

⁶² RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2003); see also GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., *BOGERT'S THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES* § 362 (rev. ed. 2025) ("A gift to a charitable corporation for its general purposes does not create a trust, but if it is restricted to a particular purpose, it does."); Evelyn Brody, *Charity Governance: What's Trust Law Got to Do with It?*, 80 CHL.-KENT. L. REV. 641, 642 (2005) ("When it comes to enforcing restrictions on gifts—even those made to corporate charities—regulators and courts commonly apply charitable trust doctrines.").

The trust law merger doctrine does not apply to a charitable trust held by a charity for the benefit of its charitable purpose. See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.02 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2021) ("In addition, the merger rule in trust law, under which there is no valid trust if the trustee and the beneficiary are the same, does not apply under charity law. Thus, a charitable organization may serve as trustee of a trust of which it is also the named beneficiary, the rationale being that the beneficiaries of the trust are the indefinite beneficiaries of that charity.").

⁶³ See Nancy A. McLaughlin & Jeff Thede, *Restricted Charitable Gifts: Practical Suggestions*, ACTEC FOUND. (Sep. 2024), <https://actecfoundation.org/podcasts/restricted-charitable-gifts/> [<https://perma.cc/7SRX-3F8U>] (Under common law, "restricted charitable gifts were treated as charitable trusts. . . . So consider making restricted gifts in trust.").

⁶⁴ See *infra* Part II.

C. The Charitable Purpose of a University

A charity's organizational documents—typically the charter or articles of incorporation, gift agreement, or trust instrument—are the main source for discerning the charity's charitable purpose.⁶⁵ Charities with federal tax-exempt status also declare their charitable purpose on their annual tax return, Form 990, the "Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax."⁶⁶ These statements, submitted to the IRS under penalty of perjury, confirm that the organization has a charitable purpose consistent with its tax-exempt status.

1. Organizational Documents

The key organizational document for a university is its charter or articles of incorporation. In contrast to a for-profit corporation, for which the articles of incorporation tend to allow for "any lawful purpose,"⁶⁷ university charters or articles of incorporation almost always state a narrowed purpose of research and education.⁶⁸

For example, the charter for Princeton states that its purpose is "the conduct of a university not for profit," including "the promotion, advancement, evaluation and dissemination of learning by instruction, study and research."⁶⁹ The articles of incorporation for the University of Chicago state that its purpose is "higher education," including "to establish and maintain one or more colleges," "to provide instruction in all collegiate studies," and "to establish and maintain a university."⁷⁰ The charter for Duke states that its purpose is to "maintain and perpetuate an institution of higher learning or other institutions of learning and all properties, facilities and services necessary or appropriate

⁶⁵ See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.01 cmt. c (A.L.I. 2021) (observing that "state attorneys general and courts look to the organizational documents to identify a charity's purpose"); RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.01 cmt. e (A.L.I. 2021) (following "the traditional common-law approach that treats a charity's existing unrestricted assets—including unrestricted gifts, earned and investment income, and other assets—as restricted to that charity's purpose at the time the assets were acquired").

⁶⁶ *Form 990 Resources and Tools*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., <https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-resources-and-tools#:~:text=Form%20990%20is%20the%20IRS,the%20public%20about%20their%20programs> [<https://perma.cc/WR5B-S8NS>] (last updated Aug. 19, 2024).

⁶⁷ See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, *Should Corporations Have a Purpose?*, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1309, 1315–18 (2021) (discussing a few modern for-profit corporations with limited purposes).

⁶⁸ The MNCA and other nonprofit corporation acts are enabling statutes that, like the business corporation acts, authorize a nonprofit corporation to have "the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity *unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.*" MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.01(a) (A.B.A., 3d ed. 2008) (emphasis added).

⁶⁹ THE TRUSTEES OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, CHARTER 5–6 (1963) [<https://perma.cc/BHK5-B99A>].

⁷⁰ RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, *supra* note 51, at § 4.

in connection therewith.”⁷¹ The charter for Northwestern prescribes that its trustees “shall hold the property of said institution solely for the purposes of education.”⁷² The charter for Georgetown states that its purpose is for “a college for the instruction of youth in the liberal arts and sciences.”⁷³

This practice of prescribing in a university’s charter the purpose of maintaining a college or university for educating students traces back to the earliest special act charters. Harvard’s original charter in 1650 formed a corporation to administer the “school or college” that had been created by earlier legislation in 1636.⁷⁴ Yale’s original charter of 1701 states that its purpose was to form “a Collegiate School . . . wherein Youth may be instructed in the Arts & Sciences.”⁷⁵ Columbia’s original charter in 1754 provided for a “Body Corporate to erect and maintain a college . . . for the Instruction and Education of Youth in the Learned Languages and Liberal Arts and Sciences.”⁷⁶ Likewise, Stanford’s founding deed of trust from 1885 prescribes a purpose of creating “a University for both sexes, with the Colleges, Schools, Seminaries of Learning, Mechanical Institutes, Museums, Galleries of Art, and all other things necessary and appropriate to a University of high degree.”⁷⁷

2. Federal Tax Returns (Form 990)

Federal law requires “that tax-exempt organizations with gross receipts or total assets above certain thresholds annually disclose their assets, expenses, and governance structures” via Form 990, the “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax.”⁷⁸ Form 990 has become the “primary tool for gathering information about tax-exempt organizations.”⁷⁹ These returns, which are publicly available, require the nonprofit to state its charitable purpose: “Briefly describe the organization’s mission or most significant activities.”⁸⁰

⁷¹ *Amended and Restated Charter of Duke University*, DUKE UNIV. BD. OF TRS., <https://trustees.duke.edu/amended-and-restated-charter-duke-university/> [<https://perma.cc/GGX5-L74F>].

⁷² AN ACT TO INCORPORATE THE NW. UNIV. § II (1851) [<https://perma.cc/S9WG-TJUF>].

⁷³ *Charter of the University*, GEO. UNIV., <https://governance.georgetown.edu/charter/> [<https://perma.cc/V792-SQXH>].

⁷⁴ *Harvard Charter of 1650*, *supra* note 54 (the spelling in the 1636 legislative allocation was “schoale or colledge”).

⁷⁵ YALE CORP., CHARTER AND LEGISLATION 4 (1976) [<https://perma.cc/L2SC-XSHJ>].

⁷⁶ COLUM. UNIV., CHARTERS AND STATUTES 3 (2024) [<https://perma.cc/BU29-2GDG>].

⁷⁷ ST. UNIV., THE FOUNDING GRANT WITH AMENDMENTS, LEGISLATION, AND COURT DECREES 3 (1987) <https://purl.stanford.edu/bz978md4965> [<https://perma.cc/PYV2-QL3B>].

⁷⁸ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 808.

⁷⁹ *Form 990 Resources and Tools*, *supra* note 66.

⁸⁰ *Form 990: Return Exempt from Income Tax*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., <https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f990.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/7N45-ASVK>].

Here, too, universities almost always state a research and educational purpose. Some, like Northwestern, are pithy: “[e]ducation and research.”⁸¹ Others, like Columbia, are prolix:

Columbia University is one of the world’s most important centers of research and at the same time a distinctive and distinguished learning environment for undergraduates and graduate students in many scholarly and professional fields. The University recognizes the importance of its location in New York City and seeks to link its research and teaching to the vast resources of a great metropolis. It seeks to attract a diverse and international faculty and student body, to support research and teaching on global issues, and to create academic relationships with many countries and regions. It expects all areas of the University to advance knowledge and learning at the highest level and to convey the products of its efforts to the world.⁸²

Most universities fall somewhere in between. Harvard states its mission as “undergraduate, graduate, and professional education and research across a broad array of academic domains.”⁸³ Princeton states that it is a “non-sectarian institution of higher education and a world renowned research institution.”⁸⁴ Dartmouth says it “educates the most promising students and prepares them for a lifetime of learning and of responsible leadership, through a faculty dedicated to teaching and the creation of knowledge.”⁸⁵ Cornell reports its purpose as “education, research, medical services and other public services.”⁸⁶

⁸¹ *Northwestern University: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending Aug. 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362167817/202531959349301243/full> [https://perma.cc/4DMK-DMYG].

⁸² *Trustees of Columbia University: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/135598093/202401369349302495/full> [https://perma.cc/WMJ8-8LD9]; see also *Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/231352685/202541349349311824/full> [https://perma.cc/NH2L-EFKX] (“The trustees of the University of Pennsylvania (the ‘University’) sees itself as having a public service mission. In such regard, the University aims to provide a rich and diverse educational environment for its students; to pioneer research that pushes the boundaries of current human knowledge; and to provide the most current and highest quality patient care through the University Health System.”).

⁸³ *President and Fellows of Harvard College: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/42103580/202531349349307548/full> [https://perma.cc/TL2L-7GYZ].

⁸⁴ *Princeton University: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/210634501/2025011339349305891/full> [https://perma.cc/KFE3-X25C].

⁸⁵ *Trustees of Dartmouth College: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/20222111/2025011339349306270/full> [https://perma.cc/AJ79-HL4U].

⁸⁶ *Cornell University: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/150532082/202511339349300031/full> [https://perma.cc/B6XC-FD28].

The University of Chicago says its mission “has been to sustain at the highest level of excellence, the communication of knowledge, the creation of knowledge, and the fostering of a dynamic community of scholars and students.”⁸⁷ MIT says its mission “is to advance knowledge and educate students in science, technology, and other areas of scholarship that will best serve the nation and the world in the 21st century.”⁸⁸ Duke says its mission is “to provide a superior liberal education, to prepare future members of the learned professions, to advance the frontiers of knowledge, and to help those who suffer, cure disease, and promote health.”⁸⁹

3. Mission and Policy Statements

Universities sometimes publish mission statements or make statements of purpose in student handbooks or online. Such statements provide further evidence of purpose.⁹⁰ University handbook and online mission statements almost always state a research and educational purpose. Indeed, a recent sample of such statements from forty universities concluded that they emphasize a broad educational mission with an emphasis on scholarly community.⁹¹ They typically state no broader social mission distinct from the public benefit arising from research and education.⁹² Consistent with these statements, some

⁸⁷ *University of Chicago: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362177139/202541359349309109/full> [<https://perma.cc/AY2H-YG4G>].

⁸⁸ *Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/42103594/202501359349301830/full> [<https://perma.cc/E73Z-4YCW>].

⁸⁹ *Duke University: Full Text of “Full Filing” for Fiscal Year Ending June 2024*, PROPUBLICA, <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/560532129/202501359349302225/full> [<https://perma.cc/24RE-L7MC>].

⁹⁰ See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, *Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties*, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 389 (2012) (“Many charitable nonprofits have a limited mission statement and, if so, this would bear upon the board’s duty . . . with respect to [the charitable] mission.”).

⁹¹ Max M. Schanzenbach & Kimberly Yuracko, *What is the University-Student Contract?*, 65 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 970–81 (describing different models of higher education, surveying handbook and mission statements, and concluding that the human capital model of skill acquisition broadly defined best describe the basis of the university-student contract).

⁹² The main exceptions are religious institutions. For example, Georgetown’s statement of purpose flows from its “identity as a student-centered research university rooted in the Jesuit and Catholic tradition.” GEO. UNIV., 2019-2020 UNDERGRADUATE BULLETIN 44 [<https://perma.cc/H6D6-ND4U>]. Yeshiva University is a “Jewish institution for higher education” and is “[r]ooted in Jewish thought and tradition . . . advancing the moral and material betterment of the Jewish community and broader society, in the service of God.” *Mission and History*, YESHIVA COLL., <https://www.yu.edu/yeshiva-college/about> [<https://perma.cc/6UFD-BTYJ>]. Only a few nonsecular institutions state a broader social purpose. For example, Oberlin College in Ohio says that it “shares an enduring commitment to a sustainable and just society.” *Mission and Values*, OBERLIN COLL. & CONSERVATORY, <https://www.oberlin.edu/about-oberlin/mission-and-values> [<https://perma.cc/SZ5Q-E3S5>].

universities maintain internal policies that limit their ability to support charitable purposes outside their core research and educational mission.⁹³

4. Charitable Purpose, Public Benefit, and Public Policy

A charity may change its purpose only in accordance with the procedures for amending its organizational documents prescribed by the law under which the charity was formed, including a procedure prescribed by the organizational documents if permitted by applicable law, or with court approval, such as under the *cy pres* doctrine.⁹⁴ If a charity is administering a gift held as trustee, it must likewise adhere to the terms of the trust or obtain a court order—for example, under the *cy pres* doctrine.⁹⁵ Even without a formal change in purpose, however, there may be room for a charitable fiduciary to invoke public policy in determining the scope of the charity’s charitable purpose. As the Supreme Court has explained, a charitable organization “must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.”⁹⁶

Probably the best example of a public policy gloss on charitable purpose is in the handful of cases that have authorized charities, including universities, to disregard race, gender, or religious limitations on restricted funds.⁹⁷ In some of those cases, the court approved a charity’s refusal to adhere to the discriminatory term, even though the term was otherwise enforceable—that is, the term was neither illegal under state or federal law nor literally inconsistent with the charity’s stated charitable purpose.⁹⁸ Instead, those provisions were held to “be inconsistent with the nature of charitable purposes,”⁹⁹ that is, inconsistent with “the public benefit principle that is at the core of the charitable purpose doctrine.”¹⁰⁰

⁹³ For example, citing its status as a “not-for-profit, tax-exempt institution, chartered to fulfill certain educational, research, and public service missions,” Princeton authorizes only de minimis contributions to other charities that are “scholarly” in nature (\$500), as memorials for employees (\$100), or through its religious life center. Any other donations require approval by a high-level university officer. See *Charitable Donations by the University Policy*, PRINCETON UNIV., <https://finance.princeton.edu/policies/charitable-donations-university-policy> [https://perma.cc/238E-S6QL] (last updated Oct. 1, 2025).

⁹⁴ See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 3.01–02 (A.L.I. 2021); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 901(a) (A.B.A. 2022).

⁹⁵ See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (A.L.I. 2007) (duty to administer a trust “in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law”).

⁹⁶ *Bob Jones*, 461 U.S. at 575.

⁹⁷ See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, MARK L. ASCHER & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 39.5.5 (6th ed. 2024) (canvassing cases).

⁹⁸ See *id.* (collecting cases on “[w]hether, in the case of an enforceable restriction that the trustees are unwilling to enforce, the court will permit the trustees thus to disregard the terms of the trust, and, if so, whether, as a result, *cy pres* is available to save the trust”).

⁹⁹ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. f (A.L.I. 2003).

¹⁰⁰ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 784; see also Thomas P. Gallanis, *Is Racial Discrimination Ever Charitable?*, 2 ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 146, 148–49 (2025) (arguing “racial discrimination by a charity violates fundamental public policy irrespective of the race of the individuals harmed”).

For example, even though accepting a bequest limited to “American born, Protestant, Gentile boys” was not literally inconsistent with a research and educational charitable purpose, Amherst College was allowed to keep the bequest but disregard the discriminatory limit.¹⁰¹ In another case, Rice University was allowed to admit nonwhite students, contrary to the terms of its founding trust instrument.¹⁰² In these and other such cases, courts allowed charitable fiduciaries to bring within their organization’s charitable purpose the public policy against discrimination that had been expressed in state and federal statutes and other governmental actions.¹⁰³

The potential for charitable fiduciaries to gloss their organizations’ charitable purposes by reference to public policy appears to be narrow, however, and thus far has been dependent on governmental actions to confirm that policy. For example, in upholding an IRS rule that private schools that discriminated on the basis of race could not qualify as charitable under the federal tax code, the Supreme Court cautioned that courts must “approach these questions with full awareness that determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious implications for the institutions affected.”¹⁰⁴ In upholding the IRS rule in that case, the Court emphasized that “[o]ver the past quarter of a century, every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education.”¹⁰⁵ That context was crucial to the Court’s conclusion that “there can be no doubt that [racial discrimination] is contrary to a fundamental public policy,” and thus contrary to the public benefit principle that defines charitable purpose.¹⁰⁶

D. University Governance and Endowment Management

1. Academic Operations Versus Endowment Management

A typical university effectively has two governance structures: one for its academic operations and another for its endowment. Each is subject to different bodies of law that prescribe different fiduciary standards. At the top of both is the university board, which is ultimately responsible in a fiduciary capacity for the university’s academic operations and endowment management. The resulting complicated scheme is illustrated by Figure 1.

¹⁰¹ See *Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep*, 170 A.2d 39, 48 (N.J. 1961).

¹⁰² See *Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ.*, 408 S.W.2d 269, 285–87 (Tex. App. 1966).


¹⁰³ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 784.

¹⁰⁴ *Bob Jones*, 461 U.S. at 592–93.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

FIGURE 1: UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC AND ENDOWMENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



In its academic operations, the typical university is a corporation with limited powers. The charter or articles of incorporation create the university and state its research and educational purpose. The board of trustees appoints the university's senior executives, typically a president (the chief executive officer) and a provost (the chief operating officer). These executives and subordinate appointees manage the academic operations of the university (the left side of Figure 1, shaded blue) subject to deferential corporate fiduciary standards of business judgment (care) and best interests (loyalty), as elaborated below in Part II. This governance structure traces back to the colonial period, and is distinct from the traditional English university model, which emphasized faculty governance.¹⁰⁷

The right side of Figure 1 (shaded pink) shows a typical governance structure for a university endowment. The board hires a chief investment officer, who reports not to the president but to the board or an investment subcommittee of the board.¹⁰⁸ The president of the university, despite being a common

¹⁰⁷ See JOHN R. THELIN, *A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION* 40 (2004) ("[Colonial colleges] had taken the Oxford-Cambridge corporate structure and turned it inside out."); *id.* at 11–12 (describing the basic president-board structure of colonial institutions and concluding that this innovation "is a legacy of the colonial colleges that has defined and shaped higher education in the United States to this day").

¹⁰⁸ For example, the University of California's investment policy statement provides, "[a]lthough the management of investment portfolios may be outsourced, investment oversight and risk management are primary fiduciary duties of the Board that are delegated to and performed by the Chief Investment Officer." UNIV. OF CAL., *GENERAL ENDOWMENT POOL*

focus of student anger over divestment, often has no direct authority over the endowment's management.¹⁰⁹ The chief investment officer, aided by his or her staff, implements the investment program, which may involve direct investment overseen by inside managers, indirect investment via investment funds or outside managers, or some combination of the two.

2. What is an Endowment?

A university's "endowment" comprises those assets that are held by the university primarily for investment purposes, a portion of which is spent annually to support the charitable mission of the university. For example, money from a donor set aside to fund a scholarship in perpetuity is part of the endowment. By contrast, a university-owned classroom building, while an asset of the university, is not held primarily for investment purposes. Assets held primarily for programmatic purposes are not part of the endowment.¹¹⁰

A university's "endowment" is in law a mix of two types of funds. One is unrestricted funds that the university has chosen to set aside. In the law of charities, these funds are called the "quasi-endowment" or "unrestricted endowment." The unrestricted endowment may be spent immediately on any purpose within the university's charitable mission. The other funds are the "restricted endowment." These funds trace to gifts restricted by their donors to a prescribed timeframe or to support a more specific purpose within the university's charitable mission, such as academic chairs or student scholarships. In the technical legal jargon, only these restricted funds are the "endowment."¹¹¹

INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 6 (2025), <https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/policies/6102.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/KK63-EBUM>]

¹⁰⁹ Some universities have created separate entities to manage their endowments. For example, Duke University transferred their endowment to a separate legal entity, the Duke Asset Management Company, which manages the Duke University endowment, Duke's defined benefit pension plan, the Duke University Health System endowment, as well as the Duke Endowment, a private charitable trust (of which Duke University is the primary beneficiary). See *DUMAC*, DUKE UNIV., <https://dumac.duke.edu/> [<https://perma.cc/9G2W-KU24>].

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 2(2), (5), (7) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006) (defining an endowment as assets held "primarily for investment," and a "program-related asset" as "an asset held . . . primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution"); RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.04 cmt. c (A.L.I. 2021) (discussing endowment versus program-related assets).

¹¹¹ See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.04 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2021) (explaining differences in law between a "true endowment" and a "quasi-endowment" or a "board designated endowment" and providing that "[a]ny assets that are not subject to externally imposed restrictions do not constitute a true endowment"); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 2(2), (5), (7) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006) (defining "endowment fund" as an "institutional fund" that "under the terms of a gift instrument[] is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis"); see also Christopher J. Ryan, Jr., *Trusting U.: Examining University Endowment Management*, 42 J.C. & U.L. 159, 165–68 (2016) (discussing taxonomy of university endowment types).

To achieve economies of scale, most obviously by minimizing costs and maximizing investment opportunities, the typical university pools its unrestricted and restricted endowments, investing that pooled fund as a collective whole known colloquially as the “endowment.” To account for the interests of the unrestricted endowment and the various gifts comprising the restricted endowment, each is allocated shares in the pooled investment fund. Thus, each constituent part of the endowment writ large is invested identically as if it were a singular, cohesive “endowment.”¹¹²

Because the restricted endowment reflects a pooling of various restricted gifts, it can be quite complex. Harvard, for example, reports that its endowment pools over 14,700 separate restricted gifts.¹¹³ In a recent survey by the National Association of College and University Business Officers of 658 institutions with \$873 billion in total endowment assets, 576 responding institutions reported that, on average, seventy-one percent of their total endowments consisted of restricted funds.¹¹⁴ Respondents also reported that about ninety percent of gifts received in 2023 were restricted.¹¹⁵

3. Why an Endowment? Prevailing Theories

A restricted gift gives rise to a charitable trust with the university as trustee. To repeat the words of the Restatement quoted above: “A disposition to [a university] for a specific purpose . . . creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the trustee”¹¹⁶ In accordance with trust fiduciary law, therefore, after a university accepts such a gift, it must apply that gift only to its restricted purpose. A trustee is under a duty “to administer the trust . . . in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law.”¹¹⁷

¹¹² Such pooling for economies of scale is a familiar practice explicitly authorized by UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3(d) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2006) and accommodated by prevailing trust law. See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 810(d) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (“If the trustee maintains records clearly indicating the respective interests, a trustee may invest as a whole the property of two or more separate trusts.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 84 cmt. c (A.L.I. 2007) (similar).

¹¹³ See *Harvard’s Endowment*, HARV. UNIV., <https://finance.harvard.edu/endowment> [<https://perma.cc/WD8D-NBQA>] (last visited Mar. 7, 2026) (explaining that the school’s endowment is “[m]ade up of approximately 14,765 individual funds invested as a single entity”).

¹¹⁴ See NACUBO 2024 Study, *supra* note 9, at 4, 72 fig. 1.3-s. By way of further illustration, Stanford’s “merged pool” is fifteen percent “assets the University has elected to treat as long-term funds” (that is, unrestricted endowment), seventy-five percent “endowment” (that is, restricted endowment), and eleven percent hospital funds. *Our Mission*, STAN. MGMT. CO., <https://smc.stanford.edu/our-mission/> [<https://perma.cc/57NM-H7B7>]. Harvard reports that eighty percent of its endowment is “restricted to particular purposes.” HARV. UNIV., FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2024, at 4 (2024), https://finance.harvard.edu/sites/g/files/omnuum12671/files/fad/files/fy24_harvard_financial_report.pdf [<https://perma.cc/SC3S-ZDQ8>].

¹¹⁵ See NACUBO 2024 Study, *supra* note 9, at 75 fig. 1.7-s.

¹¹⁶ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2003).

¹¹⁷ *Id.* § 76(1).

Unrestricted endowment funds, by contrast, are funds that are freely and immediately expendable but nonetheless set aside by the university in its discretion. The question why universities create unrestricted endowment funds—that is, why universities choose to set aside unrestricted funds as though they were restricted—has been explored by scholars across the years.¹¹⁸ The literature offers several theories that are not mutually exclusive. One is that an unrestricted endowment supports intergenerational equity by forcing boards to safeguard resources for future generations against present overspending.¹¹⁹ On this view, an unrestricted endowment protects the university's long-run mission by creating a pool of resources to be redeployed as needs evolve. Another theory is that an unrestricted endowment protects the university's independence, insulating it against short-run political pressures.¹²⁰ Still another theory is that an unrestricted endowment allows for consumption smoothing, enabling the university to carry out its mission without excessive disruption from especially good or bad times and regardless of borrowing costs.¹²¹

An important implication of each of these theories is that the endowment, whether restricted or unrestricted, should hedge against risks to the university's academic operations over the long run. Given the high fixed costs borne by universities, such long-term management is critical to helping universities weather hard times.¹²² Similar considerations likely motivate donors' preferences for restricted giving, with the additional benefit of protecting the gift from (what the donor might consider to be) meddling by university boards or others.

4. The Rise of the "Yale Model"

Endowment management was a sleepy backwater in the 1970s. Universities typically maintained conservative portfolios of directly held publicly traded stocks and bonds.¹²³ In the mid-1980s, however, the so-called Yale

¹¹⁸ See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, *Why Do Universities Have Endowments?*, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1990).

¹¹⁹ See James Tobin, *What Is Permanent Endowment Income?*, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 427, 427 (1974).

¹²⁰ See Hansmann, *supra* note 118, at 429–32 (discussing insulation from government, outside donors, and students to preserve reputational integrity).

¹²¹ See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, *Optimal Investment Strategies for University Endowment Funds*, in STUDIES OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN HIGHER EDUCATION 211, 216 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Michael Rothschild eds., 1993).

¹²² There is evidence that universities do not actually consumption smooth or hedge quite as economic theory holds they should, likely owing to agency costs manifesting in reticence to shrink the endowment in the short run even if prudent to do so. See Jeffrey R. Brown et al., *How University Endowments Respond to Financial Market Shocks: Evidence and Implications*, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 931, 931–33, 954 (2014) (finding that universities on average spend more from their endowments in good times, but less in bad times).

¹²³ In the late 1970s and early 1980s, roughly thirty percent of endowment assets were invested in fixed income. See NACUBO 50-Year Retrospective, *supra* note 8, at 7. For an infinite time horizon, this would be a rather conservative portfolio.

Model of endowment management, developed by Yale University's endowment manager David Swensen, sparked a gradual but dramatic structural change in endowment management practices.¹²⁴

For present purposes, we may distill the Yale Model to three tenets. *First*, it ties payouts to a rolling average rather than the current value of the endowment.¹²⁵ Doing so smooths payouts notwithstanding fluctuations in current endowment value, allowing budgets to adjust slowly to even large shocks. *Second*, it recognizes the endowment's infinite time horizon, reflecting the university's anticipated perpetual existence and that restricted gifts are frequently perpetual. *Third*, it posits a high tolerance for illiquidity and short-run fluctuations in value, thanks to payout smoothing and the infinite time horizon.

In consequence, the Yale Model points toward a greater exposure to equities to take advantage of the equity premium—that is, the historical excess returns to equity over fixed income.¹²⁶ The Yale Model also points toward investing outside of public markets in illiquid, equity-like investments, or even direct illiquid holdings, in pursuit of an illiquidity premium.¹²⁷ These premiums are paid for with risk that the Yale Model posits the endowment, with its long-run focus, can prudently bear. The Yale Model focuses the endowment's active management on non-publicly traded investments while pushing the endowment's publicly traded securities toward passive management.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ See DAVID F. SWENSEN, *PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT* 1–8 (2d ed. 2009); see also Ryan, *supra* note 111, at 168–73, 179–86 (criticizing the Yale Model); Leanna Orr, *How the Yale Model Ate Endowments—and Everything Else*, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (July 31, 2019), <https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/2bswbzylw79gg3hrt3q4g/portfolio/david-swensen-is-great-for-yale-is-he-horrible-for-investing> [<https://perma.cc/N6UC-KNNJ>] (providing an overview of the promise and criticisms of the Yale Model).

¹²⁵ Endowment distributions are usually set at a percentage, typically four percent of the average of several prior years of the endowment's value. See *Your Endowment Questions Answered*, NAT'L ASS'N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://www.nacubo.org/Topics/Endowment-Management/Your-Endowment-Questions-Answered#> [<https://perma.cc/PZL5-HJDJ>] (taking four percent spending rule, sometimes averaged over years or quarters, as an example). Some formulas are more complicated. Yale's spending rule, for example, is “equal to 80% of the prior year's spending plus 20% of the long-term spending rate applied to the previous year's beginning endowment market value . . . adjusted for inflation.” *Endowment Spending and Distributions*, YALE UNIV. (Mar. 1, 2023), <https://your.yale.edu/policies-procedures/policies/2202-endowment-spending-and-distributions#2202.2> [<https://perma.cc/4J95-VVSH>].

¹²⁶ See SWENSEN, *supra* note 124, at 65 (“Sensible investors approach markets with a strong equity bias, since accepting the risk of owning equities rewards long-term investors with higher returns.”); see also J. Bradford DeLong & Konstantin Magin, *The U.S. Equity Return Premium: Past, Present, and Future*, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193, 193–94 (2009) (discussing superior performance of U.S. equities relative to bonds).

¹²⁷ See SWENSEN, *supra* note 124, at 83 (“In embracing less liquid assets, investors often identify opportunities to establish positions at meaningful discounts to fair value.”).

¹²⁸ See *id.* at 65 (noting small or nonexistent excess returns to active management in publicly traded securities).

The Yale Model has been highly influential. Investments in alternative assets are today pervasive in university endowment management.¹²⁹ For example, Harvard's endowment has recently held directly timberlands, farmlands, and even wineries.¹³⁰ As of 2023, about fifty-six percent of university endowment assets were in alternative investments and real assets, while publicly traded equities comprised roughly thirty-one percent of the total endowment portfolio.¹³¹ Despite the misgivings of some experts, including Swensen himself, even smaller endowments have significant exposure to alternative investments and real assets.¹³²

Since the 1990s, a period that overlaps with a sharp increase in donations to universities,¹³³ the endowment returns of colleges and universities outperformed benchmarks tied to indices of publicly traded securities, though more recent returns are less impressive.¹³⁴ This success has created an increasing reliance of private universities on endowments to fund operations.¹³⁵ At the same time, there is growing concern that universities have overcommitted to illiquid and active investment strategies given the current political risks to university budgets and the potential for increased taxation of large endowments.¹³⁶

¹²⁹ See NACUBO 50-Year Retrospective, *supra* note 8, at 29 (reporting that marketable alternatives, private equity and venture capital, real assets, and secondaries are 45.1 percent of endowment assets, with real assets comprising another 10.8 percent).

¹³⁰ See Andrew G. Wiltshire, *An Irresponsible Campaign*, HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 16, 2024), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/16/harvard-irresponsible-campaign/> [<https://perma.cc/64ZK-NTL7>] (defending Harvard's investment in various timberlands); James Comtois, *Rally Takes Aim at Harvard Timber Investments*, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 28, 2014), <https://www.pion-line.com/article/20140428/PRINT/304289993/rally-takes-aim-at-harvard-timber-investments> [<https://perma.cc/EJ4P-PYNC>] (discussing a responsible investing petition regarding Harvard's natural resource management); Russell Gold, *Harvard Quietly Amasses California Vineyards—and the Water Underneath*, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2018, at 10:39 ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/harvard-quietly-amasses-california-vineyards-and-the-water-underneath-1544456396> [<https://perma.cc/FMM5-UXUH>] (discussing Harvard's foray into owning wineries and water rights in California).

¹³¹ See NACUBO 50-Year Retrospective, *supra* note 8, at 29.

¹³² See *id.* (showing, for example, that endowments in the \$100 million to \$250 million range held roughly twenty-five percent of their assets in alternatives and real assets); Charles D. Ellis, *Foreword* to DAVID F. SWENSEN, *PIONEERING PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: AN UNCONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT*, at ix, xvi (2d ed. 2009) (relaying Swensen's concern that other institutions "might not have the internal staff or the organizational structure and discipline required to sustain commitments through the good and bad markets").

¹³³ See AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. & TIAA INST., *KEY ISSUES FACING HIGHER EDUCATION PHILANTHROPY 2* (2019), <https://www.tiaa.org/public/institute/publication/2019/key-issues-facing-higher-education-philanthropy> [<https://perma.cc/ZX7A-RJ6G>] (reporting a near-tripling in giving between 1971 and 2017 on an inflation-adjusted basis).

¹³⁴ See Julie Segal, *Ivy League Endowment Returns Depended on One Decision: VC or PE?*, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Feb. 14, 2024), <https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/2cukcb5y3xav4bzz8j474/ivy-league-endowment-returns-depended-on-one-decision-vc-or-pe> [<https://perma.cc/3ADW-DYCS>] (reporting that the "richest schools" had a 2.1 percent return in 2023 largely because of losses in venture capital, although the ten-year returns beat a 70–30 stock-bond portfolio).

¹³⁵ See *supra* notes 8–9 and accompanying text.

¹³⁶ See Maureen Farrell & Lauren Hirsch, *Yale Is Rushing to Sell Billions in Private Equity Investments*, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2025), <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/10/business/>

Private equity has lagged behind public market returns recently, leading some managers to question the future of the Yale Model.¹³⁷

5. The Rise of Outside Managers

Another gradual development, which has accelerated in recent years, is increased reliance on outside managers and investment funds. This shift is in part an outgrowth of the Yale Model, as illiquid investments tend to require expertise in active management that internal endowment managers ordinarily do not possess. The internal endowment managers choose outside managers whom they believe will be best at chasing returns or managing a unique asset, such as timber or wineries. These outside managers are highly incentivized because many such funds pay a percentage of profits to their managers. As nonemployees, they are also easily replaced.

Reliance on outside managers allows the university to reduce the liquidity and diversification costs of holding the non-publicly traded, less liquid part of its portfolio. Outside managers can pool the investments of many investors, allowing the university to take smaller shares of each illiquid investment and tap a larger number of managers than if the university owned and managed the endowment directly. By way of illustration, MIT today invests in “hundreds” of outside funds¹³⁸ but employs fewer than fifteen investment managers in its “global investment” division.¹³⁹ Northwestern has only twelve internal portfolio managers.¹⁴⁰ Even Harvard, which long managed the bulk of its endowment internally, has moved since 2017 toward an outside manager model.

yale-endowment-private-equity-trump.html [https://perma.cc/94Y2-W34R] (discussing Yale’s decision to sell significant illiquid hedge fund investments, though Yale denied that it was restructuring its endowment model wholesale); Juliet Chung, *Universities Map Out New Investment Strategies to Deal with Tax Hike on Endowments*, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2025, at 05:30 ET), https://www.wsj.com/us-news/education/universities-map-out-new-investment-strategies-to-deal-with-tax-hike-on-endowments-6638385a?st=eX3WCi&reflink=article_image_share [https://perma.cc/X8DZ-6CGU] (“Several endowment chiefs said they might consider moving part of their portfolio to indexes, where they could easily pull money from if their schools need cash, and away from active-trading strategies that could generate tax liabilities.”).

¹³⁷ Heather Gillers, *Yale’s Trendsetting Private-Equity Strategy Is Getting Harder to Pull Off*, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2025, at 05:30 ET), https://www.wsj.com/finance/investing/yales-trend-setting-private-equity-strategy-is-getting-harder-to-pull-off-b06741eb?st=A3N5Cb&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink [https://perma.cc/7QHR-FAP8] (reporting that private equity returns have lagged public markets recently and questioning whether the Yale Model depends on low interest rates).

¹³⁸ MIT INV. MGMT. CO., MIT’S ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK (2025) [https://perma.cc/62U6-K25X].

¹³⁹ See *Team Directory*, MIT INV. MGMT. CO., <https://mitimco.org/who-we-are/team/directory/> [https://perma.cc/NQB9-AL4T]; MIT INV. MGMT. CO, BENEFITS OF A FLAT TEAM STRUCTURE (2025), <https://mitimco.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Benefits-of-a-Flat-Team-Structure.pdf> [https://perma.cc/TA43-S78D] (explaining MIT’s policy of keeping an investment team of around fifteen persons or fewer).

¹⁴⁰ See *Staff Listing: Investment Team*, NW. UNIV.: INV. OFF., <https://www.northwestern.edu/investment/about/staff-listing.html#tab-panel2> [https://perma.cc/WY4T-QT9B].

Harvard closed its internal stock trading platform and spun out its substantial directly held natural resources portfolio.¹⁴¹ By way of further illustration, Table 1 below shows the vanishingly small number and amounts of directly held public securities at five of the top endowments: Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Princeton, and MIT.

TABLE 1: SELECTED ENDOWMENTS AND DISCLOSED PUBLIC SECURITIES HOLDINGS

University	Endowment Value (FY 2025, billions)*	Number of Public Securities**	Total Value of Public Securities**	Percent of Endowment
Harvard	\$56.9	18	\$2,104,959,615	3.70
Yale	\$44.1	4	\$2,054,861	0.0047
Stanford	\$40.8	20	\$850,746,347	2.09
Princeton	\$36.3	3	\$7,773	0.00002
MIT	\$27.4	10	\$920,435,849	3.36

Sources: *Endowment values as of year-end 2025, taken from various sources. **Source is the latest 2025 SEC Form 13F-HR filing; Princeton Form 13F-HR as of February 2024. Sources collected, with links, at [<https://perma.cc/55KQ-7HRF>].

All told, a university's internal endowment managers have increasingly become managers of active investment managers or managers of investment funds rather than active investors themselves. Under this model, the role of the inside endowment managers is to understand the endowment portfolio's overall risk and return, ensure that the portfolio is appropriately balanced across asset classes, manage distributions, and identify outside talent.

II. APPLICABLE FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES

Agency problems are endemic to fiduciary contexts. To contain the agency costs that result from a separation of ownership and control, the law imposes primary fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, which are reinforced by a host of subsidiary fiduciary duties, such as disclosure and recordkeeping.¹⁴² The beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship ordinarily has standing to enforce these obligations on pain of damages and injunctive relief.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ See HARV. UNIV., FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 9, 11 (2020), https://finance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files/fy20_harvard_financial_report.pdf [<https://perma.cc/K4DM-T8CU>]; HARV. UNIV., FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 9–10 (2017), https://finance.harvard.edu/files/fad/files/final_harvard_university_financial_report_2017.pdf [<https://perma.cc/7F5U-Y2T7>].

¹⁴² See Robert H. Sitkoff, *An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law*, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 201–03 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); Robert H. Sitkoff, *Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 419, 419 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).

¹⁴³ See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) (A.L.I. 2012).

But standing is complicated in the case of a charitable organization. The defining characteristic of a charity is that it is for the benefit of a charitable purpose. And a purpose cannot have an economic interest in or legal standing to enforce the duties of the charity's fiduciaries. "In the case of an entity having no owners and established for the benefit of indefinite beneficiaries, who is the principal on whom the law can rely to monitor the agents and enforce the charitable purposes?"¹⁴⁴ The traditional answer has been to rely on enforcement by state attorneys general. But their enforcement incentives are weak and their budgets are limited.¹⁴⁵

The problem of enforcing the duties of charitable fiduciaries is exacerbated by the lack of protective institutional features that often exist in the for-profit context: votes on major transactions, alienation of shares, buy-out and sale of control provisions; the market for corporate control; and shareholder agreements. In addition, universities do not typically operate as member-organizations, which means that their boards are self-perpetuating and not subject to electoral discipline.

On the other hand, there are some offsetting features of charities not typically present in the for-profit context. Many charities, including universities, prescribe a particular charitable purpose in their organizational documents, disempowering the board from broader actions. A charity that accepts a restricted gift becomes subject to trust fiduciary law with respect to that gift,¹⁴⁶ and trust law has the strictest loyalty rule of all the fiduciary fields. Moreover, the standard of care for endowment management—the prudent investor rule from trust fiduciary law—is more rigorous than the corporate duty of care, and it is not softened by business judgment rule deference.

We now consider these issues with respect to endowment divestment and academic disassociation. We begin by reviewing (a) standing to sue; (b) trustee liability; (c) the duty of loyalty (and *ultra vires*); and (d) the duty of care or prudence. We then apply those principles to (e) endowment divestment and (f) academic disassociation, the latter including the closely related question of a university's accepting or rejecting a gift.

But first we must note an important caveat. Owing to a paucity of caselaw and sporadic enforcement, much of our analysis is derived from first principles as stated in the applicable statutes and canonical secondary authorities such as the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Restatement of Charitable Non-profit Organizations. For some of our analysis, application of these authorities is clear. For a court to decide otherwise would reflect a change in the law. On other matters, application of these authorities is less clear. On these matters we offer our best predictive analysis, acknowledging the uncertainty while recognizing that such uncertainty is itself a fiduciary risk for those tasked with formulating divestment policy.

¹⁴⁴ Evelyn Brody, *The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law*, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1429 (1998).

¹⁴⁵ See Klick & Sitkoff, *supra* note 18, at 780–83.

¹⁴⁶ See *supra* note 62 and accompanying text.

A. *Standing to Sue*

Under traditional law, the state attorney general has primary responsibility for enforcing the duties of a charitable fiduciary.¹⁴⁷ Given the one-two punch of resource constraints and the tendency of elected officials to prioritize political considerations, there is widespread belief that charitable supervision by state attorneys general is inadequate.¹⁴⁸ “In the usual case there simply is not enough of a political payoff to the attorney general to warrant the diversion of resources from other initiatives.”¹⁴⁹ A familiar refrain is “that ‘A.G.’ stands not for ‘attorney general’ but for ‘aspiring governor.’”¹⁵⁰ Indeed, when “the attorney general does intervene in response to political pressure, he or she will be tempted to promote his or her political interests at the expense of the . . . charitable purpose.”¹⁵¹ On the other hand, given the attention to universities in the current political moment, and therefore the changed political calculus of challenging university endowment management, an enforcement action by a state attorney general does not seem farfetched.

Another potential plaintiff is a dissenting board member. In the current political climate, the possibility of such a suit likewise does not seem farfetched.¹⁵² The MNCA unambiguously includes directors among the list of parties granted standing to bring a derivative action for a nonprofit corporation.¹⁵³ This clarity stands in contrast to a for-profit corporation, for which director standing to sue is less settled.¹⁵⁴

A final and relatively new category of potential plaintiffs is an individual donor of a restricted gift. Ordinarily a donor to a charitable corporation does

¹⁴⁷ See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.01 (A.L.I. 2021).

¹⁴⁸ See, e.g., Klick & Sitkoff, *supra* note 18, at 817; Susan N. Gary, *Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law*, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 622–24 (1999); see also Garry W. Jenkins, *Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Non-profit State Law*, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128–30 (2007) (reporting meager resources allocated to charity oversight).

¹⁴⁹ Klick & Sitkoff, *supra* note 18, at 781.

¹⁵⁰ Evelyn Brody, *Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement*, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946 (2004).

¹⁵¹ Klick & Sitkoff, *supra* note 18, at 781–82.

¹⁵² See, e.g., *Columbia University Trustee Calls on Board to Comply with Trump Administration Demands*, CBS NEWS (July 10, 2025, at 20:05 ET), <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/columbia-university-board-trustees-trump-administration-shoshana-shendelman-claire-shipman/> [<https://perma.cc/8MWB-C8G6>].

¹⁵³ MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 502 (a)(2), (b) (A.B.A. 2022).

¹⁵⁴ Compare PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.02(c) (A.L.I. 1994) (“A director [] of a corporation has standing to commence and maintain a derivative action unless the court finds that the director is unable to represent fairly and adequately the interests of the shareholders.”), and N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 719(a), 720 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2026, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 90) (providing for director standing for certain fiduciary breaches including mismanagement of assets), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (A.B.A. 2016) (granting derivative standing only to shareholders), and *Schoon v. Smith*, 953 A.2d 196, 210 (Del. 2008) (allowing director standing only to avoid a “complete failure of justice”).

not have standing to sue by reason of that donation.¹⁵⁵ Likewise, a settlor of a charitable trust does not have standing to enforce the trust under traditional trust law.¹⁵⁶ However, recent law reform has reversed this rule to permit settlor enforcement of charitable trusts.¹⁵⁷ In consequence, “today a majority of states allows the settlor of a charitable trust to enforce the trust.”¹⁵⁸ As we have seen, when a university accepts a restricted gift, it takes the gift as trustee of a charitable trust for that purpose.¹⁵⁹ It follows, therefore, that a donor of a restricted gift to a university has standing to sue the university to enforce the terms of the donor’s gift, including the associated fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.¹⁶⁰ Here, too, given the recent activism of university alumni, the prospect of an enforcement action—or class action—by a donor against a university is not farfetched.

B. Trustee Liability

Both trust law and corporate law provide for injunctive relief to redress a breach of fiduciary duty.¹⁶¹ Thus, a state attorney general or other party with standing could obtain an injunction to prevent or unwind an impermissible university endowment divestment or to remove members of the board. Moreover, if a divestment can be shown to have caused a loss (such as by diminished returns or increased costs), there are at least two potential paths toward imposing individual, personal liability on the university’s trustees. These arguments, which sound variously in (1) trust law and (2) corporate law, are colorable but uncertain.

¹⁵⁵ See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 6.03 cmt. a, 6.04 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2021).

¹⁵⁶ See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (A.L.I. 1959) (“A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General . . . but not by . . . the settlor.”).

¹⁵⁷ See UNIF. TR. CODE § 405(c) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2018) (“The settlor of a charitable trust, among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) (A.L.I. 2012) (similar).

¹⁵⁸ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 795.

¹⁵⁹ See *supra* note 62 and accompanying text.

¹⁶⁰ Compare *Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr.*, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (App. Div. 2001) (recognizing standing for a donor of a restricted gift), with *Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Rsch. Found.*, 320 P.3d 1115, 1126 (Wyo. 2014) (denying standing for a donor of a gift subject to a memorandum of agreement); see also Nancy A. McLaughlin, *Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts in the 21st Century*, 60 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 207, 211 (2025) (noting that “the trend is in favor of granting donors and certain others standing, although this trend is occurring in a haphazard way”); Ryan, *supra* note 111, at 190 (observing uptick in donor suits and, in contrast to earlier “flimsy” donor claims, “when a donor’s argument is strong enough and a university’s endowment is large enough,” an “expensive” settlement may follow).

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., UNIF. TR. CODE § 1001(b)(1)–(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000); MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 809 (A.B.A. 2022) (director removal by judicial action); *id.* § 830 cmt. (implying transaction may be enjoined for fiduciary breach); *id.* § 870 cmt. (permitting “injunction, disgorgement or the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the corporation” for breach of loyalty).

1. Trust Law

The first path toward imposing liability on a university's trustees is under trust law, which applies to the restricted endowment. As we have seen, when a university accepts a restricted gift, it takes that gift as trustee of a charitable trust for that purpose.¹⁶² Under prevailing trust law, the trustee of a trust is liable for damages (called "surcharge," in the jargon) in "the amount required to restore the values of the trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have been if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been properly administered."¹⁶³ Accordingly, if a divestment of the restricted endowment could be shown to be improper and to have caused a financial loss, the university could be surcharged for those losses. Such an order might require the university to use its unrestricted endowment to make the restricted endowment whole, constraining the university going forward by increasing the ratio of restricted to unrestricted funds.

Prevailing trust law also provides that if a trustee is a corporate entity, as most universities are, then an officer or director of that entity who participates in a breach of trust by the entity is herself jointly and severally liable with the entity. In the words of the leading treatise: "Any director or officer who knowingly causes the corporation to commit a breach of trust that results in a loss to a trust administered by the corporation is personally liable to the trust beneficiaries."¹⁶⁴ It follows, therefore, that a university trustee who approves an impermissible divestment that causes a financial loss to the restricted endowment could be held personally liable for that loss jointly and severally with the university.

The analysis is complicated, however, by a provision in the MNCA (if adopted in the relevant state). In its current form, the MNCA provides that a "director is not a trustee with respect to the nonprofit corporation or with respect to any property held or administered by the corporation, including property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by the donor or transferor of the property."¹⁶⁵ The official commentary says that this provision is meant to insulate a director of a nonprofit from liability "for a breach of trust by improperly using, disposing of, or otherwise dealing with assets held by the corporation in trust," provided that the director satisfied the director's corporate fiduciary duties.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² See *supra* note 62 and accompanying text.

¹⁶³ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100(a) (A.L.I. 2012); see also UNIF. TR. CODE § 1002(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2000) (similar).

¹⁶⁴ SCOTT, ASCHER & FRATCHER, *supra* note 97, at § 30.6.3. The rule is not limited to banks or trust companies. See *id.* ("Other cases have imposed liability on directors or officers of corporations that held property in trust and committed breaches of trust, although the corporations were not in the business of administering trusts.").

¹⁶⁵ MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 830(f) (A.B.A. 2022).

¹⁶⁶ *Id.* § 830 cmt. 7.

The words of the operative statutory text, however, are not as broad as the gloss given to them by the comment.¹⁶⁷ The text says only that a “director is not a trustee,” not that a director cannot be held liable for a breach of trust under a theory other than direct trusteeship. An officer or director of a corporate trustee who participates in the entity’s breach of trust is herself liable not by reason of being the trustee (manifestly, she is not the trustee), but rather by reason of “participating in the breach of trust.”¹⁶⁸ There is a straightforward textual argument, therefore, that this provision does not override the trust law principle that holds officers and directors of a corporate trustee liable for participating in the entity’s breach of trust. We are aware of no relevant caselaw.

2. Corporate Law

The second path toward imposing liability on a university’s trustees is under corporate law. Conceptually, if a divestment could be shown to be improper and to have caused a financial loss, the trustees could be liable in a derivative suit for that loss. Practically, however, this theory collides with the mandatory exoneration provisions for uncompensated directors that are often included in nonprofit corporation acts.¹⁶⁹ The MNCA, for example, provides that an uncompensated director is not liable for money damages to the corporation as director except for criminal acts, intentional harm, improper compensation, or impermissible distributions.¹⁷⁰ Other statutes exempt bad faith, reckless, willful, and grossly negligent conduct from exoneration.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ We acknowledge that a state legislature enacts the operative text with the backdrop of its commentary, making that commentary persuasive authority. Cf. Gregory A. Elinson & Robert H. Sitkoff, *When a Statute Comes with a User Manual: Reconciling Textualism and Uniform Acts*, 71 EMORY L.J. 1073, 1078 (2022) (arguing that even textualism requires courts to treat such commentaries as persuasive authority).

¹⁶⁸ SCOTT, ASCHER & FRATCHER, *supra* note 97, at § 30.6.3.

¹⁶⁹ University board members are generally uncompensated. See LaMont Jones, Jr., *What College Trustees Are and Why They Matter*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 16, 2023), <https://www.usnews.com/education/articles/what-college-trustees-are-and-why-they-matter> [https://perma.cc/PQH9-FMBD] (noting that university trustees “serve without pay”).

¹⁷⁰ MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 831(d), 832 (A.B.A. 2022). State for-profit corporation codes often allow for the exoneration of directors by a provision in their articles of incorporation. For example, the MBCA permits broad exoneration for monetary damages, carving out some exceptions such as for criminal conduct, intentional harm, or taking improper financial benefits. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (A.B.A. 2020). Delaware allows more limited exoneration, excepting conduct that is bad faith, willful, or involves breaches of loyalty. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West, Westlaw through ch. 239 of the 153rd General Assembly).

¹⁷¹ See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/108.70(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 104–460 of the 2026 Reg. Sess.) (“No director or officer serving without compensation . . . shall be liable . . . unless the act or omission involved willful or wanton conduct.”); Hazen, *supra* note 90, at 412–13 (collecting statutes, finding widespread adoption of gross negligence, willful, and reckless standard in non-MNCA states). Federal law imposes a gross negligence and willful misconduct standard for volunteer directors. See Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 14501; see also Jill R. Horwitz & Joseph Mead, *Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence*, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 585, 596–97 (2009).

Yet such exoneration is not ubiquitous and has much nuance. New York's statute, which exonerates except for gross negligence and intentional harm, does not apply if the action is brought by the attorney general.¹⁷² California's exoneration provision is similar to New York's but adds the requirement that directors obtain liability insurance coverage in amounts linked to the nonprofit's revenues.¹⁷³ Pennsylvania does not mandate exoneration of nonprofit directors, uncompensated or otherwise, but allows for a bylaw provision of indemnification of directors for conduct that does not constitute "self-dealing, willful misconduct or recklessness," similar to its for-profit statute.¹⁷⁴

The viability of a corporate law derivative suit for imposing personal liability on a university trustee is thus uncertain on two margins. The first is whether the applicable state statute provides exoneration for a director of a nonprofit corporation. The second is whether, given the typicality of exoneration and indemnification provisions, the facts of the particular improper divestment take it outside the scope of that provision. For example, a divestment that breaches the duty of loyalty, is ultra vires, or was undertaken despite legal or financial advice to the contrary could potentially constitute bad faith, gross negligence, willfulness, or recklessness depending on the specific facts. Moreover, an improper divestment that reduces the value of the endowment is conceptually akin to an impermissible in-kind distribution, and the MNCA explicitly excludes impermissible distributions from exoneration.¹⁷⁵ As with the trust law theory of director liability, we are aware of little caselaw directly addressing these questions.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷² N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720-a (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2026, chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 90).

¹⁷³ See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5047.5(e), 5239(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through ch. 6 of the 2026 Reg. Sess.); see also CAL. DEP'T. OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES: BEST PRACTICES FOR NONPROFITS THAT OPERATE OR FUNDRAISE IN CALIFORNIA 57–58 (2024), <https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/Guide%20for%20Charities.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/P9ZJ-A59T>] (explaining various sections of the California Corporate Code and how it limits or expands liability for volunteer directors of nonprofits).

¹⁷⁴ Compare 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5713 (West, Westlaw through Act 7 of the 2026 Reg. Sess.) (nonprofit), with 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 513 (West, Westlaw through Act 7 of the 2026 Reg. Sess.) (for-profit).

¹⁷⁵ See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 832 (A.B.A. 2022).

¹⁷⁶ In *Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ex rel. Estate of Lemington Home for the Aged v. Baldwin*, No. 10CV800, 2013 WL 2158543, at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. May 17, 2013), the trial court upheld a jury verdict under Pennsylvania law against the board of a nonprofit nursing home in favor of creditors suing in the right of the corporation. Even though a bylaw exonerated the directors except for actions that "constituted self-dealing, willful misconduct, or recklessness," the court concluded there was sufficient evidence that the board had acted "recklessly" by knowingly hiring unqualified officers and failing to supervise or remove them. The Third Circuit affirmed on director liability without addressing the issue of exoneration (a punitive damages award was set aside). See *Lemington Home for the Aged v. Baldwin*, 777 F.3d 620 (3d Cir. 2015).

C. The Duty of Loyalty (and Ultra Vires)¹⁷⁷

Roughly speaking, the fiduciary duty of loyalty comes in two flavors: the *sole interest rule*, which applies under trust law, and the *best interest standard*, which applies under corporate law. Accordingly, the content of the duty of loyalty applicable to endowment management turns on whether corporate law or trust law applies.¹⁷⁸ There is also a lurking third rail, the *ultra vires doctrine*. That doctrine, largely moribund in for-profit corporate law, still has significant bite in the charitable context. As we have seen, most secular universities prescribe a research and educational purpose, which narrows the powers of the corporation and its board. Acting outside the scope of those powers (that is, an *ultra vires* action) carries with it similar remedial consequences to a breach of loyalty.

1. Sole Interest Rule

Because a university holds its restricted endowment as trustee,¹⁷⁹ the trust law duty of loyalty applies to the university's investment management of its restricted endowment. Under the trust law "sole interest" rule, a trustee must "administer the trust *solely* in the interest of the beneficiaries."¹⁸⁰ In the case of a charitable trust, the trustee must act "*solely* in furtherance of [the trust's] *charitable purpose*."¹⁸¹ In trust law, sole means sole and applies to any conflict of interest, not only self-dealing.¹⁸² A trustee may not "be influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust."¹⁸³

¹⁷⁷ Portions of this section are adapted from Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, *Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee*, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 400–03, 420–22 (2020).

¹⁷⁸ The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA), discussed below in Part II.C., preserved this distinction. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3(b), § 3 cmt. b (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006) (reporting that despite concerns, the Drafting Committee concluded that a unified standard was unnecessary and "the duty of loyalty under nonprofit corporation law will apply to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, and the duty of loyalty under trust law will apply to charitable trusts.").

¹⁷⁹ See *supra* note 62 and accompanying text.

¹⁸⁰ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (A.L.I. 2007) (emphasis added); see also UNIF. TR. CODE § 802(a) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2000) (substantively same).

¹⁸¹ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (A.L.I. 2007) (emphasis added).

¹⁸² Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the blackletter rule is that "the trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary duties and personal interests." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(2) (A.L.I. 2007) (emphasis added). Thus, for example, a trustee who does "not act for personal advantage" and instead is "motivated by a desire to assist a worthy project" still violates the duty of loyalty because such a motive or desire is something other than the sole interest of the beneficiary. *Conway v. Emeny*, 96 A.2d 221, 225 (Conn. 1953).

¹⁸³ *Id.* § 78(1) cmt. f.

The trust law sole interest rule is implemented by a “no-further-inquiry rule” under which “no further inquiry” is made after a showing of a conflict.¹⁸⁴ There is no de minimis exception or best interests defense. Acting with a mixed motive, even without self-dealing, triggers “an irrebuttable presumption of wrongdoing,” full stop.¹⁸⁵ The sole interest rule is prohibitory rather than regulatory on prophylactic grounds. The rule is meant to induce trustees to refrain from conflicted actions or to disclose any conflict and obtain authorization from the beneficiaries or the court.¹⁸⁶

Under blackletter trust law, therefore, a trustee of a charitable trust violates the duty of loyalty if the trustee has any motive or rationale for undertaking an action other than furthering the trust’s charitable purpose. It follows that a trustee of a charitable trust who divests from a particular firm or industry because she finds the firm’s business or the industry distasteful—or to “curry favor”¹⁸⁷ with her friends, family, or others who find it distasteful—is in breach of the duty of loyalty.

2. Best Interest Standard

By contrast, under the “best interest” standard, which is typical of corporate law (including a charity organized as a corporation), a fiduciary is not categorically prohibited from acting with a conflict of interest, but rather must act in the “best interest” of the corporation notwithstanding the conflict.¹⁸⁸ The best interest standard is commonly implemented by way of an “entire fairness” test that is sometimes expressed as requiring fair price and fair dealing.¹⁸⁹ Because a university holds its unrestricted endowment as corporate funds, the best interest standard applies to the university’s investment management of its unrestricted endowment.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁴ See Robert H. Sitkoff, *Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 41, 44–45 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).

¹⁸⁵ Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, *ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule*, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1114–15 (1988).

¹⁸⁶ See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2007) (“This policy of strict prohibition also provides a reasonable circumstantial assurance (except as waived by the settlor or an affected beneficiary) that beneficiaries will not be deprived of a trustee’s disinterested and objective judgment.”).

¹⁸⁷ *Matter of Rothko’s Est.*, 372 N.E.2d 291, 294 (N.Y. 1977).

¹⁸⁸ See Julian Velasco, *Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 61, 66–69 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).

¹⁸⁹ *Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.*, 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); see also Andrew S. Gold, *The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty*, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 385, 388–89 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B. Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019).

¹⁹⁰ A similar best interests standard applies to a trustee if the terms of the trust waive the otherwise applicable sole interest rule. In such circumstances, the trustee is subject to “especially careful scrutiny,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 37 cmt. f(1) (A.L.I. 2007), as to whether she acted “fairly, in good faith, and in the interest of the beneficiaries,” *id.* § 78 cmt. c.

Corporate law's best interest standard reflects a policy judgment that a conflicted action will be in the best interests of a corporation with sufficient frequency that a regulatory rather than prohibitory rule is welfare maximizing. Under the best interest standard, the cost to the corporation of a conflicted transaction is a relevant factor in assessing fairness.

Thus, under the best interest standard (plus the deferential corporate law duty of care¹⁹¹), a board that divests from a firm or industry primarily because the board members find the business distasteful—or to curry favor with friends, family, or others who find it distasteful—could argue in defense that the divestment's cost was *de minimis* and offset by a purported corporate benefit, even if tenuous.

3. Ultra Vires and Charitable Purpose

Whether acting in a trustee or corporate capacity, the board of a charity may act only within the powers granted to it. An often-repeated aphorism holds that every fiduciary action is “twice tested,” first for power, and then second for duty.¹⁹² A fiduciary must act within the fiduciary's powers, and the action must be consistent with the fiduciary's duties. This principle, which applies to both trusts and corporations,¹⁹³ gives rise to two “conceptually distinct allegations of breach of trust: (a) the trustee lacked the *power* to act as she did, or (b) the trustee's act, even if within her powers, was a breach of *duty*.”¹⁹⁴ A fiduciary act beyond the powers granted to the fiduciary is *ultra vires*, remediable by injunctive relief as well as surcharge to make the trust or corporation whole for any resulting losses.¹⁹⁵

There is an academic debate over whether *ultra vires* acts are their own category of breach or are more properly classified as a breach of the duty of

¹⁹¹ See *infra* Part II.D.

¹⁹² See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., *Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust*, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (“[I]n every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of a *cestui que trust* to the trustee's exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making him a fiduciary.”).

¹⁹³ See, e.g., *Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.*, 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (explaining that in corporate law, “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible”); *Paradee v. Paradee*, No. 4988-VCL, 2010 WL 3959604, at *11 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that, in trust law, whether a trustee had the power to act is a “separate question [from] whether he breached his fiduciary duties by doing so”).

¹⁹⁴ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 605.

¹⁹⁵ See, e.g., STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, *CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS* 59 (2002) (“The responsible officers and directors could be held personally liable for any losses resulting from the [ultra vires] action.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (A.L.I. 2012) (“A trustee who commits a breach of trust is chargeable with . . . the amount required to restore the values of the trust estate and trust distributions to what they would have been if the portion of the trust affected by the breach had been properly administered.”).

loyalty.¹⁹⁶ In theory, an act could be ultra vires—that is, beyond the scope of the fiduciary’s powers—without involving a conflict of interest.¹⁹⁷ For our purposes, the classification does not matter because the available remedies, including injunctive relief and surcharge, do not turn on the classification.

D. *The Duty of Care or Prudence*

We divide our discussion of the duty of care or prudence into two parts: (1) the *endowment management*, and (2) the *charitable program*. Different rules apply to each. Endowment management is subject to trust law’s prudent investor rule, a meaningful standard that is rooted in modern portfolio theory and applies across fiduciary investment contexts. By contrast, programmatic decisions are generally reviewed under a highly deferential care standard derived from corporate law.

1. Endowment Management¹⁹⁸

The trust law prudent investor rule applies to charitable endowment management regardless of whether the charity is organized as a charitable trust or a nonprofit corporation.¹⁹⁹ Trust fiduciary law, including the prudent investor rule as codified by the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) and enacted in substance in every state,²⁰⁰ applies directly to charitable trusts.²⁰¹ The Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (UPMIFA), enacted in nearly

¹⁹⁶ Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., *Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law*, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 648–50 (2010) (arguing that it is disloyal for a “director to engage in consciously ultra vires conduct”); Hazen, *supra* note 90, at 386–87 (arguing that there is a duty of obedience to purpose that reflects the ultra vires concept, and this is particularly important in nonprofits).

¹⁹⁷ See *Shorter Coll. v. Baptist Convention*, 614 S.E.2d 37, 41 (Ga. 2005) (concluding that although “the Board fully complied with this standard of conduct, acting in the good faith belief that it was responding to a threat to the accreditation of the College,” it lacked the power to undertake its transfer of assets which would have effectively removed some trustees in a manner inconsistent with its charter).

¹⁹⁸ Portions of this section are adapted from Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 177, at 426–29.

¹⁹⁹ On the prudent investor rule, see Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, *The Prudent Investor Rule and Market Risk: An Empirical Analysis*, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129 (2017).

²⁰⁰ The UPIA or a nonuniform statute to similar effect has been enacted in all states. See *id.* at 136, 167–68.

²⁰¹ See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 790 (“The fiduciary principles applicable to a private trust apply also to a charitable trust.”); SCOTT, ASCHER & FRATCHER, *supra* note 97, at § 37.3.8 (“For the most part, the same principles that govern the investment practices of the trustees of private trusts also govern the investment practices of the trustees of charitable trusts.”).

every state,²⁰² applies the prudent investor rule to nonprofit corporations on terms nearly identical to the UPIA.²⁰³ The trust law prudent investor rule thus applies to the entirety of a university's endowment, restricted and unrestricted.

Under the prudent investor rule, a fiduciary investor must employ "an overall investment strategy having risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the" fiduciary account and, other than in exceptional circumstances, must "diversify the investments."²⁰⁴ The rule thus points to what in modern portfolio theory is known as an "efficient portfolio," meaning a portfolio that maximizes return for a given level of risk.²⁰⁵ Put more simply, the rule requires aligning overall risk and return with the terms and purposes of the fiduciary account.²⁰⁶

Under the prudent investor rule, "[s]pecific investments or techniques are not per se prudent or imprudent."²⁰⁷ Instead, a fiduciary "may invest in any kind of property or type of investment," provided that the investment fits within a diversified overall investment strategy with portfolio-level risk and return objectives reasonably suited to the fiduciary account.²⁰⁸ Canonical authority thus recognizes that a fiduciary may satisfy the duty of prudence through passive strategies, such as buying and holding low-cost index funds,²⁰⁹ or through active strategies, involving a search for assets that are underpriced or illiquid.²¹⁰

The prudent investor rule has attendant subsidiary duties of cost-sensitivity, ongoing monitoring, and recordkeeping. A fiduciary must balance costs and benefits, incurring only "costs that are appropriate and reasonable in relation to the assets, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee."²¹¹

²⁰² See *Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, Enactment History*, UNIF. L. COMM'N, <https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=043b9067-bc2c-46b7-8436-07c9054064a3> [<https://perma.cc/7SAY-ZCYZ>].

²⁰³ See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006).

²⁰⁴ UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 2(b), 3 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 1994); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3(e)(2), (4) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006) (same); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(a)-(b) (A.L.I. 2007) (similar).

²⁰⁵ See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 177, at 134–37; Sitkoff, *Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law*, *supra* note 184, at 48–49.

²⁰⁶ See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 177, at 136–37.

²⁰⁷ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. f(2) (A.L.I. 2003).

²⁰⁸ UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 2(b), (e) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 1994); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3(e)(3) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006).

²⁰⁹ See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. h(1) (A.L.I. 2007) ("Investing in index funds that track major stock exchanges or widely published listings of publicly traded stocks is illustrative of an essentially passive but practical investment alternative to be considered by trustees seeking to include corporate equity in their portfolios.").

²¹⁰ See *id.* at § 90 cmt. h(2) ("Prudent investment principles also allow the use of more active management strategies by trustees.").

²¹¹ UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 7 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 1994); see also UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3(c)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006).

Ongoing monitoring applies to both a “trustee’s decisions respecting new investments” as well as the trustee’s “continuing responsibility for oversight of the suitability of investments already made.”²¹² Finally, a fiduciary must maintain adequate records, documenting important decisions and the reasons for those decisions.²¹³ A fiduciary’s failure to keep such records would entitle a reviewing court “to resolve doubts against the trustee.”²¹⁴

A typical fiduciary investment practice, including that of university endowments, is to prepare an investment policy statement that prescribes investment guidelines such as asset allocation targets, risk tolerance and investment horizon, and overall investment strategy.²¹⁵

2. The Charitable Program

By *charitable program*, we refer to the operational side of a charity—for a university, the academic program depicted by the left side of Figure 1.

As we have seen, the typical university is organized as a nonprofit corporation.²¹⁶ It is now widely accepted that the corporate fiduciary duty of care, including some version of the highly deferential business judgment rule, applies to a charity organized as a corporation.²¹⁷ “When the business judgment rule is applicable, courts withhold substantive review of a challenged decision by a fiduciary and instead evaluate the adequacy of the fiduciary’s decisionmaking process.”²¹⁸ The business judgment rule thus shields the substance of a board’s decision from judicial review if the board followed a

²¹² UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994); *see also* RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e(1) (A.L.I. 2007) (noting duty to “make portfolio adjustments if and as appropriate”).

²¹³ *See, e.g.*, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 (A.L.I. 2007).

²¹⁴ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 83 cmt. a(1) (A.L.I. 2007).

²¹⁵ *See* COMMONFUND INSTITUTE, THE INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT: GUIDING AND GUARDING NONPROFIT ENDOWMENTS 1–5 (2016) [<https://perma.cc/CV3L-LL5X>] (discussing the importance of creating an investment policy statement, particularly for universities); SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 650–51; Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 199, at 138–39. *See, e.g.*, UNIV. OF CAL., GENERAL ENDOWMENT POOL INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT (2005), <https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/mar05/fattach.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/L2MY-MFDP>].

²¹⁶ *See supra* Part I.B.

²¹⁷ *See* RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.03 cmts. a & d (A.L.I. 2021); Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003) (following “other jurisdictions” in applying the business judgment rule to a nonprofit). The Restatement suggests a somewhat less deferential version of the business judgment rule may be warranted for nonprofits. *See* RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.03 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2021). Nonprofits face fewer institutional and market checks on charitable board discretion relative to for-profit corporations, which face shareholder votes, markets for corporate control, and greater market pressures. In all events, we caution that we are speaking only of fiduciary liability, setting aside other matters such as federal and state anti-discrimination laws.

²¹⁸ RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.03 cmt. d (A.L.I. 2021).

rational process and the decision has some rational basis.²¹⁹ For that reason, the business judgment rule has been likened to an abstention doctrine.²²⁰

Accordingly, if a university board's decision in the academic program is not conflicted, the highly deferential corporate law standard of care will normally apply.²²¹ Such deference is all but a necessity. Subjecting frequent, contestable programmatic decisions to rigorous judicial review could be paralyzing. University boards or their agents set tuition, establish admissions and tenure standards, choose which departments to expand or contract, set budgets, make long-term strategic plans, and so on. Subjecting each such decision to substantive judicial review is impracticable.

There is little caselaw applying the duty of care to a university's programmatic decisions. We are, however, aware of two care cases brought against university boards, both of which resolved in settlements. In 2009, the New Jersey Attorney General agreed to a settlement with the board of the Stevens Institute of Technology, a university operating as a nonprofit corporation, based on allegations of the board's overpaying the university president, excessive borrowing, and process failures.²²² The board agreed to amend the Institute's bylaws and articles,²²³ and the president agreed to step down.²²⁴ In the 1990s, the board of Adelphi University, which operated as a nonprofit corporation, settled with the New York Attorney General after being sued for various breaches of care, including overspending, overcompensation, and poor

²¹⁹ See, e.g., *Aronson v. Lewis*, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (requiring the board to make a decision on an "informed" basis); *In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litig.*, 964 A.2d 106, 122, (Del. Ch. 2009) (explaining that directors' duty of care "can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed").

²²⁰ See Stephen Bainbridge, *The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine*, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).

²²¹ We acknowledge that there is a colorable argument that trust law rather than corporate law might apply to the academic program of a university such as Stanford, which arose from a deed of trust. See *supra* note 58 and accompanying text. In theory, the trustee of a charitable trust is subject to a more intensive judicial review under trust law duty of care (called "prudence," in trust jargon). Indeed, trust law does not provide for business judgment rule deference. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 177, at 425. However, RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.03 cmt. a (A.L.I. 2021) would apply the corporate law duty of care to all charities without regard for form. And if a trustee is granted extended discretion by the terms of trust, as is a familiar drafting practice, the trust law standard of review becomes one of "abuse of discretion." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 (A.L.I. 2007).

²²² See Complaint, *Milgram v. Trs. of Stevens Inst. of Tech.*, No. HUD-C-115-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sep. 17, 2009) [https://perma.cc/S37A-WZC8].

²²³ See Final Consent Judgment, *Milgram v. Trs. of Stevens Inst. of Tech.*, No. HUD-C-115-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 15, 2010), [https://perma.cc/VRD2-PLDT].

²²⁴ Doug Leiderman, *President Resigns, Stevens Settles with N.J.*, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 17, 2010) https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/01/18/president-resigns-stevens-settles-nj [https://perma.cc/D8MX-RZ7C].

internal controls.²²⁵ The board members agreed to resign and pay \$1.5 million in damages.²²⁶

E. Fiduciary Principles and Endowment Divestment

Having canvassed the relevant fiduciary principles, we are now able to apply them to an endowment divestment by a university. As noted at the outset, by “divestment” we refer to the use of a nonfinancial factor in investing an endowment.²²⁷ The paradigmatic divestment is the avoidance of a particular firm, industry, or country on moral or ethical grounds (that is, to “divest” from such an investment). But nonfinancial factors can also skew an endowment portfolio in favor of a nonfinancial purpose (that is, “impact investing”). Because there is no distinction in law or economics between a positive and a negative skew (portfolio allocation is zero sum), we treat both within the rubric of “divestment.”

The fiduciary analysis for a university endowment divestment turns chiefly on two factors: (1) whether the divestment is consistent with the university’s research and educational purposes that qualify it as a charitable nonprofit and is not otherwise conflicted (satisfying the duty of loyalty); and (2) whether the divestment’s effect on the portfolio as a whole is reasonable in light of that purpose (satisfying the duty of prudence). A useful heuristic is to ask whether a direct distribution of university funds for the same purpose would have been permissible. If not, the divestment could not plausibly satisfy the even stricter fiduciary duties applicable to endowment management. The Restatement makes this point thus:

[S]ocial considerations may be taken into account in investing the funds of charitable trusts to the extent the charitable purposes would justify an expenditure of trust funds for the social issue or cause in question or to the extent the investment decision can be justified on grounds of advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust.²²⁸

²²⁵ See Courtney Leatherman, *New York Sues to Recover Millions from Adelphi’s Ex-Trustees*, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 4, 1997), <https://www.chronicle.com/article/new-york-sues-to-recover-millions-from-adelphis-ex-trustees/> [<https://perma.cc/F5ND-EYCE>].

²²⁶ See Courtney Leatherman, *Ex-Officers of Adelphi U. to Pay Settlement in Long-Running Dispute with College*, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 18, 1998), <https://www.chronicle.com/article/ex-officers-of-adelphi-u-to-pay-settlement-in-long-running-dispute-with-college/?sra=true> [<https://perma.cc/K8GE-WBU5>].

²²⁷ See *supra* note 14 and accompanying text.

²²⁸ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c. (A.L.I. 2007). The IRS agrees that a charity may give “consideration [to its] charitable purposes . . . in properly managing and investing the organization’s investment assets.” I.R.S. Notice 2015–62, 2015–39 I.R.B. 411.

For clarity, we divide our analysis into three parts: (1) the duty of *loyalty* (and the *ultra vires* doctrine); (2) the duty of *prudence*; and (3) the role of *reputation* or *constituency management*.

1. The Duty of Loyalty and Divestment

In applying the duty of loyalty to an endowment divestment, we consider variously a divestment that is: (a) within the research and educational purpose of the university as well as the narrower varied purposes of each of the restricted gifts that comprise the restricted endowment; (b) within the public benefit principle applicable to all charities; or (c) outside the research and educational purpose of the university.

a. Within the Charitable Purpose: Mission-Related Investing

By definition, an endowment divestment that falls within the prescribed charitable purpose of a charity, sometimes called “mission-related investing,”²²⁹ is consistent with the duty of loyalty. As implied by the Restatement provision quoted above, such a divestment is conceptually a substitute for direct expenditure.

The key loyalty question for such a divestment is thus factual, not legal—namely, was the divestment in fact within the applicable charitable purpose? For the unrestricted endowment, the answer is yes if the divestment is consistent with the university’s research and educational purpose. For a restricted gift, the answer is yes if the divestment is consistent with the narrower research or educational purpose of that restricted gift. However, as we have seen most universities pool all assets held primarily for investment purposes into a single fund so that all restricted gifts (that is, the restricted endowment) are pooled together along with the unrestricted endowment. For a typical university, therefore, the messy factual problem of establishing consistency with what can be many different specific research and educational purposes afflicts the entire endowment.

By way of illustration, recall that the Harvard endowment pools together its unrestricted endowment and over 14,700 separate restricted funds.²³⁰ For Harvard to justify an endowment divestment as consistent with all applicable charitable purposes, therefore, it would need to undertake 14,700 separate

²²⁹ See Susan N. Gary, *Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities That Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing*, 6 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL’Y. 106, 112 (2011) (a mission-related investment “may either yield an investment return similar to investments made without consideration of mission, or the mission-related benefits may outweigh any reduced financial benefits”).

²³⁰ See *supra* note 113 and accompanying text.

consistency checks, potentially a burdensome undertaking, in addition to the substantive difficulty of fitting the divestment within 14,700 distinct purposes. Given the myriad purposes contained within a university's restricted endowment, from medical research to student scholarships in classics to faculty chairs in astronomy, establishing that a divestment is consistent with each specific individual purpose is a daunting proposition.

b. Public Benefit, Public Policy, and Moral Abhorrence

Alternatively, a university endowment divestment could perhaps satisfy the duty of loyalty if the divestment was based on a clear public policy applicable to all charities through the public benefit principle of charity law.²³¹ In other words, the divested activity or region is so abhorrent that any charity could divest from it, thus encompassing all the varied restricted gifts held in trust. As discussed above, there is a thin caselaw that recognizes some activity as being "inconsistent with the nature of charitable purposes,"²³² that is, as being inconsistent with "the public benefit principle that is at the core of the charitable purpose doctrine."²³³ This caselaw implies the viability of a public policy gloss on the meaning of charitable purpose, albeit the caselaw is modest and appears to be dependent on statutory or other government action for confirmation of the relevant public policy.

Crucially, this theory replaces the need to show consistency with a university's research and educational purpose as well as each individual restricted gift held by the university with the single requirement of consistency with the identified public policy. Indeed, for a university with a substantial restricted endowment consisting of numerous varied and narrower restricted gifts, this theory may be the only feasible path to satisfying the duty of loyalty.

The key question in justifying a divestment on this theory is whether the divestment is supported by a clear public policy, typically confirmed by governmental action, that may be drawn into the organization's charitable purpose via the public benefit principle.²³⁴ As we shall see in greater detail in Part III, slavery, genocide, and apartheid are often suggested as examples. This theory will therefore be highly relevant in analyzing university endowment divestment from South Africa, Sudan, and Israel as well as general "moral abhorrence" divestment policies adopted by several of the universities with the largest endowments.²³⁵

²³¹ See *supra* Part I.C.4.

²³² RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. f (A.L.I. 2003).

²³³ SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, *supra* note 33, at 784.

²³⁴ See *supra* Part I.C.4.

²³⁵ See *infra* Parts III.A.1, 3, and C.2.

c. Outside the Charitable Purpose: “Sole” versus “Best” Interest

An endowment divestment that neither falls within the charitable purpose of a charity nor the public benefit principle is legally problematic at best.

i. *Ultra Vires*. To begin with, the board of a charity may act only within the powers granted to it. As we have seen, a fiduciary act beyond the powers granted to the fiduciary is *ultra vires*.²³⁶ Accordingly, a divestment outside the scope of a charity’s charitable purpose would arguably expose the trustees of that charity to liability for acting beyond the scope of their powers, even before considering the fiduciary duty of loyalty.

ii. *Restricted Endowment: Sole Interest*. Trust law applies to the restricted endowment.²³⁷ Under the trust law duty of loyalty, a trustee of a charitable trust must act “*solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose*.”²³⁸ Any motive or action other than furthering the trust’s charitable purpose is a breach of the duty of loyalty, full stop.²³⁹ A divestment of the restricted endowment that is not consistent with each affected individual restricted gift (or a public policy gloss via the public benefit principle) would thus be a textbook violation of the trust law duty of loyalty.

We acknowledge a counterargument but find it unpersuasive. The argument is that a costless divestment—that is, a divestment that could be implemented with no administrative cost and with no negative effect on portfolio efficiency—should be permissible. As a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that in modern endowment practice a truly costless divestment exists, a point we will take up in connection with the duty of prudence below.²⁴⁰ But setting this factual problem to the side, could a costless divestment be consistent with the trust law duty of loyalty?

The only trust law authority of which we are aware that could fairly be argued as supporting this position is a dubious inference from a single sentence in the official comments to the UPIA: “No form of so-called ‘social investing’ is consistent with the duty of loyalty if the investment activity entails sacrificing the interests of trust beneficiaries—for example, by accepting below-market returns—in favor of the interests of the persons supposedly benefitted by pursuing the particular social cause.”²⁴¹ By stating clearly that a

²³⁶ See *supra* Part II.C.3.

²³⁷ See *supra* note 62 and accompanying text.

²³⁸ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (A.L.I. 2007) (emphasis added); see also *supra* Part II.C.1.

²³⁹ See *supra* Part II.C.1.

²⁴⁰ See *infra* Part II.E.2.a.

²⁴¹ UNIF. PRUDENT. INV. ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994). We acknowledge that RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.04 cmt. e(3) (A.L.I. 2021) takes the position that, if “non-purpose-related social concerns . . . do not lower expected returns,” they may be considered by a charitable fiduciary. However, that Restatement follows the corporate law duty of loyalty, see *id.* § 2.02 & cmt. a, which as discussed below in connection with the unrestricted endowment, see accompanying text *infra* notes 247–248, might tolerate a divestment

costly social investment breaches the duty of loyalty, the comment could be read as implying that a costless such investment would not breach the duty of loyalty.²⁴²

Crucially, however, the UPIA comment does not literally say that a costless social investment is permissible, only that a costly one is impermissible. Moreover, whatever the comment says, it must yield to the higher authority of the UPIA blackletter text.²⁴³ And the blackletter text to which the comment applies states the familiar sole interest rule of ordinary trust law: “A trustee shall invest and manage the trust assets solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”²⁴⁴ The fundamental problem with reading that one sentence in the UPIA comments as blessing a costless divestment, therefore, is it wishes away the no-further-inquiry implementing rule that comes with the sole interest rule that is codified by the text of the UPIA itself.

The trust law authorities applying the sole interest rule are legion in doing so via the no-further-inquiry rule. As we have seen, under the no-further-inquiry rule any consideration other than the sole interest of the beneficiary, no matter the good faith of the trustee or the absence of harm, is a categorical breach of trust.²⁴⁵ As the Supreme Court put the point more than 200 years ago, “the fairness or unfairness of the transaction . . . is not suffered to enter into the consideration of the Court.”²⁴⁶ Accordingly, to permit a costless divestment of a restricted endowment would be a significant break from prevailing and longstanding trust law.

iii. Unrestricted Endowment: Best Interest. The loyalty analysis for the unrestricted endowment is different because it sounds in corporate law rather than trust law. As we have seen, under corporate law a board must act in the

outside of a charity’s charitable purpose if the effect was *de minimis* because it is less strict than the trust law duty of loyalty. We are aware of no authority, however, that follows the RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS in rejecting the no-further-inquiry principle of ordinary trust law as applied to a charitable trust, and the Restatement cites no such authority.

²⁴² The comment also cites to an interpretive bulletin by the Department of Labor that took the position, not without controversy (see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 177, at 408–11), that an ERISA fiduciary may break a tie between two financially equivalent investments by reference to social considerations. See UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1994).

²⁴³ As noted earlier, we acknowledge that a state legislature enacts the operative text with the backdrop of its commentary, making that commentary persuasive authority. See *supra* note 167.

²⁴⁴ *Id.*

²⁴⁵ See, e.g., *In re Gleeson’s Will*, 124 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (“The good faith and honesty of the petitioner or the fact that the trust sustained no loss on account of his dealings therewith are all matters which can avail petitioner nothing so far as a justification of the course he chose to take in dealing with trust property is concerned.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. b (A.L.I. 2007) (“In transactions that violate the trustee’s duty of undivided loyalty, under the so-called ‘no further inquiry’ principle it is immaterial that the trustee may be able to show that the action in question was taken in good faith, that the terms of the transaction were fair, and that no profit resulted to the trustee.”); SCOTT, ASCHER & FRATCHER, *supra* note 97, at § 17.2 (“Under this rule, a trustee who has violated the duty of loyalty is liable without further inquiry into whether the breach resulted in any actual benefit to the trustee, whether the trustee acted in good faith, whether the transaction was fair, or even, in some cases, whether the breach caused any actual harm to either the trust or its beneficiaries.”).

²⁴⁶ *Wormley v. Wormley*, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421, 463 (1823).

“best interest” of the corporation, a standard that is commonly implemented by way of an “entire fairness” test.²⁴⁷ Thus, in contrast to the restricted endowment, which is subject to the trust law sole interest rule, a costless divestment within the unrestricted endowment could be defended as fair. And because the unrestricted endowment may be applied in the university’s discretion to anything within its charitable program, a divestment made at a de minimis cost could more easily be defended as fair even with only a tenuous connection to research and education.²⁴⁸

Nonetheless, we sound three cautions. The first is a reminder that the *ultra vires* doctrine, discussed above, does not appear to recognize a de minimis exception. If that doctrine applies, then a divestment of a university’s unrestricted endowment for reasons other than the university’s research or educational purpose would be impermissible. Second, for the reasons explored in connection with the duty of prudence below, the plausibility of a de minimis divestment has been decreasing with the shift following the rise of the Yale Model to index funds and nonmarket holdings.²⁴⁹ Third, given the pooling of the restricted and unrestricted endowment by most universities, the sound fiduciary practice is to follow the stricter trust law standard. It is possible for a university to separate its endowment pools, thereby enabling more defensible divestments in the unrestricted endowment. However, such a separation could increase administrative costs overall, undermining the defense that the divestment cost was de minimis.

2. The Duty of Prudence and Divestment

A divestment that is not *ultra vires* and satisfies the duty of loyalty must also satisfy the prudent investor rule. The prudent investor rule is more rigorous and less deferential than the corporate law standard of care.²⁵⁰ As codified by UPMIFA (for the unrestricted endowment) and as typified by the UPIA (for the restricted endowment), the prudent investor rule requires an assessment of the reasonableness of the divestment, that is, a weighing of costs and benefits.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ See *supra* Part II.C.2.

²⁴⁸ We acknowledge that RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.04 cmt. e(3) (A.L.I. 2021) takes no position on “whether a charity may make investments considering factors that are both unrelated to its purposes and likely to jeopardize financial returns,” characterizing that question as “difficult and as yet unanswered.” We agree that the question is perhaps unanswered in the sense that there is not a direct decisional precedent. But the UPIA comment recognizes the illegality of such a divestment. See *supra* note 241 and accompanying text. To call this question “as yet unanswered” is thus misleading, if not disingenuous. The underlying legal principles surrounding the duty of loyalty, both in trust law and corporate law, are so well settled that the illegality of such a divestment under those principles is straightforward. To hold otherwise would work a dramatic change in the law.

²⁴⁹ See *id.*

²⁵⁰ See *supra* Part II.D.1.

²⁵¹ See *id.*

a. Assessing the Costs of a Divestment

We start with the cost side of the ledger, focusing on administrative costs and portfolio efficiency. When university endowments held directly a basket of publicly traded securities, a divestment could plausibly be undertaken at low administrative cost and with minimal effect on portfolio efficiency. A one-time reallocation of a handful of publicly traded securities into a different handful of publicly traded securities might incur a brokerage commission, perhaps even a substantial one before computerized trading. But such a reallocation would otherwise be straightforward. Moreover, unless the divestment involved the removal of a significant industry or region, in theory the effect on portfolio efficiency could be *de minimis*.²⁵²

Since the rise of the Yale Model, however, and the concomitant shift to outside active managers for illiquid investments and to index funds for public securities, even a minor divestment is likely to incur substantial administrative and portfolio efficiency costs. For the outside active managers, a divestment constraint will tend to increase cost and decrease portfolio efficiency owing to the resulting smaller pool of managers from which to choose, higher fees for those managers, and fewer opportunities in which they may invest. For the index funds, screened funds are inevitably less diversified than broad market funds and are (today, at least) more expensive too.

By way of illustration, the expense ratio of Fidelity's "sustainability" index fund is 9.5 basis points higher than its total market index fund (11 versus 1.5 basis points).²⁵³ A 9.5 basis points increase in fees on a \$100 million investment is \$95,000 per year, and that cost compounds over time. On a 10 percent annual return assumption, the fees would cost the portfolio \$1 million within eight years. The sustainability fund is also less diversified than the total market fund, with only 268 holdings, and with three technology companies—NVIDIA (12.81%), Microsoft (10.18%), and Alphabet (5.56% + 4.89%)—comprising one-third of the fund's value.²⁵⁴ The Fidelity total market fund, by contrast, has 3,818 holdings, of which the top three holdings represent less than one-fifth of the fund's value.²⁵⁵

To be sure, other funds, some cheaper, are available.²⁵⁶ A large endowment could perhaps create a bespoke screened fund at low cost. The reduced

²⁵² See RICHARD BREALEY, STEWART MYERS, FRANKLIN ALLEN & ALEX EDMANS, *PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE* 201 (14th ed. 2024) ("After about 20 or 30 companies, you've pretty much 'maxed out' the benefits of diversification").

²⁵³ Compare, *U.S. Sustainability Index Fund*, FIDELITY, <https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/summary/31635V398> [<https://perma.cc/SK4L-4QXF>], with *Total Market Index Fund*, FIDELITY, <https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/summary/315911693> [<https://perma.cc/MUA6-46CD>].

²⁵⁴ See *U.S. Sustainability Index Fund*, *supra* note 253.

²⁵⁵ See *Total Market Index Fund*, *supra* note 253.

²⁵⁶ For example, Vanguard offers a "social" fund with a slightly lower fee (7 basis points) but with a \$5 million investment minimum, and even this lower fee is several basis points higher

diversification of excluding an industry could perhaps be mitigated by oversampling adjacent and closely correlated industries, and perhaps at little administrative cost. But especially for a large endowment, even a single basis point of additional cost will compound over time to a large figure in absolute terms. The crucial point is that the fiduciary analysis is contextual and fact dependent; and the analysis must be reasonable, documented, and updated periodically.²⁵⁷

b. Assessing the Benefits of a Divestment

The benefits side of the ledger will also discourage divestment. In general, sober analysis will conclude that a divestment is unlikely to affect the targeted activity. This is especially true of a publicly traded security. University endowments total an impressive \$1 trillion, but that pales next to the volume of global capital markets. The average daily trading volume of public stocks in the U.S. alone is more than \$500 billion.²⁵⁸ A divestment by even a very large university endowment is thus unlikely to affect the cost of capital for a publicly traded firm (that is, the stock price of a publicly traded firm is likely to be inelastic to university endowment divestment).

Predicting the effect of a divestment of a private investment—that is, something that is not traded in a liquid public market—is more complicated. Whether the divestment will suppress the targeted activity will depend on the availability of substitute investors (that is, the liquidity of capital in the relevant market). And even if the divestment suppresses the targeted activity, the overall welfare consequences will depend on hard-to-predict substitution effects in the broader market.

Suppose, for example, a university declines a proposed investment in a private partnership to build a natural gas rig. The refusal of any singular endowment to invest in the rig will not prevent its construction or diminish its scope if other willing investors are readily available. Even if the divestment does stop or diminish the production of natural gas, the overall environmental impact will depend on the elasticity of the supply of substitutes. The reduction

than the fee for Vanguard's total market index (2 basis points with a \$100 million minimum or 3 basis points with a \$5 million minimum). *Compare Vanguard FTSE Social Index Fund Institutional Shares*, VANGUARD, <https://investor.vanguard.com/investment-products/mutual-funds/profile/vftnx> [<https://perma.cc/HUS7-HN2S>], with *Total Stock Market Index Fund Institutional Plus Shares*, VANGUARD, <https://advisors.vanguard.com/investments/products/vsmpx/vanguard-total-stock-market-index-fund-institutional-plus-shares> [<https://perma.cc/EG3S-JWRL>] and *Total Stock Market Index Fund Institutional Shares*, VANGUARD, <https://advisors.vanguard.com/investments/products/vitsx/vanguard-total-stock-market-index-fund-institutional-shares> [<https://perma.cc/6X8U-AWL9>].

²⁵⁷ See *supra* notes 211–214 and accompanying text.

²⁵⁸ See 2024 *Industry Snapshot: Market Activity*, FINRA, <https://finra.org/media-center/reports-studies/2024-industry-snapshot/market-data> [<https://perma.cc/74EF-V57F>].

in gas production may be offset by other sources of energy that are cleaner (for example, wind) or dirtier (for example, coal).

Every report by a university investment policy committee that we have reviewed has concluded that the proposed divestment would have either no effect or possibly negative unintended consequences.²⁵⁹ We are aware of no contrary analysis by a university investment policy committee. An analysis by Northwestern University, for example, expressed doubt about divestment's impact on public markets and cautioned against the unintended consequences of a divestment from fossil fuels owing to substitution among fossil fuel types as well as disproportionate impacts on the poor.²⁶⁰

But this does not mean all divestment is imprudent. UPMIFA allows for consideration of an "asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the charitable purposes of the institution."²⁶¹ The UPIA likewise allows for consideration of "an asset's special relationship or special value, if any, to the purposes of the trust."²⁶² As the reporter for the UPIA, Professor John Langbein, has explained, the prudent investor rule allows for consideration of "programmatic" benefits, such "as when the settlor directs that the family residence be retained as a home for the widow or that vacation property be held for the recreational use of family members."²⁶³ In this light, consider again the Restatement language quoted above that an "investment decision can be justified on grounds of advancing, financially or operationally, a charitable activity conducted by the trust."²⁶⁴

Accordingly, although we are unaware of directly relevant caselaw, we predict that a court would allow, say, the Sierra Club to divest from the fossil fuel industry even though that divestment would almost certainly have no effect on the cost of capital for those companies and would necessarily impose

²⁵⁹ See, e.g., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., FINAL REPORT IN RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL TO "DIVEST FROM ACTIVITIES ARMING, FINANCING, AND SUPPORTING THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF PALESTINIANS AND OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY," at iv (2025) [hereinafter HOPKINS REPORT] [<https://perma.cc/9DA5-5M54>] (concluding "divestment would have no measurable effect on the firms named in the proposal"); DUKE UNIV. ADVISORY COMM. ON INV. RESPONSIBILITY, DUKE UNIVERSITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASSES: TOWARD A CLIMATE-RESPONSIBLE INVESTING APPROACH 3 (2019), <https://acir.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2020/10/FINAL.ATT-ACIR-Report-to-Pres.-Price-2019-05-16.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/5EKB-GR9T>].

²⁶⁰ See Email from Northwestern University Board of Trustees to Northwestern University Community (June 23, 2022), <https://northwestern.edu/acir/docs/nu-fossil-fuels-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-energy-transition-investment-policy-guidelines.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/Y7PU-MK29>] (arguing that the university has "an obligation to carefully consider the potential unintended consequences" of fossil fuel divestment including "disproportionately impact[ing] lower income people" and increasing "usage of higher emission fuel sources such as thermal coal and heavy oil").

²⁶¹ UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INST. FUNDS ACT § 3(e)(1)(H) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2006).

²⁶² UNIF. PRUDENT INV. ACT § 3(c)(8) (UNIF. L. COMM'N 1994).

²⁶³ John H. Langbein, *Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts*, 98 Nw. U.L. REV. 1105, 1114–15 (2004).

²⁶⁴ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. c. (A.L.I. 2007).

a diversification cost on the endowment. Even without an impact, the divestment would have an expressive purpose. The hard question, for which there is a paucity of authority, is drawing the line between a prudent and an imprudent divestment in pursuit of a charity's charitable purpose. To our way of thinking, the example of the Sierra Club is an easy case. Not owning fossil fuel companies is readily located at the heart of the Club's charitable purpose, and even a significant diversification cost could be understood as a reasonable price for staying within that purpose.

But there are limits to this "special purpose" line of reasoning. A trustee of a private trust would have difficulty justifying retention of a crumbling family vacation home that cost more in upkeep than funding an alternative family vacation, especially if the beneficiaries' other needs were not being met. Likewise, suppose for the sake of argument that an environmental charity's complete divestment from fossil fuels would add 100 basis points per year in administrative costs and would constrain the portfolio to ten holdings. The trustees of that charity would likewise struggle to justify that cost to the endowment of an expressive benefit when other pressing needs were at hand.

3. Reputation and Constituency Management

In workshopping earlier drafts of this paper, a common suggestion was that a university endowment divestment could be justified on grounds of reputational benefits or constituency management. The theory is that pursuit of a university's research and educational purpose will be more efficacious—perhaps by attracting better faculty, mollifying students, or fostering alumni support—if the university avoids objectionable endowment holdings. On this theory, a divestment that would otherwise fall outside of the university's research and educational purpose is brought within that purpose by way of reputational or constituency management benefits. We conclude that, while reputation and constituency management provide colorable legal bases for a divestment, they are unlikely to pass a loyalty analysis for the entire endowment and face challenging practical issues of proof under a prudence analysis.²⁶⁵

A reputational or constituency management theory runs into the recurring problem of the diversity of purposes within the restricted endowment. The claimed reputational or constituency management benefits would need to further the specific narrower purpose of each restricted gift within the restricted endowment. Thus, although a reputational or constituency management benefits defense under a loyalty challenge is plausible in theory, it will be difficult

²⁶⁵ We give further treatment to the normative and prudential challenges of divestment for reputational or constituency management benefits in Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 29.

to defend in fact owing to the many and varied narrower specific purposes within a large university's restricted endowment. It is not obvious, for example, that placating undergraduate protesters would advance the purpose of a restricted gift for medical school research on pancreatic cancer.

For the unrestricted endowment, by contrast, a reputational or constituency management basis for divestment is more plausible. These funds are held for the university's overall research and educational purpose, and reputational or constituency management benefits more clearly fit within that more general purpose. But the typical practice of a single pooled endowment prevents a separate divestment for the unrestricted endowment. Moreover, as before, separately managing the unrestricted and restricted endowments to facilitate a divestment on the unrestricted side would unwind the economies of scale that were the reason for the pooling in the first place.

Assessing a reputational or constituency management benefit under the duty of prudence is also fraught. Reputational benefits are easy to claim but hard to prove. Yet the duty of prudence requires an assessment of costs and benefits such that a vague allusion to reputational benefits will not suffice.²⁶⁶ But we can think of no way rigorously to assess reputational harm avoided. Moreover, the shift in university endowment practice from direct holdings to externally managed funds has decreased the connection of the university to the underlying activities of the firms in which the university is invested while increasing the costs of a divestment.²⁶⁷ This shift, in other words, will tend to reduce the reputational payoff of a divestment while increasing its costs.

There are additional practical impediments to a reputational or constituency management divestment, which we explore in greater detail elsewhere.²⁶⁸ To summarize here, justifying a divestment based on reputation or constituency management necessarily rests on an acknowledgment that the divestment was undertaken to protect the reputation of the university or to mollify a constituency. Declaring some investments off limits for reputational reasons invites a reputational analysis of the remaining investments, which as a practical matter the board may have to defend to other constituencies. Such a declaration can itself introduce reputational harms as the university picks and chooses its positions or declares some divestments too costly—in effect, putting a price on its values. Likewise, a divestment to mollify a constituency, such as disruptive student protesters, would be an acknowledgment that disruptive protests work, perhaps inviting additional such disruptions. While not

²⁶⁶ To the extent a reputational benefits theory is meant to bring within the charitable purpose something that is on its face not otherwise within that purpose, arguably the trust law rule for a structural conflict of interest would apply, under which “the conduct of the trustee in the administration of the trust will be subject to especially careful scrutiny.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 37 cmt. f(1) (A.L.I. 2007).

²⁶⁷ See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 29.

²⁶⁸ *Id.*

categorically dispositive, these practical issues should be considered by the board as part of a prudent process.

All told, a reputation or constituency management basis for a university divestment is colorable but is likely to be factually difficult to apply in practice. Consistent with this analysis, as elaborated below in Part III, those major endowments that have policies that allow for divestment on the grounds of “moral abhorrence” emphasize the extreme standards required to find abhorrence and the rarity of such circumstances. In practice, abhorrence has rarely been invoked.

F. Fiduciary Principles and Academic Disassociation

As noted at the outset, by “academic disassociation” we refer to prohibiting the university’s research or educational activities from contact with an objectionable firm, industry, or country.²⁶⁹ Although less common than calls for endowment divestment, some student and faculty activists have also called for academic disassociation.²⁷⁰ Because an academic disassociation would ordinarily be classified as a programmatic or operational decision, distinct from investment management, the fiduciary principles applicable to academic disassociation are less stringent. We divide our analysis into three parts: (1) academic disassociation; (2) the related question of accepting or rejecting a gift; and (3) porousness in the line between programmatic and investment decisions.

1. Academic Disassociation

In contrast to endowment management, a typical university’s academic program is governed by the less rigorous corporate fiduciary duty of care, including some version of the business judgment rule.²⁷¹ A university board’s decisions regarding the academic program will be shielded from judicial review so long as the board follows a rational process and its decisions have some rational basis.²⁷²

For example, a university board could conclude that its academic program should include a center for the study of climate change. A different board under the same circumstances could conclude that such a center was not warranted. Provided that the decision was rooted in a rational process, either outcome would fall comfortably within the range of fiduciary discretion shielded by the business judgment rule. As we have seen, the underlying policy judgment is

²⁶⁹ See *supra* note 16 and accompanying text.

²⁷⁰ See *supra* note 17 and accompanying text.

²⁷¹ See *supra* II.D.2.

²⁷² See *id.*

that subjecting contestable programmatic decisions to rigorous judicial review would be impractical and paralyzing.²⁷³

Of course, in approving (or not) a center for the study of climate change, a board might be influenced by its members' personal political preferences. But unlike the sole interest rule of trust law, the best interest standard of the corporate law duty of loyalty tolerates mixed motives. As a practical matter, the decision would be reviewable only if there were more open conflicts of interest in the creation of the center, such as the naming of a spouse of a board member as the director of the center. Even then, such a conflict could be cleansed by disinterested board approval or defended as "fair" based on the spouse's qualifications.²⁷⁴

Accordingly, although we are aware of no directly applicable caselaw, we predict that an academic disassociation by a university organized as a corporation would likely survive fiduciary judicial scrutiny. Speaking only from a fiduciary perspective, and so setting aside state and federal antidiscrimination laws,²⁷⁵ a university could likely close its Israel programs and disassociate from Israeli universities, just as it could open an Israel program and increase its associations with Israeli universities. In either case, the decision would be effectively unreviewable as a fiduciary matter.

2. Accepting and Rejecting Gifts

In workshoping earlier drafts of this paper, we were sometimes asked about the fiduciary principles applicable to accepting or rejecting a gift, and how they relate to those applicable to endowment divestment and academic disassociation. Although we are not aware of directly applicable caselaw, we believe that the doctrinal answer is clear. The decision to accept or reject a gift is fundamentally an operational decision to which the corporate law standard of care, including the business judgment rule, would apply.

Settled principles of property law and trust law provide the relevant context. Under property law, an intended donee cannot be compelled to accept a gift; a gift is not complete without the intended donee's acceptance.²⁷⁶ Under trust law, an intended trustee cannot be compelled to accept a trusteeship;

²⁷³ *See id.*

²⁷⁴ *See, e.g.,* DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 237 of the 153rd General Assembly); *Bayer v. Beran*, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that hiring of spouse was fair under the circumstances).

²⁷⁵ *See, e.g.,* Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").

²⁷⁶ *See, e.g.,* RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(b) (A.L.I. 2003) ("Acceptance by the donee is required for a gift to become complete. Acceptance is presumed, subject to the donee's right to refuse or disclaim.").

a trusteeship does not arise without the intended trustee's acceptance.²⁷⁷ Under settled principles of property law and trust law, therefore, the decision to accept or reject a gift necessarily concerns assets that are not held yet by the university and over which the university has only a power of acceptance or rejection. It follows that the decision to accept or reject a gift is subject to the deferential corporate standard of care, including the business judgment rule. Until a gift is accepted, the prudent investor rule is not yet triggered, and the ordinary fiduciary principles applicable to an operational decision by a charitable corporation apply.

To be sure, this conclusion rests on a formal distinction. But the distinction reflects a longstanding fiduciary policy that grants a board of a charity broad discretion in managing the charitable program but subjects the investment program to a more constraining portfolio theory standard of review. If decisions concerning gift acceptance were subject to a more exacting standard of review, board discretion and, ultimately, the charitable purpose of the organization could be hijacked by donors.²⁷⁸ Indeed, the connection between a donation and the loss of university independence, arising in part from the donor's resulting leverage and the prospect of additional donations, has been judicially recognized.²⁷⁹ This concern is most evident for a restricted gift, for which an acceptance would bind the university, potentially in perpetuity, to effectuating the narrower purpose of the gift. But the point is true also for an unrestricted gift, even a modest one, as a charity's decisions about its scale and whether it can appropriately steward a gift are not investment decisions and cannot be classified as such if the board is to retain discretion over the administration of the charity. Consequently, a decision to accept or reject a gift is properly reviewed as a programmatic decision.

On a pragmatic level, accepting a donation will often tie the university, both formally and informally, to the donor in more concrete ways than an endowment holding. A restricted gift comes with the trust law sole interest rule and recognition of donor standing, giving rise to a potential new litigant. Even an unrestricted gift involves reputational risk because the potential for taint by

²⁷⁷ See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 35 (A.L.I. 2003) ("A designated trustee may accept the trusteeship either by words or by conduct. . . . A designated trustee who has not accepted the trusteeship may decline it."); UNIF. TR. CODE § 701(b) (UNIF. L. COMM'N. 2000) ("A person designated as trustee who has not yet accepted the trusteeship may reject the trusteeship.").

²⁷⁸ Similar concerns motivate arguments in favor of protecting director discretion in for-profit corporations. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, *Director Primacy*, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 17 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).

²⁷⁹ See *In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig.*, 824 A.2d 917, 920–21, 942–46 (Del. Ch. 2003) (rejecting a special litigation committee as not independent in part because two committee members were Stanford University faculty and the defendant corporation and its CEO had made substantial contributions to Stanford University); see also *In re The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig.*, No. 17148–NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding a lack of independence between a university president and a corporate officer due to "owingness" the university president would likely feel due to a large donation).

association remains. These concerns are not theoretical. Qatari donations to universities have become a focus of public and Congressional concern,²⁸⁰ and the ongoing Jeffrey Epstein scandal has likewise touched universities. MIT, for example, accepted \$750,000 in donations from Jeffrey Epstein to support the work of a professor and an academic center after Epstein's conviction for sex offenses.²⁸¹ Harvard, likewise, is still working to address the taint of its associations with Epstein.²⁸² The more direct reputational tie arising from donations is a further justification for the different standards of review governing gift acceptance versus endowment divestment.

3. Distinguishing Investment and Programmatic Assets

As illustrated by the foregoing discussion, the fiduciary consequences of characterizing a decision as programmatic or investment are profound. Given the much more deferential standard of review applicable to programmatic decisions, there may be an incentive to characterize what would otherwise be an endowment divestment as a programmatic decision. For example, a university might purchase a wind farm with unrestricted endowment funds, but then recharacterize the holding as being primarily for programmatic rather than investment purposes,²⁸³ to shift the standard of review from the prudent investor rule to the business judgment rule.

We acknowledge that UPMIFA's test of "primarily for investment" versus "primarily to accomplish a charitable purpose of the institution" may indeed open the door in some circumstances to such a recharacterization. In the words of the Restatement, "[s]ome assets are difficult to categorize as they may serve equally investment and programmatic purposes."²⁸⁴ But this potential for recharacterization is an edge case. So far as we can tell, recharacterization was not at issue in the salient historical examples of university divestment.

²⁸⁰ See Stephen Kalin, Eliot Brown & Joel Schectman, *How Qatar Spent Billions to Gain Influence in the U.S.*, WALL ST. J. (May 15, 2025) (discussing concerns about Qatari influence in U.S. higher education).

²⁸¹ GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, REPORT CONCERNING JEFFREY EPSTEIN'S INTERACTIONS WITH THE MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 5 (2020) [<https://perma.cc/2V5X-ECB2>].

²⁸² See, e.g., Dhruv T. Patel & Cam N. Srivastava, *Harvard to Launch New Investigation into Epstein's Ties to Summers*, *Other University Affiliates*, HARV. CRIMSON (Nov. 19, 2025), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2025/11/19/harvard-opens-investigation-into-summers-epstein/> [<https://perma.cc/4JYQ-EY7U>].

²⁸³ See, e.g., *Ethical Investment Policy*, YALE INV. OFF. (2016), <https://web.archive.org/web/20161009235201/http://investments.yale.edu/social-responsibility/> [<https://perma.cc/59EM-DHMC>] ("Beginning in 2007, Yale's [endowment] managers, in conjunction with local wind power development firms, identified several sites with attractive [wind] capacity factors. . . . One site in particular, Record Hill Wind, is fully operational and was transferred from the Endowment to the University, and is now maintained by the Yale Office of Facilities. This project will help meet Yale's goal of reducing 2020 emissions to 10 percent below 1990 levels, furthering Yale in its quest to become the world's greenest university.").


²⁸⁴ RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 2.04 cmt. c (A.L.I. 2021) (discussing endowment versus program-related assets).

Nor does it pertain in the context of current divestment demands. We therefore set recharacterization aside and turn now to our survey of university divestment practice, past and present.

III. UNIVERSITY DIVESTMENT IN PRACTICE: PAST AND PRESENT

Have universities adhered to the fiduciary principles canvassed above? We now consider: (a) the divestment precedents of South Africa under apartheid, tobacco, and Sudan during the Darfur war; (b) the proliferation of formalized divestment policies by universities with the largest endowments; and (c) the contemporary divestment from fossil fuels and current demands to divest from Israel. Figure 2 orients the analysis chronologically, situating South Africa, tobacco, Sudan, fossil fuels, and Israel on a timeline alongside the Yale Model and the key legal authorities discussed above. Consistent with our legal analysis, we find that American universities have for the most part not engaged in legally problematic divestments.

FIGURE 2: DIVESTMENT ACTION TIMELINE



We must, however, note an important caveat. The investment practices of university endowments are not subject to public disclosure rules, and thus are often opaque, especially in view of the shift from public securities, which in some cases are disclosed in public SEC filings (as per Table 1), to private holdings. What follows reflects our best inferential analysis based on public statements by universities (where we could find them) and secondary media or other such reports. These sources are admittedly incomplete and sometimes contradictory. Some university divestment claims are unclear, confusing, or

even misleading. Nonetheless, the quantity and variety of the evidence give us confidence in our overall conclusions, albeit with less confidence in any specific detail.

A. *Historic Divestment: South Africa, Tobacco, and Sudan*

What emerges from our excavation of the history of divestment before the mid-2000s is an enormous difference between perception and reality. In general, universities did not engage in significant divestments from South Africa under apartheid, and only a few divested from tobacco (with evidently all but one having since retreated from that divestment). Many universities divested from Sudan during the Darfur war, but those divestments involved only a few firms. Moreover, the South Africa and Sudan divestments were encouraged by governmental policy, and they occurred when direct ownership of individual securities was more common.

1. South Africa

The first salient calls for university endowment divestment involved South Africa's apartheid regime, with widespread and sometimes disruptive student protests, including encampments.²⁸⁵ But it was Congress, not university leadership, that was the primary driver of meaningful divestment. Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, which barred directed flights to and trade of various items with South Africa, among other financial sanctions.²⁸⁶ As a result of the Anti-Apartheid Act, many firms abandoned or at least restricted their business contacts with South Africa, with the second-order effect of reducing university endowment exposure to South Africa.²⁸⁷

Direct divestment by university endowments, as compared to divestment by individual firms following the Anti-Apartheid Act, was more limited than commonly assumed today. A 1988 study found that only 155 universities (out of thousands) had divested to any degree.²⁸⁸ Of those divesting univer-

²⁸⁵ See, e.g., *1987 Divestment*, BROWN UNIV. LIBR., <https://library.brown.edu/create/protest6090/1987-divestment/> [<https://perma.cc/S85A-EMUG>] (describing disruption of Brown board meetings and construction of a "shanty town" on the Brown campus); John Besche, *The Shanties on the Plaza*, YALE ALUMNI MAG. (Nov.-Dec. 2024), <https://yalealumnimagazine.org/articles/5946-the-shanties-on-the-plaza> [<https://perma.cc/8T7Z-HZ5X>] (describing a "shanty town" at Yale).

²⁸⁶ Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986).

²⁸⁷ See, e.g., Besche, *supra* note 285 ("[C]orporations operating in South Africa shrank from 21 percent to 3 percent of Yale's endowment by 1991, largely because companies left on their own, and the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 mostly obviated any would-be resolutions the Yale Corporation could have introduced at shareholder meetings.").

²⁸⁸ See THE AFRICA FUND, DIVESTMENT ACTION ON SOUTH AFRICA BY U.S. AND CANADIAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (1988) [<https://perma.cc/4BDJ-FV45>].

sities, two-thirds limited their divestments to firms that refused to sign the so-called Sullivan Principles, an anti-discrimination pledge for South African operations.²⁸⁹ Such “selective” divestment involved only a few firms. For example, by the 1990s Harvard had reportedly divested from only fifteen firms, and Yale had reportedly divested from only seventeen.²⁹⁰

Selective divestment from South Africa in the 1980s could plausibly pass fiduciary scrutiny. On the prudence side, a selective divestment was likely *de minimis*.²⁹¹ The Yale Model had just been introduced, and universities tended to still hold directly a substantial amount of publicly traded securities. Replacing a few publicly traded securities with other publicly traded securities could plausibly be achieved at low cost and with little effect on portfolio efficiency.²⁹² On the loyalty side, both university and public policy had come to embrace strong anti-discrimination norms, with state and federal governmental actions, including direct sanctions, evidencing a strong public policy against South Africa’s apartheid system in particular. A *de minimis* portfolio restructuring to avoid or minimize investment in South Africa could plausibly be defended as falling within that public policy, resolving the problem of myriad restricted funds and the sole interest rule applicable to them.

Some universities that resisted more substantial divestment from South Africa pointed to the harm to the portfolio and the lack of effect on the problem itself. For example, Harvard President Derek Bok rejected a broader divestment by pointing to the portfolio cost, the incongruity of failing to

²⁸⁹ The Sullivan Principles were named for General Motors director Reverend Leon Sullivan. See DAVID HAUCK, MEG VOORHES & GLENN GOLDBERG, TWO DECADES OF DEBATE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 147 (1983); Paul Lewis, *Leon Sullivan, 78, Dies; Fought Apartheid*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2001), <https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/26/world/leon-sullivan-78-dies-fought-apartheid.html> [<https://perma.cc/7X43-SELX>]. Sullivan eventually came to favor total divestment from South Africa. See *Sullivan Principles’ Author Hopes for Change*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1986), <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/22/business/sullivan-principles-author-hopes-for-change.html> [<https://perma.cc/5NBN-QF2K>]. For the two-thirds figure, see THE AFRICA FUND, *supra* note 288 (listing 101 of 155 divesting schools as having limited divestment to companies not complying with the Sullivan Principles).

²⁹⁰ See Randal S. Jeffrey, *Divest Completely . . .*, HARV. CRIMSON (Oct. 2, 1990), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1990/10/2/divest-completely-pbobj/> [<https://perma.cc/B6RK-K3BW>] (criticizing Harvard’s selective divestment); Matthew Lloyd-Thomas & Adrian Rodrigues, *After Corporation Decision Divestment Strategy Uncertain*, YALE DAILY NEWS (Sep. 5, 2014), <https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2014/09/05/after-corp-decision-divestment-strategy-uncertain/> [<https://perma.cc/78A2-ANPY>] (reporting Yale divested from only seventeen South Africa linked companies by the early 1990s). A 1985 news report, which predates the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, indicates that Columbia had planned to divest from twenty-five firms. See Robert D. McFadden, *Columbia Plans to Sell By ‘87 Stock Linked to South Africa*, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 1985), <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/08/nyregion/columbia-plans-to-sell-by-87-stock-linked-to-south-africa.html> [<https://perma.cc/9ADX-C8L2>].

²⁹¹ For a similar analysis in the context of public pension funds, see Fisch & Schwartz, *supra* note 15, at 757–58 (discussing caselaw permitting selective divestment from South Africa by public pension funds).

²⁹² See Blake R. Grossman & William F. Sharpe, *Financial Implications of South African Divestment*, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 17 (1986) (finding that selective divestment would leave unchanged traditional measures of portfolio risk and return).

divest from other countries with terrible human rights records, and the probability of divestment being ineffective or counterproductive.²⁹³ “I believe that moral judgments require rational arguments,” Bok was quoted as saying, and “I would consider it quite wrong and probably illegal to make important decisions involving Harvard’s finances on the basis of ‘non-rational’ judgments.”²⁹⁴

While making a limited, Sullivan-style selective divestment, Harvard did not ignore apartheid or student concerns over it. Consistent with the law’s greater deference to academic programming, Bok emphasized two actions taken within the academic program. First, Harvard launched a variety of academically-oriented pursuits around the issue of apartheid, including scholarships for Black South Africans and other academic initiatives.²⁹⁵ Second, Bok emphasized shareholder voice, committing Harvard to vote its shares “to induce companies in its portfolio to implement” anti-apartheid policies aligned with the Sullivan Principles.²⁹⁶ Selling Harvard’s shares, Bok argued, would increase the number of shareholders who “have no qualms” about the issue at hand.²⁹⁷

By contrast, a broad divestment from all firms with any business connection to South Africa, as many protesters advocated, would have been almost impossible to defend. Such a divestment would skew portfolios

²⁹³ Jeffrey C. Wu, *Bok and Activists Reach Standoff on Divestment*, HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 2, 1990), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1990/4/2/bok-and-activists-reach-standoff-on/> [<https://perma.cc/KY78-6R7T>] (reporting that Harvard President Bok pointed that the arguments by pro-divestment activists were “irrational” and pointing to the fiduciary obligation to properly manage the portfolio); HARVARD UNIV., *THE PRESIDENT’S REPORT 1989–1990*, at 7–9 (1991), [https://iif.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:427018319\\$11i](https://iif.harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:427018319$11i) [<https://perma.cc/94HA-XGMU>]. At least one analysis on the effectiveness of South African divestment concluded that it did little to hasten the fall of Apartheid. See Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch & C. Paul Wazzan, *The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from the South African Boycott*, 72 J. BUS. 35 (1999) (empirically assessing the effect of divestment and concluding no measurable significant effect on South African economy). Amid pressure to divest from South Africa, Dow Chemical continued operating its South African factory that made anti-tuberculosis drugs. See Richard C. Paddock, *Governor Signs South African Divestiture Bill*, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 27, 1986), <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-09-27-mn-10376-story.html> [<https://perma.cc/RQ2V-GPAX>].

²⁹⁴ See Wu, *supra* note 293. Bok pointed to warnings that South African divestment could be counterproductive. Bok, *supra* note 20, at 66. Others also pointed to the potential harm to Black South Africans that may arise from divestment. See, e.g., Paddock, *supra* note 293 (quoting Tenneco spokesman: “We feel our presence there is of benefit to the black community”); McFadden, *supra* note 290 (quoting Columbia’s board chairman as commenting that American companies in South Africa were making “significant efforts on behalf of blacks in that country”).

²⁹⁵ See, e.g., Bok, *supra* note 20, at 65 (discussing Harvard’s successful scholarship program for Black South Africans). Partnerships with non-discriminating universities in South Africa were possible too. See Pierre J. Hugo, *Academic Dissent and Apartheid in South Africa*, 7 J. BLACK STUD. 243, 243–44 (1977) (discussing the opposition of South African English-language universities to Apartheid).

²⁹⁶ See Bok’s *Statement on South Africa*, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 15, 1985), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1985/2/15/boks-statement-on-south-africa-pbifollowing/> [<https://perma.cc/NDW3-YBQN>].

²⁹⁷ Bok, *supra* note 20, at 63.

away from large-cap firms with international operations and toward small-cap firms in mostly domestic industries,²⁹⁸ significantly impairing portfolio efficiency. Moreover, notwithstanding the strong public policy against apartheid, a university probably could not have made a direct expenditure against apartheid—a programmatic decision that, as we have seen, is subject to less stringent fiduciary principles.²⁹⁹

Contemporary legal commentators, most prominently John Langbein and Richard Posner,³⁰⁰ and some investment managers reached the same conclusion.³⁰¹ Indeed, a few commentators who were strongly in favor of divestment on moral grounds conceded that fiduciary principles did not permit total divestment and therefore advocated for law reform.³⁰² The University of California's divestment from South Africa, which appears to be the only substantial divestment by 1988,³⁰³ is a telling anecdote. The Regents had declined a broad divestment until the state enacted legislation promising indemnification for any resulting fiduciary liability.³⁰⁴ The divestment involved selling

²⁹⁸ See Richard M. Ennis & Roberta L. Parkhill, *South African Divestment: Social Responsibility or Fiduciary Folly?*, 42 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 30, 34–35 (1986) (listing the percentage of various economic and market sectors in the S&P 500 that would be subject to divestment); see also John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, *Social Investing and the Law of Trusts*, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 85–88 (1980).

²⁹⁹ See *supra* note 228 and accompanying text.

³⁰⁰ See Langbein & Posner, *supra* note 298, at 96; see also Robert J. Lynn, *Investing Pension Funds for Social Goals Requires Changing the Law*, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 110 (1981) (concluding that “there is little support from traditional sources for using social criteria for investment”); Ennis & Parkhill, *supra* note 298, at 35 (concluding that divestment to any degree violates the exclusive purpose test); Robert H. Jerry & O. Maurice Joy, *Social Investing and the Lessons of South Africa Divestment: Rethinking the Limitations on Fiduciary Discretion*, 66 OR. L. REV. 685, 747–48 (1987) (concluding that trustees may consider collateral benefits if investments are “economically equal” but predicting trustees would not do so given lack of clear law); but see Ann-Catherine Blank, Comment, *The South African Divestment Debate: Factoring “Political Risk” into the Prudent Investor Rule*, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 201, 213–16 (1986) (arguing that fiduciary investors should consider political risks, which could make investments in South Africa unattractive); Thomas A. Troyer, Walter B. Slocombe & Robert A. Boisture, *Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions, and Pension Funds*, 74 GEO. L.J. 127, 149–50 (1985) (“More traditional trust law principles suggest that a trustee who approves a divestment policy breaches his or her duty of loyalty because he or she is pursuing an objective extraneous to the purposes of the trust. However, this analysis fails to account for the various ways in which divestment may advance a trust’s charitable purposes.”).

³⁰¹ See Barnaby J. Feder, *A Wary Reception for the Sullivan Stand*, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1987), <https://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/08/business/a-wary-reception-for-sullivan-stand.html> [<https://perma.cc/45KH-DBQD>] (reporting that some fund managers, citing fiduciary obligation, refused divestment).

³⁰² See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, *Arguments in Favor of Fiduciary Divestment of South African Securities*, 65 NEB. L. REV. 209, 225, 233–36, 241 (1986) (arguing that costless divestment is permissible, but acknowledging that costly divestment might require changing the law); Joel C. Dobris, *SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible Investing, That Is)*, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755, 788–90 (2008).

³⁰³ See THE AFRICA FUND, *supra* note 288. A 1985 report indicates that Columbia had planned an extensive divestment. See McFadden, *supra* note 290.

³⁰⁴ See Jay Mathews, *California Regents Vote to Divest \$3.1 Billion in South Africa Holdings*, WASH. POST (July 18, 1986), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/07/19/>

\$3.1 billion of assets (roughly \$9 billion in present dollars³⁰⁵), with inescapable portfolio efficiency consequences, and taking a one-time administrative cost estimated at \$118 million.³⁰⁶

2. Tobacco

In contrast to widespread, though largely *de minimis*, selective divestment from South Africa during Apartheid, most universities have declined any degree of divestment from tobacco. The most prominent endowment divestments from tobacco occurred between the late 1980s and early 2000s by Harvard, Michigan, Johns Hopkins, and the University of California, and by Dartmouth in 2012.³⁰⁷

Other universities with substantial endowments, such as Yale and the University of Pennsylvania, explicitly rejected tobacco divestment.³⁰⁸ Moreover, Harvard, Michigan, Hopkins, and Dartmouth are evidently no longer fully divested from tobacco. Harvard has since held index funds that

california-regents-vote-to-divest-31-billion-in-south-africa-holdings/bf29e8db-655f-4c40-9b62-4e9a08d02959/ [https://perma.cc/NQU8-XQDW] (reporting that trustees agreed to South Africa divestment only after Governor Deukmejian, who supported divestment, agreed to sign a law indemnifying the trustees from liability arising out of divestment).

³⁰⁵ The present-dollar figure adjusts for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator. See *CPI Inflation Calculator*, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/6B5Y-H9AS].

³⁰⁶ See Mathews, *supra* note 304.

³⁰⁷ Goldie Blumenstyk, *Many Wealthy Universities Drop Tobacco Stocks*, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 13, 1993), <https://www.chronicle.com/article/many-wealthy-universities-drop-to-bacco-stocks/> [https://perma.cc/MS9W-EWTN] (“Harvard and the Johns Hopkins University adopted tobacco-divestment policies in 1989 and 1991, respectively.”); *U-M to Divest Its Holdings in Tobacco Manufacturing Companies*, MICH. NEWS (June 16, 2000), <https://news.umich.edu/u-m-to-divest-its-holdings-in-tobacco-manufacturing-companies/> [https://perma.cc/4PL7-SLA7]; DARTMOUTH COLL. ADVISORY COMM. ON INV. RESP., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PREPARED FOR THE DARTMOUTH COMMUNITY FISCAL 2018 [hereinafter DARTMOUTH 2018], https://www.dartmouth.edu/investments/docs/2018_acir_annual_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FJ95-XL7S] (“On June 2, 2012, Dartmouth’s Board of Trustees voted to divest Dartmouth’s tobacco holdings.”). The University of California, which had reportedly not held tobacco stocks for decades, voted in 2001 to permanently exclude them from its portfolio. See Kenneth R. 18, 2001), <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jan-18-mn-13627-story.html> [https://perma.cc/3BAK-3976]. In addition, Northwestern was reported to have had a “tradition” of not holding tobacco stocks. See Blumenstyk, *supra* note 307. At least one press report claims that Stanford divested from tobacco in the 1990s, but we were unable to find corroborating evidence that Stanford in fact did so. See, e.g., Randall Smith, *Fossil Fuels Are the New Tobacco*, THE TECH (Sep. 6, 2013), <https://thetech.com/2013/09/06/wire2-v133-n35> [https://perma.cc/73LG-R7N3] (reporting that “Harvard, Stanford and CalPERS all sold their tobacco stocks” in the 1990s).

³⁰⁸ See Scott Jaschik, *Penn Rejects Divestment of Tobacco Company Stock*, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (June 22, 2014), <https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/06/23/penn-rejects-divestment-tobacco-company-stock> [https://perma.cc/9VT4-P5FG]; Susie Poppick, *Report Outlines Tobacco Policies*, YALE DAILY NEWS (Oct. 28, 2004), <https://yaledailynews.com/articles/report-outlines-tobacco-policies> [https://perma.cc/RP53-DV77] (reporting on the Yale board’s rejection of tobacco divestment).

own shares in tobacco companies,³⁰⁹ and the University of Michigan and Hopkins appear likewise to have moved to equity holdings via investment funds without a tobacco screen.³¹⁰ Dartmouth imposed a tobacco screen on its outside managers at least as of 2018.³¹¹ But Dartmouth's most recent disclosure of its direct public market holdings shows that it holds at least one broadly diversified index fund that includes tobacco companies.³¹²

So far as we can tell, only the University of California remains completely divested from tobacco. When the University of California endowment shifted to index funds in the early 2000s, it eventually created its own bespoke fund that filtered out tobacco and fossil fuels.³¹³ We have not found an assessment of the costs relative to public index funds of this in-house index fund. But the diversification costs of excluding entire industries are apparent. Indeed, the professional investment advisors to the UC system advised

³⁰⁹ See Ruoyi Zhang, *Harvard Indirectly Holds Nearly \$100,000 Worth of Stocks in Tobacco Companies*, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 10, 2020), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2020/3/10/harvard-tobacco-stocks-divestment/> [<https://perma.cc/DHU3-GCT3>] (estimating from Harvard's public disclosures of only two percent of its ownership interests that it had about \$100,000 worth of shares in tobacco companies through exchange-traded funds).

³¹⁰ See UNIV. OF MICH., ENDOWMENT INVESTMENT REPORT 2023, at 13 (2023), <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1O583spU73r14V-rrpFQhWrRyzwmPQDXO/view> [<https://perma.cc/7ZNP-4C6V>] ("The university invests in public equities through both commingled funds . . . and through separate accounts, where securities are selected by managers but held at the university's custodian. The portfolio has a global mandate and *can hold stocks in any investable market.*") (emphasis added); HOPKINS REPORT, *supra* note 259, at 33 ("Today, most universities—including JHU—invest their endowments through external managers and have very few if any directly held investments in stocks and bonds. Much of the directly held investments universities hold are in vehicles *such as market index products like ETFs*. This modern structure . . . makes divestment of any kind costly, difficult, and highly impractical.") (emphasis added).

³¹¹ See DARTMOUTH 2018, *supra* note 307, at 3 ("Further, the Board of Trustees directed the Investment Office to create a mechanism with which to ensure that none of Dartmouth's investment managers purchase tobacco stocks for Dartmouth's portfolio in the future. The current tobacco list is based on MSCI's ACWI Tobacco Index.").

³¹² Dartmouth's most recent Form 13F-HR, filed with the SEC on January 14, 2026 for year-end 2025, shows more than \$225 million invested in the SPDR S&P 500 ETF, which includes tobacco firms. See Dartmouth Coll., Report Filed by Institutional Investment Managers (Form 13F-HR) (Jan. 14, 2026), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1599404/000159940426000002/xslForm13F_X02/dart13f20251231.xml [<https://perma.cc/E8SH-BR63>]; see also STATE ST. INV. MGMT., SPDR S&P 500 ETF TRUST ANNUAL REPORT 1, 6 (2025) <https://www.ssga.com/us/en/intermediary/resources/doc-viewer#spy&annual-report> [<https://perma.cc/3LKQ-R8ZS>] (listing tobacco firms such as Altria and Philip Morris International among its holdings).

³¹³ See REGENTS POLICY 6110: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA BLUE AND GOLD ENDOWMENT INVESTMENT POLICY STATEMENT 3 (2025), <https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/policies/6110.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/7AV7-LNUK>] (describing the Blue and Gold Endowment Fund as a passively managed fund "established by the Regents with the objective to provide a low cost, liquid, diversified investment vehicle in which the various UC organizations can invest their long-term excess capital reserves"). The fund does not invest in tobacco or fossil fuels. See *id.* at 5–6 (benchmarking the fund's equity holdings to a tobacco and fossil fuels free index). As of 2025, the UC Endowment held almost twenty-two percent of its endowment assets in the Blue and Gold Endowment Fund. See OFF. OF THE CHIEF INV. OFFICER OF THE REGENTS (UC INVS.), REVIEW OF THIRD QUARTER 2024–25 FISCAL YEAR PERFORMANCE FOR UC RETIREMENT, ENDOWMENT, AND WORKING CAPITAL ASSETS 1, 3 (2025), <https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/may25/i1.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/APL8-RPBU>] (reporting total UC endowment of \$29.8 billion, of which \$6.5 billion was in the Blue and Gold Endowment Pool).

against tobacco divestment.³¹⁴ And a 2009 self-assessment concluded that the tobacco divestment had indeed resulted in \$377.8 million in forgone investment returns between 2001 and 2009.³¹⁵ Similarly, a twenty-year retrospective study by California's public pension system found that its parallel tobacco divestment had resulted in an estimated \$3.7 billion in forgone returns from 2001 to 2020.³¹⁶ Based on their relative sizes, this would represent approximately \$219 million in forgone returns for the UC system.³¹⁷

The legality of tobacco divestment is a harder case than the selective divestments from South Africa. On the prudence side, whereas selective divestment from South Africa typically involved selling off a handful of stocks across multiple industries, which could be replaced with other stocks in those same industries, tobacco divestment involves exiting an entire industry. Textbook finance teaches that exclusion of an entire industry comes with a diversification cost, as noted by the University of California's investment advisors. Moreover, screened index funds tend to be more expensive.³¹⁸

There is also the question of balancing costs against benefits. For the reasons discussed earlier, a divestment by university endowments of public holdings is unlikely to affect activity levels.³¹⁹ Indeed, when Yale's Advisory Committee on Investment Responsibility considered tobacco divestment in

³¹⁴ See Weiss, *supra* note 307 ("Ignoring professional investment advice, University of California regents Wednesday instructed their staff to snuff out plans to purchase \$55 million in tobacco stocks."). Later advice to the state employee retirement system was in accord. See Associated Press, *CalPERS to Sell Off \$550 Million in Tobacco Investments*, NBC BAY AREA (Dec. 19, 2016), <https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/calpers-to-sell-off-550-million-in-tobacco-investments/143233/> [<https://perma.cc/9WEK-NRLC>] ("In a 9-3 vote, the CalPERS investment committee disregarded the advice from its own financial advisers who recommended reversing a sell-off of tobacco stock that was approved in 2000, which has cost the system more than \$3 billion in lost earnings.").

³¹⁵ OFF. OF THE TREASURER OF THE REGENTS, UNIV. OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT ON DIVESTMENT POLICIES – IMPACT OF REGENTS' INVESTMENT POLICIES ON TOBACCO AND SUDAN 3 (2009), <https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/sept09/i8attach.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/4KYC-EVHP>] (estimating a cumulative opportunity cost of \$377.8 million from 2001 to 2009 for the tobacco-free equity portfolio relative to the unrestricted index).

³¹⁶ See CALPERS INV. COMM., FIVE-YEAR DIVESTMENT REVIEW 3–4 (2021), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/board-agendas/202103/invest/item09a-01_a.pdf [<https://perma.cc/W5B6-JGAH>] (showing a "return impact" of negative \$3,692 million for the tobacco divestment since its 2001 inception through November 2020).

³¹⁷ CalPERS reported \$502.9 billion under management in July 2024. *CalPERS Reports Preliminary 9.3% Investment Return for 2023-24 Fiscal Year*, CALPERS (July 15, 2024), <https://www.calpers.ca.gov/newsroom/calpers-news/2024/calpers-preliminary-investment-return-fiscal-year-2023-24> [<https://perma.cc/47F2-ZLKD>]. The UC system reported about \$29.5 billion in endowment assets as of fiscal year 2024. See OFF. OF THE CHIEF INV. OFFICER OF THE REGENTS (UC INVS.), REVIEW OF THIRD QUARTER 2024–25 FISCAL YEAR PERFORMANCE FOR UC RETIREMENT, ENDOWMENT, AND WORKING CAPITAL ASSETS, *supra* note 313, at 1. The \$3.7 billion in forgone returns for CalPERS represents approximately 0.73% of its portfolio; a comparable loss for the UC endowment as of fiscal 2024 would be approximately \$217 million.

³¹⁸ See *supra* Part II.E.2.a.

³¹⁹ See *supra* Part II.E.2.b.

1991, it concluded that retaining shareholder voice would be a more efficacious way of reducing tobacco harm than sale of shares:

Yale's divestment of tobacco stocks, either alone or as a spur to other investors, would not cause tobacco companies to cease producing and marketing their products. Instead, it would be a one-time symbolic act; once Yale divested, it would relinquish any continuing influence over the companies' policies. Divestment can—and in the case of tobacco, would—also impose a non-trivial cost (through lower expected market returns and decreased portfolio diversification) on Yale's endowment and thus on its essential educational and community service missions, including promotion of public health.³²⁰

Tobacco divestment is hard to square with loyalty as well. For selective divestment from South Africa, university and public policy had come to embrace strong anti-discrimination norms. State and federal governmental actions evidenced a strong public policy against South Africa's apartheid system in particular. By contrast, university and public policies against tobacco use, especially in the 1990s and early 2000s, were weaker. In the relevant timeframe tobacco was legal for purchase by the typical university student and staff member, and its use was commonly permitted on university campuses. To be sure, tobacco divestment could be consistent with some restricted gifts, especially those targeted to public health. The Johns Hopkins trustees, for example, took the position that public health had long been a core function of that university, justifying a significant tobacco divestment as to the entire endowment.³²¹ But it is hard to see how divesting from tobacco is consistent with the charitable purpose of most university restricted gifts, for example, a restricted gift made decades earlier to support research by the classics department.

Harvard's tobacco divestment is an especially problematic example, as it was evidently executed in a manner grossly deviant from fiduciary process norms. Harvard apparently divested from tobacco at the behest of then-President Derek Bok, who on his own telling was heeding the suggestion of his spouse, implementing her suggestion later that day without further

³²⁰ See YALE UNIV. ADVISORY COMM. ON INV. RESP., RECOMMENDATION BY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNING TOBACCO PRODUCTS 1–2 (1991) [<https://perma.cc/8VHJ-NTGX>]. A preference for shareholder voice instead of exit was presaged in JOHN G. SIMON, CHARLES W. POWERS & JON P. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 53–58 (1972).

³²¹ See *Johns Hopkins Drops Tobacco Investments*, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 6, 1991), <https://www.chronicle.com/article/johns-hopkins-drops-tobacco-investments/> [<https://perma.cc/NNT4-5XLS>] (quoting the university trustees' statement that "holding of tobacco stocks is incompatible with the university's mission to disseminate information on the treatment and prevention of disease and illness").

fiduciary analysis.³²² “To me,” Bok has since explained, “selling tobacco stocks was not done to bring pressure on the companies involved to stop producing cigarettes. Such an effort would have been fruitless. I simply believed that Harvard should not make money from investing in companies whose product caused great harm to millions of people while offering virtually no redeeming benefit.”³²³

But Harvard’s public health and medical schools continued to accept tobacco industry funding for faculty research for nearly fifteen years after its tobacco divestment (until 2002 and 2004, respectively).³²⁴ The use of tobacco products was permitted on campus for nearly twenty-five more years after the divestment (until 2014).³²⁵ Against this backdrop, Bok’s description of the motivations and process for Harvard’s tobacco divestment, if accurate, is all but an admission of loyalty and prudence breaches. The divestment was motivated by considerations outside its charitable purpose, and there was no assessment of portfolio costs or benefits. Ironically, Harvard chose the path that was least effective and least defensible, when programmatic options, such as an on-campus tobacco ban, were available, legally defensible, and likely more impactful. Eventually, Harvard abandoned tobacco divestment while implementing a campus tobacco ban and academic disassociation.

3. Sudan

A bloody conflict erupted in the early 2000s in Darfur, a region in western Sudan, between Sudan’s Arab-dominated government and Black African rebel groups.³²⁶ The conflict quickly took a horrific turn for civilians, many of whom were subject to deliberate attacks.³²⁷ By 2004, the U.S. Congress and U.S. State Department declared that the Sudanese government was committing

³²² Bok, *supra* note 20, at 57.

³²³ *Id.*

³²⁴ See J. Hale Russell, *HSPH Rejects Tobacco Funding*, HARV. CRIMSON (Jan. 30, 2002), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2002/1/30/hsph-rejects-tobacco-funding-the-faculty/> [<https://perma.cc/2AZP-KMR7>] (reporting that HSPH faculty voted to reject tobacco industry research funding, formalizing an unofficial policy in place since 1998); HARV. UNIV., HARV. MED. SCH. POLICY ON ACCEPTANCE OF TOBACCO RELATED RESEARCH FUNDING (2004), <https://researchadmin.hms.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Files/Policies/tobaccopolICY.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/4QF8-MWM2>].

³²⁵ See Quynh-Nhu Le, *Harvard Yard Goes Tobacco-Free*, HARV. CRIMSON (Sep. 4, 2014), <https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/9/4/harvard-yard-tobacco-free/> [<https://perma.cc/BP5D-SG3L>] (reporting that Harvard banned all tobacco products in Harvard Yard effective August 2014, after an earlier ban within 25–50 feet of Harvard buildings, effectively prohibiting tobacco use across campus).

³²⁶ See generally JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, *DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR* (2005).

³²⁷ *Id.*

genocide.³²⁸ The United Nations balked at declaring genocide, but agreed war crimes were likely being committed.³²⁹

In 2007, President George W. Bush signed the “Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act,” which declared the “sense of Congress” that divestment from Sudan by state and local governments, investment companies, and pension fiduciaries was to be encouraged.³³⁰ Some states passed legislation authorizing divestment of state funds from corporations doing business in Sudan.³³¹ Of particular concern was a robust arms and oil trade between China and Sudan, facilitated by agreements with Chinese state-owned oil companies.³³² PetroChina, affiliated with China’s state-owned oil company, was targeted as providing needed oil revenues for Sudan’s government to continue prosecution of the war.³³³

Student groups advocated vociferously for divestment from Sudan, but without disruptive demonstrations, and their demands were focused on a few companies.³³⁴ Divestment from Sudan found a positive reception among many university boards. At least sixty-one university endowments reportedly divested from Sudan, including seventeen of the twenty-five largest endowments.³³⁵

³²⁸ See Scott Straus, *Darfur and the Genocide Debate*, 84 FOREIGN AFFS. 123, 123–24 (2005) (discussing the politics around the declaration of genocide in Darfur).

³²⁹ INT’L COMM’N OF INQUIRY ON DARFUR, REPORT TO THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1564, at 3–4 (2005), <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/1480de/pdf/> [<https://perma.cc/WML4-QES9>] (concluding that both the militias and the Sudanese government had committed acts that “may amount to” crimes against humanity and war crimes).

³³⁰ Pub. L. No. 110–174, §§ 3(a), 4, 5, 121 Stat. 2516, 2518–20 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701).

³³¹ See Perry S. Bechky, *Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue*, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823, 824 (2009) (listing twenty-seven states that, as of 2009, had authorized state agencies to divest from Sudan).

³³² See Phillip Manyok, *Oil and Darfur’s Blood: China’s Thirst for Sudan’s Oil*, 4 J. POL. SCI. & PUB. AFF. 189, 189 (2016) (documenting the correlation between China’s arms sales to Sudan and Sudan’s oil sales to China).

³³³ See *Harvard Announces Decision to Divest PetroChina Stock*, HARV. GAZETTE (Apr. 4, 2005), <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2005/04/harvard-announces-decision-to-divest-petrochina-stock/> [<https://perma.cc/9ZGH-MR5X>].

³³⁴ See Scott Warren, *I Protested for Divestment from Sudan. What Today’s Protestors Should Know*, TIME (May 3, 2024), <https://time.com/6974567/divestment-sudan-lessons-israel-protestors/> [<https://perma.cc/RW7V-5NXJ>] (attributing student divestment campaign success to careful engagement and focused demands); Philip Rucker, *Student-Driven Sudan Divestment Campaign Grows*, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2006), <https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/26/nyregion/studentdriven-sudan-divestment-campaign-grows.html> [<https://perma.cc/TYA9-QRJQ>] (discussing student divestment campaign tactics).

³³⁵ See *Colleges and Universities That Divested from Sudan*, INVS. AGAINST GENOCIDE, <https://www.investorsagainstgenocide.org/about/resources/colleges-and-universities-that-divested-from-sudan/> [<https://perma.cc/U33Q-D4ZH>] (last updated Apr. 25, 2008) (listing 61 universities that divested from Sudan as of April 2008). Cross-referencing the Investors Against Genocide April 2008 list against the most recent endowment data available at that time shows that 17 of the 25 then-largest endowments by market value of assets appeared on the divestment list. See NAT’L ASS’N OF COLL. & UNIV. BUS. OFFICERS, 2007 NACUBO ENDOWMENT STUDY (2008), <https://edge.sitecorecloud.io/nacubo1-nacubo-prd-dc8b/media/Nacubo/Documents/>

The divesting endowments generally effectuated the divestment by selling a small handful of directly held securities. The effect on portfolio efficiency was therefore almost certainly *de minimis*. For example, Harvard reportedly sold shares in two corporations.³³⁶ Yale reportedly sold shares in one corporation and placed three other public and three private companies on a do-not-invest list.³³⁷ MIT announced divestment “as appropriate” of direct holdings connected to the “abhorrent acts” in Sudan.³³⁸ But MIT never identified any actual sales, and when challenged for failing to do so, the school declined further comment.³³⁹

At least two major endowments explicitly declined divestment. Texas enacted a statute directing state agencies to divest from Sudan.³⁴⁰ But the Texas university system did not divest, noting that the statute did not apply to it.³⁴¹ The University of Chicago likewise rejected divestment, citing a long-standing policy against speaking with its endowment.³⁴² Others equivocated. Johns Hopkins and Michigan stated that they did not have investments in

All-Institutions-Listed-by-FY-2007-Market-Value-of-Endowment-Assets_2007-NES.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4V6-5Z62] (ranking endowments by fiscal year 2007 market value). But what “divestment” means for inclusion on the Investors Against Genocide list is fraught. For example, Stanford is on the list of those divesting. The Stanford board voted “to divest any *directly* held shares in the four companies” and sent “letters to its investment managers *recommending* divestment of any shares held indirectly through, for example, mutual funds or indexes.” Linda A. Cicero, *Stanford Divests from Sudan: Investment Responsibility Again a Hot Topic*, STAN. MAG. (2005), <https://stanfordmag.org/contents/stanford-divests-from-sudan> [https://perma.cc/8W8E-6QKG] (emphasis added). But no information is provided on whether Stanford had direct investments in the four companies in the first place, and a “recommendation” is not a requirement.

³³⁶ Harv. Corp. Comm. on S’holder Resp., *Statement on Sinopec Divestment*, HARV. GAZETTE (Mar. 23, 2006), <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2006/03/statement-on-sinopec-divestment/> [https://perma.cc/R652-4QZS] (announcing divestment from Sinopec as second Sudan-related divestment following PetroChina in April 2005).

³³⁷ See *Yale Dumps Investments Linked to Sudan*, NBC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2006), <https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wnba11386152> [https://perma.cc/P7P9-R6T9] (reporting Yale sold stock in one of seven targeted oil companies); YALE UNIV. ADVISORY COMM. ON INV. RESP., REPORT ON INVESTING IN THE SUDAN 7 (2006), <https://acir.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/ACIRReport.pdf> [https://perma.cc/8WVK-YFKG] (identifying seven oil companies, four public and three private, for likely divestment if currently held or exclusion from future investment).

³³⁸ See *MIT Rejects Abhorrent Acts in Darfur, Will Divest as Necessary*, MIT NEWS (May 14, 2007), <https://news.mit.edu/2007/sudan-statement> [https://perma.cc/3A75-JQXN].

³³⁹ See *Groups Question Extent of MIT Divestment*, DAILY FREE PRESS (Sep. 4, 2007), <https://dailyfreepress.com/09/04/00/39817/groups-question-extent-of-mit-divestment/> [https://perma.cc/N3RS-7NP6].

³⁴⁰ See TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN. ch. 806 (West 2008) (redesignated 2017) (prohibiting state governmental entities from investing in companies with scrutinized business operations in Sudan).

³⁴¹ Laura Burke, *UT’s Dirty Investments*, TEX. OBSERVER (Feb. 28, 2011), <https://www.texasobserver.org/uts-dirty-investments/> [https://perma.cc/EJL8-R3P7] (reporting that the University of Texas system declined to divest, noting the statute enacted by the Texas legislature prohibiting investment applied to state retirement systems, not the University’s investment company).

³⁴² See *Response to Darfur*, 99 UNIV. OF CHI. MAG. 4 (2007), <https://magazine.uchicago.edu/0734/chicagojournal/darfur.shtml> [https://perma.cc/7XB8-ACQ3] (reporting board’s decision to not divest, citing the University’s 1967 Kalven Report policy against taking institutional positions on political issues).

Sudan, but they also refused student demands to commit not to make such an investment in the future.³⁴³

A fiduciary analysis of the Sudan divestments echoes that for selective divestment from South Africa. On the prudence side, selling directly held shares in one or two corporations will tend to impose little administrative cost or harm to portfolio efficiency. On the loyalty side, a strong public policy confirmed by state and federal governmental actions encouraged divestment from Sudan, and the divestment targets were narrow and tightly related to the conduct at issue: specific oil companies whose relationships with the Sudanese government were likely financing the war. As with South Africa, therefore, a de minimis portfolio restructuring in this vein could plausibly be defended as falling within that public policy, resolving the problem of myriad restricted funds and the sole interest rule.

B. *The Spread of Formal Divestment (and ESG) Policies*

A handful of universities with large endowments have long had standing committees to advise on divestment—that is, on nonfinancial factors in endowment management. Princeton was among the first universities to create such a committee, doing so in 1970.³⁴⁴ Yale established such a committee shortly thereafter in the 1972–73 academic year.³⁴⁵ Other universities created a mechanism for ad hoc committees to consider divestment issues as they came up from time to time.³⁴⁶ More recently, in the wake of the Sudan divestments and in light of increasing student demands for fossil fuel divestment, a movement arose toward formal divestment guidelines, standing advisory committees, or both. For example, in the mid-2010s Northwestern and Stanford each adopted new responsible investment guidelines.³⁴⁷

³⁴³ See Lena Denis, *University Has No Plans to Divest from Sudan—Administration Says It Has No Investments in Sudan, But Has Not Considered Formally Divesting*, JOHNS HOPKINS NEWS-LETTER (Dec. 5, 2007), <https://www.jhunewsletter.com/article/2007/12/university-has-no-plans-to-divest-from-sudan-administration-says-it-has-no-investments-in-sudan-but> [<https://perma.cc/D7CR-KYL7>]; Brian Tengel, ‘U’ Has No Stock in Sudan, Won’t Rule Out Investing, MICH. DAILY (Mar. 9, 2007), <https://www.michigandaily.com/uncategorized/u-has-no-stock-sudan-wont-rule-out-investing/> [<https://perma.cc/6F9P-BXDC>].

³⁴⁴ See *CPUC Resources Committee: About*, PRINCETON UNIV., <https://cpucresources.princeton.edu/about> [<https://perma.cc/U6AE-RR8F>].

³⁴⁵ See *Advisory Committee on Investor Responsibility, Committee History and Mission*, YALE UNIV., <https://acir.yale.edu/> [<https://perma.cc/UZB4-9857>]. The Yale committee was established contemporaneously with the publication of SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, *supra* note 320.

³⁴⁶ See, e.g., *Divestment*, PENN OFF. OF THE UNIV. SEC’Y, <https://secretary.upenn.edu/trustees-governance/divestment> [<https://perma.cc/V9VZ-5FR7>] (last visited Jan. 26, 2025) (maintaining an “ad hoc” committee to advise on specific investment responsibility issues if referred by the University Council Steering Committee).

³⁴⁷ See *Who We Are*, NW. UNIV. ADVISORY COMM. ON INV. RESP., <https://www.northwestern.edu/acir/> [<https://perma.cc/95HF-VBG7>] (noting the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Investment Responsibility in 2016); *Update from the Board of Trustees on Investment*

We collected the current divestment policies for the twenty-five largest endowments.³⁴⁸ This undertaking was challenging. There is no central repository of university divestment policies, some universities lack a formal policy, and in some instances the divestment policy is split across multiple documents. A few universities do not seem to have formal policies on divestment but rather make ad hoc assessments. For schools that lack a formal policy, we have inferred policy from observed practice, that is, we have coded based on their conduct. We acknowledge that our results are qualitative and, for any given school, perhaps incomplete.

The rise of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing is a particular complication because it may or may not qualify as a divestment. As noted at the outset, by divestment we mean reliance on a nonfinancial factor, that is, consideration of a factor other than prudent risk and return.³⁴⁹ Accordingly, use of ESG factors to improve risk-adjusted returns, what we have elsewhere called risk-return ESG, would not be a divestment.³⁵⁰ By contrast, the use of ESG factors to screen firms or industries for nonfinancial reasons, what we have elsewhere called collateral benefits ESG, would be a divestment.³⁵¹

To the extent universities state that they use ESG factors, they tend to frame that use in terms of risk and return.³⁵² If a university states that it relies on ESG factors to improve risk and return, we take it at its word and do not treat that statement as a divestment policy. Of course, not all universities say

Responsibility Issues, STAN. REP. (Oct. 11, 2017), <https://news.stanford.edu/stories/2017/10/update-board-trustees-investment-responsibility-issues> [<https://perma.cc/Q39K-8LNC>] (announcing the initiation of a full review of Stanford's investment responsibility procedures).

³⁴⁸ Because the University of Texas and Texas A&M systems are managed by the same company, we count them as one. See THE UNIV. OF TEX./TEX. A&M INV. MGMT. CO., <https://www.utimco.org> [<https://perma.cc/8772-MUKH>].

³⁴⁹ See *supra* note 14 and accompanying text.

³⁵⁰ See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, *supra* note 177, at 390.

³⁵¹ See *id.* at 389–90. For a contrasting argument that collateral benefits ESG should be permissible for public pension fiduciaries, see Fisch & Schwartz, *supra* note 15, at 771. The university (and other charitable) endowment context differs from public pensions in material ways, including that the purpose of an endowment is defined by the applicable charitable purpose.

³⁵² See, e.g., HARV. MGMT. CO., SUSTAINABLE INVESTING POLICY 1 (2020), <https://www.hmc.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/HMC-Sustainable-Investment-Policy.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/9KH8-D6YD>] (stating that “external managers . . . are expected to consider relevant ESG factors that may have a material impact on the financial performance of their portfolios”); *Investing for the Long-Term*, HARV. MGMT. CO., <https://www.hmc.harvard.edu/sustainable-investing/> [<https://perma.cc/9CN9-M8X2>] (“As a long-term investor, HMC focuses on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors that may impact the performance of our investments.”); *Responsibility*, DUMAC, <https://dumac.duke.edu/responsibility/> [<https://perma.cc/EU69-AV39>] (discussing integration of ESG risks into manager selection and monitoring); *Environmental, Social and Governance Investing*, NW. UNIV. INV. OFF., <https://www.northwestern.edu/investment/responsibility/esg-investing.html> [<https://perma.cc/XS2P-9QSU>] (committing to consider ESG factors).

they use ESG factors, including the University of Chicago and the Texas system, which make no reference to ESG.³⁵³

In all events, we are struck by the lack of consistency across the twenty-five largest endowments. The most common policy allows for the possibility of divestment but emphasizes its limitation to certain abhorrent practices and that financial returns are paramount. Roughly speaking, the policies (or our inference of policy from observable ad hoc practice) fall into four groupings: (1) no divestment; (2) rare divestment in extreme cases; (3) “direct holdings” divestment (which in substance may be the same as (2)); and (4) significant divestment, chiefly fossil fuels. Table 2 summarizes our divestment policy assessment for each university with a top twenty-five endowment.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF TOP TWENTY-FIVE ENDOWMENT
DIVESTMENT POLICIES

Non-Divestment Policy	Abhorrence/ Rare Divestment	“Direct Holdings” Divestment	Significant Divestment
MIT	Stanford University	Harvard University	Princeton University
University of Texas Systems	Duke University	Columbia University	Yale University
University of Chicago	Johns Hopkins University	Cornell University	UC System
Washington University	Northwestern University	University of Southern California	
Vanderbilt University	University of Notre Dame	Dartmouth College	
University of Virginia	Emory University	University of Michigan	
Rice University	Ohio State University	University of Pennsylvania	
	Brown University		

³⁵³ See AMNESTY INT’L, FAILING GRADE: HOW UNIVERSITY INVESTMENT OFFICES OFTEN FAIL TO CONDUCT HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE WHEN INVESTING IN VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS 37–42 (2023), <https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/FINAL-university-vc-report.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/VW5R-C8AB>] (reporting no ESG commitments from University of Chicago or UT System).

1. Non-Divestment

Seven schools have strong non-divestment policies: MIT,³⁵⁴ the Texas systems,³⁵⁵ University of Chicago,³⁵⁶ Washington University,³⁵⁷ Vanderbilt,³⁵⁸ University of Virginia,³⁵⁹ and Rice.³⁶⁰ The reasons given vary. Some emphasize that the endowment's function is to support the university's research and educational mission, and that divestment could impair that function.³⁶¹ The University of Chicago emphasizes its commitment to institutional neutrality such that it will not speak with the endowment.³⁶² Others point to practical problems with divestment, including costs and the shift from direct holdings to outside managers and pooled funds. For example, MIT emphasizes that its endowment is managed almost entirely by outside managers in "commingled

³⁵⁴ See MIT's ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 138, at 1–2 (explaining that MIT does not "engage in discussions about social consequences of individual investments" due to its use of outside managers).

³⁵⁵ See Burke, *supra* note 341; TEX. A&M UNIV. SYS., 22.01 SYSTEM INVESTMENT § 1.6–.7 (rev. 2025), <https://assets.system.tamus.edu/files/policy/pdf/annotated/22-01/22-02-ANN-200820.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/39RL-QC6Y>] (specifying in an investment policy statement the use of financial factors in investing and the objective of appropriately balancing risk and return).

³⁵⁶ See *Statement Reaffirming the University's Position on Divestment and Academic Boycotts*, UNIV. OF CHI. NEWS (Apr. 14, 2016), <https://news.uchicago.edu/story/statement-reaffirming-universitys-position-divestment-and-academic-boycotts> [<https://perma.cc/2YUP-7VVS>] ("The University does not take social or political stances on issues outside its core mission.").

³⁵⁷ See Andrew D. Martin, *Endowment 101: Socially Responsible Investing*, WASH. UNIV. ST. LOUIS, <https://andrewdmartin.wustl.edu/endowment-101-socially-responsible-investing/> [<https://perma.cc/3GQS-PL9M>] (stating that Washington University Investment Management Company views divestment as ineffective and impairing to core mission).

³⁵⁸ See Katherine Oung, Aaditi Lele & Sally Johnson, *Debrief with Diermeier: Leadership, Al Gore, the Omicron Variant and More*, VAND. HUSTLER (Dec. 8, 2021), <https://vanderbilthustler.com/2021/12/08/debrief-with-diermeier-leadership-al-gore-the-omicron-variant-and-more/> [<https://perma.cc/LY97-9JDB>] (quoting Vanderbilt Chancellor Daniel Diermeier rejecting divestment as inconsistent with university neutrality generally and rejecting fossil fuel divestment in particular as tantamount to the university "saying that the best policy solution to address climate change is to cut off capital for Western oil companies").

³⁵⁹ See UNIV. OF VA. INV. MGMT. CO., 2025 INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 4 (2025), https://uvimco.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/UVIMCO_Investor-Responsibility-Report_2025.pdf [<https://perma.cc/6FHG-92G9>] ("UVIMCO views engagement as a more effective tool than divestment to encourage climate action and emissions reduction.").

³⁶⁰ See *Rice Divestment Statement*, RICE MGMT. CO., <https://investments.rice.edu/> [<https://perma.cc/H674-CYNE>] ("Divestment mandates restrict the endowment's access to top performing investment managers, impeding the endowment's ability to generate the returns necessary to support the University and the Board's fiduciary obligations.").

³⁶¹ For example, Washington University's position is that "investment restrictions introduce adverse selection and could directly impair WUIMC's core mission to provide maximum financial support to the university." See Martin, *supra* note 357.

³⁶² *Statement Reaffirming the University's Position on Divestment and Academic Boycotts*, *supra* note 356.

funds.”³⁶³ MIT acknowledges that divestment might have been plausible when it “used to hold a relatively small number of securities . . . directly in MIT’s control,” but that is no longer the case.³⁶⁴

2. Abhorrence: Rare Divestment in Extreme Cases

Some universities with a top twenty-five endowment have publicly declared policies that permit divestment for moral abhorrence (or other similar such language³⁶⁵) but have not invoked those policies to divest other than from Sudan during the Darfur war or, in a few cases, specific fossil fuels such as tar sands or thermal coal. These abhorrence policies typically emphasize that divestment will be extremely rare and decided on a case-by-case basis.³⁶⁶

³⁶³ See MIT’s ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 138, at 1 (“As a result, we do not have real-time transparency into portfolio holdings, we do not control which securities are bought and sold, and we have exposure to many individual positions that are de minimis in size.”). MIT does not impose investment screens on managers, but it possibly applies an ethical filter in deciding which outside managers to hire. MIT states that, as a “primary line of defense,” it screens for managers “who apply an ethical lens to their activity.” *Id.* at 2. However, the examples provided of these screens do not involve traditional areas of divestment controversy, and instead involve legally dubious or otherwise risky activities such as backdating schemes, securities fraud, or avoidance of pension liabilities. One involves a manager purportedly rejected for a “cavalier attitude” toward child labor. *Id.* A few examples perhaps suggest a nonfinancial motive for eschewing an asset-specific investment, including old-growth timberlands, a patent litigation fund, and a life insurance settlement fund. See *id.* All told, we are comfortable coding MIT as having a non-divestment policy given its refusal to impose investment screens and in light of its obfuscation concerning Sudan divestment. See *supra* note 339 and accompanying text.

³⁶⁴ *Id.* at 1.

³⁶⁵ The moral abhorrence standard traces back to the framework developed by SIMON, POWERS & GUNNEMANN, *supra* note 345.

³⁶⁶ See, e.g., *Who We Are*, *supra* note 347; *Update from the Board of Trustees on Investment Responsibility Issues*, *supra* note 347.

At least six universities fall into this category: Stanford,³⁶⁷ Duke,³⁶⁸ Johns Hopkins,³⁶⁹ Northwestern,³⁷⁰ Emory,³⁷¹ and Ohio State.³⁷²

Two additional universities seemingly fall into this category as a matter of practice. Brown does not have a formal policy, but rather an ad hoc process of review of divestment suggestions by a standing committee that advises the board.³⁷³ Brown has not divested since Sudan and South Africa and, while reducing its fossil fuel holdings, explicitly disclaimed that reduction as a divestment, attributing it to a prudent risk and return analysis.³⁷⁴ Likewise, Notre Dame lacks a formal policy, though it references Catholic principles in

³⁶⁷ See STAN. MGMT. CO., *ETHICAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK* (2018), <https://smc.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/SMC-Ethical-Investment-Framework.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/Z9SE-L5P6>] (“In rare instances, the University’s Board of Trustees may elect to divest specific companies or categories of investment that are deemed abhorrent and ethically unjustifiable. Such divestment decisions are only reached after careful deliberation by the Trustees, who apply consistent principles and a thorough process.”).

³⁶⁸ See DUKE UNIV. BD. TRS., *GUIDELINE ON INVESTMENT RESPONSIBILITY* (2020), <https://dumac.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2020/10/Guideline-on-Investment-Responsibility-5.8.20.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/84PT-UC5L>] (“In rare cases, the Duke community may call upon ACIR [Advisory Committee on Investment Responsibility] to review investment that is engaged in activity considered morally abhorrent, such as apartheid, genocide, or slavery.”).

³⁶⁹ See HOPKINS REPORT, *supra* note 259, at 8, 11–12 (stating that divestment is “a costly and difficult act,” should be rare, and applying the standards under which a proposed divestment should be reviewed).

³⁷⁰ See NW. BD. TRS., *STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT RESPONSIBILITY* (2019), https://www.northwestern.edu/about/board-of-trustees/docs/bot-statement-on-investment-responsibility_approved-2019.11.15.pdf [<https://perma.cc/L8GM-EW4Z>] (“[T]he Trustees recognize that, on very rare occasions, a continued investment may be so morally reprehensible, such as investments that directly support slavery, apartheid, or genocide, that such investment would necessitate the University’s divestment.”).

³⁷¹ See EMORY UNIV., *EMORY INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (“EIM”): INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (“ESG”) ISSUES* (2021), https://sustainability.emory.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Emory-Investment-Management_-_ESG-Policy_6.7.19-1.pdf [<https://perma.cc/JBC5-XELK>] (“The Executive Committee of Emory University indicated that in extraordinary circumstances, the trustees may determine that direct financial investment in particular companies associates Emory with actions or positions that violate the university’s most deeply held values and should be avoided, regardless of potential financial return. In such instances divestment from those particular companies may be necessary to separate the Emory community from the morally abhorrent activity of the company or companies in question.”).

³⁷² See OHIO ST. UNIV., *UNIV. POLICY* (2024), <https://policies.osu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/09/investment-policy.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/M29A-4DWK>] (“Divestment for non-economic reasons should be recommended through an appropriate university governance process, i.e., student government, University Senate, or another appropriate committee or decision-making body. That recommendation must be brought forward for a vote by the Board of Trustees, accompanied by an impact review report from the senior vice president for business and finance regarding the potential impact of the proposed divestment on the LTIP.”).

³⁷³ See *Q&A with Jane Dietze: The Brown Endowment, Divestment and Ethical Investing*, BROWN UNIV. (Apr. 19, 2024), <https://www.brown.edu/news/2024-04-19/dietze> [<https://perma.cc/N79S-DXJ7>] (describing Brown’s divestment process).

³⁷⁴ See *id.* (disclaiming reduction in fossil fuel exposure as divestment and emphasizing older divestments from South Africa, Sudan, and tobacco were solely from direct holdings).

its investment standards and so far as we can tell has not reported a divestment other than from Sudan during the Darfur war.³⁷⁵

The Northwestern and Stanford policies, which as noted above came out of advisory committees charged with drafting them following Sudan and calls for fossil fuels divestment,³⁷⁶ are representative of the abhorrence/rare divestment category in both policy and application. Each allows for possibility of divestment for moral abhorrence. Each emphasizes that such circumstances will be rare. And each has declined to divest in practice since South Africa or Sudan.

Northwestern's policy, adopted in 2019, states that divestment "is an ineffective means of exercising investment responsibility, especially in comparison to the value of encouraging the University community to engage in education, research, and debate."³⁷⁷ However, "on very rare occasions," such as investments that "directly support slavery, apartheid, or genocide," Northwestern may divest. Such a divestment "will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis," including "the extent to which the proposed divestment would generate tangible and positive change with respect to the issue at hand" and the financial impact on the portfolio.³⁷⁸ It appears that Northwestern has never divested under this policy.³⁷⁹

Stanford's policy is of similar vintage and to similar effect. The policy is framed as an embrace of risk-return ESG and speaks of an obligation "to place proper weight on ethical issues that can have a bearing on economic results."³⁸⁰ Pointing to "state and federal laws governing trust fiduciaries," the

³⁷⁵ Notre Dame has not publicly announced any divestments that we could find and has explicitly rejected fossil fuel divestment. See Rev. John I. Jenkins, *President's Annual Address to Faculty 2016*, UNIV. NOTRE DAME (Sep. 20, 2016), <https://president.nd.edu/about/history-of-the-presidency/president-emeritus-rev-john-i-jenkins-csc/father-jenkins-communications-archive/presidents-annual-address-to-the-faculty-2016/> [https://perma.cc/76ED-LFRA]. Notre Dame declares that it invests according to Catholic social principles but focuses its application of those principles on supporting its mission without mentioning divestment. See *Sustaining Impact: How Notre Dame's Endowment Pool Helps Support Its Mission*, UNIV. NOTRE DAME, <https://fightingfor.nd.edu/stories/sustaining-impact/#:~:text=How%20the%20Endowment%20Works,purpose%20of%20the%20donor's%20choosing> [https://perma.cc/SJY9-SD2A]. We code Notre Dame as at least open to divestment given its focus on Catholic social mission.

³⁷⁶ See *supra* note 347 and accompanying text.

³⁷⁷ NW. BD. TRS., STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT RESPONSIBILITY, *supra* note 370.

³⁷⁸ *Id.*

³⁷⁹ Northwestern divested from four companies related to the Darfur war but declined a broader divestment. See Olivia Exstrum, *Deciding Divestment: Northwestern Student Activists Face Obstacles Beyond Their Control*, DAILY NW. (May 22, 2015), <https://dailynorthwestern.com/2015/05/22/campus/deciding-divestment-northwestern-student-activists-face-obstacles-beyond-their-control/> [https://perma.cc/ZRE9-HUMB]. Northwestern did not then have a publicly declared divestment policy. Although Northwestern has not had a standing committee to advise on divestment since the policy, as part of an "agreement" with campus protesters following the start of the war in Gaza, Northwestern committed to appoint a new advisory committee to hear student demands. See NW. UNIV., AGREEMENT ON DEERING MEADOW (2024), <https://www.northwestern.edu/leadership-notes/2024/agreement-on-deering-meadow.pdf> [https://perma.cc/4HRS-UL5S].

³⁸⁰ STAN. MGMT. CO., ETHICAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 367, at 2.

policy rejects “use [of] the endowment to pursue other agendas.”³⁸¹ However, “[i]n rare instances, the University’s Board of Trustees may elect to divest specific companies or categories of investment that are deemed abhorrent and ethically unjustifiable.”³⁸² Stanford’s board has separately confirmed “that very rare occasions may arise when companies’ actions or inactions are so abhorrent and ethically unjustifiable as to warrant the University’s dissociation from those investments.”³⁸³ As with Northwestern, it appears that Stanford has never divested under this policy.

3. “Direct Holdings” Divestment

In recent years, seven universities claimed to have divested from “direct holdings,” or certain primary-purpose private equity vehicles, mainly concerning fossil fuels.³⁸⁴ Harvard,³⁸⁵ Columbia,³⁸⁶ Cornell,³⁸⁷ USC,³⁸⁸ Dartmouth,³⁸⁹ Michigan,³⁹⁰ and the University of Pennsylvania³⁹¹ all fall into this category to varying degrees. Some of these universities, such as Dartmouth, have formal policy statements that limit divestment to rare

³⁸¹ *Id.*

³⁸² *Id.*

³⁸³ STAN. UNIV. BD. TRS., STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2018) <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1hG17KRtClhHRm7w9wES2fCxxAx0qaKeK/view> [<https://perma.cc/LF2T-VF5L>].

³⁸⁴ Private prisons have episodically been targeted for divestment. *See, e.g.*, Lee C. Bollinger, *Statement on Divestment*, COLUM. UNIV. (May 15, 2015), <https://president.columbia.edu/news/statement-divestment> [<https://perma.cc/C2LY-9HAE>] (discussing a proposed divestment from “any direct stock ownership interests in companies engaged in the operation of private prisons”).

³⁸⁵ *See infra* Part III.C.1.

³⁸⁶ *See id.*

³⁸⁷ *See* James Dean, *Cornell Announces Moratorium on Fossil Fuel Investments*, CORN. CHRON. (May 22, 2020), <https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2020/05/cornell-announces-moratorium-fossil-fuel-investments> [<https://perma.cc/NQ4J-F544>] (reporting Cornell has no direct holdings of any securities but that “the moratorium applies to new private equity and bond vehicles focused on fossil fuels” and not to mutual funds).

³⁸⁸ *See* UNIV. OF S. CAL., FOSSIL FUEL FACTSHEET (2024), <https://acir.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Fossil-Fuels-Fact-Sheet-March-2024-1.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/9GW9-BPQL>].

³⁸⁹ *See* DARTMOUTH 2018, *supra* note 307, at 3–4 (reporting Dartmouth will not have direct holdings in fossil fuels or tobacco companies). Dartmouth has chosen not to dissociate from fossil fuel producers and named a center after an oil company founder. *See generally* FOSSIL FREE DARTMOUTH, INVESTIGATING IRVING (2023) https://www.fossilfreedartmouth.com/uploads/1/4/7/4/147414802/investigating_irving_-_fossil_free_dartmouth.pdf [<https://perma.cc/3U3W-V9PN>].

³⁹⁰ *See* Don Jordan, *UM Shifts Strategy for Natural Resource Investments*, UNIV. REC. (Mar. 25, 2021), <https://record.umich.edu/articles/u-m-shifts-strategy-for-natural-resources-investments/> [<https://perma.cc/8HFV-B55D>] (reporting Michigan will “stop investing in funds primarily focused on certain fossil fuels and discontinue direct investments in publicly traded companies that are the largest contributors to greenhouse gases”).

³⁹¹ *See A Message about Penn’s Endowment and Sustainability*, PENN TODAY (Nov. 29, 2022), <https://penntoday.upenn.edu/announcements/message-about-penns-endowment-and-sustainability> [<https://perma.cc/2JB5-T5DE>] (statement from the University of Pennsylvania President’s office that, as a matter of policy, “Penn does not directly hold investments in any companies focused on the production of fossil fuels”).

abhorrent circumstances.³⁹² Others, such as Harvard, do not have a formal policy statement but have divested from direct holdings in fossil fuels ad hoc.³⁹³

By implication, a direct holdings divestment allows investment funds and outside managers not trading in the university's name to invest in fossil fuels (or whatever else was divested from direct holdings). Given the limited scope of direct holdings in contemporary endowment practice, these universities that are open to direct holdings divestment are in substance not dissimilar from the prior group. The Columbia divestment from direct holdings in fossil fuels is illustrative, because as elaborated below, it did not foreclose indirect investment in fossil fuels, yet the overwhelming bulk of the endowment is invested indirectly.³⁹⁴

4. Significant Divestment

Finally, three of the top twenty-five endowments are open to significant divestment as evidenced by their broad divestment from fossil fuels: Princeton, Yale, and the University of California system. As elaborated below, these universities openly undertook a broad divestment for ethical reasons, acknowledging additional administrative costs and losses to portfolio efficiency.³⁹⁵ The openness of the University of California system to significant divestment is also evidenced by its ongoing exclusion of tobacco, as discussed above.³⁹⁶

C. Modern Divestment Controversies: Fossil Fuels and Israel

1. Fossil Fuels

In the early 2010s, student groups and others began to push for divestment from fossil fuels. At about the same time, several universities with a top twenty-five endowment began clarifying their divestment policies based on moral abhorrence. This was probably not a coincidence. We suspect that

³⁹² See DARTMOUTH COLL., STATEMENT ON INVESTMENT AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES (2017) https://trustees.dartmouth.edu/sites/trustees.prod/files/trustees/wysiwyg/statement_of_investment_and_social_responsibility_issues.pdf [<https://perma.cc/LQJ2-TZ2E>] (stating that “[i]n extraordinary circumstances, the Board of Trustees may consider divestment an appropriate response to social, environmental or governance-related considerations” if shareholder action would be ineffective, the “[d]ivestment will make a material impact on correcting the company’s injurious behavior,” and the divestment “will not compromise Dartmouth’s ability to address the target issue” in its charitable program).

³⁹³ See *infra* Part III.C.1.b.

³⁹⁴ See *id.*

³⁹⁵ See *infra* Part III.C.1.c.

³⁹⁶ See *supra* Part III.A.2.

these universities, following Sudan, acted to get out ahead of the fossil fuels divestment movement.

Among the twenty-five largest endowments, responses to fossil fuel divestment proposals were mixed. Some universities, particularly those that refuse divestment generally, took no discernable action. Others singled out thermal coal and tar sands, which have especially high carbon and pollution impacts, on a mix of ethical and risk-return grounds but sometimes limited this divestment to direct holdings. Still other universities reduced their fossil fuels investments more broadly but asserted that they did so on grounds of risk and return, connecting the decision to an ESG risk-return framework. Only three universities made broad (though probably not complete) divestments from fossil fuels on explicitly nonfinancial grounds. This point bears repeating. So far as we can tell, only three of the schools with a top twenty-five endowment admit to having undertaken a broad divestment from fossil fuels for nonfinancial reasons. The rest took no or limited action and often tied that action to a risk-and-return framework.

a. Rejecting Fossil Fuels Divestment or Minimally Divesting

Most top twenty-five endowments have rejected broad fossil fuel divestment citing: (1) failure to meet the abhorrence standard; (2) portfolio harm; (3) ineffectiveness; and (4) the university's own reliance on fossil fuels.³⁹⁷

For example, Duke rejected fossil fuel divestment owing to a lack of evidence that it would positively affect global warming and out of concern that it could be counterproductive.³⁹⁸ Northwestern cautioned that a blanket divestment, if effective, could push energy production toward dirtier sources such as coal and disproportionately harm the poor.³⁹⁹ We did not find any university divestment analysis concluding that fossil fuel divestment was likely to have a positive environmental impact.

Some universities that rejected broad divestment left the door open to divestment from thermal coal or tar sands oil. In 2016, Stanford rejected a broad fossil fuels divestment on the grounds that it could not be shown to

³⁹⁷ Large universities consume significant amounts of electricity, and some have their own power or heating plants powered by fossil fuels, including fuel oil. See McLaughlin & Pell, *supra* note 27 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁸ See DUKE UNIVERSITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE GASSES, *supra* note 259 (concluding fossil fuel divestment would be merely "symbolic," as well as "hypocritical" and possibly "counterproductive").

³⁹⁹ See Letter from Northwestern University Board of Trustees to Northwestern University Committee, (June 23, 2022), <https://www.northwestern.edu/about/board-of-trustees/docs/fossil-fuels-guidelines.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/27F4-RLNG>] ("Indiscriminate divestment from all energy production could result in unintended consequences such as higher income inequality, a shift back to higher emission production sources such as coal or a disengagement by responsible investors from the field of energy production overall.").

satisfy the university's divestment standards of social harm: society needs fossil fuels, and Stanford uses them.⁴⁰⁰ The advisory committee that studied the issue did recommend divestment from "companies whose primary business is oil sands extraction."⁴⁰¹ But the board took "no action" on that recommendation because the endowment already had "no direct exposure to companies whose primary business is oil sands extraction."⁴⁰²

Two years later, in 2018, Stanford adopted a risk-return ESG framework for ethical investing, stating that it had an obligation "to place proper weight on ethical issues that can have a bearing on economic results, but not to use the endowment to pursue other agendas."⁴⁰³ Two years after that, in 2020, Stanford again rejected "blanket" fossil fuels divestment, but endorsed the exclusion of thermal coal and tar sands, and reported that its "active holdings in energy" had fallen from 16 percent to 1.5 percent,⁴⁰⁴ though it did not specify what "active holdings" meant. The extent of Stanford's fossil fuel exposure therefore remains unclear, and it has identified no specific company as having been divested.

In 2017 the Johns Hopkins trustees voted to divest from thermal coal.⁴⁰⁵ The school's divestment advisory committee had recommended exclusion of the "CU-200" list of the worst carbon emitters.⁴⁰⁶ But the committee also acknowledged that the cost of its recommended broader divestment, including constraints on the school's outside managers, would amount to "millions of dollars," and that it might have no effect on global emissions.⁴⁰⁷

All told, the schools that divested from thermal coal or tar sands oil wrapped those decisions in a risk-return ESG framework, thereby staying within the duty of loyalty, and they did not exclude the industry generally,

⁴⁰⁰ See *Stanford and Climate Change: A Statement from the Board of Trustees*, STAN. UNIV. (Apr. 25, 2016), <https://news.stanford.edu/2016/04/25/stanford-climate-change-statement-board-trustees/> [<https://perma.cc/P4AL-A5Z4>] (declining to divest from "the fossil fuel industry more broadly" and concluding that "it could not evaluate whether the social injury caused by the fossil fuel industry outweighs the social benefit it provides").

⁴⁰¹ *Id.*

⁴⁰² *Id.*

⁴⁰³ STAN. MGMT. CO., ETHICAL INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 367, at 2.

⁴⁰⁴ STAN. BD. TRS., DECISION ON THE DIVESTMENT REQUEST OF FOSSIL FREE STANFORD 1 (2020), https://news.stanford.edu/_data/assets/pdf_file/0025/127456/BOT_Statement_06.12.20_915am.pdf [<https://perma.cc/K9FW-RQUF>].

⁴⁰⁵ See *Johns Hopkins University to Divest Holdings in Major Coal Producers*, HUB (Dec. 12, 2017), <https://hub.jhu.edu/2017/12/12/thermal-coal-divestment-board-vote/> [<https://perma.cc/4683-AR3N>].

⁴⁰⁶ See JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. PUB. INT. INV. ADVISORY COMM., REPORT OF JHU PUBLIC INTEREST ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL OF REFUEL OUR FUTURE 7–8 (2017), <https://provost.jhu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/PIAC-Report-final.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/4PP4-D9QE>].

⁴⁰⁷ *Id.* at 4. ("By limiting access to certain managers and their strategies, constraining the University's financial engagement with fossil fuel companies may affect the endowment by millions of dollars over the next decade. Nonetheless, with a total endowment of over \$4 billion, the University is expected to have the ability to evaluate fully, bear, and possibly offset the costs associated with alternative divestment options.").

answering the diversification problem posed by a categorical divestment. Accordingly, in the absence of a good reason to find that the stated reasonings were pretextual, the minimal divestments of the schools in this category would likely be judged as satisfying the applicable fiduciary standards.

b. Divesting from “Direct” Fossil Fuels Investments

Some universities with a top twenty-five endowment have charted a middle course on fossil fuels by announcing that they will foreclose “direct” investment in fossil fuels. As noted above, to varying degrees Harvard, Columbia, Cornell, USC, Dartmouth, Michigan, and the University of Pennsylvania fall into this category.⁴⁰⁸

The extent of such a divestment, or whether it even constitutes a nonfinancial divestment, is difficult to assess. The scope of “direct” investment covered by these announcements is not always clear. The term is typically used to refer to an investment traded in an account in the university’s name, as distinct from an investment in a mutual fund, an exchange traded fund, or other pooled fund administered by an outside manager.⁴⁰⁹ But as we have seen, the largest endowments today hold relatively few investments as direct holdings whether measured in number or dollars.⁴¹⁰

The Columbia and Harvard divestments from “direct” fossil fuel holdings are representative anecdotes. When Columbia announced its fossil fuel divestment, it treated its direct and indirect holdings differently. Columbia acknowledged that it already had no direct investments in fossil fuels—that is, no direct investment in “publicly traded oil and gas companies”—and was merely “formalizing this policy of non-investment for the foreseeable future.”⁴¹¹ As for “private funds,” Columbia announced that it would avoid those that “*primarily* invest in oil and gas companies,”⁴¹² which is not a categorical screen on private funds that include fossil fuel holdings. In consequence, we cannot ascertain whether this policy in fact reduced the endowment’s exposure to fossil fuels.

As for Harvard, recall that its president shifted from asserting in March 2021 that fossil fuel divestment would be a breach of fiduciary duty to claiming

⁴⁰⁸ See *supra* Part III.B.3.

⁴⁰⁹ For example, Harvard’s policy states: “When, on rare occasions, the University issues investment restrictions to [Harvard Management Company], these restrictions extend to direct internal holdings, as well as to direct holdings by investment managers trading in [Harvard’s name]. These restrictions do not extend to investment advisers of commingled funds.” HARV. MGMT. CO., SUSTAINABLE INVESTING AT HMC (2020), <https://www.hmc.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/HMC-Sustainable-Investing-Overview.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/HJC6-QMUN>].

⁴¹⁰ See *supra* Table 1.

⁴¹¹ See *University Announcement on Fossil Fuel Investments*, COLUM. NEWS (Jan. 22, 2021), <https://news.columbia.edu/news/university-announcement-fossil-fuel-investments> [<https://perma.cc/X3XC-ZTDG>].

⁴¹² See *id.* (emphasis added).

in September 2021 that it was a fiduciary obligation.⁴¹³ Crucially, however, both positions were tied to a claim of prudent risk-and-return analysis, and not just worry over climate change. Thus, although the September 2021 announcement of a direct holdings divestment opened by stating that “[c]limate change is the most consequential threat facing humanity,” the portion of the statement addressing the endowment asserted that, given “our responsibility as fiduciaries to make long-term investment decisions that support our teaching and research mission, we do not believe such investments are prudent.”⁴¹⁴

The Harvard announcement was thus not a clear nonfinancial divestment thrice over. First, Harvard holds a very small portion of its endowment directly, and at the time of the announcement there were already no fossil fuels holdings among its direct holdings.⁴¹⁵ Second, as Harvard acknowledged, fossil fuel holdings would continue among its private equity indirect investments, albeit those investments would be “in runoff mode” until divested at an unspecified future date.⁴¹⁶ Third, in spite of general language about climate change, the rationale for the divestment was repeatedly tied to a fiduciary risk-and-return analysis.⁴¹⁷ In all events, we note parenthetically that Harvard has since invested almost \$500 million in cryptocurrency via an exchange traded fund.⁴¹⁸ The Department of Energy estimates that “electricity use from cryptocurrency mining probably represents from 0.6% to 2.3% of U.S. electricity consumption.”⁴¹⁹

As in the case of Harvard, some other universities that divested direct holdings also reduced fossil fuels exposure in their (possibly indirect) private holdings. While allowing existing private fossil fuel investments to phase out, these universities made a commitment not to make future such private investments. This process would gradually reduce fossil fuel exposure. For example, Dartmouth and USC reported that, in addition to divesting direct holdings, a phase out of private fossil fuel investments reduced their overall

⁴¹³ See *supra* notes 12-13 and accompanying text.

⁴¹⁴ *Climate Change: Update on Harvard Action*, HARV. UNIV. (Sep. 9, 2021), <https://www.harvard.edu/president/news-and-statements-by-president-bacow/2021/climate-change-update-on-harvard-action/> [https://perma.cc/QQ3J-WSKU].

⁴¹⁵ *Id.* (“As we reported last February, HMC has no direct investments in companies that explore for or develop further reserves of fossil fuels.”).

⁴¹⁶ *Id.* The announcement did not speak of mutual funds or exchange traded funds.

⁴¹⁷ *Id.*; see also HARV. MGMT. CO., CLIMATE REPORT 1 (2024) <https://www.hmc.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/2024-Climate-Report.pdf> [https://perma.cc/E3KH-H6TV] (“As part of its fiduciary duty to account for all material risks to the endowment portfolio, HMC has long considered the climate transition and physical risks more generally in making investment decisions.”).

⁴¹⁸ Harvard invested roughly \$443 million in the iShares Bitcoin Trust ETF, as per Harvard’s Form 13F-HR. See Harv. Mgmt. Co., Report Filed by Institutional Investment Managers (Form 13F-HR) (Nov. 14, 2025) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1082621/000119312525283114/xslForm13F_X02/47098.xml [https://perma.cc/4YSB-RVLD].

⁴¹⁹ Mark Morey, Glenn McGrath & Hiroaki Minato, *Tracking Electricity Consumption from U.S. Cryptocurrency Mining Operations*, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2024), <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61364> [https://perma.cc/N8CX-HBGZ].

exposure to fossil fuels to less than five percent from over ten percent, with a goal toward eventually removing all fossil fuel investments.⁴²⁰ Thus far, however, those reductions are equivalent to a portfolio rebalancing to align with market weights. As of early 2026, 3.41 percent of a typical S&P 500 index fund was in the energy sector and 2.45 percent was classified as utilities.⁴²¹ In a related vein, MIT, which has a policy against divestment,⁴²² reported that it had previously overweighted fossil fuels as a hedge against its enormous energy needs but has since abandoned the overweight because it increasingly relies on alternative sources of energy.⁴²³

The “direct” holdings divestments from fossil fuels would probably pass fiduciary scrutiny. As with thermal coal and tar sands oil, the “direct” holdings divestments were wrapped in a risk-return ESG framework. A similar analysis applies to the schools that reduced their holdings to align with market weights. Accordingly, as before, in the absence of a good reason to find that the stated risk-and-return reasonings were pretextual, the “direct” holdings divestments would likely be judged as satisfying the applicable fiduciary standards. Additionally, it appears that most of these divestments, involving only direct holdings, were *de minimis* and so likely without significant cost or effect on portfolio efficiency, albeit this additional point has less purchase for the restricted endowment, which is subject to the trust law sole interest rule. To continue to satisfy the prudent investor rule, however, an avoidance of fossil fuels based on risk and return would need to be regularly assessed for ongoing prudence.⁴²⁴ If a university continued to avoid fossil fuels in the face of portfolio harm, the risk-and-return rationale would no longer apply and the earlier claim of a risk-and-return basis might be found to be pretextual.

c. Nonfinancial Fossil Fuel Divestment

Of the universities with a top twenty-five endowment, it appears that only Princeton, Yale, and the University of California system have committed to a broad fossil fuel divestment that for the most part applies to both direct and

⁴²⁰ *Environmental, Social & Governance Policy*, DARTMOUTH INV. OFF., https://www.dartmouth.edu/investments/environmental_social_governance/policy/index.php [https://perma.cc/RNU4-6PQB] (last updated Nov. 29, 2022) (though setting the goal of “zero over time.”); UNIV. OF S. CAL., FOSSIL FUEL FACTSHEET, *supra* note 388.

⁴²¹ *See State Street SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust*, STATE ST. INV. MGMT., <https://www.ssga.com/us/en/intermediary/etfs/state-street-spdr-sp-500-etf-trust-spy> [https://perma.cc/E6Y9-RNWN]. Dartmouth’s public disclosure of its direct holdings shows that it invested in this SPDR S&P 500 index fund. *See supra* note 312.

⁴²² *See supra* Part III.B.1.

⁴²³ MIT’S ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 138, at 3 (“Fifteen years ago, we pro-actively sought out fossil fuel investments to add to the portfolio given their ability to hedge against the Institute’s energy costs.”).

⁴²⁴ *See supra* note 212 and accompanying text.

indirect holdings. The Princeton and Yale divestments were explicitly non-financial. The California divestment was couched, dubiously, in terms of risk and return.

Princeton reports that, as of February 2024, it had completely divested from “publicly traded fossil fuel companies” for reasons other than risk and return.⁴²⁵ With respect to “indirectly held companies where an immediate sale was not possible,” Princeton took “offsetting positions, known as ‘hedgies,’ that effectively neutralize the endowment’s ownership of those companies.”⁴²⁶ Not only did Princeton divest from fossil fuel investments for reasons other than risk and return, it bore additional costs to extricate itself from its illiquid fossil fuel holdings instead of letting those positions unwind over time.

Yale adopted a fossil fuel policy in 2021 that, for various nonfinancial reasons, resulted in a list of more than a hundred fossil fuel companies from which it bars investment.⁴²⁷ The list includes large firms such as Exxon, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, which were banned among other reasons for not “supporting sensible government regulation and industry self-regulation addressing climate change.”⁴²⁸ Although Yale’s position is not pellucid, it appears (but we are not certain) that these exclusions apply to its outside managers.⁴²⁹ On the other hand, “Yale’s ethical investment policy does not prevent the holding of [index] funds.”⁴³⁰ Yale’s most recent SEC filing shows that it has a small position (less than \$1 million) in a total market index fund that by definition would include all or nearly all of excluded firms.⁴³¹

⁴²⁵ *Fossil Fuel Dissociation*, PRINCETON UNIV., <https://fossilfueldissociation.princeton.edu/> [<https://perma.cc/3B9D-UDHR>] (last updated Jan. 2026).

⁴²⁶ *Id.*

⁴²⁷ *See Implementation of the Fossil Fuel Investment Principles*, YALE UNIV., <https://acir.yale.edu/implementation-fossil-fuel-investment-principles> [<https://perma.cc/ETX9-K37A>].

⁴²⁸ *Id.*

⁴²⁹ Yale’s fifth fossil fuel principle is that fossil fuel companies “should be transparent with Yale and Yale’s Investment Managers about their compliance” with the other four principles. *Id.* Failure to comply with any of the principles results in being put on the no-buy list. *Id.* In addition, Yale’s chief investment officer “asked Yale’s external investment managers to avoid companies that refused to acknowledge the social and financial costs of climate change and that failed to take economically sensible steps to reduce GHG emissions.” *Report of the Committee on Fossil Fuel Investment Principles*, YALE UNIV., <https://president.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2024-08/CFIP%20-%20Final%20Report%20%28with%20Appendix%29-1.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/5P2L-XCV8>]. Failure to comply with Yale’s fossil fuel principles would, we suppose, constitute grounds under this direction to avoid the firm.

⁴³⁰ *Investor Responsibility*, YALE INVEST. OFF., <https://investments.yale.edu/investor-responsibility/> [<https://perma.cc/S6HA-SLJN>] (specifying that Yale’s divestment policy does not preclude ownership via index funds and ETFs).

⁴³¹ Yale Univ., Report Filed by Institutional Investment Managers (Form 13F-HR) (Nov 14, 2025), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/938582/000199937125017769/xslForm13F_X02/infotable.xml [<https://perma.cc/Z3JM-F8EK>] (showing nearly \$1 million invested in the iShares Core S&P Total Stock Market ETF).

We confirmed that this index fund does indeed include at least Exxon, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips.⁴³²

The University of California system reports that it completely divested from direct and indirect fossil fuel holdings as of 2020.⁴³³ The chief investment officer expressed a risk-and-return basis for the divestment: “Today we remain convinced that continuing to invest in fossil fuels poses an unacceptable financial risk to UC’s portfolios and therefore to the students, faculty, staff and retirees of the University of California.”⁴³⁴ But the announcement also referenced “UC’s systemwide sustainability efforts.”⁴³⁵ And we have not been able to locate any report or other documentation of the underlying risk-and-return analysis.

As with its tobacco divestment, the California system implemented its divestment from fossil fuels by creating its own bespoke index fund, for which we couldn’t locate relative cost information, that filtered out tobacco and fossil fuels.⁴³⁶ In 2024, however, a student journalist discovered that in the years following the 2020 announcement the University of California system continued to vote shares in numerous publicly traded fossil fuel companies, including Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and Shell, that had purportedly been divested years earlier, implying that the University of California system continued to own those shares.⁴³⁷

A broad fossil fuel divestment for nonfinancial reasons is almost certainly a fiduciary breach. For the restricted endowment, which is subject to the trust law sole interest rule and no-further-inquiry principle, there is no tolerance for any purpose other than the stated purpose of each individual restricted gift. For the unrestricted endowment, which is subject to the corporate law best interest standard implemented by way of a fairness test, it would be hard to show fairness for a costly divestment. That these broad divestments were costly is implied by Princeton’s hedging positions, and textbook finance teaches that a reduction in portfolio efficiency is the consequence of exclusion

⁴³² *iShares Core S&P Total U.S. Stock Market ETF*, iSHARES, <https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239724/ishares-core-sp-total-us-stock-market-etf> [https://perma.cc/3REE-NB9B] (last visited Feb. 13, 2026).

⁴³³ See U.C. Office of the President, *UC’s Investment Portfolios Fossil Free; Clean Energy Investments Top \$1 Billion*, UNIV. CAL. (May 19, 2020), <https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/press-room/ucs-investment-portfolios-fossil-free-clean-energy-investments-top-1-billion> [https://perma.cc/L2JU-78UF] (“The University of California Office of the Chief Investment Officer of the Regents announced today (May 19) that its investment portfolios are fossil free.”).

⁴³⁴ *Id.*

⁴³⁵ *Id.*

⁴³⁶ See *id.*; see also *supra* note 313 and accompanying text.

⁴³⁷ See Fatima Yousuf, *Did UC System Ever Really Divest From Fossil Fuels?*, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Jun. 21, 2024), https://www.dailycal.org/opinion/the_soapbox/did-uc-system-ever-really-divest-from-fossil-fuels/article_442b6648-3043-11ef-8051-7b62cd14e9ca.html [https://perma.cc/SY8M-H75W] (“However, the UC system’s proxy voting record reveals that the institution has held shares in public oil and gas companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp., Chevron Corp. and more, well beyond when it announced it had already divested from fossil fuels.”).

of an industry.⁴³⁸ In these respects, a broad fossil fuel divestment resembles broad (rather than selective) divestment from South Africa, which at the time was widely agreed would be a fiduciary breach.

2. Israel

A “Boycott, Divest, Sanction” or “BDS” movement has long advocated for universities to divest from Israel and disassociate from academic ties to Israeli institutions.⁴³⁹ After the war in Gaza, the BDS movement gained traction among student protesters, with much of the focus on endowment divestment, but also with some calls for academic disassociation.⁴⁴⁰ Some of the divestment proposals focused on a handful of firms with military ties to Israel.⁴⁴¹ Other proposals sought a broad divestment, encompassing any firm doing business in Israel.⁴⁴² Universities have thus far almost uniformly resisted divestment from Israel.⁴⁴³

⁴³⁸ Empirical work assessing the portfolio impact of large-scale fossil fuel divestment is mixed, in part because fossil fuels may be pro-cyclical, thus providing low diversification benefits. Compare Hendrik Bessembinder, *Frictional Costs of Fossil Fuel Divestment* (June 3, 2016) (unpublished working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2789878 [<https://perma.cc/JPV4-9L49>] (estimating a two percent to twelve percent reduction in endowment value over twenty years), and Bradford Cornell, *The Divestment Penalty: Estimating the Costs of Fossil Fuel Divestment to Select University Endowments* (Sep. 3, 2015) (unpublished working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2655603 [<https://perma.cc/3AD3-KP9U>] (estimating a \$100 million annual loss to Harvard’s endowment), with Auke Plantinga & Bert Scholtens, *The Financial Impact of Divestment from Fossil Fuels*, 21 CLIMATE POL’Y 107, 116 (2021) (arguing the costs of divestment are low due to the industry’s strong correlation with the market), and Christopher J. Ryan & Christopher R. Marsicano, *Examining the Impact of Fossil Fuel Divestment on University Endowments*, 17 NYU J.L. & Bus. 95, 135–52 (2020) (finding little effect of fossil fuel divestment in university endowments in the 2010s, but with a coding of divesting universities that differs from our assessment). Assessments relying on publicly traded securities, moreover, do not readily translate an endowment model that involves active ownership of illiquid assets. In addition, fossil fuels may provide diversification benefits beyond the portfolio if a university faces high energy costs.

⁴³⁹ See PACBI *Guidelines for the International Academic Boycott of Israel*, PALESTINIAN BDS NAT’L COMM. (Jul. 9, 2014), <https://bdsmovement.net/pacbi/academic-boycott-guidelines> [<https://perma.cc/W2PF-7URY>] (discussing disassociation from and boycott of Israeli universities).

⁴⁴⁰ See *supra* notes 14–17.

⁴⁴¹ See, e.g., Letter from Christina H. Paxson, President of Brown University to Members of Brown Community, Brown Univ. 7, 8 (Oct. 9, 2024) <https://acurm.brown.edu/sites/default/files/ACURM-Report-on-2024-Proposal-by-Brown-Divest-Coalition.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/UTD2-6XBK>] (Brown University student groups proposing divestment from ten companies, rejected by the board of trustees).

⁴⁴² See, e.g., Josh Moody, *Brown Trustee Resigns in Protest Over Divestment Vote*, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sep. 10, 2024), <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/governance/trustees-resigns/2024/09/10/brown-trustee-resigns-protest-over-divestment-vote> [<https://perma.cc/MC9E-6CRG>] (discussing the “broad” divestment demands of many protesters in the spring of 2024).

⁴⁴³ The handful of exceptions that we could find are modest. See *Union Theological Seminary Board of Trustees Endorses Divestment and Other Strategies for Companies Profiting From War in Palestine/Israel*, UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY (Sep. 5, 2024), <https://utsnyc.edu/blog/2024/05/09/union-theological-seminary-board-of-trustees-endorses-divestment-and->

We are not aware of any university with a top twenty-five endowment that has agreed to divest from Israel to any extent. To the contrary, many of those universities have explicitly rejected such a divestment. For example, Harvard's president reiterated the university's "consistent position that it has no intention of 'divesting from Israel.' . . . Harvard will not use its endowment funds to endorse a contested view on a complex issue that deeply divides our community."⁴⁴⁴ The president's message, posted on a Harvard webpage, continued:

Generations of supporters have directed their philanthropy to Harvard rather than the many other causes they could pursue because they wanted to enable the University to pursue excellence in education and research and to make that excellence more widely available. That is the fundamental purpose of the endowment funds that have resulted from their generosity. And that is why the investment strategy is designed to support the academic mission, not to serve as a direct instrument of social or political change.⁴⁴⁵

Although Harvard does not have a publicly declared divestment policy, this sort of expansive statement about neutrality and charitable purpose could tie its hands in the future, not just rhetorically but also legally. The common law "treats a charity's existing unrestricted assets—including unrestricted gifts, earned and investment income, and other assets—as restricted to the charity's purpose at the time the assets were acquired."⁴⁴⁶

In any event, Harvard is not alone among the top twenty-five endowments in explicitly rejecting divestment from Israel. For example, Johns Hopkins rejected a proposal to divest "from companies with ties to . . . Israel" as being in conflict with "the university's core commitment to free inquiry and its obligation to foster a diversity of perspectives."⁴⁴⁷ Hopkins also noted

other-strategies-for-companies-profiting-from-war-in-palestine-israel/ [https://perma.cc/4G5S-4BXL] (divesting from "companies . . . benefiting from the war in Palestine"); Christie Smith & Andrew Mendez, *SFSU Divests From 3 Arms Makers in Deal with Pro-Palestinian Students*, NBC BAY AREA (Aug. 31, 2024), <https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/san-francisco/sfsu-divests-from-3-arms-makers-in-deal-with-pro-palestinian-students/3638810/> [https://perma.cc/4GPP-ZFBC] ("In the agreement reached with students, the university will sell its corporate bond position in aerospace and defense company Lockheed Martin, stock positions in Italian defense company Leonardo, and U.S.-based data analysis enterprise Palantir Technologies."). Portland State University announced a "pause" on its relationship with the Boeing Corporation owing to its ties to the war in Gaza. Letter from Ann Cudd, President of Portland State University (Apr. 26, 2024), <https://www.pdx.edu/president/april-26-2024-message> [https://perma.cc/2XU8-QTBP].

⁴⁴⁴ Letter from Alan M. Garber, President of Harvard University (Oct. 3, 2024), <https://www.harvard.edu/media-relations/2024/10/28/oct-3-2024-correspondence-from-president-alan-m-garber/> [https://perma.cc/L87K-LSZY].

⁴⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁴⁶ RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.01 cmt. e (A.L.I. 2021).

⁴⁴⁷ HOPKINS REPORT, *supra* note 259, at ii–iii (emphasis removed).

that the divestment would have only “a de minimis impact on the targeted corporations but a significant negative impact on the university’s finances.”⁴⁴⁸ Brown rejected a proposed divestment of ten companies on the grounds that the divestment would have no effect, “Brown’s mission doesn’t encompass resolving or adjudicating global conflict,” and the divestment would violate Brown’s principles of academic freedom grounded in viewpoint neutrality.⁴⁴⁹ The University of Pennsylvania stated on several occasions that it “does not support boycotts, divestment, or sanctions against Israel.”⁴⁵⁰

Other universities with a top twenty-five endowment rejected divestment from Israel but promised attentive advisory committee review of further divestment proposals. For example, as part of deal with campus protesters, Northwestern agreed to resurrect an advisory committee on investment responsibility.⁴⁵¹ Similarly, although reaffirming that Columbia “will not divest from Israel,” its president also “offered to develop an expedited timeline for review of new proposals from the students by the Advisory Committee for Socially Responsible Investing, the body that considers divestment matters.”⁴⁵² Nonetheless, neither school has since reversed course from its stated position of not divesting from Israel.

A divestment from Israel by a typical secular university would be difficult to square with fiduciary principles. Opposition to the war in Gaza is not an obvious fit with the research and educational charitable purpose of a typical university. This loyalty problem looms even larger for the restricted endowment, which is subject to the trust law sole interest rule and is an amalgam of gifts with a wide array of narrower research and educational purposes, many of which will have no plausible connection to the war in Gaza. Nor can those advocating Israeli divestment invoke a strong public policy evidenced by clear governmental action and applicable via the public benefit principle of charity law, as could divestment advocates regarding South Africa and Sudan. Indeed, objective indicators of public policy point in the opposite direction. As the Johns Hopkins committee that rejected divestment from Israel observed, “the official stance of the United States government continues to be support for

⁴⁴⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁴⁹ See *Brown Corporation Votes to Reject Divestment*, BROWN UNIV. (Oct. 9, 2024) <https://www.brown.edu/news/2024-10-09/divestment-decision> [<https://perma.cc/CY8V-P2L9>].

⁴⁵⁰ Neema Baddam & Katie Bartlett, *Penn Rebuffs Student Referendum Vote in Favor of Divestment from Israel*, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (June 27, 2024), <https://www.thedp.com/article/2024/06/penn-muslim-student-association-referendum-vote> [<https://perma.cc/W3DS-4Z74?type=standard>] (quoting messages from the University).

⁴⁵¹ The promise was part of the “Deering Meadow Agreement.” See NW. UNIV., AGREEMENT ON DEERING MEADOW, *supra* note 379. See also Jacob Wendler & Avani Kalra, *Administrators, Student Demonstrators Reach Agreement to End Encampment on Deering Meadow*, DAILY NW. (Apr. 29, 2024), <https://dailynorthwestern.com/2024/04/29/campus/breaking-administrators-student-demonstrators-reach-agreement-to-end-encampment/> [<https://perma.cc/PV3G-39R6>].

⁴⁵² *Statement from Columbia University President Minouche Shafik*, COLUM. UNIV. (Apr. 29, 2024), <https://president.columbia.edu/news/statement-columbia-university-president-minouche-shafik-4-29> [<https://perma.cc/6WAM-38L6>].

Israel, and at least 38 state governments . . . have outlawed or created retaliatory measures against divestment.”⁴⁵³

Divestment from Israel would also be difficult to square with the prudent investor rule. In contrast to selective divestment from South Africa under apartheid and divestment from Sudan during the Darfur war, a broad divestment from Israel could not be implemented by selling a small handful of directly held firms and replacing them with other firms. The Johns Hopkins committee contrasted current endowment practice to that prevailing during the South Africa and tobacco divestments:

Today, most universities—including JHU—invest their endowments through external managers and have very few if any directly held investments in stocks and bonds. Much of the directly held investments universities hold are in vehicles such as market index products like ETFs. This modern structure is necessary to ensure the university maximizes the endowment’s return . . . the committee acknowledged throughout its process that this structure also makes divestment of any kind costly, difficult, and highly impractical.⁴⁵⁴

This is not to say that no university could skew its portfolio for or against Israel. For example, a reasonable argument could be made that a university with a profound pacifist commitment (such as a Quaker school) or a university with a Jewish mission or identity could plausibly skew its portfolio for or against Israel, just as the Sierra Club could skew its portfolio against fossil fuels.⁴⁵⁵ Further, because a university has significantly more leeway in its academic program than in its endowment management,⁴⁵⁶ it would have wider fiduciary latitude to increase or decrease its programmatic engagements with Israel, Palestine, or otherwise.⁴⁵⁷ But given the current state of public policy and endowment practice, the inconsistency of an endowment divestment from Israel with fiduciary principles is not a close call.

CONCLUSION

We have synthesized the law and finance of university (or other charitable nonprofit) endowment divestment. Under prevailing law, endowment

⁴⁵³ HOPKINS REPORT, *supra* note 259, at 24; *see also* H.R. 246, 116th Cong. (2019) (Congressional resolution against BDS movement passed 398 to 17); *Anti-Semitism: State Anti-BDS Legislation*, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/anti-bds-legislation> [<https://perma.cc/GHX7-LKNP>] (last visited Jan. 23, 2025) (listing anti-BDS laws in thirty-eight states, some of which bar state pension investments and others bar any contracting with businesses engaged in boycotting Israel).

⁴⁵⁴ HOPKINS REPORT, *supra* note 259, at 33.

⁴⁵⁵ *See supra* Part II.E.2.

⁴⁵⁶ *See supra* Part II.D.


⁴⁵⁷ We are focusing exclusively on fiduciary principles, setting aside state and federal anti-BDS and anti-discrimination laws.

divestment for nonfinancial reasons is permissible only if: (1) the divestment is consistent with the university's charitable purpose of research and education or the narrower purpose attached to a restricted gift, and (2) the divestment's effect on the portfolio is reasonable in light of that purpose. Divesting in compliance with fiduciary principles is thus challenging. The stated charitable purpose of most secular universities is research and education. The bulk of their endowments consists of restricted gifts, which have narrower purposes and are subject to trust law's strict fiduciary loyalty rules. Divestment for reasons outside the applicable charitable purpose is *ultra vires*, disloyal, or both.

Even if within the applicable charitable purpose, a divestment must also satisfy the duty of care as elaborated by the prudent investor rule. Contemporary endowment practice relies largely on externally managed funds, however, making divestment from even a few corporations or a single region costly and thus by definition harmful to the portfolio. In today's endowment practice, therefore, even a *de minimis* divestment from Israel would likely breach the fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence, exposing university trustees to potential out-of-pocket damages for any resulting costs or losses. A useful heuristic is to ask whether a direct distribution of university funds for the same purpose would have been permissible. If not, the divestment could not plausibly satisfy the even stricter fiduciary duties applicable to endowment management.

This paper also considered the fiduciary principles applicable to academic disassociation, which are much more relaxed than those applicable to endowment divestment. Instead of the prudent investor rule, programmatic decisions are evaluated under the corporate law duty of care, which comes with business judgment rule deference. Accordingly, there is far more latitude within a university's educational and research programs to address almost any issue of concern, and with a variety of tools, including research funding, scholarships, and investments in facilities. As the name "university" itself implies, the scope of inquiry is virtually unlimited.

Finally, so far as the fragmentary public record allows, we have undertaken to excavate the lost history of purported prior divestments: South Africa under apartheid, tobacco, Sudan during the Darfur war, and fossil fuels. Consistent with our analysis of prevailing law, but contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that universities have for the most part not engaged in broad divestments, not even from South Africa under apartheid. Instead, most large endowments either do not divest or adhere to a narrow divestment policy for "moral abhorrence" that has been rarely (if ever) applied. We show that a divestment for moral abhorrence could pass fiduciary muster as consistent with the public benefit principle of charity law if supported by a clear public policy established by confirmatory governmental actions.



About ECGI

ECGI is an international non-profit membership organisation that provides a platform for debate and dialogue among academics, policymakers, and business leaders, with a focus on major corporate governance, ESG, and stewardship issues.

The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI or its members.

ECGI Working Paper Series in Law

Editorial Board

Editor

Amir Licht, Professor of Law, Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University

Consulting Editors

Hse-Yu Iris Chiu, Professor of Corporate Law and Financial, Regulation, University College London

Martin Gelter, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law

Geneviève Helleringer, Professor of Law, ESCP and Oxford Law Faculty

Kathryn Judge, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School

Wolf-Georg Ringe, Professor of Law & Finance, University of Hamburg

Series Manager

Asif Malik, ECGI Working Paper Series Manager

<https://www.ecgi.global/publications/working-papers>