

What are the costs of weakening shareholder primacy? Evidence from a U.S. quasi-natural experiment

Finance Working Paper N° 1064/2025
August 2026

Benjamin Bennett

Texas Christian University

René M. Stulz

The Ohio State University

Zexi Wang

Lancaster University

© Benjamin Bennett, René M. Stulz and Zexi Wang 2026. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
<https://www.ecgi.global/publications/working-papers>

ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance

What are the costs of weakening shareholder primacy? Evidence from a U.S. quasi-natural experiment

Working Paper N° 1064/2025
August 2026

Benjamin Bennett
René M. Stulz
Zexi Wang

Abstract

We study the economic consequences of weakening shareholder primacy using Nevada Senate Bill 203 as a quasi-natural experiment. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that affected Nevada firms experience a decline in firm value of more than 4%, as measured by Tobin's q. Rather than responding with stronger governance to reassure capital providers, affected firms experience a worsening of their governance. We document significant real effects through the investment channel: treated firms undertake worse acquisitions and exhibit reduced efficiency in both capital expenditures and R&D spending. Weakening shareholder primacy does not improve how stakeholders are treated, as environmental and social performance worsens.

Keywords: Shareholder primacy, corporate governance, firm value, investment efficiency,

JEL Classification: D22, G32, G34, K22, M14

Benjamin Bennett

Texas Christian University

René M. Stulz

The Ohio State University

Zexi Wang

Lancaster University



*Charles A. Dice Center for
Research in Financial Economics*

**What are the costs of weakening
shareholder primacy? Evidence
from a U.S. quasi-natural
experiment**

Benjamin Bennett,
Texas Christian University

René M. Stulz,
The Ohio State University, NBER, and ECGI

Zexi Wang,
Lancaster University

Dice Center WP 2025-12
Fisher College of Business WP 2025-03-012

August 2026

What are the costs of weakening shareholder primacy?

Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

Benjamin Bennett, René M. Stulz, and Zexi Wang¹

August 2026

Abstract

We study the economic consequences of weakening shareholder primacy using Nevada Senate Bill 203 as a quasi-natural experiment. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that affected Nevada firms experience a decline in firm value of more than 4%, as measured by Tobin's q . Rather than responding with stronger governance to reassure capital providers, affected firms experience a worsening of their governance. We document significant real effects through the investment channel: treated firms undertake worse acquisitions and exhibit reduced efficiency in both capital expenditures and R&D spending. Weakening shareholder primacy does not improve how stakeholders are treated, as environmental and social performance worsens.

JEL Classification: D22, G32, G34, K22, M14

Keywords: Shareholder primacy, corporate governance, firm value, investment efficiency, Stakeholder model, ESG

¹ Bennett is from the Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, Stulz is from the Fisher School of Business, The Ohio State University, NBER and ECGI, and Wang is from the Lancaster University Management School. We are grateful for comments from Ilona Babenko (discussant), Michal Barzuza, Jay Jie Cai (discussant), Maxime Couvert (discussant), Craig Doidge, Alex Edmans, Ofer Eldar, Laurent Fresard, Sinan Gokkaya, Salvatore Miglietta, Leandro Sanz, Steven Solomon, Eric Talley, Michael Wittry, and participants at the first annual corporate governance academic forum at the University of Toronto, the EUROFIDAI-ESSEC Paris December Finance Meeting, and the 2026 Delaware Corporate Governance Symposium.

1. Introduction

Mainstream corporate governance doctrine in the U.S. posits that directors' and officers' primary responsibility is to the shareholders. This is the doctrine of shareholder primacy. Typically, shareholders want the directors and officers to maximize firm value and, consequently, the duty of directors and officers is to maximize shareholder wealth. If directors and officers stray from their duty, shareholders, capital markets, and the market for corporate control have various mechanisms they can use to constrain or remove directors and officers. An alternative corporate governance doctrine is that the primary responsibility of directors and officers is to the corporation's stakeholders. This stakeholder theory offers limited guidance when decisions affect stakeholders heterogeneously (Jensen, 2001), so that stakeholder theory gives substantially greater discretion to directors and officers than the shareholder primacy theory. As a result, stakeholder theory makes it easier for insiders to pursue their own interests (Bebchuk and Tallarita, 2020; Karpoff, 2021) and to find excuses for underperformance (Flugum and Southern, 2025).

In this paper, we investigate the impact of a law passed in Nevada that gave considerable discretion to officers and directors (managers in the following) to take actions adverse to the interests of shareholders and increased their legal protection if they take actions that are not in the interests of shareholders. The literature has examined the impact of various state laws that give managers the right to make decisions in the interest of the corporation that are inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization. The Nevada law we consider is new and important because it essentially wipes out the doctrine of shareholder primacy from Nevada corporate law and protects managers when they take actions inconsistent with shareholder primacy. In particular, this Nevada law was intended to ensure that Nevada's statutory corporate-law regime, rather than Delaware-derived fiduciary principles, governs the internal affairs of Nevada corporations. We show in this paper that when corporate law gives managers almost free rein to ignore shareholder interests, shareholders are hurt, governance worsens, investment quality drops, and stakeholders do not benefit.

In the U.S., the corporate law applying to a corporation is determined by its state of incorporation. Delaware is the most popular state of incorporation for public companies. Roughly 60% of public corporations are incorporated in that state (Eldor and Magnolfi, 2025). Delaware law is explicit about the

duty that the board of directors owes to the shareholders. As the former chief justice of the Delaware Supreme Court put it, “a clear-eyed look at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end” (Strine, 2015). The second most popular state for incorporation of public firms is Nevada. Nevada law does not have the doctrine of shareholder primacy and it protects managers against litigation by shareholders. Despite Nevada’s corporate law, before 2017, the Courts applying Nevada law still followed the Courts in Delaware (Penrose and Young, 2019), so that for practical purposes the doctrine of shareholder primacy still impacted judicial decisions for Nevada corporations. For instance, in a 2006 decision, the Nevada Supreme Court, in contrast to the spirit of Nevada corporate law, declared that the duty of loyalty “requires the board and its directors to maintain, in good faith, the corporation’s and its shareholders’ best interests over anyone else’s interests.”² In 2017, the Nevada legislature put a stop to this practice by passing Senate Bill No. 203 (the Bill). The Bill made it crystal clear that the doctrine of shareholder primacy does not apply in Nevada and that directors and officers are protected against shareholder litigation. The adoption of this law represents a quasi-natural experiment (the Nevada experiment) to study the implications of a broad weakening of shareholder primacy with strong protection of managers from shareholder litigation for shareholders, stakeholders, and firm policies.

There is much evidence examining implications of differences in shareholder protection across countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). An advantage of the Nevada experiment for studying shareholder protection is that it represents a change in the level of shareholder protection for only a subset of U.S. firms. Hence, cross-country differences in economic development or national institutions do not affect our experiment. We can therefore focus directly on the impact of changes in corporate law that weaken the rights of shareholders and give more leeway to insiders to pursue other goals than shareholder wealth maximization. The U.S. has the advantage of high financial development, so that market mechanisms that can discipline managements and boards are as developed as in any country. While

² Schoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 122 Nev. 621 (2006).

the Berle and Means (1932) tradition in governance emphasizes the role of the law in ensuring that investors receive a return on their investment, the agency tradition following Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasizes the role of market mechanisms (Ma and Shleifer, 2025). If market mechanisms constraining agency costs are strong enough, the Nevada experiment should have little or no impact on firm governance and shareholder wealth. However, if the law plays a crucial role in firm governance in the presence of strong market mechanisms, we expect the Nevada experiment to affect governance and shareholder wealth adversely if before the passage of the law Nevada directors and officers maximized shareholder wealth.

The corporate-finance literature has studied weakened shareholder primacy primarily through antitakeover laws, which reduce discipline from the market for corporate control (e.g., Garvey and Hanka, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan, 2005; Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman, 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Cain, McKeon, and Solomon, 2017; Karpoff and Wittry, 2018; see Karpoff and Wittry, 2024, for a review). We focus on a different and broader margin. Our question is whether relaxing shareholder-centered governance through the fiduciary and liability regime, thereby expanding managerial discretion generally rather than just in response to a takeover attempt, with the addition of substantial protection against shareholder litigation, affects firm value and corporate policies. This distinction is important because takeover laws alter one external disciplining channel of management, whereas broader changes in manager's discretion and litigation exposure can affect corporate policies generally. Doing so while giving extremely strong protection from shareholder litigation to managers enhances their discretion further.

Recent literature has focused on two separate arguments for why giving management latitude to depart from shareholder wealth maximization could be beneficial for shareholders and/or for society. One argument is that shareholder wealth maximization focused on short-term outcomes destroys shareholder wealth because it means underinvesting in projects that are expected to pay off in the long-run but have an adverse impact on earnings in the short-run (e.g., Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist, 2015). This short-termism argument implies that the law should increase shareholder wealth if it enables management to improve long-run shareholder wealth better. The second argument is that relaxing the constraints resulting

from shareholder primacy permits management to focus on ESG metrics. One view of these goals is that they are metrics of long-run performance (Edmans, 2023). If that is the case, greater discretion to focus on long-term performance metrics would increase firm value. Alternatively, if the actions to increase ESG metrics are valuable for society but not for shareholders, we expect a law that makes it easier to increase such metrics to affect shareholder wealth adversely as long as investors expect managers to make use of that discretion.

Given the nature of the Nevada experiment, we can compare the evolution of public firms subject to the Bill to the evolution of public firms not subject to the Bill. For that purpose, we use a difference-in-differences (DiD) design for our investigation. Specifically, we compare the evolution of firms incorporated in Nevada to the evolution of other firms for the two years following the adoption of the law to the two years preceding the adoption of the law. We limit our investigation to the two years following the adoption of the law to avoid the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, but we show evidence of robustness if we extend the post-treatment period. Importantly, our empirical design is such that we compare the same firm after the adoption of the law to before the adoption of the law. Consequently, our results cannot be explained by changes in the composition of firms in Nevada or outside of Nevada.

We hypothesize that the Bill had an adverse impact on the value of Nevada firms. We find limited evidence of an adverse impact when the law was proposed and a more decisive negative impact when the law became effective. We find an abnormal return of -1.21% significant at the 1% level on the day the law became effective. This abnormal return understates the impact of the law as the legislature was strongly supportive of the bill in the months before the law became effective. Further, we find that Nevada incorporated public firms have poor stock returns in the year following the adoption of the law.

Many papers in the corporate governance literature use Tobin's q as a valuation measure. A classic paper shows that Delaware firms have higher valuations using Tobin's q (Daines, 2001). We find that the Tobin's q of Nevada firms falls by more than 4% as a result of the passage of the law. This result is robust when we exclude gaming firms or focus on firms that benefited little, if at all, from a potentially confounding factor, namely the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA). In support of the argument of Eldar

(2020) and Eldar and Magnolfi (2020) that shareholders have a preference against discretion for insiders at large firms, we find that the adverse impact of the law on large firms is more than twice the size of the impact on small firms. We strengthen our inference of a causal impact of the law on firm value by implementing placebo tests. We show that the value of Delaware firms or of firms in states with constituency laws does not experience a decrease around the time of the passage of the Bill. We also show that firm cash flows decrease following passage of the Bill.

In principle, the passage of a law wiping out shareholder primacy could trigger market forces that discipline insiders, as market mechanisms would decrease the value of the firm and increase its cost of capital if it becomes less likely to maximize shareholder wealth. By strengthening corporate governance and bonding themselves to a course of action favorable to shareholders, insiders could reverse these outcomes partially or completely. However, the opposite outcome is also possible. As the law reduces the external constraints that previously protected shareholders, governance may be weakened. For insiders to take measures to offset the impact of the law, the loss they make from not doing so must exceed the additional private benefits they can extract under weaker shareholder protection. Consequently, when insiders can gain substantially at the expense of shareholders from greater discretion, they have no incentives to take actions that mitigate the adverse impact of the law on shareholder wealth. We find no evidence that the board monitors more after the passage of the Bill. Instead, we find striking evidence of a worsening of board monitoring. Specifically, board attendance worsens and board members become busier. These results show that governance worsens from the perspective of shareholder wealth maximization.

Insiders benefit from the Bill in that they become less subject to external monitoring. Institutional shareholders are often viewed as having a monitoring role (Coffee, 1991; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007). They are part of the market mechanism that helps make it more likely that directors and officers maximize firm value. When shareholder primacy is weakened, institutional investors may find it more difficult to influence corporate decisions without complementary governance mechanisms. As a result, we expect a decline in overall institutional ownership. We find strong empirical support in the data for this prediction. Since shareholders are hurt by the law and insiders do not attempt to offset the impact of the law on

shareholders, it must be that insiders benefit from the law. We find that CEO excess pay, meaning the pay of a CEO in excess of what other CEOs in a comparable situation earn, increases.

Our evidence shows that the Bill hurt shareholders and that market mechanisms did not offset the impact of the bill on shareholder wealth. However, since the Bill gives greater discretion to managers, they could have used that discretion to make stakeholders better off and to pursue a stakeholder agenda. We use two separate ESG indices to examine whether the Bill led to an improvement in firms' environmental and social performance. We find that both environmental and social performance worsen. There is no indication that the greater discretion given to management by the Bill made stakeholders better off.

With weaker governance, we expect investment to become less efficient. A measure of efficiency for capital expenditures is the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's q . With the q -theory of investment, firms should invest more when q increases. We examine the sensitivity of investment to q . We find that investment essentially becomes insensitive to q after the Bill's adoption. This evidence suggests that firms' investment policies are less efficient after the passage of the Bill, which would contribute to the decrease in firm value that we document. We further find that firms make poorer acquisitions after the adoption of the Bill in that the market reacts more adversely to acquisition announcements. Lastly, we find that firm patent applications drop. These results suggest that weakening shareholder primacy does not lead to outcomes consistent with alleviating short-termist pressures on directors and officers. Instead, these results suggest a decrease in innovation efficiency.

Our paper contributes to several literatures. First, it adds to the literature on the role of laws and markets in corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). While this literature typically compares countries with different laws, here we compare a change in laws within a country that affects only some firms in that country. This makes it possible to better understand the impact of a change in laws that reduces shareholder primacy since financial and economic development are the same for treated firms and non-treated firms. We show that even in a country where market mechanisms are strong, weakening shareholder primacy has significant adverse effects on the value of corporations, and on how they are run.

Second, the paper contributes to the literature on changes in state corporate laws that weaken the duty of officers and directors to maximize shareholder wealth. Much of this large literature focuses on state anti-takeover amendments (for a review, see Karpoff and Wittry, 2024). A more recent literature investigates relaxation in the duty of loyalty of officers and directors (e.g., Rauterberg and Talley, 2017; Fich, Harford, and Tran, 2023; Eldar and Grennan, 2024; Babenko, Bennett, and Wang, 2025). Our paper considers a change that explicitly allows managers to prioritize stakeholders over shareholders in general and gives them much greater legal protection when they do so.

Third, the paper contributes to the literature on differences across states in corporate law and on competition among states for corporate incorporations. Much recent attention has been focused on the competition between Delaware and Nevada (e.g., Barzuza, 2024). Elgar and Magnolfi (2020) argue that large firms are hostile to laws that weaken shareholder primacy, but smaller firms can benefit from them and generally prefer laws that protect managers. We find that the decrease in valuations resulting from the Nevada law is much stronger for large firms than for small firms. In the next section, we summarize more directly the smaller literature focused on Nevada corporate law.

Fourth, the paper adds to a more recent and more limited literature on corporate purpose and the stakeholder model. We show that reducing shareholder primacy to enable insiders to pursue a stakeholder model is unlikely to improve the welfare of stakeholders but reduces economic efficiency. This evidence is consistent with the evidence of Bebchuk, Kastiel, and Tallarita (2020) that management or directors do not bargain for stakeholders in takeovers even when they claim to be concerned about their welfare.

Lastly, our evidence speaks to the recent literature on short-termism. We fail to find evidence supportive of the argument that relaxing shareholder primacy benefits firms because it enables management to take into account the interests of stakeholders in a way that benefits shareholders in the long run. The literature on constituency statutes finds some evidence supportive of the argument that giving greater discretion to management can enable management to focus more on the long run and reduces the cost of debt (Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2016; Gao, Li, and Ma, 2021). Nevada already had a constituency statute when the Bill became effective, so that the Bill's impact is incremental to the impact of a constituency statute. We find

that the Bill has different effects from the adoption of a constituency statute. A possible explanation for why we do not find similar results is that constituency statutes do not erect barriers to protect managers against shareholder litigation. Hence, managers in constituency statutes have greater discretion, but are still limited in taking actions that could generate shareholder litigation.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background and the empirical design. Section 3 describes our data and sample. Section 4 shows that the Bill led to a decrease in the value of Nevada firms. Section 5 investigates how the Nevada experiment affected the governance of Nevada firms. Section 6 examines the effects of the Bill on investment efficiency. Section 7 concludes.

2. The Nevada experiment

We first briefly discuss the evolution of Nevada corporate law and how the Nevada Senate Bill 203 fits in with that evolution. We then review the main provisions of the Bill. Lastly, we explain how the experiment we consider motivates our empirical approach.

2.1. Nevada corporate law and Senate Bill 203

Delaware is by far the preferred choice for incorporation for public firms. We show in Figure 1 the number of firms incorporated in the five most popular states for incorporation. While Delaware is first, Nevada is second. However, Delaware's edge is very large, as it has roughly twenty times more incorporations of SEC registered firms than Nevada during our sample period. Yet, Bainbridge (2024) finds that out of the 67 public companies incorporated in Delaware that left Delaware from 2012 to 2024, 49 chose to be incorporated in Nevada. DExit became more of an issue after Delaware found against Musk in the *Tornetta v. Musk* litigation concerning Musk's pay package. Musk responded to the decision by saying "Never incorporate your company in the state of Delaware. I recommend incorporating in Nevada or Texas if you prefer shareholders to decide matters."³ Musk moved the incorporation of Neuralink as well as X to

³ "Elon Musk shifts Neuralink's incorporation to Nevada," by George Hammond and Sujeet Indap, *Financial Times*, February 9, 2024.

Nevada. The *Tornetta v. Musk* decision is just one decision in a series of decisions that suggest to some observers that Delaware has become more receptive to shareholder litigation (Bainbridge, 2024).

The main difference between Delaware and Nevada in corporate law dates from a law passed in Nevada in 1987. The Nevada law of 1987 has lax protection of shareholders in the event of adverse actions by directors and officers compared to Delaware law (Barzuza and Smith, 2014). While Delaware does not allow corporations to exculpate directors and officers for breach of the duty of loyalty, the Nevada law of 1987 does so for most breaches. An important step in the evolution of the weakening of the liability of officers and directors for breach of the duty of loyalty was a legal reform in 2001 that eliminated monetary penalties for breaches of the duty of loyalty for all incorporated firms rather than just making this option available to firms in their charter. Eldar (2018) investigates this change and his analysis shows that it had no significant effect on Tobin's q . He also argues that this change may have been advantageous to shareholders for smaller fragile firms. These protections of directors and officers have been strengthened through time so that directors and officers are subject to personal liability only if their breach of a duty involves "intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of the law" (Barzuza, 2024). When it comes to conflicted transactions, Barzuza (2024) states that "Self-interested, conflicted transactions in Nevada are not subject to meaningful judicial scrutiny."

Nevada Senate Bill 203, enacted in 2017, represents a significant development in the evolution of Nevada's corporate law. Over the course of several decades, the Nevada legislature sought to enhance the state's attractiveness as a jurisdiction for incorporation. A central motivation for this legislative agenda has been to provide clarity, predictability, and flexibility in corporate governance, differentiating Nevada from Delaware. An important feature of Nevada is that it is a state where the statute defines bright lines for liability while Delaware relies more on judicial interpretation that changes over time. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) emphasize the greater protection of shareholders in common law countries compared to civil law countries. From the perspective of corporate law, Nevada is more like a civil law country and Delaware is more like a common law country.

Despite these efforts of the legislature, Nevada’s statutory framework was often undermined by judicial interpretations that imported corporate governance principles from Delaware case law. For example, in cases such as *Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp.* (1997) and *Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp.* (2006), courts applied Delaware judicial precedents that diluted the unique governance principles enshrined in Nevada’s statutes. This judicial drift created uncertainty for corporations incorporated in Nevada, undermining the state’s legislative intent to establish a governance model that explicitly permitted directors and officers to prioritize broader stakeholder interests and resist shareholder pressures. In response, Nevada Senate Bill 203 was introduced and enacted to reaffirm the state’s commitment to a distinct corporate governance regime.⁴ Effective October 1, 2017, the legislation strengthened the right of corporate directors and officers to pursue objectives inconsistent with shareholder primacy and protected them by erecting strong obstacles to shareholder litigation.

2.2. Key Provisions of Senate Bill 203

A central feature of the Bill is the explicit recognition that managers have no legal obligation to prioritize shareholder interests as the dominant consideration in their decision-making. The Bill authorizes managers to consider a wide range of factors other than shareholder value, including the interests of employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the broader community, and societal impacts. They have the right to subordinate shareholder interests to any of these factors. It also highlights that managers may weigh both short-term and long-term corporate interests, giving them broader flexibility to make decisions aimed at the sustainability and independence of the corporation. This aligns with Nevada’s intent to offer a governance model distinct from Delaware that gives managers great discretion to pursue objectives other than maximizing shareholder wealth.

The Bill further provides clearer instructions on the circumstances under which managers may rely on information provided by internal and external advisors. It also reinforces the protections offered by the

⁴ We refer to the 2017 legislative reform as SB 203 for simplicity; the Bill amends NRS 78.012.

business judgment rule, presuming that managers act in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the best interests of the corporation unless proven otherwise. By raising the evidence threshold for challenging decisions made by managers, the Bill reduces their exposure to personal liability for corporate actions and restricts shareholders' power. This clarification ensures that managers can operate with confidence and make decisions without undue interference from shareholder pressures.

In sum, by codifying these provisions, the Senate Bill 203 provides clearer and more concrete guidelines for managers on their fiduciary duties and decision-making powers. It tells them that not only shareholder primacy does not apply, but that they have strong legal protections when making decisions inconsistent with shareholder maximization.

2.3. Why SB 203 matters

A natural question is why SB 203 should matter economically given that Nevada corporate law had long been more protective of managers than Delaware law. Our claim is not that SB 203 created Nevada's manager-protective regime from scratch. Rather, its significance is that it reduced an important source of legal uncertainty and eliminated the possibility that shareholder primacy could be introduced in judicial decisions as courts followed Delaware precedents. Before 2017, Nevada's statutes already diverged from Delaware's, but courts applying Nevada law at times imported Delaware fiduciary principles in ways that diluted Nevada's statutory choice. SB 203 mattered because it curtailed that judicial drift and made Nevada's governance regime clearer, more predictable, and less vulnerable to shareholder-centric judicial reconstruction.

Contemporaneous legal commentary is consistent with this interpretation. Penrose and Young (2019) explain that the bill clarified directors' ability to assign weight to any constituency and abrogated the contrary suggestion in the Shoen decision. A 2017 client alert by Snell & Wilmer similarly describes SB 203 as requiring plaintiffs to rebut the business judgment rule presumption to impose damages liability, broadening the range of factors managers may consider, and expressly providing that Nevada law governs

the internal affairs of Nevada corporations.⁵ Another contemporaneous commentary characterizes the bill as an unmistakable rejection, for fiduciary-duty purposes, of the prior practice of resorting to Delaware authority.⁶ These materials do not treat SB 203 as mere housekeeping. They treat it as a meaningful anti-Delaware clarification that strengthened managerial discretion and made shareholder challenge more difficult.

While judicial decisions in Delaware are written, so that they form precedents on which future decisions can build as is standard for common law, Nevada courts typically do not produce written decisions. In part, this is because Delaware Chancery does not have jury trials while Nevada often does. It is therefore hard to trace the impact of SB 203 on judicial decisions. However, judges in other states at times have to make decisions where Nevada law applies. A written decision in such a case is *Cheffers Holding Company, Inc., and another v. Onpage Ideas, Inc.* in the Superior Court of Suffolk, Massachusetts. In that case, Plaintiffs argued in 2023 that the judge should follow Delaware on an issue where Nevada law is silent. The Court rejected the argument of the Plaintiffs referring to the Bill, saying it “suggests that Nevada courts should no longer look to Delaware common law in the same way they once did and that any judicially created standards going forward should be tied to existing Nevada statutes.”

2.4. Empirical Design: Difference-in-Differences Analysis

Our empirical design exploits the adoption of Nevada Senate Bill 203 (SB 203) in 2017 as a quasi-natural experiment that weakened shareholder primacy by altering the legal duties of corporate directors and officers. We employ a difference-in-differences (DiD) framework to estimate the causal effects of the law on firm value, corporate governance, and investments.

Our analysis focuses on the response of incumbent Nevada firms to a change in the legal regime governing them. Although competition among states in the market for corporate charters provides useful

⁵ <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/corporate-communicator-fall-2017-10543>

⁶ <https://www.calcorporatelaw.com/2017/06/is-it-a-breach-of-fiduciary-duty-to-fail-or-refuse-to-conform-to-delawares-judicial-decisions-or-practices>

institutional background, the empirical question in this paper is narrower: whether SB 203 affected the value, governance, monitoring environment, and investment policy of firms that were already incorporated in Nevada when the law changed. Reincorporations involving Nevada are infrequent during our sample period, so the relevant empirical margin in our setting is the within-firm response of existing Nevada corporations rather than contemporaneous changes in incorporation status.

Consistent with this focus, we define the treatment group as firms incorporated in Nevada before SB 203 and exclude firms that change their incorporation from other states to Nevada or from Nevada to other states during our sample period. Firms incorporated in other states serve as the control group. To isolate medium-term effects and avoid transitional dynamics, we restrict the baseline DiD analysis to a symmetric event window spanning two years before and after the law’s adoption, excluding the event year (i.e., 2015-2016 vs. 2018-2019) and avoiding the potential contamination from the COVID-19 shock. Because our baseline specification includes firm fixed effects, the estimated treatment effect is identified from changes within the same firm before and after the adoption of SB 203, rather than from shifts in the composition of Nevada-incorporated firms. The design therefore captures how firms already governed by Nevada law respond when that legal regime is clarified and strengthened.

Our baseline specification is as follows:

$$Y_{it} = \beta_1 \cdot \text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t + \Gamma \cdot X_{it} + F_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where i is the firm index and t is the year index, Y_{it} is the outcome variable of interest, Treat_i is an indicator for firms incorporated in Nevada, and Post_t is an indicator equal to one for post-adoption years, X_{it} is a vector for time-varying firm-level covariates, Γ is a vector for the corresponding coefficients, F_{it} is a vector of fixed effects, and $\varepsilon_{i,t+1}$ is the error term. The interaction term is for the differential change in outcomes for treated firms relative to controls and its coefficient β_1 captures the treatment effect of the DiD analysis. For the vector of fixed effects, we include firm fixed effects and industry-year fixed effects. Further, to account for potential heterogenous treatment effects across firms, following Andreani, Ellahle, and Shivakumar (2025), we create quartile indicator variables for our baseline control variables in 2016 (firm

size, leverage, cash holdings) and interact these quartile indicators with the year indicator variables. Therefore, we have five fixed effects in all our DiD regressions. $Treat_i$ and $Post_t$ do not appear individually in the specification because they are absorbed by these fixed effects.

3. Data and Sample

Our sample combines firm-level data from multiple sources spanning 2015 to 2019. Firms' states of incorporation are extracted from SEC 10K filings. We restrict the sample to U.S. incorporated, non-financial, non-utility firms with available data over the sample period. We access annual accounting data from Compustat and stock market data from CRSP. We exclude firms with stock prices below \$1 to mitigate the influence of microcap and distressed firms. Institutional ownership data is drawn from Thomson Reuters 13F filings, while corporate governance characteristics are obtained from Capital IQ and RiskMetrics. Data on mergers and acquisitions are from SDC Platinum. Executive compensation information is obtained from ExecuComp. Environmental and social performance measures are from S&P Trucost. Patent data are from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017). In our main sample, we have 151 treated firms (incorporated in Nevada) and 3,041 control firms (incorporated in other states). All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Variable definitions are described in the Appendix.

Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables in our analysis. Internet Appendix Table IA1 illustrates the means of variables for Nevada and non-Nevada firms separately in the year before the adoption of SB 203 (i.e., 2016). Nevada firms differ in some dimensions from other listed firms. They are smaller on average and have lower levels of institutional ownership and a higher Tobin's q , consistent with the finding by Barzuza and Smith (2014) that Nevada firms do not have a lower q than Delaware firms. Nevada firms do not have higher leverage or more cash holdings than other firms. The environmental performance and social performance of Nevada firms are similar to those of other firms.

4. Firm Value and the Adoption of Nevada Senate Bill 203

In this section, we first examine the impact of the Bill on shareholder wealth and Tobin's q . We then show the impact of the Bill on the cost of debt.

4.1. The stock-price impact of the Bill

To examine the stock-price reaction to the passage of a law, it is best when there is controversy about whether the law will be passed or not. Otherwise, the impact of the law is likely to be already incorporated in stock prices before the passage of the law. With SB 203, there was no controversy. The law passed the Nevada Senate unanimously on May 19, 2017. It then passed the Nevada Assembly unanimously on June 5. The governor approved it on June 12. The law became effective on October 1, 2017.

We study the short-run market reaction in a two-day window (i.e., $[0, +1]$) for each step in the evolution of the law until it became effective. As the adoption of SB 203 could potentially affect all stocks of firms incorporated in Nevada, cross-sectional correlations among stock returns could lead to high false positive results (Cohn, Johnson, Liu, and Wardlaw, 2024; Fahlenbrach, Ko, and Stulz, 2025). We thus follow Cohn et al. (2024) and use generalized least squares with time-series standard errors of estimates to address the concern of cross-sectional correlations. Specifically, we use daily returns over 252 trading days prior to the effective date (i.e., October 1, 2017) to calculate the covariance matrix and the time series of estimates. Panel A of Table 2 reports abnormal returns over the $[0, +1]$ window surrounding each event date from the introduction of the bill to the effective date, using the market model, the Fama-French three-factor model, and the Fama-French plus momentum model, respectively. For the introduction date of February 22, the market model abnormal return of -1.05% is significant at the 10% using the market model, but it is not significant with the Fama-French models. None of the abnormal returns for the passage of the law by the Senate, passage of the law by the Assembly, and signing by the governor are significant. Finally, the abnormal returns are negative and range from -1.21% to -1.55%, statistically significant at the 1% level, for the effective date. These results indicate that investors interpreted the law's passage as detrimental to

shareholder wealth, consistent with the idea that weakening shareholder primacy undermines firm performance and increases concerns about conflicts of interest.

Turning to the long-term stock return performance following the adoption of the law, Panel B examines abnormal returns over the two years following the law's adoption. Using the Barber and Lyon (1997) matched portfolio approach, we find economically meaningful and statistically significant negative abnormal performance. Treated firms underperform matched peers by approximately 14.4% on both an equal-weighted and value-weighted basis (p -value 0.06). Taken together, the short- and long-run abnormal return results provide consistent evidence that markets reacted negatively to the weakening of shareholder primacy.

4.2. The Nevada experiment and Tobin's q

In this section, we estimate DiD regressions using Tobin's q and its natural logarithm as dependent variables. The empirical specification follows Equation (1), and the baseline analysis compares firm value over an event window of two years before and two years after the law's adoption in 2017. A key identifying assumption in our DiD design is that treated and control firms would have followed parallel trends in firm value in the absence of the law change. To check the validity of this assumption, Figure 2 plots dynamic treatment effects by estimating event-time coefficients from a regression of Tobin's q in Panel A and the natural logarithm of Tobin's q in Panel B on relative year indicators, using the year before the event as the benchmark. The error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation level. Figure 2 shows that both Tobin's q and the natural logarithm of Tobin's q for Nevada firms are statistically indistinguishable from that of control firms in the two years prior to the law's adoption, supporting the validity of the parallel trends assumption. Following the law's implementation, however, treated firms experience a sharp and statistically significant decline in Tobin's q in both $t+1$ and $t+2$, consistent with a negative treatment effect on firm value.

Our main findings on the treatment effect of Nevada Senate Bill 203 on firm value are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The odd-numbered columns use Tobin's q as the dependent variable, while the even-numbered

columns use its natural logarithm. Columns 1 and 2 present specifications without additional controls; Columns 3 and 4 add controls for firm size, leverage, and cash holdings. All regressions include the full panoply of fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the incorporation state level. The treatment effect, captured by the interaction term $\text{Treat} \times \text{Post}$, is consistently negative and statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications. For example, Column 3 shows a decline in Tobin's q of 0.220 following the law's adoption. The log specification in Column 4 yields a coefficient of -0.042, implying a 4.2% relative decline in Tobin's q for treated firms compared to control firms. These findings provide strong evidence that weakening shareholder primacy leads to a significant reduction in firm value.

Eldar (2018) and Eldar and Magnolfi (2020) make the case that smaller firms, in contrast to large ones, prefer a corporate law that provides more discretion to insiders. As a result, small firms can benefit from incorporating in a state with a corporate law that provides more discretion (Eldar, 2018). It is therefore important to examine whether the treatment effect differs between small and large firms. We do so in Panel B of Table 3, where we use an indicator variable for firms with a market capitalization larger than the median market capitalization in a year. We find that the adverse impact on Tobin's q is significantly worse for large firms. However, the adverse impact is significant both for firms with below-median market capitalization as well as for the larger firms. The magnitude of the size effect is large. For instance, in Column 1, the effect for small firms is -0.271, while the triple-interaction for large firms has a coefficient of -0.242, so that the total treatment effect for large firms is almost double that for small firms.

To assess the robustness of our baseline findings, we conduct further tests that are reported in Panel C. We report results for Tobin's q .⁷ The distribution of firms across industries is similar for firms incorporated in Nevada and firms incorporated in other states. An exception is the importance of gaming firms in Nevada. We therefore estimate our DiD regressions with controls excluding the firms in the gaming industry to ensure that our results are not caused by issues specific to that industry. This is particularly relevant since

⁷ The results for $\text{Log}(q)$ are similar and are shown in Internet Appendix Table IA2.

Nevada adopted new laws for the gaming industry during our event window.⁸ We find in Column (1) that our results are unchanged if we exclude the gaming industry. In 2017, the TCJA was adopted. It could be that the law affected differentially firms incorporated in Nevada from firms incorporated in other states. In Columns (2), we exclude firms with foreign profits as those would likely be more affected by the law (tax cut for foreign profit repatriation, see, e.g., Albuquerque et al, 2025). Again, our results are not changed meaningfully. We then exclude firms with a tax rate in 2016 greater than 21%, which is the tax rate after adoption of the law. These firms would presumably be less affected by the TCJA, if at all. Again, our results are unaffected, as reported in Columns (3).

In Column (4), we report a placebo test, where we estimate the same regression as the regression in Column (3) of Panel A but where the pseudo-treatment affects firms incorporated in Delaware. We exclude firms incorporated in Nevada from the sample. The coefficient on treatment of 0.029 is not significant statistically or economically. Constituency statutes give discretion to management to take into account the interests of enumerated clienteles when making decisions. In Column (5), we estimate the regression in Column (3) of Panel A using only firms incorporated in constituency states for our control sample. This test reduces the sample size substantially. Nevertheless, we find the coefficient on treatment to be significantly negative and the treatment effect to be larger than for the whole sample. We focus on results using the whole sample as these results appear more conservative. Finally, we examine whether the treatment effect holds for an alternative measure of firm performance, namely cash flow. We find in Column (6) that treatment has an adverse impact on cash flow.

We perform additional robustness tests that are reported in the Internet Appendix. In Internet Appendix Table IA3, we estimate the baseline regressions of Panel A of Table 3 for longer event windows. Such an extension is possibly problematic because it means that the year of the COVID crisis, 2020, becomes part of the window. Nevertheless, we find that our conclusions are unaffected. In Table IA4 Panel A shows that our results hold when we eliminate the smallest firms, those with market capitalization below \$100 million.

⁸ In 2015, video game-style slot machines were allowed; in 2017, rules for cashless wagering were put in place; in 2018, sports betting was expanded; in 2019, rules strengthening anti-money laundering oversight were adopted.

In Panel B of Table IA4, we restrict the sample to firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. A concern in DiD analyses of law adoption is that firms may influence legislation to pursue their interests by lobbying (Karpoff and Wittry, 2018). Ideally, one would address this concern by excluding firms that actively lobbied for SB 203. However, as far as we know, detailed firm-level lobbying records for Nevada are not publicly available for the relevant period. Available state-level lobbying data from the Nevada Legislature (www.leg.state.nv.us) begins in 2021, well after the law's passage. Nevertheless, we exclude firms that are identified as registered lobbyists in Nevada in 2021 and re-estimate our baseline specifications. As shown in Panel C, our results remain robust.

Panel D of Internet Appendix Table IA4 shows that our results are robust when including additional control variables in the regression analysis. Panel E presents the results using Total q as an alternative measure of firm value (Peters and Taylor, 2017). The results remain consistent. Finally, an additional concern in DiD analyses of law adoption is that new legislation may be correlated with local economic conditions, which are typically tied to firm headquarter locations. This raises the possibility that observed effects could reflect local economic shocks rather than the legal change itself. As a robustness test, we exclude firms that are incorporated in their headquarter state. The results, reported in Panel F, remain robust. Finally, in Panel G, we show that our results hold when matching the Nevada firms in our sample to firms incorporated in other states with similar Log(assets) and same industry.

5. The Nevada experiment, corporate governance, and stakeholders

In Section 4, we showed that the adoption of SB 203 causes a drop in firm value and a loss of shareholder wealth. In this section, we investigate whether SB 203 leads to a worsening in corporate governance. As explained in the introduction, the law could cause managers to take steps to improve governance to mitigate its impact on shareholder wealth. Alternatively, managers could choose to take steps to take advantage of their greater discretion. In the latter case, we would expect a worsening of governance from the perspective of shareholders since the attributes of governance that shareholders value would no longer be as relevant.

In this section, we first investigate whether governance worsens and find that it does. An indicator of poor governance is whether the pay of the CEO is excessive compared to an appropriate benchmark. We find that excess pay increases after the Bill. Finally, we report that the broader discretion of management to consider the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders does not appear to benefit other stakeholders.

5.1. Does governance worsen?

It follows from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the subsequent agency literature that if the legal rights of shareholders are weakened, firms could choose to change their governance to make it harder to pursue courses of action detrimental to shareholders at the expense of a loss of flexibility (Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2007). However, this presumes that firm-level governance can offset the adverse effects of weak legal protections, which may not be feasible if the private benefits made possible by weaker laws are too valuable for insiders to resist (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000). We examine whether firm-level corporate governance improves or worsens as a result of SB 203.

To empirically examine the effects of SB 203 on corporate governance, we focus on indicators that board monitoring is weakening and the results are reported in Table 4.⁹ First, we investigate whether board members become busier. Our measure of board busyness is the percentage of board members with more than two board seats. Column (1) shows that board busyness increases by 0.011, which is 14% of the sample mean of the variable. We then estimate whether board attendance worsens. We construct a Bad Attendance indicator that is equal to one if any director misses more than 25% of board meetings in a given year. The coefficient of 0.064 in Column (2) indicates a relative increase of 155% of its sample mean (0.041). These findings suggest that board monitoring weakens after passage of the law.

As discussed in the introduction, it is generally accepted that institutional investors perform a monitoring role. However, monitoring by institutional investors involves costs and efforts. If monitoring

⁹ Internet Appendix Figure IA1 plots the dynamic treatment effects for these dependent variables, supporting the parallel-trends assumption.

by institutional investors has less impact because management has fewer reasons to be responsive, then we would expect institutional ownership to fall. We next examine how the weakening of shareholder primacy under SB 203 affects firms' ownership structure and information production. Weakening shareholder rights can lead to a retreat by institutional investors, who are likely to lack the influence or incentives to monitor effectively in the face of diminished legal protections. Column (3) of Table 4 shows that institutional ownership declines significantly following the adoption of SB 203. The coefficient on $Treat \times Post$ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient of -0.018 indicates a 5% decline relative to the sample mean of 0.369 for Nevada incorporated firms. Geczy, Jeffers, Musto and Tucker (2015) examine how institutional ownership changes following the adoption of a constituency statute. They find no change. Their result contrasts with ours and shows that the Nevada Bill has unique effects compared to constituency statutes.

5.2. Did SB 203 lead to better treatment of stakeholders?

The Bill explicitly allows directors and officers to focus on the interests of other stakeholders besides shareholders. We investigate whether stakeholders other than shareholders benefit from the Bill. A straightforward measure of whether the Bill improves the situation of stakeholders other than shareholders is to examine whether it affects firms' ESG performance, especially the environmental and social performance. A frequently discussed justification for weakening shareholder primacy is to allow managers and directors to consider the interests of all stakeholders, e.g., employees, customers, communities, and the environment, rather than maximizing shareholder value alone. In principle, such a shift could enhance corporate responsibility and generate positive externalities for society. However, delivering meaningful improvements in environmental and social performance often requires sustained managerial effort and the allocation of firm resources. When shareholder rights and monitoring of management are weakened, it does not follow that insiders necessarily want to improve the situation of stakeholders as opposed to pursuing other objectives, such as increasing the private benefits they can extract from the corporation. As such, the effect of SB 203 may not help stakeholders even though management is given latitude to do so. We use

indices of environmental performance and social performance to investigate whether stakeholders in general are helped by the Bill.

Table 5 presents the impact of SB 203 on firms' environmental and social performance and the data are from the S&P Trucost. The *E Score* and *S Score* are the original measures scaled by 100 for illustration purpose. Column (1) shows that the E score declines significantly following the law's adoption. Specifically, E Score drops by 0.023, a 6.0% decline relative to its mean of 0.367 for Nevada firms in 2016 significant at the 5% level. In Column (2), the Social (S) score falls significantly by 0.054, or 16.2% of the mean value of 0.337. The decrease in the Social score is the most direct evidence that stakeholders do not benefit from the Bill since this score incorporates how employees, customers, and the community in which a firm operates are treated by the firm. We also run robustness tests using environmental and social performance data from the LSEG ESG datasets. Internet Appendix Table IA5 shows that the E score of LSEG ESG (scaled by 100) falls by 0.017 and the S score (scaled by 100) falls by 0.024. These coefficients are significant at the 1% level.

These results suggest that despite the legal shift toward allowing greater stakeholder consideration under SB 203, firms' actual environmental performance and social performance both deteriorate. These findings provide no support for the view that removing shareholder primacy improves stakeholder welfare. Instead, they suggest that the broadening of managerial discretion under SB 203 did not help shareholders or other stakeholders. A plausible explanation for this outcome is that insiders may be pushed by institutional investors to pay attention to their firm's environmental and social performance, so that when shareholder primacy is essentially wiped out, these investors have less influence on the actions of the insiders and some leave.

5.3. Managerial pay

As governance worsens, we expect agency costs to increase and hence firm value to fall. We have seen that SB 203 led to a worsening of governance when the quality of governance is evaluated from the perspective of shareholder primacy. If shareholder rights weaken, an increased ability of managers to extract

rents leads to an increase in managerial excess pay, defined as the compensation above the compensation expected for similar firms. We measure excess pay as the residual from a regression of $\log(\text{Total Pay})$ on $\log(\text{Assets})$, $\text{Debt}/\text{Assets}$, $\text{Cash}/\text{Assets}$, Tobin's q , and stock return (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Graham, Li, and Qiu, 2012).¹⁰ In Column (1) of Table 6, we use our baseline DiD and show that excess pay increases significantly. In Column (2), we add the stock return and cash flow divided by assets as additional regressors. The estimate of the treatment effect is similar. The economic significance is that treatment increases excess pay by 8% of the standard deviation of excess pay.

6. Investment Efficiency

In this section, we examine whether SB 203 affects the efficiency of corporate investment. Removing shareholder primacy may improve investment efficiency if shareholder pressure induces managerial short-termism. Alternatively, reduced shareholder oversight may exacerbate agency conflicts and permit managers to undertake investments that do not maximize shareholder value. We evaluate these competing predictions using three outcomes: announcement returns to acquisitions, the sensitivity of capital expenditures to Tobin's q , and patent filings.

6.1. Market Reaction to Acquisition Announcements

We estimate whether stock-price reaction to acquisition announcements changes with the Bill. Specifically, we use the M&A announcement date from SDC Platinum and compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a $[-1, +1]$ window surrounding each deal announcement based on the Fama-French 3-factor plus momentum model. We then test whether the adoption of SB 203 affects the market's reaction to acquisition decisions. Table 7 presents the results. Across all three specifications, the coefficient on $\text{Treat} \times \text{Post}$ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, with estimates ranging from -1.4% to -2%. These results suggest that investors respond more negatively to acquisition announcements by treated firms

¹⁰ Internet Appendix Table IA6 reports the detailed estimates of CEO excess pay.

in the post-SB 203 period. This finding implies a deterioration in acquisition quality, so that reduced shareholder power and weaker oversight under SB 203 lead to poorer acquisitions.

6.2. Efficiency of capital expenditures

According to standard q -theory (Tobin, 1969; Hayashi, 1982), firms should increase investment when Tobin's q is high, as it signals favorable growth prospects and a high marginal return on capital. A strong empirical link between investment and q is therefore indicative of efficient capital allocation. A weakening of that link is evidence of a decrease in the efficiency of capital expenditures (Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; McLean, Zhang, and Zhao, 2012). With reduced shareholder oversight, such as that induced by SB 203, insiders may have greater discretion to pursue investments irrespective of their net present value. As a result, we expect that the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's q declines following the adoption of SB 203, reflecting a deterioration in investment efficiency.

To empirically investigate the impact on investment- q sensitivity, we use the following specification for the relevant analysis:

$$\text{Capex}_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot q_{it} \times \text{Treat}_i \times \text{Post}_t + \beta_2 \cdot q_{it} \times \text{Treat}_i + \beta_3 \cdot q_{it} + \dots + X_{it} \cdot \Gamma + F_{it} + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (2)$$

where i is the firm index, t is the year index, Capex is capital expenditures (scaled by total assets), q is Tobin's q , F_{it} is the vector of fixed effects, and $\varepsilon_{i,t+1}$ is the error term. Our focus is the coefficient on the triple interaction term, β_1 . A negative β_1 suggests that investment- q sensitivity decreases following the adoption of SB 203.

Table 8 reports the results. Column (1) shows the model without controlling for firm characteristics beyond the use of fixed effects, Column (2) reports the estimates of the model with typical control variables in the investment literature, and Column (3) adds to the controls the baseline controls that are not included in Column (2). All three columns show that β_1 is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates a notable reduction in the responsiveness of investment to Tobin's q for treated firms post-SB 203,

consistent with a decrease in focus on maximization of shareholder wealth. For example, in Column (2), the coefficient on Tobin's q (β_3) is significantly positive, suggesting that control firms' capital expenditures are positively associated with their Tobin's q , as expected. The coefficient on Tobin's $q \times \text{Treat}$ (β_2) is positive and significant, which means that before SB 203 treated firms had greater investment- q sensitivity than control firms. Importantly, the coefficient on the triple interaction term Tobin's $q \times \text{Treat} \times \text{Post}$ (β_1) is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, which means that compared to control firms, treated firms' investment- q sensitivity decreases significantly following the adoption of SB 203.¹¹ The magnitude of the coefficients is such that after SB 203 we cannot reject that the q -sensitivity of investment for Nevada firms is insignificantly different from zero. The decline in investment- q sensitivity among treated firms supports the interpretation that SB 203 impairs investment efficiency from the perspective of shareholders. These results are consistent with the prediction that the erosion of shareholder primacy weakens the alignment between investment decisions and shareholder value, leading to less efficient capital allocation.

6.3. Innovation efficiency

We next examine how the erosion of shareholder primacy affects innovation. Unlike capital expenditures, which often involve tangible assets and clearer near-term payoffs, R&D investments are riskier, less observable, and more discretionary, making them particularly sensitive to agency conflicts and governance quality (Jensen, 1993). In theory, the effect of weakened shareholder primacy on R&D efficiency could make R&D expenditures more efficient if pressures from short-termism of shareholders creates distortion. However, poorer governance could make R&D expenditures less efficient as it could lead to greater entrenchment of management, increase the cost of capital, and increase extraction of private benefits. One measure of the efficiency of R&D is the extent to which R&D expenditures lead to patents. Given the short window that we use after the adoption of the Bill, we focus on patent filings since patent

¹¹ Column 2 shows that the coefficient on $\text{Treat} \times \text{Post}$ (denoted as β_4) is significantly positive. However, it does not mean that treated firms' Capex significantly increases following SB 203. In this specification, the total loading on $\text{Treat} \times \text{Post}$ is $(\beta_1 \cdot \text{Tobin's } q + \beta_4)$. For a firm with average Tobin's q (2.325) in our sample, this total loading is still negative at -0.003.

grants after the adoption of the Bill would typically be grants for patents filed before the adoption of the Bill.

Table 9 reports how patent filings change in response to the adoption of SB 203. In both specifications, the coefficient on the interaction term $\text{Treat} \times \text{Post}$ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The findings suggest that while the level of R&D spending does not change significantly, as shown earlier, the effectiveness of those expenses deteriorates after shareholder primacy weakens. These results are consistent with the prediction that weakened shareholder primacy can lead to a less efficient allocation of innovative capital, and thus lower innovation efficiency. They stand in contrast with results for the adoption of constituency statutes that show that these statutes cause more innovation (Kacpercyk and Flammer, 2015).

7. Conclusion

This paper studies the consequences of largely eliminating shareholder primacy by examining the adoption of Nevada Senate Bill 203 as a quasi-natural experiment. We find that the law's passage leads to a statistically and economically significant decline in firm value corresponding to a decrease in Tobin's q of 4%. We show that this result survives a battery of robustness tests.

Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that the adoption of the law results in a significant decrease in the quality of governance for Nevada firms. Such a decrease does not necessarily follow the law. Firms could respond to the law by strengthening their governance to offset its adverse impact on firm value. Such an outcome is obtained if insiders find that their increased discretion is profitable enough that they would rather have this increased discretion than try to mitigate the effect of the law on firm value. This evidence shows that market responses are not substitutes for laws when it comes to monitoring insiders and preventing them from taking advantage of their position.

We investigate the real effects of the law and show that it led to changes in investment policy. We find acquisitions have a worse impact on firm value after the adoption of the Bill and the efficiency of both capital expenditures and R&D falls.

In recent years, there has been much criticism of shareholder primacy. It has been blamed for short-termism and neglect of factors that can increase long-run firm value represented by ESG metrics. Our investigation finds no support for the proposition that removing constraints on managers resulting from shareholder primacy and giving them more legal protection when they take actions against the interests of shareholders causes managers to focus more on source of long-term value creation or on increasing ESG metrics. Put differently, increasing managerial discretion by removing shareholder primacy and giving greater legal protection to managers does not benefit stakeholders or long-term value creation. In fact, the opposite is the case. Rather than focusing on the long-run, managers seem to focus on their interests at the expense of those of shareholders. This evidence suggest that for directors and officers to take actions that enhance the welfare of stakeholders in the absence of shareholder primacy likely requires duties made specific in a firm's charter or through a law.

References

- Albuquerque, Ana, Benjamin Bennett, Petro Lisowsky, and Zexi Wang, 2025. The effect of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on payout policies. Working paper available at [SSRN](#).
- Andreani, Martina, Atif Ellahie, and Lakshmanan Shivakumar, 2025. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Evidence from corporate tax windfalls. *The Journal of Finance*, forthcoming.
- Asker, John, Joan Farre-Mensa, and Alexander Ljungqvist, 2015. Corporate investment and stock market listing: A puzzle? *The Review of Financial Studies* 28(2): 342-390
- Babenko, Ilona and Bennett, Benjamin, and Wang, Zexi, 2025. When loyalty is optional: The economics of corporate opportunity waivers and CEO compensation. *HKU Jockey Club Enterprise Sustainability Global Research Institute Paper* No. 2025/030, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=5187100>.
- Bainbridge, Stephen Mark, 2024. DExit Drivers: Is Delaware's Dominance Threatened? *UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper* No. 24-04, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4909689>.
- Barber, Brad M., and John D. Lyon, 1997. Detecting long-run abnormal stock returns: The empirical power and specification of test statistics. *Journal of Financial Economics* 43(3): 341-372.
- Barzuza, Michal, 2024. Nevada v. Delaware: The New Market for Corporate Law. *European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper* No. 761/2024, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4746878>.
- Barzuza, Michal, and David C. Smith, 2014. What happens in Nevada? Self-selecting into lax law. *The Review of Financial Studies* 27(12): 3593-3627.
- Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, 2009. What Matters in Corporate Governance? *Review of Financial Studies* 22(2): 783-827.
- Bebchuk, Lucian A., Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita, 2020. For whom corporate leaders bargain. *Southern California Law Review* 94: 1467.
- Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Roberto Tallarita, 2020. The illusory promise of stakeholder governance. *Cornell Law Review* 106: 91.

- Berle, Adolf A., and Means, Gardiner C. 1932. *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*. Macmillan: New York.
- Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, 2003. Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and managerial preferences, *Journal of Political Economy* 111, 1043–1075.
- Cain, Matthew D., Stephen B. McKeon, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, 2017. Do takeover laws matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers, *Journal of Financial Economics* 124(3), 464–485.
- Chen, Qi, Itay Goldstein, Wei Jiang, 2007. Price informativeness and investment sensitivity to stock price. *Review of Financial Studies* 20(3): 619-650.
- Chen, Xia, Jarrad Harford, and Kai Li, 2007. Monitoring: Which institutions matter? *Journal of financial Economics* 86(2): 279-305.
- Cheng, Shijun, Venky Nagar, and Madhav V. Rajan, 2005. Identifying control motives in managerial ownership: Evidence from antitakeover legislation, *Review of Financial Studies* 18(2), 637–672.
- Cohn, Jonathan B. and Johnson, Travis L. and Liu, Zack and Wardlaw, Malcolm, 2024. Past is prologue: Inference from the cross section of returns around an event. *Working paper* available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4296657>.
- Coffee Jr, J.C., 1991. Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate monitor. *Columbia Law Review* 91: 1277.
- Daines, R., 2001. Does Delaware law improve firm value? *Journal of Financial Economics* 62(3): 525-558.
- Doidge, Craig, G. Andrew Karolyi, and René M. Stulz, 2007. Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance? *Journal of Financial Economics* 86(1): 1–39.
- Edmans, Alex, 2023. The end of ESG. *Financial Management* 52(1): 3-17.
- Eldar, Ofer, 2018. Can lax corporate law increase shareholder value? Evidence from Nevada. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 61(4), 555-605.
- Eldar, Ofer, and Lorenzo Magnolfi, 2020. Regulatory competition and the market for corporate law. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 12(2): 60-98.

- Eldar, Ofer, and Jillian Grennan, 2024. Common venture capital investors and startup growth, *Review of Financial Studies* 37, 549–590.
- Eldar, Ofer, and Lorenzo Magnolfi, 2025. Explaining Delaware's Dominance: Firm Heterogeneity and Demand for Legal Flexibility. Working paper.
- Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, Minsu Ko, and René M. Stulz, 2025. Politics, regulation, and bank payouts. *NBER Working Paper* 32770.
- Fich, Eliezer M., Jarrad Harford, and Anh L. Tran, 2023. Disloyal managers and shareholders' wealth. *The Review of Financial Studies* 36(5): 1837-1888.
- Flugum, Ryan, and Matthew E. Souther, 2025. Stakeholder value: a convenient excuse for underperforming managers? *Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis* 60(1): 135-168.
- Francis, Bill B., Iftekhhar Hasan, Kose John, and Maya Waisman, 2010. The effect of state antitakeover laws on the firm's bondholders, *Journal of Financial Economics* 96(1), 127–154.
- Frommer
- Gabaix, Xavier, and Augustin Landier, 2008. Why has CEO pay increased so much? *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1): 49–100.
- Garvey, Gerald T., and Gordon Hanka, 1999, Capital structure and corporate control: The effect of antitakeover statutes on firm leverage, *Journal of Finance* 54, 519–546.
- Giroud, Xavier, and Holger M. Mueller, 2010, Does corporate governance matter in competitive industries? *Journal of Financial Economics* 95, 312–331.
- Graham, John R., Si Li, and Jiaping Qiu, 2012. Managerial attributes and executive compensation. *Review of Financial Studies* 25(1): 144–186.
- Hart, Oliver, and Luigi Zingales. Companies should maximize shareholder welfare not market value. *ECGI-Finance Working Paper* 521 (2017).
- Hayashi, Fumio. 1982. Tobin's marginal q and average q : A neoclassical interpretation. *Econometrica* 50(1): 213-224.

- Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. *Journal of Finance* 48(3): 831-880.
- Jensen, M.C., 2001. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance* 14 (3): 8-21.
- Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics* 3(4): 305-360.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M., 2021. On a stakeholder model of corporate governance. *Financial Management* 50(2): 321-343.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Michael D. Wittry, 2018. Institutional and legal context in natural experiments: The case of state antitakeover laws. *Journal of Finance* 73(2): 657-714.
- Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Michael D. Wittry, 2024. "Corporate takeover defenses." In David Denis, ed., *Handbook of Corporate Finance*, Edward Elgar Publishing: 410-454.
- Kogan, Leonid, Dimitris Papanikolaou, Amit Seru, and Noah Stoffman, 2017. Technological innovation, resource allocation, and growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 132(2): 665–712.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 1998. Law and finance. *Journal of Political Economy* 106(6): 1113-1155.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 2000. Investor protection and corporate governance. *Journal of Financial Economics* 58(1-2): 3-27.
- Ma, Yueran, and Andrei Shleifer, 2025. The invention of corporate governance. *Journal of Financial Economics* 172: 104115.
- McLean, R. David, Tianyu Zhang, and Mengxin Zhao. 2012. Why does the law matter? Investor protection and its effects on investment, finance, and growth. *Journal of Finance* 67(1): 313-350.
- Penrose, Jim, and Paul Young, 2019. Nevada Senate Bill No. 203 (2017): An important development for Nevada corporations and their counsel. *Nevada Lawyer*, 18-21.
- Peters, Ryan H., and Lucian A. Taylor, 2017. Intangible capital and the investment-*q* relation. *Journal of Financial Economics* 123: 251-272.

- Rauterberg, Gabriel, and Eric Talley, 2017. Contracting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty: An empirical analysis of corporate opportunity waivers, *Columbia Law Review* 117, 1075.
- Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1997. A survey of corporate governance. *Journal of Finance*, 52(2): 737–783.
- Strine, Leo, 2015. The dangers of denial: The need for a clear-eyed understanding of the power and accountability structure established by the Delaware general corporation law. *Wake Forest Law Review* 50: 761.
- Terry, Stephen J., 2023. The macro impact of short-termism. *Econometrica* 91(5): 1881-1912.
- Tobin, James. 1969. A general equilibrium approach to monetary theory. *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 1(1): 15-29.

Appendix: Variable Definitions

Tobin's q – sum of shares outstanding multiplied by price per share plus the book value of debt all scaled by total book assets

Log(Assets) – natural logarithm of total book assets

Debt/Assets – short- and long-term debt scaled by total book assets

Cash/Assets – cash and short-term equivalents scaled by total book assets

Cash Deal – indicator variable for an acquisition deal paid only by cash

%Busy – percent of directors on more than two outside boards

Diverse – a dummy variable equal to one if a firm made a diverse acquisition in a year and zero otherwise, where a diverse acquisition refers to one with acquirer and target in different industries given in SDC

E Score – Environmental score for a firm-year from S&P Trucost (Environmental Dimension), scaled by 100

S Score – Societal score for a firm-year from S&P Trucost (Social Dimension), scaled by 100

Excess Pay – the residual in the regression of $\log(\text{TDC1})$ on $\log(\text{Assets})$, Debt/Assets , Cash/Assets , Tobin's q , and stock return, where TDC1 is the total CEO compensation (in 1000s)

Return – Annual stock return over the previous fiscal year based on data from Compustat

Bad Attendance – dummy variable equal to one if any of a firm's directors have bad attendance in a firm-year, where bad attendance is defined as missing at least 25% of a firm's board meetings within a year

InstOwnership – percent of firm's shares outstanding held by institutional investors (13F)

Capex/Assets – capital expenditures scaled by total book assets

Patents – the number of patents filed in a year

Figure 1. Number of Firms by State of Incorporation

This figure illustrates the number of firms by incorporation state for the top 5 states in the US across our sample period 2015-2019 (event year excluded). The data on states of incorporation is from SEC 10K filings. The right vertical axis is for Delaware (DE). The left vertical axis is for the remaining four states, with the second largest state by numbers of incorporated firms as Nevada (NV) in red.





Figure 2. Dynamic Treatment effects of Nevada Senate Bill 203 on Firm Value

This figure illustrates the dynamic treatment effects of SB 203 on firm value. In Panel A (B), Tobin's q ($\text{Log}(q)$) is regressed on year indicator variables (relative to the event year), including the relevant fixed effects in Equation (1). The y-axis plots the coefficient estimates on each year indicator variable. The x-axis shows the time relative to the event year. Year $t-1$ is the benchmark year. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. The error bars illustrate the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates. The confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the state level.

Panel A Tobin's q



Panel B. $\text{Log}(q)$




Table 1. Summary Statistics

This table presents the statistics of the main variables in analysis. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

Variable	Mean	SD	p25	p50	p75	N
Tobin's q	2.324	1.916	1.194	1.663	2.692	10,732
Log(q)	0.626	0.614	0.177	0.509	0.990	10,732
Log(Assets)	6.583	2.101	5.082	6.614	8.009	10,732
Debt/Assets	0.266	0.244	0.042	0.233	0.407	10,732
Cash/Assets	0.233	0.265	0.040	0.122	0.330	10,732
%BusyBrd	0.080	0.110	0	0	0.143	3,941
BadAttendance	0.041	0.199	0	0	0	3,942
InstOwnership	0.702	0.295	0.523	0.794	0.925	8,921
E Score	0.321	0.197	0.18	0.24	0.43	2,999
S Score	0.286	0.164	0.17	0.24	0.34	2,998
ExcessPay	0.004	0.550	-0.246	0.047	0.330	5,239
Patents	4.636	20.735	0	0	0	10,732
Capex/Assets	0.041	0.051	0.011	0.025	0.051	10,732
CF/Assets	0.017	0.210	0.000	0.072	0.122	10,710

Table 2. Stock Market Reaction to the Adoption of Nevada Senate Bill 203

This table presents the stock abnormal returns around the relevant dates of the Nevada law. Panel A reports the average abnormal returns using a [0,1] window around the effective date and other relevant dates as indicated in the table. We show results using three asset pricing models: market model, Fama-French 3-factor model, and Fama-French 3-factor plus Momentum model. Factor loadings are calculated using daily data from the previous year. Following Cohn, Johnson, Liu, and Wardlaw (2024), we calculate the standard errors based on the volatility of the time series of estimates in the previous year. We use generalized least squares to calculate the average returns for pre-periods and abnormal returns. Panel B presents long-run returns (24 months) using monthly abnormal returns calculated by subtracting the firm return from a matched portfolio return calculated following Barber and Lyon (1997). *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Panel A: Short-run

	Mean	<i>p</i> -value
<i>Effective Date (20171001)</i>		
Market model	-0.0121	0.00***
FF3	-0.0155	0.00***
FF3+Momentum	-0.0152	0.00***
<i>Bill Introduced (20170222)</i>		
Market model	-0.0105	0.07*
FF3	-0.0047	0.43
FF3+Momentum	-0.0077	0.20
<i>Passed Senate (20170519)</i>		
Market model	-0.0012	0.82
FF3	0.0013	0.81
FF3+Momentum	0.0016	0.77
<i>Passed House (20170605)</i>		
Market model	0.0033	0.64
FF3	0.0043	0.54
FF3+Momentum	0.0042	0.55
<i>Governor Approval (20170612)</i>		
Market model	0.0010	0.79
FF3	0.0005	0.89
FF3+Momentum	0.0001	0.98

Panel B: Long-run

Weighting	Abnormal return	<i>p</i> -value
Equal-weighted	-0.1447	0.06*
Value-weighted	-0.1441	0.06*

Table 3. Firm Value and the Adoption of Nevada Senate Bill 203

This table presents the effect of the Nevada Senate Bill 203 on firm value, which is measured by *Tobin's q*. $\text{Log}(q)$ is the natural logarithm of *Tobin's q*. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after the law adoption and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the treatment effect on *Tobin's q* and $\text{Log}(q)$. Panel B shows the heterogeneous effects by firm size, where *Large* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm's market capitalization is above median in a year and zero otherwise. Panel C reports the robustness tests excluding gaming industry and dealing with the potential concern about TCJA in 2017. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Industry classification is Fama-French 30. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

Panel A. Treatment effect on *Tobin's q*

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) $\text{Log}(q)$	(3) Tobin's q	(4) $\text{Log}(q)$
Treat x Post	-0.262*** [0.028]	-0.054*** [0.010]	-0.220*** [0.033]	-0.042*** [0.009]
Log(Assets)			-0.563*** [0.100]	-0.170*** [0.026]
Debt/Assets			-0.279** [0.106]	-0.081*** [0.027]
Cash/Assets			0.784*** [0.132]	0.327*** [0.032]
Observations	10,452	10,452	10,452	10,452
R-squared	0.828	0.864	0.835	0.871
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Panel B. Heterogeneous effects by firm size

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) Log(q)	(3) Tobin's q	(4) Log(q)
Treat x Post x Large	-0.242*** [0.066]	-0.095*** [0.017]	-0.254*** [0.075]	-0.095*** [0.018]
Treat x Post	-0.271*** [0.041]	-0.047*** [0.012]	-0.222*** [0.055]	-0.035** [0.014]
Log(Assets)			-0.552*** [0.089]	-0.167*** [0.024]
Debt/Assets			-0.336*** [0.110]	-0.090*** [0.028]
Cash/Assets			0.594*** [0.154]	0.294*** [0.035]
Observations	9,909	9,909	9,909	9,909
R-squared	0.827	0.864	0.834	0.870
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Panel C. Exclude gaming industry and deal with the TCJA in 2017

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Tobin's q	Tobin's q	Tobin's q	Tobin's q	Tobin's q	CF/Assets
Sample	Excl Gaming	No Foreign Profits	Tax rate <21%	DE as Treated	Constituency	Full
Treat x Post	-0.248*** [0.035]	-0.178*** [0.045]	-0.207*** [0.053]	0.029 [0.052]	-1.082*** [0.227]	-0.027*** [0.003]
Log(Assets)	-0.567*** [0.105]	-0.597*** [0.120]	-0.585*** [0.133]	-0.533*** [0.074]	-2.038*** [0.701]	0.089*** [0.008]
Debt/Assets	-0.296*** [0.107]	-0.220 [0.199]	-0.285** [0.141]	-0.296*** [0.111]	-0.048 [0.868]	-0.149*** [0.007]
Cash/Assets	0.769*** [0.136]	0.884*** [0.237]	0.892*** [0.211]	0.772*** [0.132]	-1.797 [1.493]	0.117*** [0.017]
Observations	10,343	5,782	7,105	10,041	2,306	11,069
R-squared	0.835	0.823	0.830	0.822	0.898	0.847
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table 4. Corporate Governance, External Monitoring, and the Nevada Senate Bill 203

This table presents the effect of SB 203 on corporate governance. *%BusyBrd* is the fraction of directors on more than two outside boards is above median and zero otherwise. *BadAttendance* is a dummy variable equal to one if at least one director misses more than 25% of the board meetings within a year and zero otherwise. *InstOwnership* is the fraction of firm's shares outstanding held by 13F institutional investors. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) %BusyBrd	(2) BadAttendance	(3) InstOwnership
Treat x Post	0.011*** [0.004]	0.064*** [0.009]	-0.018*** [0.004]
Log(Assets)	-0.010 [0.006]	0.014 [0.011]	0.088*** [0.005]
Debt/Assets	0.035*** [0.010]	-0.028 [0.022]	-0.073*** [0.010]
Cash/Assets	-0.037** [0.017]	-0.016 [0.043]	0.044*** [0.011]
Observations	3,837	3,838	8,657
R-squared	0.732	0.338	0.941
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y

Table 5. Environmental and Social Performance

This table presents the effect of SB 203 on firm-level environmental and social performance. *E Score* is the environmental score and *S Score* is the societal score, from S&P Trucost dataset and scaled by 100. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) E Score	(2) S Score
Treat x Post	-0.023** [0.011]	-0.054*** [0.006]
Log(Assets)	-0.002 [0.012]	0.004 [0.009]
Debt/Assets	0.010 [0.036]	-0.008 [0.019]
Cash/Assets	0.024 [0.041]	0.074*** [0.024]
Observations	2,307	2,307
R-squared	0.909	0.907
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Table 6. CEO Excess Pay

This table presents the effect of SB 203 on CEO excess pay. *ExcessPay* is the residual in the regression of $\log(\text{Total Pay})$ on $\log(\text{Assets})$, $\text{Debt}/\text{Assets}$, $\text{Cash}/\text{Assets}$, Tobin's q , and stock return, as reported in the Internet Appendix IA4. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) ExcessPay	(2) ExcessPay
Treat x Post	0.041** [0.020]	0.044** [0.019]
Log(Assets)	-0.110*** [0.015]	-0.107*** [0.014]
Debt/Assets	-0.295*** [0.057]	-0.290*** [0.052]
Cash/Assets	0.057 [0.062]	0.040 [0.061]
Return		0.048*** [0.010]
CF/Assets		-0.048 [0.087]
Observations	5,198	5,185
R-squared	0.676	0.677
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Table 7. Market Reaction to Acquisition Announcements

This table presents the effect of SB 203 on announcement returns of acquirers. *CAR* is the 3-day abnormal return [-1, +1] around the announcement of a merger based on the Fama-French 3-factor plus momentum model. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. The announcement data is from SDC. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) CAR	(2) CAR	(3) CAR
Treat x Post	-0.020*** [0.006]	-0.014** [0.005]	-0.014** [0.006]
Log(Assets)		-0.006*** [0.001]	-0.006*** [0.001]
Debt/Assets		0.002 [0.007]	0.002 [0.007]
Cash/Assets		0.024*** [0.007]	0.023*** [0.007]
Cash Deal			0.009*** [0.001]
Diverse			0.000 [0.001]
Observations	5,829	5,831	5,665
R-squared	0.045	0.036	0.044
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y

Table 8. Investment- q Sensitivity

This table presents the effect of SB 203 on investment- q sensitivity following Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007). $Capex/Assets$ is capital expenditures scaled by total assets. $Treat$ is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. $Post$ is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) Capex/Assets	(2) Capex/Assets	(3) Capex/Assets
Tobin's q	0.003*** [0.000]	0.002*** [0.000]	0.002*** [0.000]
Tobin's q x $Treat$ x $Post$	-0.003*** [0.000]	-0.004*** [0.000]	-0.003*** [0.000]
Tobin's q x $Treat$	0.001*** [0.000]	0.001** [0.000]	0.001*** [0.000]
Tobin's q x $Post$	-0.001** [0.000]	-0.001* [0.000]	-0.000 [0.000]
$Treat$ x $Post$	0.005*** [0.002]	0.006*** [0.002]	0.005*** [0.002]
Log(Assets)		-0.005*** [0.001]	-0.004*** [0.001]
CF/Assets		0.008*** [0.003]	0.001 [0.003]
Debt/Assets			-0.024*** [0.003]
Cash/Assets			0.013*** [0.004]
Observations	9,741	9,723	9,723
R-squared	0.788	0.788	0.791
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y

Table 9. Innovation Efficiency

This table presents the effect of SB 203 on firms' innovation efficiency, which is measured by the number of patents filed. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in NV and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. Patent data are from Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2017). Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.


VARIABLES	(1) Patents	(2) Patents
Treat x Post	-1.206*** [0.175]	-1.217*** [0.152]
Log(Assets)		0.012 [0.042]
Debt/Assets		-0.556*** [0.167]
Cash/Assets		0.219 [0.182]
Observations	3,259	3,259
R-squared	0.895	0.896
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Internet Appendix


Figure IA1. Dynamic Treatment Effects of Nevada Senate Bill 203: Further Evidence

This figure illustrates the dynamic treatment effects of SB 203. Panels A to G are for Bad Attendance, Busy Board, Institutional Ownership, E Score, S Score, Excess Pay, Patents, respectively. In each figure, the dependent variable is regressed on year indicator variables (relative to the event year), including the relevant fixed effects in Equation (1). The y-axis plots the coefficient estimates on each year indicator variable. The x-axis shows the time relative to the event year. Year t-1 is the benchmark year. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. The error bars illustrate the 95% confidence intervals of the coefficient estimates. The confidence intervals are based on standard errors clustered at the state level.


Panel A. Bad Attendance




Panel B. Busy Board




Panel C. Institutional ownership




Panel D. E Score



Panel E. S Score



Panel F. Excess Pay



Panel G. Patents




Table IA1. Summary Statistics: Nevada vs Non-Nevada

This table presents the means of variables for Nevada and non-Nevada firms separately in the year before the law adoption (i.e., 2016). Column 3 reports the differences in the means, where ***, **, * denote significance for the t -tests at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

Variable	Nevada	Non-Nevada	p -value
Tobin's q	3.236	2.232	0.001***
Log(q)	0.771	0.632	0.01**
Log(Assets)	4.550	6.581	0.001***
Debt/Assets	0.233	0.261	0.23
Cash/Assets	0.237	0.233	0.86
%BusyBrd	0.060	0.085	0.43
BadAttendance	0.000	0.048	0.42
InstOwnership	0.369	0.697	0.001***
E Score	0.367	0.410	0.56
S Score	0.337	0.358	0.76
ExcessPay	-0.328	-0.025	0.01**
Patents	1.327	7.281	0.02**
Capex/Assets	0.050	0.040	0.04**
CF/Assets	-0.064	0.021	0.001***

Table IA2. Robustness Tests on Firm Value using $\text{Log}(q)$

This table presents the robustness tests for Panel C of Table 3 using $\text{Log}(q)$, the natural logarithm of Tobin's q , as the dependent variable. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after the law adoption and zero otherwise. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Industry classification is Fama-French 30. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) $\text{Log}(q)$	(2) $\text{Log}(q)$	(3) $\text{Log}(q)$	(4) $\text{Log}(q)$	(5) $\text{Log}(q)$
Sample	Excl Gaming	No Foreign Profits	Tax rate <21%	DE as Treated	Constituency
Treat x Post	-0.053*** [0.010]	-0.024** [0.011]	-0.042*** [0.012]	-0.001 [0.018]	-0.084** [0.034]
$\text{Log}(\text{Assets})$	-0.170*** [0.027]	-0.163*** [0.031]	-0.162*** [0.037]	-0.165*** [0.022]	-0.297*** [0.034]
Debt/Assets	-0.084*** [0.027]	-0.045 [0.043]	-0.034 [0.035]	-0.092*** [0.027]	0.022 [0.087]
Cash/Assets	0.321*** [0.033]	0.345*** [0.056]	0.336*** [0.041]	0.323*** [0.031]	0.239** [0.107]
Observations	10,343	5,782	7,105	10,041	2,306
R-squared	0.871	0.862	0.868	0.867	0.908
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table IA3. Robustness Tests on Firm Value: Longer Event Windows

This table presents the treatment effect of SB 203 on firm value using longer event windows as robustness tests. $\text{Log}(q)$ is the natural logarithm of Tobin's q . Treat is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable equal to one after the law adoption and zero otherwise. The analysis using a window of $[-3,+3]$ ($[-4,+4]$) is reported in the first (last) four columns. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) $\text{Log}(q)$	(3) Tobin's q	(4) $\text{Log}(q)$	(5) Tobin's q	(6) $\text{Log}(q)$	(7) Tobin's q	(8) $\text{Log}(q)$
Window	$[-3,+3]$	$[-3,+3]$	$[-3,+3]$	$[-3,+3]$	$[-4,+4]$	$[-4,+4]$	$[-4,+4]$	$[-4,+4]$
Treat x Post	-0.381*** [0.031]	-0.076*** [0.009]	-0.339*** [0.035]	-0.064*** [0.009]	-0.404*** [0.028]	-0.104*** [0.009]	-0.354*** [0.027]	-0.090*** [0.009]
Log(Assets)			-0.487*** [0.074]	-0.151*** [0.016]			-0.468*** [0.059]	-0.142*** [0.012]
Debt/Assets			-0.260*** [0.073]	-0.036** [0.017]			-0.174*** [0.061]	-0.014 [0.015]
Cash/Assets			0.952*** [0.110]	0.371*** [0.026]			0.943*** [0.097]	0.344*** [0.020]
Observations	15,478	15,478	15,478	15,478	20,183	20,183	20,183	20,183
R-squared	0.773	0.824	0.780	0.833	0.739	0.794	0.748	0.804
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Table IA4. Additional Robustness Tests for the Effect of SB 203 on Firm Value:

This table reports the results of additional robustness tests for the effect of SB 203 on firm value. $\text{Log}(q)$ is the natural logarithm of Tobin's q . Treat is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. Post is a dummy variable equal to one after the law adoption and zero otherwise. Panel A excludes small firms (market capitalization below USD 100 million). Panel B restricts the sample to firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Panel C excludes firms identified as registered lobbyists in Nevada in 2021. Panel D augments the baseline specification with additional control variables. Panel E re-estimates the main analysis using Total q (Peters and Taylor, 2017) as an alternative measure of firm value. Panel F excludes firms incorporated in their headquarter state. Panel G reports matched-sample results, where each Nevada firm is matched to up to seven non-Nevada firms by Fama–French 30 industry and $\text{Log}(\text{assets})$ in the year prior to the event. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

Panel A: Exclude small firms (market capitalization smaller than USD 100 million)

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) $\text{Log}(q)$	(3) Tobin's q	(4) $\text{Log}(q)$
Treat x Post	-0.361*** [0.025]	-0.092*** [0.009]	-0.313*** [0.021]	-0.076*** [0.009]
$\text{Log}(\text{Assets})$			-0.690*** [0.079]	-0.230*** [0.016]
Debt/Assets			-0.325** [0.135]	-0.116*** [0.027]
Cash/Assets			0.995*** [0.099]	0.384*** [0.032]
Observations	8,408	8,408	8,408	8,408
R-squared	0.848	0.885	0.857	0.895
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Panel B. Listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ only

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) Log(q)	(3) Tobin's q	(4) Log(q)
Treat x Post	-0.273*** [0.043]	-0.049*** [0.012]	-0.239*** [0.047]	-0.040*** [0.013]
Log(Assets)			-0.489*** [0.082]	-0.153*** [0.024]
Debt/Assets			-0.322** [0.121]	-0.094*** [0.030]
Cash/Assets			0.489*** [0.100]	0.275*** [0.039]
Observations	9,004	9,004	9,004	9,004
R-squared	0.824	0.865	0.829	0.870
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Panel C. Exclude Nevada lobbying firms

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) Log(q)	(3) Tobin's q	(4) Log(q)
Treat x Post	-0.255*** [0.028]	-0.049*** [0.010]	-0.214*** [0.033]	-0.037*** [0.009]
Log(Assets)			-0.563*** [0.100]	-0.170*** [0.026]
Debt/Assets			-0.280** [0.106]	-0.082*** [0.026]
Cash/Assets			0.784*** [0.132]	0.327*** [0.032]
Observations	10,446	10,446	10,446	10,446
R-squared	0.828	0.864	0.835	0.871
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Panel D. Additional control variables

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) $\text{Log}(q)$
Treat x Post	-0.220*** [0.030]	-0.055*** [0.010]
Log(Assets)	-0.367*** [0.064]	-0.138*** [0.024]
Debt/Assets	-0.328*** [0.118]	-0.086*** [0.030]
Cash/Assets	0.543*** [0.134]	0.263*** [0.045]
PP&E/Assets	-0.416** [0.170]	-0.202*** [0.064]
R&D/Assets	1.895*** [0.229]	0.264*** [0.053]
Advertising/Assets	2.526*** [0.605]	1.293*** [0.224]
Volatility	1.588*** [0.521]	0.124 [0.093]
Observations	9,864	9,864
R-squared	0.825	0.869
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Panel E. Total q as an alternative measure of firm value

VARIABLES	(1) Total q	(2) Total q
Treat x Post	-0.208*** [0.032]	-0.238*** [0.033]
Log(Assets)		0.167 [0.153]
Debt/Assets		-0.558*** [0.122]
Cash/Assets		2.280*** [0.167]
Observations	10,286	10,286
R-squared	0.812	0.818
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Panel F. Exclude firms headquartered and incorporated in the same state

VARIABLES	(1) Tobin's q	(2) Log(q)	(3) Tobin's q	(4) Log(q)
Treat x Post	-0.452*** [0.021]	-0.085*** [0.009]	-0.417*** [0.021]	-0.076*** [0.008]
Log(Assets)			-0.497*** [0.052]	-0.152*** [0.011]
Debt/Assets			-0.302*** [0.071]	-0.081*** [0.021]
Cash/Assets			0.638*** [0.060]	0.303*** [0.016]
Observations	8,148	8,148	8,148	8,148
R-squared	0.822	0.860	0.828	0.866
Firm FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y	Y	Y

Panel G. Matching on industry and Log(Assets)

VARIABLES	(1) Log(q)	(2) Log(q)
Treat x Post	-0.114*** [0.019]	-0.103*** [0.015]
Log(Assets)		-0.165** [0.064]
Debt/Assets		-0.091 [0.124]
Cash/Assets		0.416*** [0.109]
Observations	1,749	1,749
R-squared	0.869	0.877
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Table IA5. Robustness Tests: Environmental and Social Performance Using Data from the LSEG ESG Dataset

This table presents the robustness tests for the effect of SB 203 on firm-level environmental and social performance, using the environmental and social performance data from the LSEG ESG dataset. *E LSEG* is the environmental score and *S LSEG* is the societal score, from the LSEG ESG dataset and scaled by 100. *Treat* is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in Nevada and zero otherwise. *Post* is a dummy variable equal to one after SB 203 and zero otherwise. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors are clustered at the state of incorporation and reported in brackets. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) E LSEG	(2) S LSEG
Treat x Post	-0.017*** [0.004]	-0.024*** [0.004]
Log(Assets)	0.033*** [0.003]	0.015*** [0.003]
Debt/Assets	-0.019** [0.007]	-0.006 [0.012]
Cash/Assets	-0.001 [0.012]	0.025* [0.012]
Observations	6,126	6,126
R-squared	0.935	0.908
Firm FE	Y	Y
Year-Size FE	Y	Y
Year-Leverage FE	Y	Y
Year-CashRatio FE	Y	Y
Year-Industry FE	Y	Y

Table IA6. Estimation of CEO Excess Pay

This table reports the estimates of CEO excess pay, which is the residual from a regression of $\log(\text{TDC1})$ on $\log(\text{Assets})$, $\text{Debt}/\text{Assets}$, $\text{Cash}/\text{Assets}$, Tobin's q , and stock return. TDC1 is CEO total compensation from Execucomp. The sample is from 2015 to 2019 and the event year is excluded. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.

VARIABLES	(1) Log(TDC1)
Log(Assets)	0.410*** [0.005]
Debt/Assets	0.148*** [0.040]
Cash/Assets	0.120** [0.058]
Tobin's q	0.090*** [0.006]
StockReturn	0.082*** [0.019]
Observations	5,445
R-squared	0.555

About ECGI

ECGI is an international non-profit membership organisation that provides a platform for debate and dialogue among academics, policymakers, and business leaders, with a focus on major corporate governance, ESG, and stewardship issues.

The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI or its members.

www.ecgi.global

ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance

Editorial Board

Editor

Nadya Malenko, Professor of Finance, Boston College

Consulting Editors

Renée Adams, Professor of Finance, University of Oxford

Franklin Allen, Professor of Finance and Economics, Imperial London

Julian Franks, Professor of Finance, London Business School

Mireia Giné, Professor of Finance, IESE Business School

Marco Pagano, Professor of Economics, Facoltà di Economia Università di Napoli
Federico II

Series Manager

Asif Malik, ECGI Working Paper Series Manager

<https://www.ecgi.global/publications/working-papers>