

Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback

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Abstract

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On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives' incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted "smart" excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements.

*Dane Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to John Cook, Lauren Falkowitz, Craig Ferrere, Dan Gallagher, Rob Jackson, Kobi Kastiel, Ira Kay, Da Lin, Yaron Nili, David Raedler, Nitzan Shilon and others who provided helpful comments. I am especially grateful to John Cannon and Brian Foley for their very detailed feedback on an earlier draft of the paper. Comments are welcome and can be sent to me at jfried@law.harvard.edu.

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I. Introduction

Executives of public firms receive a substantial amount of their pay in the form of incentive compensation—compensation that is tied to a performance metric. Much of this incentive compensation is directly tied to financial accounting results, such as revenues or earnings, or to other performance-related measures. While such incentive compensation can beneficially encourage executives to generate value for shareholders, it can also lead them to misreport financial accounting results or other metrics to generate “excess pay”—extra pay received solely because a pay-relevant metric is erroneous. Such misreporting imposes costs on shareholders of the firm and on the market as whole.

Misreporting is difficult to deter directly through case-by-case enforcement of the securities laws against individual executives. To be sure, extreme forms of misreporting, which are relatively easy to detect and prove, can lead to legal action against individual executives for violating the securities laws. Forfeiture of ill-gotten gains,¹ or even more severe punishments, may then follow. However, less extreme forms of misreporting may often go unsanctioned, because of the difficulties of detection and proof, and because the boundaries between good-faith reporting and misreporting are often fuzzy.

The difficulty of deterring misreporting through case-by-case law enforcement has led to a search for alternative regulatory strategies. One

¹ The SEC has long used equitable remedies to force executives found to have personally violated the securities laws to return ill-gotten gains. *See, e.g.*, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); *aff’d in part and rev’d in part*, 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971) (granting remedy requiring restitution of profits obtained by defendants following Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations). This remedy has often been used to force individuals to disgorge bonuses that were inflated on the basis of financial misstatements. *See* Securities & Exchange Comm’n, Report Pursuant to Section 308(c) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 at 8 (reviewing enforcement actions over the five years preceding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) *available at* <https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox308creport.pdf>; S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 32 (C.A.2, 2013) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to order disgorgement of a culpable CEO’s bonuses and other compensation earned in relation to an accounting fraud).

such approach is a (no-fault) excess-pay clawback: a mechanism that recovers excess pay without the need to prove misconduct or fault on the part of the executive.² If executives knew that they would be required to return excess pay, the thinking goes, they would have much less incentive to misreport.

In 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act³ (“Dodd-Frank”), one of whose provisions (Section 954) will require issuers with securities on a national exchange to create and enforce an excess-pay clawback meeting certain requirements (the “Dodd-Frank clawback”).⁴ On July 1, 2015, the SEC proposed a Rule (Rule 10D-1) to implement the Dodd-Frank clawback (the “SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback”).⁵ A final version of the Rule has yet to be adopted.

In a nutshell, the Dodd-Frank clawback requires an issuer that has restated its financials to recover from a covered executive who had received “incentive-based compensation” the excess (if any) of (a) the incentive-based compensation she *actually* received over (b) the incentive-based compensation she *would have* received under the restated financials.⁶ There is no need to prove executive misconduct or fault.

² I will use the term “excess-pay” clawback throughout this paper to refer to *no-fault* excess-pay clawbacks. For a discussion of excess-pay clawbacks, *see generally* Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, *Excess-Pay Clawbacks*, 36 J. CORP. L. 722 (2011).

³ Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

⁴ *See infra* Part II.A. While most provisions of Dodd-Frank target financial institutions, three provisions apply to executive compensation in both financial and non-financial firms: (1) “say on pay”—requiring a shareholder vote on executives’ compensation and any golden-parachute arrangements (Section 951); (2) a provision relating to the composition and functioning of compensation committees (Section 952); and (3) the clawback provision in Section 954.

⁵ *Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation*, Securities Act Release 33-9861, Exchange Act Release No. 34-75342, 80 Fed. Reg. 41144 (proposed July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249 & 274) (also available at <http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/33-9861.pdf>) [hereinafter, “*Listing Standards*”].

⁶ *See infra* Part II.A.

The purpose of this Essay is four-fold:

First, to explain that given the current lack of a “reliable” excess-pay clawback at public firms, the Dodd-Frank clawback can be expected to beneficially reduce (at least some) executives’ incentives to misreport financial information to shareholders.

Second, to systematically identify the costs that any reliable excess-pay clawback will inevitably impose.

Third, to argue that the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches issuers and executives where it cannot be expected to materially improve incentives, and compensation arrangements where it may well reduce the incentive to misreport but where there is a very high risk that the costs will substantially exceed this benefit.

Fourth, to put forward a more narrowly-targeted “smart” version of the Dodd-Frank clawback—aimed at fewer issuers, executives, and types of compensation—that, I argue, would be more desirable than the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback.

I begin by describing the potential incentive benefits of the Dodd-Frank clawback. I focus on the application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to those executives whose behavior is most likely to be improved by it: top executives at a firm without a controlling shareholder (CS), one with dispersed investors (“a non-CS firm”). At a non-CS firm, directors have small equity stakes and spend relatively little time on firm affairs. For these and other reasons, directors are generally hands-off, turning effective control over to top executives and providing them with high-powered incentives. Given their small equity stakes, directors are unlikely to have a substantial personal interest in taking steps to deter misreporting or, for that matter, pressuring executives to misreport. If misreporting occurs, it is likely to be driven by the executives themselves, who are perhaps seeking to generate excess pay through their high-powered incentives. In this setting, an effective excess-pay clawback is likely to offer the greatest potential incentive benefit.

Before Dodd-Frank, executives of publicly-traded firms (including non-CS firms) were *potentially* subject to two types of clawbacks that

could operate as (no-fault) excess-pay clawbacks. First, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) gave the SEC the power to force the CEO or CFO to return pay to the firm in certain situations involving a restatement and “misconduct” by the firm itself, even if the SEC could not show that the executive herself engaged in misconduct (hereinafter, the “SOX clawback”).⁷ Second, directors could choose to seek to recover excess pay, under a firm-adopted recovery policy or otherwise.⁸

However, these potential clawbacks have not been “reliable”; neither the SEC nor directors could be counted on to recover excess pay. During the first decade after SOX was enacted, there were approximately 8,000 financial restatements by U.S. firms.⁹ Given the widespread use of incentive compensation keyed to financial accounting results, it is likely that hundreds of executives (if not more) received excess pay, including the kind targeted by Dodd-Frank. But during this 10-year period, the SEC used the SOX clawback to recover pay from only six executives who were not alleged to have personally engaged in misconduct (even though their firms were accused of misconduct).¹⁰

The frequency of director-initiated recoveries appears to be even lower. The overwhelming majority of public firms (about 75%) lack a disclosed recovery policy; in these firms there do not appear to be any instances of directors recouping excess pay.¹¹ Among the 25% of firms that have disclosed recovery policies, the statistics are not much different. One study reports that, since firms began voluntarily adopting clawback policies, there have been *only three* reported instances of recovery during the period 2007-2012 among the 242 firms that restated their financials.¹² An important reason why director-initiated recoveries are so rare, even at firms with clawback policies, is that almost all voluntarily-adopted

⁷ See *infra* Part III.B.1.

⁸ See *infra* Part III.B.2.

⁹ See *infra* Part III.B.1.

¹⁰ See *infra* Part III.B.1.

¹¹ See *infra* Part III.B.2.a.

¹² See *infra* Part III.B.2.a.

clawback policies give directors discretion to forego recovery of excess pay from executives,¹³ and directors of non-CS firms have strong personal reasons to use their discretion to avoid recouping pay.¹⁴

After the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback is implemented, restating firms will, except in limited circumstances, be required to recover covered excess pay from executives.¹⁵ With a reliable excess-pay clawback in place, the frequency of excess-pay recoveries will increase dramatically. Thus, Dodd-Frank can be expected to beneficially reduce the incentives of top executives at non-CS firms to misreport financial information to shareholders. The reduction in misreporting will, in turn, generate "incentive benefits": among other things, it will reduce the often large costs associated with restatements and improve the quality of financial reporting across the market.¹⁶

Although Dodd-Frank will generate incentive benefits, it will also impose costs. I thus systematically identify the costs that any reliable excess-pay clawback will inevitably impose.¹⁷ There are two types of costs. The first type—"incentive costs"—includes all of the potential adverse effects on executives' behavior of such a clawback, such as inducing them to shift from value-reducing earnings manipulation to even more destructive real earnings management, or to over-invest in financial reporting. These incentive costs, like the incentive benefits described above, are associated with applying the Dodd-Frank clawback to the executives with the most power: namely, top executives at non-CS firms. With respect to these executives, the clawback will generate *net* incentive benefits (benefits less costs) which, we are hope, are positive. The second type—"non-incentive costs"—includes regulator-diversion, issuer-compliance, and executive-burden costs, all of which would arise even if there are no adverse effects on executives' behavior. These costs, I

¹³ See *infra* Part III.B.2.b.

¹⁴ See *infra* Part III.B.2.a.

¹⁵ See *infra* Part II.B.

¹⁶ See *infra* Part III.C.

¹⁷ See *infra* Part IV.

explain, arise with respect to any executive targeted by the Dodd-Frank clawback.

After sketching out the benefits and costs of a reliable excess-pay clawback such as Dodd-Frank, I identify three dimensions along which the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback sweeps too broadly from a cost-benefit perspective. First, it reaches two types of issuers that are always controlling shareholder (CS) firms: issuers with no listed equity but with listed debt, and "controlled companies" (a CS firm where the CS has more than 50% of the voting power).¹⁸ Unlike in a non-CS firm, where directors have small equity stakes and do not closely monitor top executives, a CS firm has an 800-pound gorilla in the boardroom: namely, the CS. The CS has a large financial stake in the company, and exercises control through personally appointed directors. If the CS wants to discourage executives from misreporting, the CS has the ability to put in place a reliable excess-pay clawback or threaten more severe measures (pay cut, termination) to deter misreporting; the CS does not need the government's helping hand to do so. By the same token, if the CS' large equity stake makes the CS want executives to misreport (say, to enable the firm to issue shares at a higher price or the CS to unload some of her shares at a higher price), the CS can easily undo the incentives created by the Dodd-Frank clawback through the use of carrots (extra pay) and sticks (threats of pay cut, termination) whose magnitudes will dwarf that of the clawback. In either of these cases, the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot be expected to generate material net incentive benefits at the CS firm. However, it will still impose all of the non-incentive costs of the clawback (on regulators, issuers, and executives), and thus likely generate costs in excess of the net incentive benefits.

Second, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches too many executives.¹⁹ In particular, it can be expected to reach ten or more executives at each firm,²⁰ including low-level executives (executives below the top 5, whom I call "below-5" executives). Application of the clawback to below-5 executives, even at a non-CS firm, cannot be expected to reduce misreporting. To begin, below-5 executives have much

¹⁸ See *infra* Part V.A.

¹⁹ See *infra* Part V.B.

²⁰ See *infra* Part V.B.1.

less ability to influence financial reporting results than top-5 executives. In addition, even if below-5 executives have some ability to influence financial reporting, they have very different incentives than top-5 executives. Because their pay packages are much smaller, the personal benefit of generating excess pay is much lower. More importantly, below-5 executives can be expected to focus keenly on pleasing their bosses (top-5 executives), who determine their pay and whether they will stay in their jobs, be promoted, or be terminated. If top-5 executives signal that below-5 executives should *not* use their (limited) discretion to misreport, the below-5 executives won't do so, even absent the Dodd-Frank clawback. If, on the other hand, top-5 executives *want* below-5 executives to misreport, an excess-pay clawback cannot be expected to deter the below-5 executives from misreporting. As with application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to any executive at a CS firm, application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to below-5 executives at any firm cannot be expected to generate significant net incentive benefits. But it still imposes non-incentive costs on regulators, issuers, and executives.

Third, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback covers too much compensation.²¹ It applies not only to "accounting-based pay" (pay that is granted, earned or vested based on accounting results) but also to "price-based pay" (pay that is granted, earned, or vested based on the stock price).²² As I explain, an excess-pay clawback is suitable for accounting-based pay because the "but for" amount of compensation (had financial results not been misstated) is knowable, permitting easy calculation of the excess amount.²³ But the clawback is not suited for price-based pay, because the "but for" stock price is *unknowable*. Excess price-based pay thus can only be *guesstimated*. While application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to the price-based pay of top-5 executives at non-CS firms will generate some incentive benefits, the need to guesstimate excess price-based pay (and defend the guesstimated amount to regulators, shareholders, and courts) will lead to large non-incentive costs, such as issuer compliance costs and risk-bearing costs for executives, creating a

²¹ See *infra* Part VI.

²² See *infra* Part II.B.

²³ See *infra* Part VI.A.

large risk that these costs will exceed any net incentive benefits.²⁴ As a result, there is a very high likelihood that the costs of extending the clawback to price-based pay will exceed any incentive benefits.

After explaining that the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback goes too far along these three dimensions, I put forward a more narrowly-targeted "smart" version of the Dodd-Frank clawback—aimed at fewer issuers, executives, and types of compensation—that, I argue, would be more desirable than the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback.²⁵ This clawback would be targeted solely at the accounting-based pay of top-5 executives at types of issuers that are not exclusively CS firms.

Throughout the Essay, my yardstick for evaluating the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback is economic-value maximization. That is, I assume that the proper objective of the government in regulating public companies is to increase the size of the total economic pie: the total amount of value flowing to those with residual claims on the value of firms subject to the clawback (as well as taxpayers, to the extent they must fund the regulators enforcing the clawback).

Before proceeding, several caveats are in order. First, my analysis does not extend to two types of issuers that are subject to the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback: (1) firms whose compensation arrangements are subject to regulation and oversight by the Federal Reserve or any other body that regulates financial institutions; and (2) "foreign private issuers" (firms that are organized under the laws of a foreign country and meet certain other criteria).²⁶ Although both regulated financial institutions and foreign private issuers are subject to the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback,²⁷ their institutional features and regulatory environments are sufficiently distinct from those of the firms that I cover here to warrant separate treatments. However, the analysis I offer—that it is undesirable to apply an excess-pay clawback to CS firms, below-5 executives, and price-based pay—should apply with equal force

²⁴ See *infra* Part VI.B.

²⁵ See *infra* Part VII.

²⁶ These criteria are described in Exchange Act Rule 3b-4(b) and (c).

²⁷ See *infra* Part II.B.1.a.

to these two types of issuers.

Second, I do not consider here many of the “nuts-and-bolts” details of the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, including (a) the types of required restatements that will trigger activation of the clawback; (b) timing issues (the deemed date of the required restatement, the operation of the look-back window); (c) the precise boundaries of “incentive-based compensation” and the difficulties that arise from the use of bonus pools and compensation that is only partly based on accounting results; (d) the recovery process; (e) disclosure requirements around the clawback; and (f) transition questions. I thus do not express a view, one way or the other, on whether the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback gets these details “right.” Instead, I focus solely on the types of issuers, executives, and compensation covered by the proposed clawback.

Third, I do not seek here to defend the government’s decision to impose an excess-pay clawback on issuers of publicly-traded securities. Nor do I seek to show that the benefits of any particular implementation of the Dodd-Frank clawback will exceed the costs. Instead, taking *some* form of the Dodd-Frank clawback as a given, I suggest that the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback should be trimmed along various margins (issuers, executives, pay arrangements) where, I argue, the costs of going beyond each of these margins likely exceed the benefits.

The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows: Part II briefly describes the Dodd-Frank clawback, and the features of the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback that are most relevant for my analysis. Part III highlights the potential incentive benefits of a reliable excess-pay clawback such as Dodd-Frank, given the limitations of the SOX clawback and firm-adopted recovery policies. Part IV turns to the inevitable incentive and non-incentive costs that a reliable excess-pay clawback imposes. Part V explains that the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches certain issuers and executives where the net incentive benefits are at best marginal (and thus less than the expected costs). Part VI argues that the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches certain types of compensation arrangements where, even if there are possible net incentive benefits, there is a great risk that the non-incentive costs are likely to be significantly higher. Part VII suggests that the SEC adopt a “smart” targeted excess-pay clawback aimed at fewer issuers, executives, and

compensation arrangements—one that, I argue, will generate almost all of the incentive benefits of the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback at a much lower cost. A conclusion follows.

II. The Dodd-Frank Clawback

This Part briefly describes the Dodd-Frank clawback, and the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback. Section A focuses on the Congressional statute instructing the SEC to create the clawback. Section B highlights the most important features of the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback. Section C explains that the Dodd-Frank clawback is a “reliable” but “limited” excess-pay clawback, in that it requires the recovery of *some* but not *all* excess pay.

A. Congressional Mandate to the SEC

Section 954 of Dodd-Frank²⁸ added a new Section 10D to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).²⁹ Section 10D is divided into two subsections: Section 10D(a) and Section 10D(b).

Section 10D(a) instructs the SEC to adopt rules directing the national securities exchanges³⁰ (hereinafter, collectively, the “exchanges”) to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the requirements of Section 10D(b).³¹

²⁸ Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 954, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

²⁹ 15 U.S.C. 78j-4.

³⁰ A “national securities exchange” is an exchange registered as such under Section 6 of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78f]. There are currently eighteen exchanges registered under Section 6(a) of the Exchange Act, most notably the NASDAQ Stock Market and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”). The Dodd-Frank clawback also applies to “national securities associations.” A “national securities association” is an association of brokers and dealers registered as such under Section 15A of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78o-3]. However, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) is the only association registered with the SEC under Section 15A(a) of the Exchange Act, and it does not list securities. Thus, for now, the Dodd-Frank clawback applies only to national securities exchanges.

³¹ 15 U.S.C. 78j-4.

Section 10D(b) requires each issuer to develop and implement a policy providing:

(1) for disclosure of the policy of the issuer on incentive-based compensation that is based on financial information required to be reported under the securities laws; and

(2) that, in the event that the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to... material noncompliance... with any financial reporting requirement ..., the issuer will recover from any... executive officerwho received incentive-based compensation....during the 3-year period preceding the date on which the issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement, based on the erroneous data, in excess of what would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting restatement.³²

B. The SEC's Proposed Dodd-Frank Clawback

On July 1, 2015, the SEC proposed Rule 10D-1 to set forth the listing requirements that exchanges must establish pursuant to Section 10D of the Exchange Act.³³ The SEC also proposed a variety of related rule and form amendments mostly concerning disclosure.³⁴ I will use the term “SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback” to refer to Proposed Rule 10D-1 and the accompanying rule and form amendments, collectively.

Under the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, an issuer’s security would be subject to delisting if the issuer does not adopt a fully compliant compensation recovery policy, disclose the policy, and comply with the policy’s recovery provisions.³⁵

³² 15 U.S.C. 78j-4.

³³ *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x.

³⁴ *See id.* at 41,146 (proposing rules “for disclosure of the policy of the issuer on incentive-based compensation that is based on financial information required to be reported under the securities laws”).

³⁵ *Id.*

1. Issuers, Executives, and Compensation Covered

My focus in this Essay is on the types of issuers, executives, and compensation covered by the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback. Along these dimensions, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback applies to a wide range of issuers, executives, and types of compensation.

a. Covered Issuers

Almost all issuers with listed securities are covered.³⁶ Among the covered firms are issuers with unlisted equity but with listed debt, controlled companies, and foreign private issuers.³⁷ Only a few types of issuers are exempted.³⁸ The SEC estimates that 4800 issuers will be covered by their proposed clawback.³⁹

b. Covered Executives

At a covered issuer, a covered "executive officer" is defined as:

*"the issuer's president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or if there is no such accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making functions for the issuer."*⁴⁰

This definition is modeled on the definition of "executive officer" under Rule 16a-1(f). As I explain in Part V.B., this definition may cover 10 or more executives at a particular issuer, potentially bringing around

³⁶ *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,146.

³⁷ *Id.* at 41,146--41,150.

³⁸ *See infra* Part V.A.

³⁹ *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,172.

⁴⁰ *See* Proposed Rule 10D-1(c)(3); *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,153. For discussion of this definition and the types of executives it includes, *see infra* Part V.B.

50,000 executives within the scope of the rule.

c. Covered Compensation

For each covered executive, covered “incentive-based compensation” is defined as:

*“any compensation that is granted, earned, or vested based ... upon the attainment of a financial reporting measure...[which are] measures that are determined and presented in accordance with the accounting principles used in preparing the issuer’s financial statements, any measures that are derived from ...such measures, and stock price and total shareholder return” (emphasis added).*⁴¹

Note that “incentive-based compensation” excludes stock options, restricted stock, or other equity-based awards that are either time-vested or granted outright. Even though the ultimate value of these instruments is tied to the stock price, these instruments are not within reach of the clawback because they are not *granted, earned, or vested* upon the attainment of a financial reporting measure, stock price, or total shareholder return.

For convenience, I will refer to incentive-based compensation that is granted, earned, or vested based on *actual* financial reporting results (e.g., earnings, revenues) as “accounting-based pay”; I will refer to both “stock price” and “total shareholder return [TSR]” as “stock price” and denote compensation that is granted, earned, or vested based upon the attainment of stock price as “price-based pay.”

2. Activation

The Dodd-Frank clawback must be activated only if there is a restatement due to material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement under the securities laws (hereinafter, “restatement”).⁴²

⁴¹ Proposed Rule 240.10D-1(c)(4).

⁴² Proposed Rule 240.10D-1(b)(1).

In the event of a restatement, a determination must be made whether the erroneous accounting results directly (through accounting-based pay) or indirectly (through price-based pay) impacted the amount of incentive-based compensation that was granted, earned, or vested.

If the erroneous accounting results generated excess pay, the issuer is generally required to recover the excess amount: the difference between what the executive actually received (under the original financial results) and what the executive would have received (under the restated financial results).⁴³ As I will discuss in Part VI, knowing the excess amount of price-based pay is impossible; it can only be “guesstimated.”

However, an issuer is permitted to forego recovery in one particular situation. Specifically, the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback exempts an issuer from recovery if the direct expense paid to a third party to assist in enforcing the policy would exceed the amount to be recovered.⁴⁴

C. DODD-FRANK AS A RELIABLE (BUT LIMITED) EXCESS-PAY CLAWBACK

The SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback is a “reliable” excess-pay clawback because it appears to require recovery of covered excess pay in most circumstances. As discussed in Section B, the only situation in which recovery is not required is that where the cost of recovery paid to a third party would exceed the amount recovered. Thus, with respect to the excess pay covered by the clawback, recovery of covered excess pay seems highly likely to occur.

However, the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback is not a *complete* excess-pay clawback: it is “limited.” Under a *complete* excess-pay clawback, an executive would be required to return any and all excess

⁴³ Proposed Rule 10D-1(b)(1)(iii).

⁴⁴ Proposed Rule 10D-1(b)(1)(iv). Foreign private issuers, not covered by this Essay, are also exempted from recovering excess pay if recovery would violate home-country law. Throughout this Essay, when referring to “issuers” or “firms,” I mean covered entities that are not foreign private issuers.

pay, not just excess pay arising from errors in financial reporting measures that are later corrected in a restatement.⁴⁵ In contrast, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback permits an executive to keep excess pay for two types of reasons.

First, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback can apply only to excess pay that arises out of what is defined as "incentive-based compensation": pay that is granted, earned, or vested based on a "financial reporting measure," which includes accounting measures (e.g., revenues, net income, earnings per share) as well as stock price and TSR.⁴⁶ Thus, the clawback does not apply to excess pay generated by the use of non-financial metrics (such as customer satisfaction) that turn out to be erroneous. Even if errors in these metrics substantially inflate an executive's pay, that excess pay need not be returned to the issuer.

Second, because it is restatement dependent, the Dodd-Frank clawback (and the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback) cannot reach excess incentive-based compensation when there is no restatement. Excess incentive-based pay can, however, arise absent a restatement in two scenarios. First, a small error in an accounting result (say, earnings) that may be too minor to require a restatement could trigger a large increase in an executive's payout if (a) the executive's payout function is kinked and (b) the error gets the executive over a key threshold. Second, to the extent executives have discretion over whether to restate a firm's financials, they may well be able to avoid a clawback of excess pay by not restating (even if the SEC believes a restatement is required).⁴⁷ For these

⁴⁵ An example of a complete excess-pay clawback is found in the TARP regulations. In particular, the Interim Final Rules under Section 111(b)(3)(B) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) provide that executives of financial institutions receiving assistance under TARP are required to repay compensation if awards based on statements of earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria were later found to be materially inaccurate. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 CFR 30.8. There is no requirement of a restatement, or that the "criteria" that turn out to be materially inaccurate be limited to financial reporting measures corrected in a restatement.

⁴⁶ See *infra* Part II.B.

⁴⁷ The failure of executives to restate financials has, in at least one instance, precluded application of the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback (discussed *infra* Part III.A.1), which also

two reasons, an executive may well be free to keep considerable amounts of excess incentive-based compensation in the event there is no restatement.⁴⁸

In sum, the Dodd-Frank is a limited excess-pay clawback because it reaches only “incentive-based compensation,” and can only reach that compensation if there is a restatement of results that directly or indirectly impacts pay in the manner described in Section B.

III. Benefits of Introducing a Reliable Excess-Pay Clawback

This Part explains that introduction of a reliable excess-pay clawback such as Dodd-Frank may provide an economic benefit by reducing executives’ incentives to deliberately misreport financial accounting results (hereinafter, “misreport”) for the purpose of generating excess pay.

Section A describes the setting in which the Dodd-Frank clawback is likely to have the most impact: top executives in non-CS firms. Section B explains why existing clawback rules and arrangements—the SOX clawback and firm-adopted recovery policies—are unlikely to recover excess pay from top executives in non-CS firms and are thus not reliable. Section C describes the benefit of introducing a reliable excess-pay clawback like Dodd-Frank into the compensation environment for top executives of non-CS firms.

requires that there be a restatement. In *S.E.C. v. Shanahan*, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078 (E.D. Mo. 2008), a CFO took part in a scheme to backdate options, which had the effect of overstating firm pretax operating income by 25% and generated \$1.9 million in extra bonus for the CFO. The firm never restated its financials, but the SEC argued that the firm should have done so. The district court ruled that the SOX clawback could not be used to recover the CFO’s bonus because “an issuer must be compelled or ordered to prepare a financial restatement, and must actually file the restatement” before the SEC can invoke the clawback. *Id.*; see also Sarah Johnson, *Sarbox Clawback Ruling Could Keep Pay in Some CFOs’ Pockets*, CFO (Dec. 24, 2008), available at <http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12840062> (describing *Shanahan* decision).

⁴⁸ See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 748. In our survey of excess-pay clawback policies voluntarily adopted by S&P 500 firms as of 2010, we found that the overwhelming majority required a restatement for activation. *Id.* at 743. For a discussion of these recovery policies, see *infra* Part III.A.2.b.

A. The Sweet Spot for a Reliable Excess-Pay Clawback

A reliable excess-pay clawback is likely to have the most positive impact when applied to a particular type of executives: top executives at a firm without a controlling shareholder (CS) but rather with dispersed investors: a non-CS firm. At such a firm, directors have small equity stakes. One frequently cited study estimated that median percentage ownership for independent directors is only about 0.005%.⁴⁹ Not surprisingly, directors' time commitment to the firm is extremely limited; they may well sit on other boards, in addition to having a demanding full-time job. Because they have small stakes in the firm and little time to attend to its affairs, non-CS firm directors generally take a hands-off approach, turning control over to the top executives and giving them high-powered incentives. Given their small equity stakes, directors are unlikely to have much personal interest in pressuring executives to misreport, or in discouraging them from doing so. If executives choose to misreport, it is for their own reasons, not because directors are pressuring them to do so. Perhaps they wish to generate excess pay from their high-powered incentives. Of course, whether they decide to misreport may depend, in part, on the existence of a reliable excess-pay clawback.

In Part V, I will explain why a reliable excess-pay clawback is likely to have much less effect on top executives of CS firms, or lower-level executives at any firm, each for slightly different reasons. In brief, these executives have much less power than top executives at non-CS firms; they can be expected to make reporting decisions primarily to satisfy those who have the most power in the firm and control their fates (the CS, in the case of top executives of CS firms; and top executives, in the case lower-level executives at any firm). For these executives, the presence or absence of excess pay cannot be expected to play an important role in their decision-making. Thus, this Part, which focuses on the potential incentive benefit of a reliable excess-pay clawback, will continue to focus on the top executives of non-CS firms.

⁴⁹ John E. Core et al., *Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Compensation, and Firm Performance*, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 384 (1999).

B. The Lack of a Reliable Excess-Pay Clawback Before Dodd-Frank

Prior to Dodd-Frank, executives could be forced to return excess pay following a restatement, without the need to demonstrate fault or misconduct on their part, through two mechanisms: (1) the SEC could choose to deploy the Sarbanes-Oxley clawback; or (2) a firm's directors could demand the money back, perhaps under the firm's voluntarily-adopted recovery policy.⁵⁰ As this Section explains, the likelihood of recovery under either of these mechanisms has been very low. Thus, neither of these mechanisms has provided a reliable excess-pay clawback.

1. Sarbanes-Oxley Clawback

Section 304 of SOX⁵¹ gave the SEC the power to force certain executives to return pay to the firm in specified situations.⁵² In particular, if a firm is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to material noncompliance, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement, Section 304 enables the SEC to require the CEO and CFO of the firm to return to the firm any bonus or other incentive- or equity-based compensation received within 12 months of the misleading financial statement, as well as any profits realized from the sale of stock during that period.⁵³ The SOX clawback can be applied against an executive as long as there is some misconduct associated with the misleading financial statement, even if it cannot be demonstrated that the targeted executive

⁵⁰ In some cases, shareholders may have the right to sue derivatively to recover excess pay. But such cases are almost never brought because of the costs involved and the substantial procedural hurdles that must be overcome to maintain such a suit. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 45-48 (2004) [hereinafter, "BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE"] (describing difficulty of bringing derivative suit). Shareholder suits have thus been a viable method for recovering excess pay.

⁵¹ Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. 7243 (2002)

⁵² There is no private right of action under the provision. See, e.g., *Neer v. Pelino*, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (holding that SOX §304 does not provide a private right of action to recover value from executives); *In re Digimarc Corp. Derivative Litig.*, 549 F.3d 1223, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).

⁵³ *Id.*

was personally at fault.⁵⁴

The SOX clawback is thus not a *pure* excess-pay clawback like Dodd-Frank: one designed to recover only erroneously awarded compensation. Rather, it is potentially *punitive*, enabling not only the recovery of excess pay, but (1) *all* incentive compensation received within the clawback window; as well as (2) profits from stock sales within the clawback window.

For two reasons, however, the SOX clawback is unlikely to be wielded to recover any pay, including excess pay, even if there is a restatement. First, as explained, the SOX clawback can be deployed only if there is “misconduct.” Even if the SOX clawback could be perfectly enforced, it would not reach (a) excess pay that is generated without misreporting; and (b) excess pay that is generated by misreporting to the extent that misreporting falls short of “misconduct.” It could reach only misreporting that counts as “misconduct.” As long as some forms of misreporting are not considered “misconduct” for purposes of the SOX clawback, executives would still be free to misreport and keep excess pay following a restatement.

Second, and more importantly, even if there is restatement and misreporting that counts as “misconduct,” the difficulty of enforcing the SOX clawback makes the likelihood of recovery very low. The SEC’s resources are limited, given the wide range of tasks it is assigned. Hundreds of issuers restate their financials each year.⁵⁵ Investigating restatements to determine whether there might have been misconduct is costly. Litigating a clawback case would also be expensive, in part because of the need to prove misconduct. A resource-constrained SEC cannot be expected to detect and litigate every case involving restatement and misconduct, or even most of them.

⁵⁴ See, e.g., SEC v. Jenkins (9th Cir. 2016)(Op. at 28) (ruling that SOX 304 allows the SEC “to seek disgorgement from CEOs and CFOs even if the triggering restatement did not result from misconduct on the part of those officers.”)

⁵⁵ Don Whalen et al., *Audit Analytics, 2014 Financial Restatements: A Fourteen Year Comparison*, available at https://www.complianceweek.com/sites/default/files/AuditAnalytics_RestatementRpt_4-15.pdf.

Let's look at the statistics. Over SOX's first decade (2003-2012), there were approximately 8,000 restatements.⁵⁶ We do not know how many executives received excess pay as a result of incorrect financials that needed to be restated. But given the widespread use of accounting-based pay, there are likely to be at least several hundred (if not more) executives who received excess pay. During this period, the SEC apparently successfully deployed the SOX clawback at 14 firms, recovering pay from approximately 21 executives. Of these 21 executives, 15 were alleged to have personally engaged in misconduct.⁵⁷ Thus, during SOX's first decade the SEC recovered pay from only 6 executives not alleged to have personally engaged in misconduct (all of whom were at firms where some misconduct was alleged).⁵⁸

In short, the SOX clawback is punitive when applied, potentially recovering more than the excess pay received by the targeted executive. But the large range of situations in which the clawback cannot be wielded or is unlikely to be wielded means that the SOX clawback is not a reliable excess-pay clawback.⁵⁹

2. Clawback by Directors

⁵⁶ *Id.*, at 17. Beginning in late 2004, the SEC required certain types of restatements (those that made past financial statements unreliable) to be reported in Item 4.02 of Form 8-K. This 8,000 restatement figure includes almost 1500 Item 4.02 restatements between 2005 and 2012. *Id.* at 20.

⁵⁷ For a list of the cases, *see* Appendix A, Table 1. In some of these cases, the SOX clawback was deployed only after the targeted executive had first been convicted of criminal fraud. *See* Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 730-732.

⁵⁸ The frequency of recovery appears to have increased during the period 2013-2015. During that period, the SEC targeted 11 executives at 8 firms, 4 of whom were not alleged to have personally engaged in misconduct. *See* Appendix A, Table 2.

⁵⁹ The limited ability of the SOX clawback to deter misreporting may well be evidenced by the fact that much of the illegal option backdating occurred after SOX had been enacted in 2002, in blatant violation of SOX's new reporting requirements (as well as longstanding disclosure rules). *See* Jesse M. Fried, *Option Backdating and Its Implications*, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853, 856-57 (2008).

The directors of a non-CS firm could try to create a reliable excess-pay clawback.⁶⁰ For example, they could try to make a credible commitment (through a policy, bylaw, or otherwise) to recover excess pay from executives, except perhaps in very limited circumstances. In other words, firms could adopt a clawback policy similar to the one required by Dodd-Frank.

However, as I detail below, directors of non-CS firms do not appear to have created reliable excess-pay clawback policies. The overwhelming majority of firms do not have any disclosed recovery policy, giving directors complete discretion to forego recovery—and there do not appear to be any recoveries of excess pay in these firms. Those firms that have a disclosed clawback policy give directors substantial discretion to forego recovery, which they then almost always exploit to forego recovery. In short, these firms have not created reliable excess-pay clawbacks.

a. Firms Without Disclosed Recovery Policies

According to the SEC's own estimates, more than 75% of the firms that would be covered by the Dodd-Frank clawback have not disclosed any excess-pay recovery policy.⁶¹ Unless these issuers have hidden policies that require directors to recoup excess pay, which is extremely unlikely, these issuers leave discretion fully in the hands of directors. Not surprisingly, there does not appear to be any instances of directors of such firms recouping pay.

There may well be cases where non-CS directors (a) decline to

⁶⁰ Because corporate law gives the board of directors ultimate authority over the management of the firm, all clawback decisions by the corporation itself will be made by the board or a subset of its directors.

⁶¹ *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,172 (reporting that only 1116 of the 4845 filers that would be covered by Dodd-Frank have a disclosed recovery policy); Ilona Babenko et al., *Clawback Provisions* 9 (April 24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript, *available at* <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023292>) (reporting that over 700 of firms in the S&P 1500 did not have a disclosed clawback policy).

adopt a recovery policy and then (b) forego recovery of excess pay solely for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders. But their personal cost-benefit analysis is likely to play a role. As I explain below, for any given director, the personal benefit of recovering excess pay from either a current or departed executive is likely to be miniscule. The costs, on the other hand, are not.

i. The Miniscule Benefit of Recovering Excess-Pay

For a non-CS director considering whether to recover an executive's excess pay, there are two possible benefits. First, to the extent that the director has equity in the firm, the director will share pro rata in any (net) recovery. However, as explained above, independent directors typically own only a tiny fraction of the firm's equity; one study reported that median independent director ownership to be about 0.005%.⁶² Even if an independent director held 10 times that percentage (0.05%) of the firm's shares, she would reap a personal benefit through her own equity of only \$500 for every \$1 million in net recovery. Relative to the median annual pay in 2014 for independent directors at Fortune 500 firms, which exceeds \$250,000,⁶³ this amount is trivial.

Second, the director might be able to maintain her reputation among shareholders as an "independent" director capable of serving shareholders' interests. But the complexity of compensation contracts and the litigation system would make it difficult for outsiders to determine whether a decision to forego recovery is in the shareholders' interest or not. Thus, a director foregoing recovery is unlikely to face adverse reputational effects among shareholders, except in rare situations where the firm is already in the public spotlight because of its size or prominence, and the executive's misbehavior is seen as egregious by market participants.

⁶² See Core et al., *supra* note x.

⁶³ Michael Bowie, Towers Watson Executive Compensation Bulletin (August 27, 2015), available at <https://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/Newsletters/Global/executive-pay-matters/2015/Executive-Compensation-Bulletin-Equity-Based-Pay-Continues-to-Push-Increases-Outside-Director-Pay>.

ii. The Non-Miniscule Cost of Recovering Pay

While benefits to a director of excess-pay recovery will tend to be miniscule, the personal cost of recovering excess pay from an executive is likely to be substantial, whether the executive is still serving at the company or has already departed.

Recovery from Current Executives. In a non-CS firm, directors often have financial, social, and psychological reasons to favor executives in compensation matters.⁶⁴ To the extent that directors feel loyal to an executive or otherwise care about their relationships with the executive, who will continue to serve the company and may well be a director on the board with them, it is likely to be personally costly to seek to recover excess pay from that executive.⁶⁵

In addition, there could be a reputational cost to a director (Director X) who decides to recover excess pay from the executive. In particular, Director X would be concerned about her reputation among directors at other firms, who might be less willing to favorably consider Director X for a board position if Director X acquires a reputation for aggressively trying to recover excess pay from executives.

Recovery from Departed Executives. By the time the board learns that an executive has received excess pay, the executive may well have departed the company. One might believe that it would be less costly for directors to recover excess pay from a departed executive. After all, the executive has much less influence over directors once she has left the firm. However, directors will still tend to incur substantial personal costs in seeking to recoup excess pay from departed executives.

To begin, any reputational cost to recovering excess pay from a

⁶⁴ See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, *supra* note x at 23–27 (describing sources of executives' influence over directors in public companies).

⁶⁵ To be sure, directors could indirectly recover excess pay by reducing current compensation. However, if the amount of excess pay is sufficiently large, it may not be feasible or in shareholders' interests to reduce current compensation by enough to fully offset the excess payment. See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 733 n. 53.

current executive would also arise when recovering excess pay from a departed executive. Directors in other firms may be reluctant to bring on board a director who is seen as acting aggressively toward top managers, whether these managers are still in their positions or have recently departed.

In addition, an executive will typically resist and may well threaten to litigate rather than turn over any pay sought by the board.⁶⁶ Should there be litigation, the directors may be deposed and accused of wrongdoing (even if they are in fact blameless). For directors, the psychological and reputational costs associated with litigation could be considerable.

Finally, directors seeking recovery may forfeit the value of their relationships with the departing executive. Many directors are interested in maintaining good relationships with departing or departed executives because these executives can perform favors for them in the future.⁶⁷ A departing CEO is more likely to be a friend if directors do not aggressively pursue the recovery of any excess pay that he received. Directors' desire to ingratiate themselves with departing executives is evidenced by the fact that directors have often provided departing executives with various emoluments not required by the executives' contracts.⁶⁸

Given this pattern, directors are likely to let executives departing the firm keep any excess pay as well as collect other gratuitous goodbye benefits. Indeed, this is precisely what happened at Fannie Mae. During the period 2001–2004, its executives received millions of extra dollars in earnings-based bonuses and earnings-triggered option grants by deliberately overstating firm earnings by at least \$10 billion.⁶⁹ Franklin

⁶⁶ See *Id.*, at 734 (describing executives' resistance to returning disputed compensation to the firm).

⁶⁷ See BEBCHUK AND FRIED, *PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE*, *supra* note x, at 87-89 (explaining why directors treat departing executives favorably).

⁶⁸ See *id.* at 87–94 (describing the benefits executives receive when leaving their companies, even if they have performed poorly).

⁶⁹ See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, *Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage*, 30 J. CORP. L. 24

Raines, Fannie Mae's then-CEO, departed in late 2004, after personally reaping millions of dollars in excess pay from bonuses based on inflated earnings.⁷⁰ Fannie Mae's directors not only allowed Raines to keep his excess pay, but also gratuitously boosted his pension on the way out.⁷¹

b. Firms with Disclosed Recovery Policies

Now let us turn to firms that have publicly disclosed recovery policies. According to the SEC's estimates, slightly over 1000 of the 4,800 issuers that would be subject to the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback have voluntarily adopted and disclosed recovery policies.⁷² In principle, these policies could constrain director discretion around recovering excess pay. Indeed, these policies (like the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback) could actually *require* directors to recover excess pay, except in very limited circumstances.

However, what do these recovery policies *actually* do? The SEC and academic researchers have examined clawback policies to determine

807, 807–12 (2005) (explaining how the structure of Fannie Mae's compensation arrangements gave executives an incentive to inflate earnings) [hereinafter, "Bebchuk & Fried, *Fannie Mae*"]; Eric Dash, *Fannie Mae to Restate Results by \$6.3 Billion Because of Accounting*, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/business/07fannie.html?_r=1&em&ex=1165726800&en=ce14eaf69685179d&ei=5087%0A (reporting regulators' conclusion that, of the \$90 million paid to Fannie Mae CEO Franklin Raines during the period 1998–2003, at least \$52 million—more than half—was tied to bonus targets that were reached by manipulating accounting).

⁷⁰ See Bebchuk & Fried, *Fannie Mae*, *supra* note x. at 807 (describing Raines' departure from Fannie Mae); Dash, *supra* (explaining that Raines reaped tens of millions of bonus dollars as a result of manipulating earnings).

⁷¹ *Id.* at 814.

⁷² See *Listing Standards*, *supra* note 5, at 41,172 (reporting that slightly over 1000 issuers of the more than 4,800 issuers that would be subject to the proposed Dodd-Frank clawback have disclosed a recovery policy); Babenko et al., *supra* note x, at 9 (reporting that 791 of the firms in the S&P 1500 had a disclosed clawback policy).

when they are “triggered.”⁷³ But, as I will explain in more detail, these policies are generally written carefully so that there are *no conditions* under which recovery is *automatically* triggered. In almost all firms, there can be recovery only if (a) certain requirements are met and (b) *directors use their discretion to squeeze the trigger*. In other words, almost all firm-adopted clawback policies leave director discretion intact.

The first study to examine director discretion under clawback policies is one that I conducted with Nitzan Shilon several years ago.⁷⁴ Our study examined all of the disclosed clawback policies that had been adopted by non-financial S&P 500 firms shortly before Dodd-Frank was enacted.⁷⁵ We focused on provisions dealing with the recovery of excess pay.⁷⁶ At the time, over half of these firms had no disclosed clawback policy of any kind.⁷⁷ A number of firms indicated that they had a clawback policy but failed to disclose enough details to make the plan intelligible.⁷⁸ Only 225 of the non-financial S&P firms had a well-disclosed clawback policy concerning the recovery of excess pay.⁷⁹ We examined each of these policies carefully.

⁷³ See, e.g., *Listing Standards*, *supra* note 5, at 41,173 (“Many of the issuers that disclose recovery policies do not require misconduct on the part of the executive to trigger recovery.”); Babenko et al., *id.* at 9 (“Out of 12 triggers that we identify, the most common trigger is an accounting restatement...”).

⁷⁴ See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x.

⁷⁵ *Id.* at 735-736.

⁷⁶ Unlike the Dodd-Frank clawback, which is restatement dependent, 15% of these policies contemplated the possibility of recovering excess pay even if there is no restatement. *Id.* at 743.

⁷⁷ See *id.* at 736-737.

⁷⁸ See *id.* at 736.

⁷⁹ See *id.* The SEC estimates that, in 2015, fewer than 25% of the issuers covered by the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback disclosed some form of executive compensation recovery policy. See *supra* note x. Consistent with our findings, see Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 737, the SEC finds that the frequency of disclosed recovery policy is much lower for smaller firms. *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,172.

We found that the overwhelming majority (81%) of the 225 policies give directors *complete discretion to forego* a clawback of excess pay, even if directors determined that the executive committed “misconduct.”⁸⁰ Another 16% of the 225 policies required directors to recoup excess pay, but if and only if directors first determined that there was “misconduct” on the part of the executive. In these firms, directors wishing to avoid recovery could thus use their discretion to determine that there is insufficient proof of “misconduct.”⁸¹ Only 3% of the policies required directors to recover excess pay whether or not there was a determination of misconduct (barring some undefined “impracticability”).⁸² Thus, 97% of the 225 policies gave directors substantial discretion to avoid recovery if they preferred to let executives keep their excess pay.⁸³

⁸⁰ See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 738-39.

⁸¹ As noted above, if the misconduct is egregious and the facts are publicly known, directors may well feel compelled to seek recovery of at least some of the excess pay. See *supra* Part III.A.2.a.i. But in the large range of cases where the details are murky, directors inclined to avoid recovery may be able to hide behind the misconduct requirement to avoid recovery of any excess pay.

⁸² See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 738, 742. Moreover, even in these recovery-requiring firms, the clawback policy lacked the teeth of the Dodd-Frank clawback. Some of these policies did not apply to former executives, or applied only to particular compensation arrangements. See *id.* at 742 n. 89. More importantly, these policies could be amended or eliminated at any time by the directors themselves, without shareholder consent, thus providing a “meta-level” of discretion to directors looking for a way to avoid recovery.

⁸³ While the policies at these firms may have been revised somewhat since we looked at them, it is unlikely that they were changed to substantially increase clawback risk for executives. Babenko et al. also look at the provisions of clawback policies, and concluded that trigger-pulling discretion can be exercised in 60% of policies. Babenko et al, *supra* note x, at 45. But our study finds that in almost all of the clawback policies where directors do not have explicit discretion to forego recovery if certain conditions are met, one of these conditions is that the directors must determine that there has been misconduct by the executive, a condition that implicitly returns full discretion to the directors. We can presume that, in the 40% of policies where Babenko et al. found no discretion, there was in fact considerable discretion accorded to executives. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain their study’s finding (discussed *infra*) that there were only 3 instances of pay recovery among 242 firms with recovery policies that restated their earnings during the period 2007-2012.

Critically, the use of a misconduct condition in firm recovery policies not only makes it easy for recovery-averse directors to avoid recouping excess pay, but also creates a high hurdle for any recovery-seeking directors trying to get excess pay back. In our sample, 154 (67%) of the 225 firms with fully disclosed policies barred directors from recovering excess pay unless there was a determination that the executive committed “misconduct.”⁸⁴ In these firms, even if an executive had engaged in what directors would deem as misconduct (if they knew all the facts), the misconduct may be difficult for directors to detect or prove (if, as could be expected, the executive resists recovery). Like the SEC seeking to deploy the SOX clawback, the directors would need to determine that the misconduct occurred and then be prepared to prove it in court.⁸⁵ Thus, in only 33% of the firms with disclosed policies could recovery-seeking directors do so without proving misconduct.⁸⁶

All in all, a close reading of disclosed firm recovery policies

⁸⁴ See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 742. Similarly, in a sample of 2,326 companies in the Corporate Library database, deHaan et al. find that 61 percent had compensation recovery policies that could not be activated without a finding of executive misconduct. See Ed deHaan, Frank Hodge & Terry Shevlin, *Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quality?*, 30 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1027-1062 (2013).

⁸⁵ While it might seem natural to model voluntary firm recovery policies on the SOX clawback, there is an important difference between the SOX clawback and an excess-pay clawback that makes the use of a misconduct hurdle in an excess-pay clawback inappropriate. SOX allows the recovery of *all* incentive-based compensation within the clawback window, both excess pay and non-excess pay. See *supra* Part III.A.1. If SOX had no misconduct requirement, all of an executive’s incentive pay could be recovered in the event of a restatement, many of which could occur for completely innocent reasons. SOX would thus impose a large tax on the use of incentive-based pay and thereby could seriously distort compensation arrangements. However, this over-deterrence concern does not apply where the clawback policy targets only *excess pay*. There is no good reason why the culpability or innocence of an executive should affect an executive’s ability to keep money that he or she received only because of an error in a financial reporting measure.

⁸⁶ Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 743. These policies also appear to have created other impediments to recovery. In particular, any of these policies barred recovery from former executives or permitted recovery only for excess pay arising from part of an executive’s compensation arrangement, such as a particular incentive program. *Id.*

suggests that directors who wish to forego recovery of excess pay typically have the discretion to do so, while directors who wish to recover excess pay commonly must overcome hurdles to do so. The result is that even when a firm has a disclosed recovery policy there is no reliable excess-pay clawback. Not surprisingly, according to a recent study, the number of reported cases of pay recovery by directors in the 242 firms that adopted a recovery policy and then restated their financials during the period 2007-2012 could be counted on one hand, even if it were missing a finger or two – there have been *three*.⁸⁷

To be sure, an executive in one of the 25% of issuers with a disclosed recovery policy may be more likely than an executive in one of the 75% of issuers without a disclosed recovery policy to perceive a greater risk of recovery. This may account for findings that suggest that investors view adoption of these policies favorably,⁸⁸ and that there is a positive association between these policies and higher-quality financial reporting.⁸⁹ But the low frequency of recovery resulting from director

⁸⁷ See Babenko et al, *supra* note x, at 29.

⁸⁸ See, e.g., Mai Iskandar-Datta and Yonghong Jia, *Valuation Consequences of Clawback Provisions*, 88 ACCT. REV. 171, 173 (2013) (finding positive stock price reaction to announcement of recovery policy adoption as well as a narrower bid-ask spread). However, because of self-selection effects (the firms adopting recovery policies may differ from those not adopting such policies in ways that cannot be observed and measured), it is exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to attribute any observed changes in the behavior of executives and firms, or in the market's valuation of firms, to the adoption of recovery provisions. See, e.g., Diane K. Denis, *Mandatory Clawback Provisions, Information Disclosure, and the Regulation of Securities Markets*, __ J. ACCT. & ECON. __ (2012).

⁸⁹ See Lilian H. Chan et al., *The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior*, 54 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 180-196 (2012) (finding that after the adoption of a recovery policy, auditors are less likely to report a material weakness in an issuer's internal control over financial reporting) [hereinafter, "Lilian H. Chan et al., *Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior*"]; Lillian H. Chan, et al., *The Effects of Firm Initiated Clawback Provisions on Bank Loan Contracting*, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 659 (2013) [hereinafter, "Lilian H. Chan et al., *Bank Loan Contracting*"] (finding that voluntary adoption of recovery policies appears to improve lenders' perception of reporting quality); Mark A. Chen, Daniel T. Greene, & James E. Owers, *The Costs and Benefits of Clawback Provisions in CEO Compensation*, __ REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. __ (2014) (finding that voluntary adoption of a recovery mechanism reduces aggressiveness in financial reporting, leading to a lower likelihood of restatements and a smaller

discretion means that expected likelihood of excess-pay recovery is low. As a result, even the issuers with disclosed policies lack a reliable excess-pay clawback.

C. Incentive Benefits of the Dodd-Frank Clawback

As we saw in Section A, before Dodd-Frank there had not been a reliable excess-pay clawback: excess pay is almost never clawed back by either the SEC wielding the SOX clawback, or by directors themselves under firm-adopted recovery policies (or otherwise). Introducing a reliable excess-pay clawback such as Dodd-Frank will reduce the incentives of top executives at non-CS firms to misreport, generating economic benefits.

1. Reduced Incentive to Misreport

When top executives at non-CS firms are given incentive compensation—compensation tied to a performance measure—they have incentive to misreport to generate excess pay. The greater the potential gain from generating and retaining excess pay, the larger the incentive to misreport. Thus, everything else equal, the absence of a reliable excess-pay clawback that would prevent executives from retaining excess pay increases the incentive to misreport.

To be sure, the absence of a reliable excess-pay clawback does not mean that these executives will always misreport. Ethical considerations, reputational concerns, and fear of adverse reactions from directors or shareholders might discourage an executive from misreporting, even if misreporting would generate excess pay. An executive may also be afraid that misreporting will be considered fraud, and potentially subject the executive to civil or criminal penalties. However, everything else equal, the absence of a reliable excess-pay clawback can be expected to increase the amount of misreporting.

magnitude of abnormal accruals); deHaan et al., *supra* note x, at __ (voluntary adoption of recovery policies appears to lead to less aggressive financial reporting and decreased “unexplained” audit fees, as well as fewer restatements, higher earnings response coefficients, and lower analyst forecast dispersion). All of these findings, however, may be due to a self-selection effect that cannot be controlled for. *See* Denis, *supra* note x.

The introduction of a reliable excess-pay clawback such as in Dodd-Frank will thus, on the margin, reduce these executives' incentives to misreport. By requiring directors of non-CS firms to do what they would otherwise be inclined to avoid doing, recouping excess pay, executives know that they are less likely to be able to keep excess pay. The expected gain to top executives at non-CS firms from misreporting will thus decline.

Of course, misreporting may generate other benefits for the executive besides excess pay. In particular, by boosting the stock price, misreporting may enable top executives at non-CS firms to unload shares at a higher price or reduce the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid, shareholder-activist intervention, or institutional-investor pressure. Thus, a reliable excess-pay clawback will not necessarily deter an executive from misreporting. It can only reduce the expected benefit of misreporting that arises from excess pay, and therefore the propensity to misreport.⁹⁰

2. Benefits from Reduced Misreporting

The reduction in the incentive to misreport can be expected to reduce the frequency and severity of misreporting, and therefore generate a variety of benefits. I will describe just two of these benefits below: (1) reduced restatement-induced value destruction; and (2) higher quality financial reporting and thus better capital allocation in the wider market.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Executives may also take steps to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent misreporting. For example, executives may structure transactions to require fewer accounting judgments. Such steps may improve the quality of financial statements, providing a benefit. However, if the steps taken are themselves costly, the costs could outweigh the benefits. For a discussion of this type of incentive-distortion cost, see *infra* Part IV.A.

⁹¹ There are at least three other economic benefits to reducing misreporting. First, reduced misreporting improves corporate governance mechanisms by making it difficult for managers to mask poor performance. When managers are doing poorly, higher quality financial reporting increases the likelihood that directors and/or shareholders will act to replace them.

Second, reduced misreporting may lower firms' cost of capital by reducing *ex post* diversion of value to executives. While *ex post* diversion, by itself, does not generate an *economic* cost that reduces the total economic pie, see *infra* Part IV.B.3, *ex post* diversion may well systematically lower public-investor returns to the extent that it is not fully taken into account *ex ante* by directors in setting executive pay. Reducing *ex post*

a. Reduced Restatement-Induced Value Destruction

When executives deliberately generate excess pay through the manipulation of financial results, they can destroy far more value at the firm than the amount of excess pay they ultimately receive. For example, Fannie Mae alone incurred over \$1 billion in expenses cleaning up its books after its executives, who had been given high-powered incentives to boost earnings, overstated earnings by \$10 billion.⁹² Firms that engaged in secret option backdating also spent large amounts dealing with the collateral damage of this misreporting.⁹³ The destruction in firm value at Fannie Mae and these backdating firms likely far exceeded the excess pay received by the executives themselves. By reducing the frequency and severity of restatements, a reliable excess-pay clawback will lower such costs.

b. Better Quality of Financial Reporting

The prospect of generating excess pay may give executives an incentive to engage in financial misreporting that reduces the real and/or perceived quality of financial information provided to the market. The prospect of such misreporting (or perceived misreporting) can be expected to raise firms' cost of capital by increasing the cost to investors of assessing the performance of their investments, thereby making it difficult

diversion can thus lower firms' cost of capital and increase the amount of capital available for value-increasing projects.

Third, reduced misreporting can, by reducing *ex post* diversion, also improve pay-for-performance sensitivity and thereby strengthen executives' incentives to generate value. See Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried, *Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues*, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 665 (2005).

⁹² See Marcy Gordon, *Wall St. Applauds Fannie Mae Restatement*, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 2006, at 3 (describing the response to Fannie Mae's 2006 earnings restatement); Bebchuk & Fried, *Fannie Mae*, *supra* note x, at 809–12 (explaining how the structure of Fannie Mae's compensation arrangements gave executives an incentive to inflate earnings).

⁹³ See Peter Lattman, *Big Law Firms Find Backdating Probes Good for Business*, Wall Street Journal July 19, 2006 (reporting that one firm estimated it spent \$70 million in legal, accounting, and other professional fees just to restate its financials because of backdating); Susan Beck, *Companies With Backdating Troubles Are Paying Astronomical Legal Fees*, AM. LAW. (October 27, 2007) (reporting that legal fees for Brocade in connection with backdating could reach \$100 million).

for firms to fund certain desirable projects.⁹⁴ It also makes it difficult to compare performance across issuers and makes it more difficult for investors to rationally allocate capital across different firms and industry sectors. By reducing such misreporting at particular firms, a reliable excess-pay clawback can improve the quality of financial information at those firms to the benefit of all investors and capital-raisers in the market.

IV. Costs of a Reliable Excess-Pay Clawback

As Part III explained, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, by creating a reliable way to recoup excess pay, can be expected to reduce the incentives of top executives at non-CS firms to misreport, generating benefits.

However, as this Part explains, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback or any reliable excess-pay clawback will also impose a variety of costs. Section A describes the incentive-distortion costs that can arise when the clawback applies to those whose behavior it can most affect: the top executives at non-CS firms. These incentive costs offset (or might even outweigh) the incentive benefits described in Part III.

Section B sketches out the three types of "non-incentive" costs that a reliable excess-pay clawback will impose with respect to *any* firm (CS or non-CS) and any executive (top or non-top, in a CS or non-CS firm) to which it applies. These include: (1) regulator-diversion costs; (2) issuer-compliance costs; and (3) executive-burden costs.

A. Incentive-Distortion Costs

When targeted at executives whose behavior can be meaningfully affected (top executives in non-CS firms), a reliable excess-pay clawback can not only improve incentives (by reducing the payoff from misreporting) but also worsen them in some respects, generating incentive-distortion costs. In particular, it could distort these executives'

⁹⁴ See, e.g., Mary E. Barth, Yaniv Konchitchki & Wayne R. Landsman, *Cost of Capital and Earnings Transparency*, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 206 (2013) (finding that firms with more transparent earnings enjoy a lower cost of capital).

incentives either directly or indirectly (by changing their compensation arrangements in a way that undermines incentives).

Potential *direct* distortions include causing executives to (1) switch from misreporting to “real-earnings management”—transactional decisions that are made to boost short-term financial measures rather than to generate long-term value—that destroys more economic value than misreporting;⁹⁵ (2) forego valuable projects that are associated with more accounting judgment and thus a higher risk of restatement; (3) overinvest in financial reporting (relative to the economic optimum) to minimize the chance of a restatement; and (4) avoid or delay a restatement to try to neutralize or minimize the effect of a clawback, reducing the quality of financial reporting.

Turning next to potential *indirect* distortions, issuer-compliance and executive-burden costs (described in Part B) may lead to changes in the structure of compensation arrangements. These changes, in turn, could improve or worsen executives’ incentives to generate value. Whether a reliable excess-pay clawback generates any such collateral effects will depend on (a) what, if any, changes occur; and (b) how any such changes affect executives’ incentives. The net directional impact of these collateral effects cannot be known in advance, and might be positive. However, an adverse change to compensation arrangements is a *potential* cost to any reliable excess-pay clawback. And the larger the issuer-compliance and executive-burden costs associated with the clawback, the more likely it is that there will be a substantial change in compensation arrangements, possibly for the worse.⁹⁶

Going forward, I will use the term “net incentive benefits” to describe the net incentive effects of the clawback, taking into account the

⁹⁵ See Lillian H. Chan, Kevin C.W. Chen, Tai-Yuan Chen, and Yangxin Yu, *Substitution Between Real and Accruals-Based Earnings Management After Voluntary Adoption of Compensation Clawback Provisions*, 90 ACCT. REV. 147-174 (2015) (finding that executives of firms that adopt recovery provisions substitute real transactions management for accruals management).

⁹⁶ Incentive-distortion costs, like issuer-compliance costs, will fall largely on the residual claimants of the firm. For a publicly-traded firm, then, these costs will fall mostly on public shareholders.

benefits described in Part III.C. and the distortion costs described here. For ease of exposition, I will assume that these net incentive benefits are generally positive (incentive benefits exceed incentive costs). But the analysis and conclusions do not depend on this assumption.

B. Non-Incentive Costs

The non-incentive costs of applying a reliable excess-pay clawback fall into three categories: (1) regulator-diversion costs; (2) issuer-compliance costs; and (3) executive-burden costs. These costs arise whether or not executive behavior is affected positively or negatively by the clawback. And they arise with respect to any executive targeted by the clawback.

For each of these categories, I divide costs into two types. “*Ex ante* costs” are those non-incentive costs that arise in anticipation of the operation of a reliable excess-pay clawback, whether or not there is misreporting. “*Ex post* costs” are those non-incentive costs that arise when there is a restatement, whether or not the clawback is activated (and whether or not misreporting has occurred).

1. Regulator Diversion

Implementing a reliable excess-pay clawback rule requires “regulators” (self-regulatory organizations such as stock exchanges, government agencies, and courts) to modify, interpret, and enforce the clawback. The more issuers and executives are covered by the rule, and the more complicated is the rule, the higher these costs will be. These costs, which are primarily borne *ex post* (after a restatement), reduce the size of the economic pie.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ The incidence of these regulator-diversion costs depends, in part, on whether regulators get additional resources to administer the clawback. To the extent regulators are resource-constrained, and spend time and resources on the clawback rather than on other matters, the clawback will reduce the time and resources devoted to other activities that benefit market participants. In this scenario, market participants are likely to bear some or all of the costs associated with regulator diversion. To the extent regulators receive additional resources, the incidence of the regulator-diversion costs will fall on those funding the regulators (taxpayers, etc.).

2. Issuer Compliance

To the extent an issuer is given any responsibility for implementing a reliable excess-pay clawback, the issuer will incur a variety of compliance costs. *Ex ante* costs include the costs of (1) formulating the issuer's clawback policy; (2) revising executive pay arrangements to take account of the clawback policy; (3) modifying the policy over time, in response to "learning" and changing circumstances. *Ex post* costs include the costs of (1) determining whether a clawback is required and calculating the amount of the clawback; (2) seeking recovery if a clawback is required, including the costs of potential litigation by executives and/or shareholders; and (3) any required reporting to regulators and shareholders.⁹⁸

3. Executive Burden

A reliable excess-pay clawback will of course reduce the expected amount of excess pay flowing to executives *ex post*. But this reduction in pay, by itself, does not represent an *economic* cost. That is, it does reduce the size of the total pie; it is offset by an equal increase in value available to the issuer and its shareholders *ex post*.⁹⁹

However, a reliable excess-pay clawback will impose *economic* costs through its effect on executives. For all executives, it creates *ex ante* risk-bearing costs associated with the uncertainty of deployment of a

⁹⁸ Issuer-compliance costs, unlike regulator-diversion costs, are borne (at least in the first instance) entirely by the residual claimants on the value of the issuer. For a publicly-traded firm, this would mean public investors bear almost all of issuer-compliance costs.

⁹⁹ Of course, to the extent the executive demands more pay *ex ante* to compensate for the loss of expected excess pay *ex post*, expected pay will not change. That is, the executive simply may demand higher *nominal* pay if there is no excess pay. But *actual* pay should remain the same, everything else equal. As my focus is on the economic costs and benefits of the Dodd-Frank clawback, it does not matter whether there is an *ex ante* adjustment to the expected loss of excess pay. To the extent the tax system does not fully credit the executive for return pay, the executive will be subject to a higher effective tax rate, and may demand higher compensation (even apart from risk-bearing costs). From an economic perspective, however, this extra tax just represents a transfer to other parties and does not represent an economic cost.

clawback (which are exacerbated by the possible failure of the tax system to adequately “credit” the executive for returned pay).¹⁰⁰ For executives who receive excess pay covered by the clawback, the clawback generates *ex post* transaction costs. Unlike the reduction in excess pay *ex post*, these *ex ante* and *ex post* costs do not confer an equal benefit on another party.¹⁰¹

V. The SEC’s Proposed Dodd-Frank Clawback Reaches Too Many Issuers and Executives

As Part III explained, a reliable excess-pay clawback can potentially generate economic benefits by reducing the incentive of top executives of non-CS firms to misreport. However, a reliable excess-pay clawback is not always necessary or sufficient to prevent misreporting. Misreporting may not occur absent a reliable excess-pay clawback, and may occur even if there is such a clawback in place. And, as we saw in Part IV, a reliable excess-pay clawback may generate incentive-distortion

¹⁰⁰ The SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback prohibits issuers from indemnifying covered executives from the clawback, or reimbursing them for the purchase of insurance to cover clawbacks. Proposed Rule 10D-1(b)(1)(v). Executives could buy their own insurance from a third party. Should such policies be offered, the risk-bearing costs borne by executives may be lower than they would otherwise be. Note also that, in a CS firm, the controlling shareholder can implicitly commit to insulate an executive from the effects of the clawback.

¹⁰¹ Executive-burden costs fall in the first instance on the executive. The executive, in turn, may demand and receive higher compensation. If that happens, executive-burden costs will be shifted to the firm, and ultimately to shareholders. But whichever party bears these costs, even if it is the executive, these executive-burden costs shrink the size of the pie.

Relatedly, the evidence on the effect of adoption of voluntary firm recovery policies on executive pay is mixed. *See, e.g.*, Iskandar-Datta and Jia, *supra* note x, at 173 (finding no evidence that CEO pay increases at firms adopting recovery policies); Babenko et al, *supra* note x, at 5 (finding that top-5 executive pay increases in aggregate by more than \$700,000 upon adoption of a recovery policy); Chen et al., *supra* note x, __ (reporting higher CEO pay following adoption of recovery policy) deHaan et al, *supra* note x, at __ (finding that CEO base salary increases following adoption of a recovery policy). Because of a potential self-selection effect, *see* Denis *supra* note x, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about whether the voluntary adoption of a recovery policy actually *causes* subsequent changes (including compensation levels) at the firm, or whether both the adoption of the policy and subsequent observed changes are caused by another, unobserved change in the firm.

costs when applied to top executives at CS firms, so we must consider *net* incentive benefits (incentive benefits less incentive costs).

As Part IV also explained, a reliable excess-pay clawback will also impose a variety of non-incentive costs with respect to *any* executive to which it applies: (1) regulator-diversion costs; (2) issuer-compliance costs; and (3) executive-burden costs. The non-incentive costs are worth bearing if and only if they are less than any net incentive benefits generated.

It will be difficult to know for certain, even after the Dodd-Frank clawback goes into effect, whether the rule generates net economic benefits or net economic costs. But one thing is clear: it will not be desirable to apply a reliable excess-pay clawback to executives in situations where, *a priori*, one cannot reasonably expect net incentive benefits to be generated. As I explain in this Part, however, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback unfortunately does precisely this: it applies to issuers (Section A) and executives (Section B) where it cannot be expected to materially shape behavior for the better. Thus, from an economic perspective, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches too many issuers and too many executives.

A. Issuers

The Dodd-Frank Act appears to contemplate application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to the issuers of all publicly-traded securities. Section 10D of the Exchange Act provides that the SEC shall, by rule, direct the exchanges to “prohibit the listing of any security of any issuer that does not comply with the requirements of [Section 10D].”¹⁰²

However, the SEC has general exemptive authority under Section 36(a) of the Exchange Act to exempt specific categories of issuers, to the extent such exemptions are in the public interest and consistent with investor protection.¹⁰³ In proposed Rule 10D-1, the SEC appropriately used this authority to exempt several types of securities where application

¹⁰² 15 U.S.C. 78j-4.

¹⁰³ Section 36(a) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78mm(a)).

of the Dodd-Frank clawback clearly makes no sense: security futures products, standardized options, securities issued by unit investment trusts (UITs), and the securities of registered investment companies that do not themselves pay incentive-based compensation.¹⁰⁴

Unfortunately, the SEC failed to use this authority to exempt various types of issuers for which the incentive effects (and thus potential net incentive benefits) of the Dodd-Frank clawback are likely to be marginal at best: issuers that always have a controlling shareholder (CS). These firms include (1) issuers that do not have listed common equity, but only listed debt or preferred stock; and (2) controlled companies. As I will explain in more detail, executives of CS firms can be expected to follow the wishes of the CS when it comes to misreporting; the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot meaningfully change their incentives or the frequency of misreporting. Because application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to these issuers cannot be expected to generate material net incentive benefits but will still impose regulator-diversion, issuer-compliance, and executive-burden costs, these issuers should be exempted from the rule (or at least permitted to opt out).¹⁰⁵

1. Firms Without Listed Common Equity

The SEC is proposing to apply the Dodd-Frank clawback to firms that do not have listed common stock (“private firms”) but do have listed

¹⁰⁴ See *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,146-47.

¹⁰⁵ The SEC was urged to exempt emerging growth companies (EGCs) and smaller reporting companies (SRCs) on the grounds that the rule would be disproportionately burdensome to these smaller firms. See *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,147. The SEC declined to do so. In my view, the SEC’s decision to not exempt these categories of issuers is defensible. Smaller firms generally have weaker corporate governance and are subject to less investor and media scrutiny than larger, more established firms. (For example, only 2.4% of EGCs and 4.1% of SRCs have any disclosed recovery policy, vs. over 60% for S&P 500 firms, see *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,172). As a result, they are the firms most likely to experience incentive benefits from a reliable excess-pay clawback. So even if the clawback imposes disproportionate costs on smaller firms, it is likely to yield disproportionate benefits. Importantly, the costs imposed on these smaller firms would be lowered if the SEC narrows the Dodd-Frank to target only top-5 executives and only accounting-based pay, as I propose in Part VII.

non-convertible debt or preferred stock (hereinafter, simply, “listed debt”).¹⁰⁶

A private firm will almost always be a CS firm: it has either a single controlling shareholder or a small group of shareholders that collectively control the firm. In fact, there may well be only a single shareholder of the private firm. As I will now explain, the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot be expected to improve executives’ incentives in a private firm.

Obviously, there is no need for a Dodd-Frank clawback to improve executives’ incentives vis-a-vis the *shareholders* of a private firm. Unlike a non-CS public firm, a private firm is unlikely to suffer from substantial agency costs in the relationships between shareholders and directors. Indeed, it is likely that the controlling shareholder(s) (or their employees) constitute many, most, or all of the firm’s directors. In such a setting, there is no reason to believe that, from the *shareholders’ perspective*, pay arrangements will deviate substantially from arm’s-length bargaining such that the Dodd-Frank clawback can improve incentives. If the CS believes that a reliable excess-pay clawback is desirable for itself and other shareholders, given the other tools at its disposal, it has the incentive and ability to put one in place, and then enforce it if necessary. If it believes otherwise, we have no reason to second-guess its judgment.

Of course, even if executives’ interests are aligned with shareholders’ interests in a private firm, these shareholders (and thus the executives they appoint) may have different interests than the direct buyers or holders of the firm’s listed debt. Thus we must consider the ability of the Dodd-Frank clawback to improve the incentives of the executives of a private firm vis-à-vis the direct buyers or holders of listed debt. As I will now explain, however, the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot be expected to improve executives’ incentives relative to these parties.

a. Direct Buyers of Listed Debt

Consider the parties who buy debt directly from the firm—debt that will subsequently be listed. It might be argued that that the Dodd-

¹⁰⁶ See *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,148.

Frank clawback could increase the quality and reliability of the financial reporting used by purchasers of the debt to assess its value, thereby increasing the firm's ability to raise capital and indirectly benefiting the firm's shareholders. However, as I will explain, the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot be expected to have such a beneficial effect in a private firm.

Imagine, for example, a hypothetical private corporation (ABC) controlled by a CS. ABC will issue listed debt. ABC's executives prepare the financial reports before ABC issues the debt. The CS and the executives know that a rosier financial picture will enable ABC to sell the debt for a higher price, benefiting the CS. Suppose, notwithstanding the expected costs to ABC of a restatement, the CS wants ABC executives to misreport so that ABC can issue debt more cheaply. Will ABC executives be deterred from misreporting because of the possibility of a restatement and the operation of the Dodd-Frank clawback? No. The CS can use carrots (extra pay) or sticks (implicit threats of lower raises, slower promotion, pay cuts, or termination) to overcome the deterrent effect of the clawback. Importantly, if there is a restatement and a clawback, the recovered excess pay will simply be returned to ABC, where it can be used to reward loyal executives. When shareholders directly control the executives, misreporting serves shareholders' interests, and an excess-pay clawback applied to executives simply returns funds to the shareholders, the clawback cannot be expected to deter the shareholders from inducing the executives to misreport.

Now suppose that the CS does *not* want ABC executives to misreport when ABC is issuing it debt. The executives won't do so, even absent the Dodd-Frank clawback. They will be afraid that the CS will penalize them (through lower raises, pay cuts, slower promotion, or termination) in ways that would dwarf any excess pay they could hope to receive.

Of course, there could be situations where the CS of ABC is *indifferent* to some mild forms of misreporting. In such situations, the Dodd-Frank clawback might well generate net incentive benefits when applied to ABC executives. But if the CS is indifferent to particular forms of misreporting, any net incentive benefits from reducing mild misreporting are likely to be small.

b. Holders of Listed Debt

Next consider the possibility that the Dodd-Frank clawback might improve executives' incentives after the firm issues debt. In particular, after the firm issues debt, the shareholders (and thus executives) may have an incentive to take excessive risks or engage in other forms of "misbehavior" (such as "asset dilution," the distribution of value to shareholders) at the expense of debtholders. Debtholders anticipate this risk and protect themselves from such misbehavior through their extensive contractual arrangements with the firm. These contractual arrangements are typically extremely detailed, and frequently individually tailored and highly negotiated. Can the Dodd-Frank clawback add anything to these contractual protections? The answer is "no." As I explain below, application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to these firms cannot be expected to materially improve incentives of executives vis-à-vis debtholders.

To begin, it is worth noting that the Dodd-Frank clawback does not target excessive-risk taking and asset dilution but rather receipt of excess pay through misreporting. Debtholders are unlikely to be hurt by misreporting itself. First, any losses in firm value due to value-reducing activities used to generate excess pay will be absorbed first by equityholders; the losses hurt debtholders only to the extent they increase the risk of insolvency or the severity of any insolvency. Second, as explained above, the CS of a private firm has the ability to prevent executives from engaging in misreporting, and the incentive to do so to the extent it expects to absorb the costs. Executives of a private firm will have an incentive to engage in misreporting only in the presumably unusual situation where this misreporting can somehow transfer value from debtholders to equityholders.

But even in this situation—where misreporting transfers value from debtholders to equityholders—the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot do much good. Why? Because, as the ABC example above illustrated, if the CS wants the executives to engage in misreporting to transfer value from third parties, the CS can use carrots (extra pay) or sticks (threats relating to pay or position) to undo the deterrent effect of the clawback. If there is a restatement and clawback, the recovered funds are simply returned to the firm and the CS (the party that pushed the executives to misreport). Again, the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot affect executive behavior in a private firm; executives will do the shareholders' bidding, for better or for

worse, and there is nothing a clawback can do about that.

2. Controlled Companies

The SEC is proposing to apply the Dodd-Frank clawback to controlled companies—those whose stock is publicly-traded, but more than 50% of the voting power for election of directors is held by a controlling shareholder (CS), whether it is an individual, a group, or another company.¹⁰⁷ The vast majority of controlled companies are owned, directly or indirectly, by the founder of the company or the founder's family. Application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to these firms cannot be expected to generate meaningful net incentive benefits, for essentially the same reasons that it cannot be expected to generate any net incentive benefit in private firms, including those with listed debt.¹⁰⁸

In a controlled company, the CS has a large economic stake in the enterprise. If the firm has a single class of common shares, the CS will have more than 50% of the cash-flow rights. Even if the firm has a dual-class structure, the CS will typically have at least 20% of the cash flow rights.¹⁰⁹ By way of contrast, a director of a non-CS firm may own approximately 0.005% of the firm's equity.¹¹⁰ Even if the non-CS director owns 10 times that percentage (0.05%), a CS' proportional stake will be 400 to 1000 times larger than that of a non-CS director. The CS thus internalizes much of the costs and benefits of misreporting, unlike a

¹⁰⁷ Under New York Stock Exchange Rule 303A.00 and NASDAQ Stock Market LLC Rule 5615(c) a "controlled compan[y]" is defined as a company of which more than 50% of the voting power for the election of directors is held by an individual, group, or another company.

¹⁰⁸ My analysis does not apply to a controlled company whose parent is a non-CS firm and whose executives also serve as executives at the parent. In such a controlled company, power remains in the hands of the executives and a reliable excess-pay clawback such as Dodd-Frank may well improve their incentives.

¹⁰⁹ See Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, *Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States*, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1053-1057 (2009) (finding that average insider cash-flow ownership in dual-class firms was about 40%).

¹¹⁰ See *supra* note x.

director of a non-CS firm.

The CS of the controlled company also controls the appointment of every director on the board of the company, who thus can be expected to serve the interests of the CS. The executives, in turn, are chosen either directly by the CS or by its appointed directors. While in a non-CS firm executives often have influence over directors, and are generally given the reins of the firm unless there is a crisis requiring board intervention, in a controlled company top executives can be expected to care deeply about pleasing the CS.

In such a setting, the Dodd-Frank clawback is likely to generate little net incentive benefit. Suppose the CS of a controlled company does not want executives to misreport because, for example, it believes that such misreporting will impose net costs on the firm (much of which the CS will bear indirectly through its large equity stake). It has the power to put in place a reliable excess-pay clawback. Or it can take more powerful steps to deter misreporting, such as making clear that misreporting is likely to lead to termination, a pay cut, or a smaller raise. The CS does not need the government's required clawback to manage executives.

Now suppose that the CS wants executives of the controlled company to boost the stock price, even if this requires misreporting, perhaps so that the firm can issue shares at a higher price or the CS controller can sell some of its own shares at a higher price.¹¹¹ Will the Dodd-Frank clawback deter executives from misreporting? No. The CS can deploy a variety of carrots (promises of pay increases, promotions) and sticks (threats of pay cuts, slower pay increases, no promotion, or termination) whose magnitude and incentive effect will dwarf that of an expected clawback. If there is a restatement and recovery from executives, the funds flow back into the firm where they can be used by the CS to reward loyal executives.¹¹²

¹¹¹ See Jesse M. Fried, *The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders*, 124 YALE L. J. 1554, 1566 (2015) (explaining why controlling shareholders with a long-term horizon may wish to manipulate the stock price).

¹¹² In a situation where the CS of the controlled company is herself the CEO (the CS-CEO), it should be even easier to see that the Dodd-Frank clawback will also have no effect on her incentives. First, she is unlikely to need any of the incentive-based compensation covered by Dodd-Frank to motivate her to perform her job. The purpose of

Of course, there could be situations where the CS of the controlled company (like the CS of a private firm with listed debt) is *indifferent* to some mild forms of misreporting. In such situations, the Dodd-Frank clawback might well generate net incentive benefits when applied to ABC executives. But if the CS is indifferent to particular forms of misreporting, any net incentive benefits from reducing mild misreporting are likely to be small.

In a non-CS firm, the Dodd-Frank clawback might generate net incentive benefits because misreporting is likely to be driven by the executives themselves, in part to generate excess pay, and the clawback will reduce the expected benefit from generating excess pay. These net incentive benefits might, in turn, be higher than the non-incentive costs, making application of the Dodd-Frank clawback desirable from an economic perspective.

But in a CS firm, such as a private firm with listed debt or a controlled company, the CS has a strong economic interest in whether executives misreport and the power to adjust executives' misreporting incentives to serve its economic interest, whether or not the Dodd-Frank clawback is in place. In this setting, the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot be

incentive compensation is to align an executive's interests with those of shareholders. When the CEO is herself the CS, no such incentive-alignment mechanism is needed. If the Dodd-Frank clawback applies to compensation X but not to compensation Y, the CS-CEO can simply pay herself with compensation Y to avoid the clawback, without any loss of efficient incentives. Second, if the CS-CEO does happen to pay herself with incentive compensation covered by the clawback, she will engage in aggressive reporting not to boost the value of this compensation (which is likely to be trivial relative to her overall wealth) but rather to enable herself or the firm to sell stock at a higher price. If there is a restatement and a clawback, the recovered funds can be used to boost the CS-CEO's pay in the next period. There is nothing that minority shareholders can do to stop this recycling of funds. Moreover, even if the CS does not expect to take the clawed-back compensation and use it to increase her compensation in the next pay period, most of the recovered funds will still flow back to the CS-CEO as the CS. The prospect of having some of her compensation clawed back (most of which will be returned to her) will not deter her from misreporting as long as the extra wealth generated from direct or indirect stock sales at a higher price is greater than the net excess pay recouped from her (excess pay recouped, less amount returned to her as CS of the firm).

expected to generate net incentive benefits. But it will still impose non-incentive costs, including regulator-diversion, issuer-compliance, and executive-burden costs. Applying the Dodd-Frank clawback or any reliable excess-pay clawback to private firms with listed debt or controlled companies is thus unlikely to pass a simple cost-benefit test.¹¹³ Indeed, this analysis suggests that it might well be desirable to exempt not only private firms with listed debt and controlled companies, but also other CS firms where the CS does not have more than 50% of the voting power but still exercises effective control.

B. Executives

In Section A, I explained why application of a reliable excess-pay clawback to *any* executive at a CS firm is unlikely to be economically desirable. I now turn my attention to non-CS firms. As this Section explains, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback covers too many

¹¹³ The SEC proposes to apply the Dodd-Frank clawback to the up to seven registered management companies (RMCs) that are listed issuers (e.g., closed-end funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs)) and have executive officers who may receive incentive-based compensation. *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,148. For the same reasons that the SEC should exempt CS firms from the Dodd-Frank clawback, it should also exempt these RMCs.

Even if the executives of these RMCs might otherwise have an incentive to misreport as a result of their compensation, a Dodd-Frank clawback will not generate any incentive benefits. If the asset manager wants to deter financial misreporting by executives, it can be expected to put in place its own clawback (which it has a credible threat to activate) or make it clear that it will fire, demote, or reduce the pay of misreporting executives. Unlike the directors of a non-CS firm, the asset manager has the incentive and ability to discipline misbehaving executives. It does not need Dodd-Frank to do so.

If, on the other hand, the asset manager wants to encourage financial misreporting, the threat of a Dodd-Frank clawback cannot really deter an executive from misreporting. The asset manager will make it clear that the executive will be fired, demoted, or paid less if the executive does not engage in aggressive financial reporting, and that the executive will be compensated for any excess pay that is clawed back. In other words, the asset manager will simply work around the Dodd-Frank clawback to neutralize its incentive effects.

Given that (a) there appears to be no problem that application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to executives of RMCs would address, (b) there are very few such entities, and (c) application of the clawback to these issuers may raise unique issues, generating additional regulator-diversion costs, it is difficult to see how application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to these issuers serves the public interest or the interest of investors.

executives at non-CS firms, reaching executives with respect to which it is unlikely to generate any net incentive benefits. Thus, the non-incentive costs of applying the clawback to these executives are likely to be higher than the incentive benefits.

1. The Wide Net of the SEC's Proposed Dodd-Frank Clawback

Section 10D(b)(2) requires exchanges and associations to promulgate listing standards that require issuers to adopt and comply with policies that provide for recovery of excess incentive-based compensation from “any current or former executive officer.”¹¹⁴ Section 10D does not define “executive officer,” rather it gives the SEC discretion to define the executive officers covered by the rule.

In its proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, the SEC uses a definition of “executive officer” modeled on the definition of “officer” in Rule 16a-1(f) that includes:

*“the issuer’s president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or if there is no such accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making functions for the issuer.”*¹¹⁵

The proposed rule could thus cover a dozen executives at a single issuer. For example, Exxon Mobil has 21 such executives;¹¹⁶ Procter & Gamble has 20;¹¹⁷ Ford Motor has 18;¹¹⁸ General Motors has 15;¹¹⁹ Tyson

¹¹⁴ 15 U.S.C. 78j-4.

¹¹⁵ 17 C.F.R. 240.16a-1.

¹¹⁶ Exxon Mobil Corporation Form 10-K Item 4 (2015), available at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/000003408816000065/xom10k2015.htm>.

¹¹⁷ The Procter & Gamble Company Form 10-K (2015), available at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/80424/000008042415000070/fy141510-kreport.htm>.

Foods has 14.¹²⁰ Approximately 4,800 issuers would be subject to Rule 10D-1 as proposed, according to SEC estimates.¹²¹ If, on average, the number of senior executives at those issuers subject to the risk of clawback is 10, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback would reach around 50,000 executives.

2. The Limited Benefits of Targeting Below-5 Executives

In Section A, I explained that there are categories of issuers—basically, any firm with a controlling shareholder (CS)—for which the Dodd-Frank clawback is likely to generate little net incentive benefit. In those firms, the CS has sufficient power and incentive to deter misreporting if it so desires, or to vitiate the effect of a government-mandated reliable excess-pay clawback, if it so desires. In either case, the Dodd-Frank clawback will do little good. I now turn to an explanation of why application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to lower-level executives in non-CS firms is similarly unlikely to generate material net incentive benefits.

In a non-CS firm, power will be concentrated in the CEO and perhaps one or two other executives, all of whom can be expected to be among the top-5 executives. Other, lower-ranking executives (“below-5 executives”) generally do not have a relationship with or influence over directors; they report to, are promoted and paid by, and can be fired by, the top-5 executives. Another way to put it: there is a vast difference in power between the most powerful executives in the top-5 and the most powerful executives in the below-5.

¹¹⁸ Ford Motor Company Form 10-K Item 4A (2015), *available at* <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799616000092/f1231201510-k.htm>.

¹¹⁹ General Motors Company Form 10-K (2015), *available at* <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467858/000146785816000255/gm201510k.htm>.

¹²⁰ Tyson Foods, Inc. Form 10-K Item 4 (2015), *available at* <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100493/000010049315000109/tsn201510kq4.htm>.

¹²¹ *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at ____.

Given that the below-5 executives lack power, the net incentive benefit of applying the Dodd-Frank clawback to these executives is likely to be marginal at best, because (a) the abilities of below-5 executives to misreport are limited; and (b) their compensation arrangements do not give them as strong an incentive to misreport as those of top-5 executives.

a. Below-5 Executives' Limited Ability to Influence Reporting

In a non-CS firm, below-5 executives' *ability* to influence the firm's reporting decisions are much more limited than, say, that of the CEO or CFO. All major decisions by below-5 executives will generally be reviewed and approved by a top-5 executive. In contrast, top-5 executives (as a group) have considerable power. Even if a top-5 executive such as the CEO must get approval for major decisions from the board, directors of a non-CS firm may not have the incentive, information, or ability to meaningfully constrain decision-making by that top executive. As a result, there is a vast difference in the ability of top-5 and below-5 executives to affect financial reporting.

b. Below-5 Executives' Limited Incentive to Misreport to Generate Excess Pay

Even if below-5 executives in a non-CS firm have some power and discretion over reporting, they have much different *incentives* than top-5 executives, limiting the ability of the Dodd-Frank clawback to improve behavior of these lower-level executives. In particular, they are much less likely to be motivated by the prospect of excess pay to misreport.

First, below-5 executives pay packages are much smaller than top-5 executive pay packages. This means they receive less benefit *directly* through their compensation packages from using whatever discretion they have to engage in misreporting. They simply cannot generate as much excess pay from misreporting as top-5 executives.

Second, because below-5 executives are generally more accountable to top-5 executives than top-5 executives are accountable to directors of non-CS firms, below-5 executives can be expected to place a

relatively greater weight on the wishes of top-5 executives than on the prospect of getting (and keeping) excess pay. If they displease top-5 executives, they will be out of a job and not receive any more compensation at that firm. So, even if a below-5 executive has the ability to engage in misreporting that might generate some excess pay for him, he may well be reluctant to do so if it would displease his boss (which could occur if the misreporting triggers the Dodd-Frank clawback against her).

Of course, under the same logic, if the top-5 boss really wants the below-5 executive to assist in misreporting, notwithstanding the application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to top-5 executives, application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to below-5 executives will not reduce the below-5 executive's incentive to assist in misreporting. The below-5 executive can reasonably expect the top-5 executive to reward him for following her wishes, and punish him for not following them—creating upsides and downsides (promotion or no promotion, raise or no raise, no termination or termination) that dwarf the effect of the Dodd-Frank clawback. In other words, the below-5 executive can be expected to do what the top-5 executive wants him to do, whether or not the Dodd-Frank clawback applies to the below-5 executive. Thus, the relationship between the below-5 executive and a top-5 executive in a non-CS firm is not unlike the relationship between the top-5 executive and the CS in a CS firm. In both cases, the presence or absence of the Dodd-Frank clawback cannot be expected to make much difference to the party seeking to please his boss.

3. Costs of Extending the Clawback to Below-5 Executives

While the benefits of extending the Dodd-Frank clawback to below-5 executives are marginal because the clawback cannot be expected to affect their incentives, extension of the clawback to these executives increases the three non-incentive costs: regulator-diversion costs; issuer-compliance costs; and executive-burden costs. Notably, below-5 executives may not be able to shoulder as easily the risk-bearing and other costs as wealthier top-5 executives, so executive-burden costs may well be higher.

What is more, the SEC's proposed rule does not offer a bright-line test to determine which executives are subject to the clawback, requiring both the issuer and the SEC to expend resources determining which

executives are covered and which are not, further increasing costs associated with issuer compliance and regulator diversion.

The SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback can reach a dozen or more executives per firm. Failure to comply with the clawback's rules means that a firm would be delisted. While such delistings are unlikely to occur, the threat of delisting may well cause firms to spend massive amounts on attorneys and experts to ensure that this outcome is avoided, all, of course, at shareholders' expense. Is it rational, from an economic perspective, to put a firm at risk of delisting because it did not properly comply with the Dodd-Frank clawback's provisions when seeking to recover excess pay from the 10th most powerful executive in the company? The question answers itself.

The SEC's decision to extend the proposed Dodd-Frank clawback to below-5 executives may well be driven, at least in part, by a misapprehension on the part of the SEC about what limiting the clawback to top-5 executives would mean. In the explanation for its proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, the SEC writes:

*"...we do not believe that a listed issuer should be unable to recover unearned compensation from an executive officer simply because he or she was not one of the [top-5 executives]."*¹²²

However, even if the Dodd-Frank clawback applies only to top-5 executives, *there is nothing preventing the firm from voluntarily creating a clawback policy to cover below-5 executives if it so desires.* And in those cases where the incentives of below-5 executives do matter, top-5 executives would have the incentive and ability to take the necessary steps to ensure that the interests of below-5 executives are aligned with those of top-5 executives, including through the use of specially-tailored excess-pay (or other) clawbacks targeted at the "right" below-5 executives.

¹²² *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,181.

In short, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback covers far too many executives. There seems to be no good reason for mandating application of the clawback to below-5 executives. If the SEC believes that it is statutorily prevented from limiting the clawback to top-5 executives, it should cover as few executives as possible, and Congress should amend the language of Section 954 to give the SEC discretion to further limit the number of covered executives.¹²³

VI. The SEC's Proposed Dodd-Frank Clawback Reaches Too Much Compensation

In Part V, I showed that the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches types of issuers (CS firms) and executives (below-5 executives) where the net incentive benefits are likely to be marginal at best, and thus lower than the non-incentive costs: regulator-diversion, issuer-compliance, and executive-burden. In this Part, I consider the Dodd-Frank clawback as applied to the top-5 executives of non-CS firms. I show that, with respect to these executives, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback reaches too many types of compensation.

As Part II.B explained, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback covers not only pay that is accounting-based (granted, earned, or vested based on financial results) but also price-based (granted, earned, or vested based on stock price or TSR). Thus, in the event of a restatement, the issuer must return excess price-based pay: pay received by the executives that the issuer believes would not have been received under the restated financials.

Section A explains that, in the event of an accounting restatement, excess price-based pay cannot be known but rather can only be "guesstimated." Section B describes the substantial non-incentive costs of extending the Dodd-Frank clawback to price-based pay because of the need to guesstimate the recovery amount. It also describes the potential net incentive benefits. Given the substantial non-incentive costs, there is a

¹²³ The SEC might consider permitting firms to decide which of the below-5 executives should be subject to the Dodd-Frank clawback. To the extent top-5 executives and directors believe that they are better off subjecting some below-5 executives to the Dodd-Frank clawback, they can then have the option to do so.

heightened risk that application of the Dodd-Frank clawback to excess price-based pay will be detrimental. Section C concludes by showing that there are much better tools for the job of addressing price manipulation than an excess-pay clawback (such as Dodd-Frank).

A. Need to “Guesstimate” Excess Price-Based Pay

Calculating excess accounting-based pay is likely to be a relatively straightforward mechanical exercise. One takes the corrected accounting measure, plugs it into an executive’s pay formula, calculates the corrected pay amount, and subtracts the corrected pay amount from the pay amount received by the executive. Computation costs should not be too high.

To be sure, executive pay arrangements are complex, and there are likely to be tricky issues requiring some judgment. But the range of possible outcomes over which discretion will need to be exercised is likely to be narrow. Thus, the stakes are likely to be small and the affected parties are unlikely to have an incentive to incur significant costs in calculating the excess amount.

By contrast, it is *impossible* to accurately determine excess price-based pay: that is, how the misreporting of one or more accounting measures affected the stock price of a particular firm over the relevant period or at a given point in time. The effect is simply unknowable. For example, if revenues turn out to be overstated by 2%, we can be fairly confident (although not 100% certain) that this overstatement did not have a *negative* effect on the stock price. But we will have no idea whether the stock price during the relevant period was 0%, 2%, 5%, or 25% higher as a result of this overstatement.

The problem is that a firm’s stock price involves the interactions of thousands of buyers and sellers who are making trading decisions based on a variety of inputs, including but not limited to the particular accounting results that were erroneously reported. Even if stock markets were completely efficient at processing new information, there would always be confounding effects—other information arriving in the market—that make it impossible to tease out the effect of a particular error in the reporting of financial results on a firm’s stock price over a particular period or on a given date. Moreover, markets are not completely efficient

and might often be quite inefficient. We know there is a considerable amount of movement in stock prices that cannot be explained by the arrival of new value-relevant information to the market, but is the result of investor mood swings, errant algorithms,¹²⁴ and other “noisy” market drivers. How a particular accounting mismeasurement gets translated into the stock price is not, and cannot be, knowable.

The SEC’s proposal appears to recognize the unknowability of how accounting measures affect the stock price, and permits issuers to make a “reasonable estimate.”

“In some cases, issuers may need to engage in complex analyses that require significant technical expertise and specialized knowledge, and may involve substantial exercise of judgment in order to determine the stock price impact of a material restatement....We recognize these potential challenges and....are proposing that issuers be permitted to use reasonable estimates when determining the impact of a restatement on stock price and [TSR] and to require them to disclose the estimates. We believe that being able to use reasonable estimates to assess the effect of the accounting restatement on these performance measures in determining the amount of erroneously awarded compensation should help to mitigate these potential difficulties.”¹²⁵

But a “reasonable estimate” is at best a “guesstimate.” It will not (and cannot) reveal whether and how (if at all) a particular error in reported financial results at a particular firm at a particular point in time affected the stock price of that firm during a particular period of time. The estimate generated for purposes of the clawback may well be substantially higher or lower than the actual effect of the error on the stock price.

B. The Marginal Economic Effect of Extending the Clawback to Guesstimated Excess Price-Based Pay

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Yesha Yadav, *How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets* (Mar. 29, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2586106>.

¹²⁵ *Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,155.

In Part V, I explained why the clawback should be applied only to top executives of non-CS firms. I will thus focus here on that subset of executives. A requirement to recoup guesstimated excess price-based pay from these executives will substantially raise the non-incentive costs of the Dodd-Frank clawback, creating a heightened risk that the marginal costs of extending the clawback to price-based pay will exceed the benefits.

1. Additional Non-Incentive Costs

Unfortunately, the need to guesstimate the amount of excess price-based pay will lead to non-incentive costs that are significantly higher than those that would arise if the Dodd-Frank clawback reached only accounting-based pay.

a. Additional Issuer-Compliance and Regulator-Diversion Costs

As explained in Part IV, any reliable excess-pay clawback will impose issuer-compliance costs, even if the clawback applies only to easy-to-calculate accounting-based excess pay. But applying the clawback to price-based pay would generate large, additional issuer-compliance costs. Issuers would be required to hire highly-paid experts, consultants, and advisors to generate “reasonable estimates” of the impact of accounting-measure errors on the stock price. Directors would have an incentive to invest large amounts of shareholders’ money to generate estimates that would be as defensible as possible to the SEC and exchanges (which could delist the issuer if it does not comply with the Dodd-Frank clawback); to proxy advisory services and to shareholders (to the extent that they might believe that the directors were under-enforcing the clawback, and base voting advice or decisions on this issue); to executives (whose money was being clawed back); and to courts (if a clawback becomes the subject of litigation between the firm and any of the parties above—shareholders, executives, or the exchange). The SEC, exchanges, and perhaps courts would all have to grapple with the reasonableness of the estimates of excess price-based pay—something that is essentially unknowable.

b. Additional Executive-Burden Costs

Any reliable excess-pay clawback will generate risk-bearing costs

for the executive *ex ante* because of the uncertainty that some of the pay received by the executive will be recovered. But if the claw extends to price-based pay, there would be two sources of uncertainty: (a) whether there is a restatement involving a financial result, and the potential magnitude of the error; and (b) the extent to which that error is guesstimated to affect the stock price. If the clawback is extended to price-based pay, “reasonable estimates” of excess price-based pay produced by issuers may well generally be biased downwards, to reduce or avoid recovery (for the very same reasons that directors now seem averse to recover excess pay under firm clawback policies or otherwise¹²⁶). That, at least, would be my prediction. But a risk-averse executive may worry that, when the claw is applied to her, the estimate will be high. This risk-bearing cost, whether it is borne by executives or passed on to shareholders, reduces the size of the pie.

In addition, should the clawback be applied to excess price-based pay, executives can be expected to spend resources seeking to lower the guesstimated amount, perhaps through litigation. These are deadweight costs.

2. Marginal Incentive Benefits and Incentive-Distortion Costs

While the non-incentive effects of extending the Dodd-Frank clawback to price-based pay would be substantially higher, there would also be additional incentive benefits and incentive-distortion costs. The effect on net incentive benefits is thus unclear.

a. Additional Incentive Benefits

Even though excess price-based pay can only be guesstimated, there is a marginal incentive benefit to recouping the guesstimate amount via a reliable excess-pay clawback. The stock price is driven in large part by reported financial results. Thus, *to the extent firms continue to use price-based pay to compensate executives*, there is a benefit to bringing price-based pay within the sweep of the clawback: it reduces the excess pay that would arise *indirectly* from accounting-measurement errors, and thus decreases executives’ incentives to misreport.

¹²⁶ See *supra* Part III.A.2.

b. Additional Incentive-Distortion Costs

To the extent the Dodd-Frank clawback extends to price-based pay, there will be more incentive-distortion costs. For example, executives may have stronger incentives to switch from misreporting to real earnings management, or to delay or refrain from a necessary restatement.

In addition, extending the Dodd-Frank clawback to price-based pay is likely to change compensation arrangements, potentially for the worse. In particular, the large issuer-compliance costs and executive-burden costs associated with recovering excess price-based pay are likely to drive issuers and executives away from price-based pay, everything else equal. This, in turn, could cause a shift from price-based pay to accounting-based pay, as the costs associated with applying the clawback to the former will be higher than applying the clawback to the latter. It could cause a shift from price-based pay to types of compensation that are beyond the reach of the clawback, such as equity pay that is time-vested. We don't know what effects any such changes would have on the overall mix of incentives provided to executives, and whether these changes would be good or bad. But the *risk* of large indirect incentive-distortion costs rises substantially if the clawback is extended to guesstimated excess pay, because such guesstimation sharply increases the issuer-compliance and executive-burden costs of the clawback.¹²⁷

C. Better Alternatives for Dealing with Price Manipulation

Executives have a variety of levers to manipulate the stock price to boost their payouts in ways that reduce economic value generated by the

¹²⁷ In the proposed Dodd-Frank clawback rule, the SEC solicits comments as to whether the clawback should be further extended to any type of instrument whose payoff is based on stock price, including time-vested restricted stock or options. *See Listing Standards*, *supra* note x, at 41,159. Extending the clawback further in this manner may create some additional benefits, but would sharply raise issuer-compliance costs and executive-burden costs, and might well lead to additional changes in compensation arrangements, the direction and magnitude of which are unknowable. For the same reason extending the clawback to price-based pay is risky, further extending the clawback to proceeds of equity sales—which are likely to be a more important feature of compensation arrangements—is even more risky.

firm over time. Accounting manipulation that gives rise to a restatement, the target of the Dodd-Frank clawback, is one such lever. But there are others, such as real earnings management.¹²⁸ Reducing executives' incentive or ability to pull any of these manipulation levers to boost the stock price is certainly a worthwhile objective.

However, as Nitzan Shilon and I have argued, a mandatory excess-pay clawback requiring costly guesstimation of the "but-for" stock price is not the right tool for addressing any form of price manipulation.¹²⁹ To deal with problems relating to price manipulation (including but not limited to manipulation of financial results), there are much better tools for the job. Some of these tools must be wielded by directors, but others are already in the hands of the SEC.

1. Directors' Toolkit: Improving Equity Compensation

The most powerful tools for reducing executives' incentive to engage in price manipulation are in the hands of the directors who design and approve executives' compensation arrangements. Directors wishing to reduce price manipulation could seek to limit the extent to which pay from compensation arrangements depend on a single day's price or, indeed, the stock price over a short period of time. For example, as Lucian Bebchuk and I have argued, back-end payoffs from the unwinding of equity grants (or their equivalent) should be based on the average stock price over a significant period of time, perhaps a month, two months, six months, or a year.¹³⁰ And on the front end, to the extent a firm uses pay that is granted, earned, or vested based on the stock price (i.e., price-based pay), directors should use an average stock price over a reasonably long period of time.¹³¹ By not basing an executive's payoff on the stock price of a particular day

¹²⁸ See Lilian H. Chan et al., *Earnings Quality and Auditor Behavior*, *supra* note x.

¹²⁹ See Fried & Shilon, *supra* note x, at 749.

¹³⁰ See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, *Paying for Long-Term Performance*, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1945-47 (2010) (suggesting that the payoffs from executive stock sales should be based on the average stock price over a reasonably long period).

¹³¹ Similarly, if pay is granted, earned, or vested based on TSR, the TSR should be over a sufficiently long period of time.

or over a short period of time, directors can reduce an executive's incentive to manipulate the short-term stock price to inflate her compensation.

To be sure, even if compensation arrangements were structured in the manner suggested, executives might still have an incentive to manipulate the short-term stock price. For example, executives might still wish to boost the short-term stock price at the expense of long-term value to reduce the likelihood of a hostile takeover, the intervention of an activist shareholder, or institutional-investor pressure. Moreover, directors will not necessarily adopt compensation arrangements that provide optimal incentives for executives. The point here is only that the compensation-generated incentive to manipulate the stock price is most effectively mitigated by improving compensation arrangements to reduce the sensitivity of executive's pay to the stock price on any particular day or over any particular short-term period.

2. The SEC's Toolkit: Improving Disclosure

If the SEC wishes to reduce executives' incentive and ability to engage in stock-price manipulation, there are simple steps it can take to do so—steps that it has already been urged to take. To begin, the SEC could amend its own Rule 10b5-1 so that so-called Rule 10b5-1 plans (which provide an affirmative defense to Rule 10b-5 liability) are less easily gamed by executives.¹³² There is long-standing evidence that 10b5-1 plan sales are, on average, preceded by abnormal stock run-ups and followed by abnormal stock declines,¹³³ suggesting that executives are engaged in a combination of stock-price manipulation and insider trading. Executives' ability to game their 10b5-1 plans and incentive to manipulate the stock price would be reduced if, among other things, the affirmative defense provided by a 10b5-1 plan was not available unless the plan was disclosed

¹³² Cf. Jesse M. Fried, *Hands-Off Options*, 61 VAND. L. REV. 453, 464-466 (2008) (describing some of the flaws of so-called 10b5-1 plans).

¹³³ See, e.g., Alan D. Jagolinzer, *SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders' Strategic Trade*, 55 MGT. SCI. 224 (2009); Eliezer M. Fich, Robert Parrino, & Anh L. Tran, *Timing stock trade for personal gains: Private information and sales of shares by CEOs* (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2579047>.

and the first trade under the plan did not occur until a month after the plan was disclosed.¹³⁴

In addition, there is justifiable concern that executives of US firms use open market repurchases (or their announcement) to falsely signal to the market,¹³⁵ exert price pressure on the stock,¹³⁶ mechanically change earnings per share (EPS), perhaps to boost EPS-based bonus payouts,¹³⁷ and buy shares at low prices to boost the value of their long-term equity incentives.¹³⁸ Under the SEC's own rules, firms need not disclose open market repurchases until months after they occur, and firms need not disclose each trade but rather monthly aggregates, making it difficult to detect improper activity.¹³⁹ There is nothing preventing the SEC from following regulators in other developed markets (such as Hong Kong and the U.K.) and requiring firms to disclose open-market repurchases by the firm within a day or two.¹⁴⁰ Under such a regime, executives would have less incentive and ability to use repurchases to manipulate the stock price and otherwise enrich themselves at the expense of other shareholders.¹⁴¹ These disclosure requirements would provide considerable benefits to investors, at minimal cost.

In short, there are much better tools than a mandatory excess-pay clawback to deal with the problem of executives manipulating the stock

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, *Do SEC's 10b5-1 Safe Harbor Rules Need to be Rewritten?*, __ COLUM. BUS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming).

¹³⁵ See Jesse M. Fried, *Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases*, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1351-57(2005).

¹³⁶ *Id.* at 1332.

¹³⁷ See Heitor Almeida, Vyacheslov Fos & Mathias Kronlund, *The Real Effects of Share Repurchases*, __ J. FIN. ECON. __ (2016).

¹³⁸ See Jesse M. Fried, *Insider Trading via the Corporation*, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 801 (2014).

¹³⁹ *Id.* at ____.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* at ____.

¹⁴¹ *Id.* at ____.

price. Directors and the SEC should seek to employ these tools. Meanwhile, the Dodd-Frank clawback should be focused on the job for which it is the best tool: reducing easily calculated excess *accounting-based* pay.

VII. A “Smart” Dodd-Frank Clawback

The analysis in Parts V and VI suggests that the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback is overbroad. It reaches issuers and executives where any net incentive benefits are likely to be marginal at best, and applies to types of compensation (price-based pay) for which a clawback is simply not the right tool for the job. Along these margins, there is strong reason to believe that application of the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback generates or is likely to generate economic costs that substantially exceed the benefits. Most of these net economic costs are likely to be borne, directly or indirectly, by public investors.

Although Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to adopt a rule to implement Section 954’s mandatory excess-pay clawback, the SEC has considerable latitude in crafting the rule.¹⁴² It has general exemptive authority under Section 36(a) of the Exchange Act to exempt specific categories of issuers to the extent such exemptions are in the public interest and consistent with investor protection.¹⁴³ Similarly, the SEC has at least some rule-making discretion over the types of executives and compensation covered by the rule.

This Part argues that it would be desirable for the SEC to use its discretion to adopt a more narrowly targeted version of the Dodd-Frank clawback, one that is as close as possible to the “smart” clawback

¹⁴² See *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (holding that where Congress has not directly spoken to an issue, “the question for the [reviewing] court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute” and requiring only that an agency interpretation, where Congress has not clearly spoken, be one among many permissible readings of the statute).

¹⁴³ 15 U.S.C. 78mm(a).

described in Section A. Section B describes the advantages of this smart clawback relative to the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback.

A. CONTOURS OF A “SMART” CLAWBACK

A smart Dodd-Frank clawback would be aimed at top-5 executives at non-CS firms.¹⁴⁴ And it would cover only accounting-based pay, not price-based pay.

The differences between the smart clawback and the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback are summarized in the Table 1 below.

Table 1: SEC's Proposed Dodd-Frank Clawback vs. “Smart” Clawback

	SEC's Proposed Dodd-Frank Clawback	Smart Clawback
Issuers	Almost all issuers	Excludes issuers with unlisted equity and controlled companies
Executives	Section 16(a) executives	Top-5 executives
Compensation	Accounting-based pay & price-based pay	Accounting-based pay

¹⁴⁴ The top-5 executives would generally correspond to the named executive officers (NEOs) in Item 402(a)(3) of Regulation S-K, whose compensation must be disclosed in elaborate detail in SEC Form DEF 14A each year. In some cases, NEOs would include individuals who served as the CEO or CFO during the year but are no longer serving in those positions. Because individuals other than the CEO and CFO might move in and out of the NEO category from year to year, the clawback could be applied to any individual who was an NEO during any of the last X years. Other possible approaches might be to have the clawback cover (1) the CEO, the CFO, and the next three most powerful executives as designated by the firm; or (2) just the CEO and CFO.

B. Benefits of a Smart Clawback

Relative to the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, the smart clawback offers two advantages. By targeting only those issuers and executives that are likely to be positively affected by the clawback, it can achieve all or almost all of any net incentive benefits of the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback at a much lower cost. And by exempting price-based pay, the smart clawback would eliminate the substantial additional regulator-diversion, issuer-compliance, and executive-burden costs that would otherwise be incurred.

1. Saving Resources by Targeting Fewer Issuers and Executives

As I have explained, applying the Dodd-Frank clawback to private firms with listed debt and controlled companies is unlikely to improve executives' incentives at these firms and the quality of financial reporting. Similarly, applying the clawback to below-5 executives, who have little power or discretion, will not materially improve incentives or financial reporting at any firms. Thus, exempting these issuers and executives will not meaningfully reduce any net incentive benefit of the clawback.

At the same time, there are cost savings to such exemptions. The fewer issuers and executives are covered, the fewer non-incentive costs the clawback will impose on regulators, issuers, and executives. From an economic point of view, these exemptions should generate more economic benefits than costs, and thus be desirable.

Because public investors will enjoy most of the economic benefits and bear most of the economic costs of the Dodd-Frank clawback, they too would benefit from these exemptions. It should go without saying that public investors prefer that firms not spend shareholders' money complying with, or compensating executives for, corporate-governance mandates that do not benefit them. Public investors also do not want regulators to spend their limited time, resources, and attention enforcing relatively pointless rules, at the expense of other activities that could benefit investors.

2. Lowering Costs by Excluding Price-Based Pay

As explained, extending the Dodd-Frank clawback to excess price-based pay may generate additional incentive benefits to the extent it applies to top executives at widely-held firms. But it will also generate much larger non-incentive costs (regulator-burden, issuer-compliance and executive-burden costs) than when the clawback is applied only to accounting-based pay, and potentially larger incentive costs, because the clawback is ill-suited for dealing with price manipulation. The risk of the marginal costs exceeding the marginal benefits thus appears to be quite high.

Focusing the clawback on accounting-based pay will save substantial regulator-diversion, issuer-compliance, and executive-burden costs. While there is a potential failure to achieve net incentive benefits, preserving these potential net incentive benefits does not seem worth it, especially since the SEC has not yet tried to use other, more appropriate and cost-effective tools to deal with the general problem of price manipulation.

Conclusion

The SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback substantially increases the likelihood that executives will return excess pay to their firms following a financial restatement. The clawback can therefore be expected to reduce the incentives of executives to misreport financial results, generating economic benefits. However, as I have explained, this incentive benefit is likely to be generated only with respect to a subset of the firms and executives to which the proposed clawback applies: top executives of widely-held firms. When applied to firms with a controlling shareholder or to the lower-level executives of any firm, the clawback is unlikely to improve behavior. Because the clawback generates a variety of costs (for regulators, issuers, and executives) with respect to any issuer or executive it targets, the costs of applying the Dodd-Frank clawback to firms with a controlling shareholder or lower-level executives of any firm likely outweigh the incentive benefits.

In addition, the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback applies not only to "accounting-based pay" (pay that is granted, earned, or vested based on accounting results) but also to "price-based pay" (pay that is granted, earned, or vested based on the stock price). An excess-pay clawback is suitable for accounting-based pay because the "but for"

amount of compensation (had financial results not been misstated) is knowable, permitting easy calculation of the excess amount. But the clawback is not suited for price-based pay, because the “but for” stock price is *unknowable*. Excess price-based pay thus can only be *guesstimated*. The need to guesstimate excess price-based pay (and defend the guesstimated amount to regulators, shareholders, and courts) will lead to large expenditures, most of which will be borne by shareholders. As a result, there is a high risk that the costs of extending the clawback to price-based pay will substantially exceed any incentive benefits.

In short, the SEC’s proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while providing incentive benefits, reaches too many issuers, executives, and types of compensation. It would thus be desirable for the SEC to adopt a more narrowly-targeted “smart” clawback focused on fewer firms, executives, and compensation arrangements. In particular, the clawback should be aimed at the accounting-based pay of top-5 executives at issuers that are not exclusively CS firms. Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank clawback in this manner would be consistent with the presumed objectives of the securities laws: strengthening the economy and benefiting public investors.

Appendix A

Table 1. SEC recoveries under the SOX clawback: 2003-2012. “Innocent” denotes executives not personally accused of wrongdoing. Voluntary reimbursements are not distinguished from SEC clawback orders.

Year	Abbreviated Release Citation	Amount(s) Recovered	Total Executives Reached	"Innocent" Executives Reached
2012	Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Don W. Watson, et al., S.E.C. Release No. 3382, 2012 WL 1894182 (Apr. 18, 2012)	\$646,404	1	0
2012	SEC v. Koss Corp. & Michael J. Koss., S.E.C. Release No. 3368, , 2012 WL 1894126 (Mar. 9, 2012)	\$451,314 + other securities	1	0
2012	SEC v. Richard J. Senior et al., Litigation Release No. 22241, 2012 WL 8700164 (Jan. 30, 2012); In the Matter of Symmetry Medical Inc., S.E.C. Release No. 3358, 2012 WL 1024028 (Jan. 30, 2012)	\$450,000 and \$185,000	2	1
2011	Former CEO to Return \$2.8 Million in Bonuses and Stock Profits Received During CSK Auto Accounting Fraud, S.E.C. 11-243, 2011 WL 5554241 (Nov. 15, 2011)	\$2,796,467	1	1
2011	In the Matter of Michael C. Pattison, CPA, S.E.C. Release No. 3407, 2012 WL 4320146 (Sept. 20, 2012) (noting settlement in July 2011)	\$300,000	1	0
2011	Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. James O'Leary, S.E.C. Release No. 3314, 2011 WL 3837289 (Aug. 30, 2011); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Ian J. McCarthy, S.E.C. Release No. 3250, 2011 WL 761793 (Mar. 4, 2011)	\$1,431,022 and \$6,479,281 + other securities	2	2
2010	In the Matter of Navistar Int'l Corp., et al., S.E.C. Release No. 33-9132, 2010 WL 3071892 (Aug. 5, 2010)	\$1,3200,000 and \$1,049,503	2	0
2010	Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Carl W. Jasper, Litigation Release No. 21598, 2010 WL 2886400 (July 22, 2010)	\$1,869639	1	0
2010	SEC v. Diebold, Inc., S.E.C. Release No. 3137, 2010 WL 2199552 (June 2, 2010)	\$470,016 + other securities	1	1
2008	Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Sycamore Networks, Inc., et al., S.E.C. Release No. 2843, 2008 WL 2677225 (July 9, 2008)	\$190,000	1	0
2007	Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. William W. McGuire, M.D., Litigation Release No. 2754, 2007 WL 4270709 (Dec. 6, 2007)	\$448M	1	0

Table 2. SEC recoveries under the SOX clawback: 2013-2015. “Innocent” denotes executives not personally accused of wrongdoing. Voluntary reimbursements are not distinguished from SEC clawback orders.

Year	Abbreviated Release Citation	Amount(s) Recovered	Total Executives Reached	"Innocent" Executives Reached
2015	<u>Computer Sciences Corporation</u> : S.E.C. Release No. 3662, 2015 WL 3526033 (June 5, 2015)	\$3,771,00 and \$369,100	2	0
2015 & 2014	<u>Saba Software</u> : S.E.C. Release No. 3636, 2015 WL 528128 (Feb. 10, 2015); S.E.C. Release No. 3584, 2014 WL 4726472 (Sept. 24, 2014)	\$337,375, \$141,992 and \$2,570,596	3	3
2014	<u>DGSE Companies Inc.</u> : S.E.C. Release No. 3596, 2014 WL 5842377 (Nov. 12, 2014)	\$106,250	1	1
2014	<u>Diamond Foods, Inc.</u> : 2014 WL 69462 (Jan. 9, 2014)	>\$4,000,000 (voluntary)	1	0
2013	<u>China Natural Gas, Inc.</u> : Litigation Release No. 22719, 2013 WL 2456245 (June 7, 2013)	\$77,479	1	0
2013	<u>Mercury Interactive, LLC</u> : Litigation Release No. 22623, 2013 WL 653016 (Feb. 21, 2013)	\$5,064,678 and \$2,814,687	2	0
2013	<u>The Street, Inc.</u> : S.E.C. Release No. 3440, 2013 WL 139353 (Jan. 11, 2013)	\$34,149	1	0

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