

The Credit Markets Go Dark

Law Working Paper N° 810/2024

November 2024

Jared A. Elias

Harvard University

Elisabeth de Fontenay

Duke University

© Jared A. Elias and Elisabeth de Fontenay 2024.
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

This paper can be downloaded without charge from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=4879742

<https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers>

ECGI Working Paper Series in Law

The Credit Markets Go Dark

Working Paper N° 810/2024

November 2024

Jared A. Ellias
Elisabeth de Fontenay

The authors thank Josh Clarkson, Cole Harten, Madeleine Hung, Nicole Fang, Russell Feinman, Michael Finknbinder, Farrah Kalach, Alina Kilcoyne, Chinmay Pandit, Bo Roy, Johnathan Sun and Vivian Zhang for their helpful research assistance. For helpful comments, the authors also thank William Birdthistle, Vince Buccola, John Coates, Jeff Ferris, Jeff Himstreet, Scott Hirst, Dan Kamensky, Dorothy Lund, Mariana Pargendler, Alex Platt, Elizabeth Pollman, Eric Pratt, Adriana Robertson, Mark Roe, David Smith, Roberto Tallarita, and Andrew Tuch, representatives of the LSTA, the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), and the Alternative Credit Council (ACC), as well as seminar audiences at Harvard Law School, the 2024 BYU Winter Deals Conference, the 2024 American Law and Economics Annual Meeting, and 2024 the Penn/NYU Conference on Law and Finance, and the many industry participants who generously shared their insights.

© Jared A. Ellias and Elisabeth de Fontenay 2024. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Abstract

Over the past generation, conflicting trends have reshaped the ownership of corporate equity on the one hand and corporate debt on the other. In equity, the two great trends have been the shift from public markets to private ownership and the consolidation of American companies' stock in the hands of powerful investment funds. In debt, by contrast, the great trends have been a shift from private loans to quasi-public markets and dispersed ownership. In this Article, we chronicle the recent and dramatic reversal of these trends in the debt markets. Private investment funds executing a "private credit" strategy have become increasingly important corporate lenders, bringing into corporate debt the same forces of privatization, concentration, and illiquidity that have been reshaping the equity markets. We offer new data that illustrate the meteoric rise of the now \$1.5 trillion private-credit industry, and we explore the allure and implications of private credit. For many corporate borrowers, private credit offers a faster, more efficient, and more accessible source of financing than either banks or the public (and quasi-public) debt markets. Yet the transition from bank-intermediated finance to private credit will transform not only corporate finance, but also firm behavior and economic activity more generally. First, as the corporate-debt markets follow the equity markets in going dark, information about many large firms will be lost to the investing public. For better or worse, these firms will act with unprecedented discretion—having been shielded from the discipline and scrutiny of regulators, the trading markets, and the general public. Second, corporate debt—like corporate equity—will become the dominion of investment funds, some of which are already unimaginably large. These funds will influence everything from firm operations and strategy to corporate distress, with uncertain consequences.

Keywords: bankruptcy, corporate finance, corporate debt, corporate governance, corporate law

JEL Classifications: bankruptcy, corporate finance, corporate debt, corporate governance, corporate law

Jared A. Elias*

Scott C. Collins Professor of Law
Harvard University
1545 Massachusetts Ave
Cambridge MA 02138, United States
phone:
e-mail: jellias@law.harvard.edu

Elisabeth de Fontenay

Karl W. Leo Distinguished Professor of Law
Duke University
210 Science Drive
Durham, NC 27708, USA
phone: (919) 613-7038
e-mail: defontenay@law.duke.edu

*Corresponding Author

The Credit Markets Go Dark

Jared A. Ellias* and Elisabeth de Fontenay**

Forthcoming, 134 YALE LAW JOURNAL ____ (2025)

October 23, 2024

Over the past generation, conflicting trends have reshaped the ownership of corporate equity on the one hand and corporate debt on the other. In equity, the two great trends have been the shift from public markets to private ownership and the consolidation of American companies' stock in the hands of powerful investment funds. In debt, by contrast, the great trends have been a shift from private loans to quasi-public markets and dispersed ownership.

In this Article, we chronicle the recent and dramatic reversal of these trends in the debt markets. Private investment funds executing a “private credit” strategy have become increasingly important corporate lenders, bringing into corporate debt the same forces of privatization, concentration, and illiquidity that have been reshaping the equity markets. We offer new data that illustrate the meteoric rise of the now \$1.5 trillion private-credit industry, and we explore the allure and implications of private credit. For many corporate borrowers, private credit offers a faster, more efficient, and more accessible source of financing than either banks or the public (and quasi-public) debt markets. Yet the transition from bank-intermediated finance to private credit will transform not only corporate finance, but also firm behavior and economic activity more generally. First, as the corporate-debt markets follow the equity markets in going dark, information about many large firms will be lost to the investing public. For better or worse, these firms will act with unprecedented discretion—having been shielded from the discipline and scrutiny of regulators, the trading markets, and the general public. Second, corporate debt—like corporate equity—will become the dominion of investment funds, some of which are already unimaginably large. These funds will influence everything from firm operations and strategy to corporate distress, with uncertain consequences.

* Scott C. Collins Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

** Karl W. Leo Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. The authors thank Josh Clarkson, Cole Harten, Madeleine Hung, Nicole Fang, Russell Feinman, Michael Finkenbinder, Farrah Kalach, Alina Kilcoyne, Chinmay Pandit, Bo Roy, Johnathan Sun and Vivian Zhang for their helpful research assistance. For helpful comments, the authors also thank William Birdthistle, Vince Buccola, John Coates, Jeff Ferris, Jeff Himstreet, Scott Hirst, Dan Kamensky, Dorothy Lund, Mariana Pargendler, Alex Platt, Elizabeth Pollman, Eric Pratt, Adriana Robertson, Mark Roe, David Smith, Roberto Tallarita, and Andrew Tuch, representatives of the LSTA, the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA), and the Alternative Credit Council (ACC), as well as seminar audiences at Harvard Law School, the 2024 BYU Winter Deals Conference, the 2024 American Law and Economics Annual Meeting, and 2024 the Penn/NYU Conference on Law and Finance, and the many industry participants who generously shared their insights.

Table of Contents

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	A BRIEF (RECENT) HISTORY OF CORPORATE DEBT.....	12
A.	The Traditional Approach: Relationship Lending	13
B.	The Shift to Syndicated Lending and High-Yield Bonds—or “Quasi-Public” Debt	16
C.	Effects on Corporate Information and Bankruptcy	20
i.	Corporate Information Production	20
ii.	Corporate Distress and Bankruptcy	22
III.	THE RISE OF PRIVATE CREDIT	26
A.	Overview	26
B.	Data	38
IV.	THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE CREDIT	44
C.	Advantages for Borrowers	45
D.	Advantages for Debt Investors.....	48
i.	Attractive Risk-Adjusted Returns	49
ii.	Stronger Covenants	52
iii.	Protection from “Creditor-on-Creditor Violence”	53
E.	Advantages for Asset Managers	55
i.	Attractive Fee Structures.....	55
ii.	Relationship Lending Without Banking-Law Limitations.....	58
iii.	Earning Returns to Scale.....	61
iv.	Less Fire-Sale Pressure	61
V.	CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISE OF PRIVATE CREDIT.....	62
F.	Corporate Governance: Investment Funds Own Everything.....	63
i.	Corporate Equity in the Hands of Investment Funds	63
ii.	Corporate Debt Follows Suit.....	67
G.	Corporate Information Production: Private Markets Cannibalize Public Markets	71
H.	Corporate Distress and Bankruptcy: Private-Credit Lenders Will Make Their Mark.....	75
i.	Private-Credit Lenders Bring New Capabilities and Incentives to Pre-Bankruptcy Workout Negotiations	77
	CONCLUSION	82

I. INTRODUCTION

The ownership, governance, and financing of corporate America look radically different today than they did only a few decades ago. By now, we have become accustomed to the two key features of this new landscape—namely (1) that companies increasingly choose to remain private, and (2) that the equity (stock) of both public and private companies is increasingly concentrated in the hands of powerful investment funds.¹ Over the past few decades, companies have increasingly chosen to remain, or become, private firms. Unlike public companies, private firms are not subject to the public-disclosure requirements of the securities laws, and their shares are not traded on a public stock exchange.² Instead, their shares are typically owned by private investment funds such as private-equity or venture-capital funds.³ Meanwhile, the shares of the shrinking set of public companies are increasingly owned by public (or “registered”) investment funds sponsored by a handful of the world’s largest asset managers, rather than by individual investors or even smaller investment funds.⁴ One could, accordingly, describe the two major trends in

¹ In the equity markets, a large literature has recently focused on the concerns raised by the rise of “mega-funds.” See, e.g., JOHN COATES, *THE PROBLEM OF TWELVE: WHEN A FEW FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS CONTROL EVERYTHING* (2023); Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, *Big Three Power, and Why It Matters*, 102 B.U. L. REV. 1547 (2022) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, *Big Three Power*]; Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, *The Specter of the Giant Three*, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, *The Specter of the Giant Three*]; Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, *Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let Shareholders Be Shareholders*, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1771 (2020); Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, *The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors*, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (2019).

² See Mark J. Roe & Charles C.Y. Wang, *Half the Firms, Double the Profits: Public Firms’ Transformation, 1996-2022*, J. L. FIN. & ACCT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2-3, 6), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4372070> [<https://perma.cc/T3FX-24CG>] (documenting a decline in the number of public firms, but noting that the aggregate size of the public-firm sector by asset value is up significantly).

³ For a deeper discussion of private-equity funds, see generally Robert S. Harris, Tim Jenkinson & Steven N. Kaplan, *Private Equity Performance: What Do We Know?*, 69 J. FIN. 1851 (2014), which analyzes the historical performance of private-equity funds. For a discussion of the consequences of venture-capital ownership, see Elizabeth Pollman, *Startup Governance*, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 156-76 (2019).

⁴ See COATES, *supra* note 1, at <pincite>; Bebchuk & Hirst, *Big Three Power*, *supra* note 1, at 1550-52; Bebchuk & Hirst, *The Specter of the Giant Three*, *supra* note 1, at 725-26; Kahan & Rock, *supra* note 1, at 1774; Fisch, Hamdani & Solomon, *supra* note 1, at 19-20.

corporate-equity ownership as *privatization*—the large-scale exit of companies from the public regulatory scheme and from information-rich markets—and *concentration* of ownership.

Within the world of corporate debt, however, opposite trends had been at work until recently.⁵ Historically, firms both large and small borrowed on a secured basis from banks.⁶ (Large firms also borrowed on an unsecured basis from investors in the public bond markets.) With this form of secured lending, banks lent their own money—either internal funds or customer deposits—to corporations.⁷ The 1990s saw secured lending evolve dramatically.⁸ The role of banks shifted from originating loans to identifying corporations that needed capital and finding nonbank investors to supply it, building what became known as the “syndicated debt markets.”⁹ With the development of syndicated lending, secured debt began to resemble the world of public equity and public bonds: a liquid market dominated by dispersed, passive investors, with firm and market information reflected continuously in trading prices.¹⁰

To state it differently, while the trend in corporate equity has been for public companies to go private and for shared ownership to become concentrated in a smaller number of asset managers, the trend in corporate debt has been the opposite: large numbers of dispersed, passive investors supply the capital, and companies are disciplined by the trading markets rather than by

⁵ See *infra* Section II.A.

⁶ See generally Joshua D. Rauh & Amir Sufi, *Capital Structure and Debt Structure*, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 4242, 4251 (2010) (discussing heterogeneity in debt structure).

⁷ For a discussion of secured finance, see Robert E. Scott, *The Truth About Secured Financing*, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1437–40 (1997).

⁸ See Lisa Lee, *Private Credit Is the Hot New Thing, But Its Roots Go Back to 1980s Junk Bonds*, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 16, 2023, 8:00 AM EST), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-16/private-credit-is-the-hot-new-thing-on-wall-street> [<https://perma.cc/4B9M-C7TT>].

⁹ See Greg Nini & David C. Smith, *Leveraged Finance*, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE 249, 260 (David J. Denis ed., 2024) (discussing the evolution of the syndicated lending market).

¹⁰ See Andreas Keßle & Thomas Mählmann, *Trading Costs of Private Debt*, 59 J. FIN. MKTS. art. no. 100644, at 1–3 (2022).

active, expert intermediaries such as banks. Corporate-debt ownership has thus been dispersing as corporate equity has been concentrating.

In this Article, we provide a comprehensive account of a startling reversal of this trend for corporate debt: since the 2010s, the same trends of privatization and concentration that reshaped corporate equity are now reshaping corporate debt. This ongoing shift is driven by an investment strategy known as “private credit.”¹¹ While private credit lacks a strict definition, we define private-credit loans as commercial loans that are arranged and originated not by banks, but primarily by private investment funds.¹² Among other important features, private-credit loans are not generally traded and are held to maturity by the private investment fund that makes the loan.¹³ Collectively, private-credit funds originate a major and accelerating share of all commercial loans.¹⁴ Individually, private-credit funds are often able to originate a given company’s *entire* outstanding debt singlehandedly, rather than hold a small piece of the company’s debt along with many other creditors. This has radically transformed firms’ capital structure: such companies face

¹¹ See *infra* Part III.

¹² The rise of private credit is widely covered in the press. See, e.g., Andres Gonzales & Pablo Mayo Cerqueiro, *As Golden Age for Capital Ends, 2024 Heralds More Consolidation*, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2023, 1:03 AM EST), <https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/golden-age-private-capital-ends-2024-heralds-more-consolidation-2023-12-20> [<https://perma.cc/HGJ8-TXB7>]; see also Lee, *supra* note 8 (discussing private credit); Ben Foldy, *How Risky Is Private Credit? Analysts Are Piecing Together Clues*, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2023, 5:30 AM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/finance/how-risky-is-private-credit-analysts-are-piecing-together-clues-79762038> [<https://perma.cc/B5UV-BBL5>] (discussing the emergence of private credit). Financial scholars have also begun to produce pioneering work on private credit in the financial literature. See Young Soo Jang, *Are Direct Lenders More Like Banks or Arm’s-Length Investors?* 1, 6 (Jan. 24, 2024) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529656> [<https://perma.cc/5QKQ-NF7D>]; Joern Block, Young Soo Jang, Steven N. Kaplan & Anna Schulze, *A Survey of Private Debt Funds*, 13 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 335, 336-40 (2024).

¹³ See *infra* Section IV.A.iii.

¹⁴ See, e.g., Chris Cumming, *Private-Credit Surge Could Last for Years, Lenders Say*, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2023, 5:35 PM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/private-credit-surge-could-last-for-years-lenders-say-40f8a616> [[perma, >\]; Jodi Xu Klein, The \\$1.5 Trillion Private-Credit Market Faces Challenges](https://perma.cc/2Q54-DFXB), WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2023, 7:30 AM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-1-5-trillion-private-credit-market-faces-challenges-1bb555ce> [<https://perma.cc/2Q54-DFXB>] (“The boom in private credit has so far shown little sign of ebbing as bespoke corporate loans overtake more traditional sources of debt financing such as syndicated loans and high-yield bonds.”).

a single loan from a single lender, instead of a complex web of different types and tranches of debt, each funded by large numbers of passive (and often warring) creditors.

Investment funds deploying private-credit investment strategies—such as secured lending, subordinated lending, and distressed investing, with senior secured lending making up the bulk of the strategy—managed \$400 million in 2000, \$300 billion in 2010, and an estimated \$1.6 trillion in 2023.¹⁵ These funds may be on their way to managing \$3.5 trillion in 2028.¹⁶ Large public retirement funds are currently allocating at least \$100 billion into the asset class.¹⁷ As institutional investors stampede into private credit, corporate governance and corporate finance are transforming once again.

The rise of private credit has many drivers.¹⁸ Borrowers are choosing private-credit loans over alternatives because private-credit funds can deploy capital quickly, flexibly, and with greater confidentiality and certainty than is possible in public debt markets.¹⁹ Institutional investors are pouring money into private-credit funds to earn handsome returns from investing in illiquid assets; to obtain priority in bankruptcy through secured debt and contractual protections that go beyond what has become typical in syndicated-loan deals; and to protect themselves from the “creditor-on-creditor violence” that has become a feature of the public and quasi-public debt markets.²⁰ For their part, asset managers are drawn to sponsoring private-credit funds for the opportunities to earn

¹⁵ Lee, *supra* note 8.

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ See Shruti Singh, *Private Credit Attracts Billions from U.S. Pension Plans*, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2023, 10:37 AM EST), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-18/calpers-other-us-public-pensions-pump-billions-into-private-credit> [<https://perma.cc/9WVQ-YNEB>].

¹⁸ See *infra* Part IV.

¹⁹ See *infra* Section IV.B.

²⁰ See *infra* Part IV. In this Article, we define the public debt markets loosely as the set of securities exchanges, trading systems, and brokered transactions in which corporate bonds are freely tradable, trading prices are public and continuously updated, and the issuers and offerings are subject to extensive public-disclosure obligations. As discussed in Section II.B *infra*, we define the “quasi-public” debt markets as the markets for corporate debt such as the syndicated loan and 144A note markets in which trading is relatively liquid, and trading prices are publicized and updated, yet public disclosure is not required and there may be some restrictions on trading.

high compensation, to deploy capital with minimal regulatory constraints, and, in some cases, to profit from size while building gigantic funds.²¹

Although many commentators have remarked on the meteoric growth of private credit,²² we argue that its impact has, if anything, been understated. Private credit should instead be understood as heralding a sharp reversal in the trend toward dispersed and traded debt, which will have transformative impacts on corporate governance and corporate finance along three dimensions.²³

First, as private credit increasingly competes with traditional bank syndication for loans to large firms and reaches an ever-wider array of smaller firms, we should anticipate a world in which the entire capital structure—both the equity *and* the debt—of many or most American firms is held primarily by private investment funds.²⁴ This means that the strengths, limitations, and incentives of these fund managers will take on the same outsized importance in the debt markets as in the equity markets.²⁵ Even the largest companies now have the option to forgo underwritten debt offerings to large syndicates of lenders or dispersed bondholders and instead have their entire debt arranged and funded by a single private-credit fund, in record time. Yet it appears that private credit not only substitutes for existing sources of debt financing (such as traditional bank loans, syndicated loans, and high-yield bonds), but also expands the supply of credit, both by extending credit to new borrowers and adding still more leverage to existing borrowers. In other words, private credit not only changes how the corporate-debt “pie” is split, but also expands the size of

²¹ See *infra* Section IV.C.

²² See *infra* notes 237-38 and accompanying text.

²³ See *infra* Section V.A.

²⁴ One observer expects private credit’s market share of corporate lending to double over the next few years, with the gains coming as syndicated lending continues to shrink. See Lee, *supra* note 8.

²⁵ In the equity markets, a large literature has recently focused on the concerns raised by the rise of “mega-funds.” See, e.g., sources cited *supra* note 1.

the pie. Crucially, the pie increasingly rests in the hands of a relatively small number of private investment funds.

Second, with the addition and expansion of private credit, information about firms, investors, and transactions will change, and, for larger firms, grow scarcer.²⁶ Among U.S. companies that take on outside capital, the modal firm may very soon be one that is owned by a private-equity fund and financed by a private-credit fund.²⁷ For some smaller firms that would have otherwise borrowed from traditional banks or not borrowed at all, this may lead to somewhat *more* disclosure about the firm, if the private credit lender is a business development company, as further described below.²⁸ But for larger firms that would have otherwise accessed the public or quasi-public debt markets and made statutorily or contractually required disclosures to dispersed investors or even the public, information will be shared far less widely and often avoid the eyes of both bank regulators and securities regulators. On the one hand, the lack of scrutiny by regulators, trading markets, ratings agencies, and the public may promote economic activity by granting firms extraordinary flexibility in both their operations and their governance. On the other hand, it raises the potential for large-scale misallocation of capital and illiquidity in the long run. In the old equilibrium, the debt of large companies traded actively in the loan and bond markets, providing

²⁶ See *infra* Section V.B.

²⁷ Importantly, the firm in this example would not have equity and debt from the same asset manager. Private-equity sponsors do not normally use other funds under the management of the same sponsor to provide loans to their portfolio companies because this would create a conflict of interest.

²⁸ See Section III(B) *infra* (reporting information from business development corporation public filings). The additional disclosure may come from smaller companies that would have otherwise borrowed money from traditional banks that report details of their loan books to regulators but not to the public. For example, if borrower A borrows money from bank B, that information may only be known to the bank, its employees and regulators. If the loan is secured, which it often is, the lender will also make required state filings to perfect the lien, which would create a public record of the loan. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Elizabeth Warren and Robert M. Lawless, SECURED TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (2023) (describing the law of secured transactions). To the extent this loan is now made by a private credit asset manager using a business development corporation, they will be required to make the public filings reviewed in Section III(B), which would make public, for a subset of borrowers, the identity of their lender, the interest rate, the loan amount and maturity and the current book value of the debt. For larger firms that would have borrowed in the quasi-public or public debt markets, the information mix is likely to shrink.

early signals of when companies were in trouble and giving investors and regulators visibility into challenged companies or industries. Now, many firms and even entire industries will seek capital instead from private-credit funds. As a result, only certain asset managers will enjoy the high level of visibility into the economy that was previously more widely shared, making objective valuation by outsiders considerably more difficult.

Third, private credit will have a major impact on corporate insolvency and the process of restructuring corporate debt. The consequences will remain highly uncertain until the market is tested by a major correction. Nonetheless, we advance several hypotheses, based on the idea that private credit represents a tradeoff between (1) the benefits of potentially better monitoring of corporate borrowers and lower debt renegotiation costs and (2) the costs of greater opacity and greater risk of misvaluation by outsiders.

First, to the extent that private credit increases the size of the corporate-debt pie (by providing leverage to new borrowers and adding more leverage to existing borrowers), the rise of private credit should produce more episodes of corporate financial distress and insolvency. Second, however, among firms that *are* financially distressed, private credit should lead to fewer bankruptcies. The structure of private credit deals – with fewer lenders at the bargaining table – could solve some of the coordination problems and creditor conflicts that plague workout talks for large firms and require the bankruptcy process for resolution. In addition, some private credit lenders are more willing than traditional banks to take over ownership of distressed firms or their assets. To the extent that private credit replaces traditional banks for smaller loans to middle market borrowers, therefore, it may offer a new bargaining counterparty that is better able to restructure deals, own assets and inject new capital when necessary. Third, and counterintuitively, for some subset of corporate borrowers, private credit may *delay* resolution of the firm's financial distress

inefficiently. As discussed above, in most cases private credit should result in *faster* renegotiation and restructuring than public and quasi-public debt, by reducing collective action costs. Unlike investors in public and quasi-public debt, however, private credit lenders sometimes have both the incentive and the ability to avoid taking or marking losses on their loan portfolio, and to forbear instead indefinitely in the hope that the borrower's condition improves. Such incentives raise the risk of so-called "zombie firms" among private-credit borrowers. At this stage, we do not know enough to gauge the severity of this risk.

When bankruptcies *do* occur among private-credit borrowers, the process of restructuring corporate debt will look very different from the market-based practices that dominated corporate financial distress in the prior world of dispersed and traded debt.²⁹ Over the course of the 2000s, investors in quasi-public debt embraced specialized roles, ushering in an industry of expert investors who specialized in buying distressed debt and helping firms reorganize.³⁰ Bankruptcy judges embraced a more passive, procedural role that relied on "market checks" and the presence of sophisticated investors to guide firms through Chapter 11 processes. In a world where debt no longer trades and where information on corporate borrowers is less widely shared, the core assumption that enabled this ecosystem and set of legal procedures to develop will unravel, and the biases and idiosyncrasies of private-investment funds (and their sponsors) will dominate the landscape of financial distress. We argue that as markets fade, bankruptcy judges may need to assert a more muscular role in administering bankruptcy law as a safety valve to promote efficient asset reallocation

²⁹ See *infra* Section V.C.

³⁰ See Wei Jiang, Kai Li & Wei Wang, *Hedge Funds and Chapter 11*, 67 J. FIN. 513, 513-15 (2012).

This Article explores the reemergence of a new form of relationship-based lending, which promises profound consequences for the future of corporate governance and corporate finance. Before proceeding, however, we briefly review the extant literature on private credit, focusing particularly on the direct-lending approach, whereby private-credit funds originate and hold loans to companies themselves, rather than simply participating in bank-arranged financing.

Legal scholarship on private credit is surprisingly sparse. Most recently, Narine Lalafaryan directly examined the role of private credit in corporate governance and corporate finance.³¹ She compared private credit to commercial banking along a variety of measures and concluded that private credit can be efficient for firms, notwithstanding potential conflicts with the interests of their equity holders.³² Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, and Jeremy McClane briefly described some of the characteristics of direct loans, based on interviews with finance lawyers.³³ In early and prescient papers, William Birdthistle and M. Todd Henderson in 2009 and Andrew Tuch in 2017 observed that large private-equity firms were increasingly sponsoring private-credit funds, and they discussed the associated conflicts of interest.³⁴ Another strand of the legal literature, including recent work by Patrick Corrigan, examines the risks and opportunities of “shadow banking” generally, which under some definitions includes private credit.³⁵

³¹ See generally Narine Lalafaryan, *Private Credit: A Renaissance in Corporate Finance*, J. CORP. L. STUD. 1 (2024).

³² See *id.* at 1-6.

³³ See Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili & Jeremy McClane, *The Lost Promise of Private Ordering*, 109 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38-42 (2023).

³⁴ See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, *One Hat Too Many? Investment Desegregation in Private Equity*, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 45-49 (2009); Andrew F. Tuch, *The Remaking of Wall Street*, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315, 342-45 (2017).

³⁵ See, e.g., Patrick M. Corrigan, *Shining a Light on Shadow Banks*, 49 J. CORP. L. 1 (2023); Tobias Adrian, *Shadow Banking and Market Based Finance*, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 14, 2017), <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/09/13/sp091417-shadow-banking-and-market-based-finance> [<https://perma.cc/MA4Q-937C>] (noting that shadow banking “is often thought to comprise private credit intermediation occurring outside the formal banking system”); Leah Downey, *If Shadow Banking Looks Like a Duck...*, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2024), <https://www.ft.com/content/f6c1acf3-f100-4952-842d-f5adebb0fb24> [<https://perma.cc/9JT7-J9DU1>] (“The new boom industry of ‘private credit’ is undeniably one form of [shadow banking].”).

The financial-economics literature examining private-credit funds and their direct-lending investment strategy is more extensive but remains nascent. One strand of this literature focuses on the performance or other characteristics of private-credit funds themselves.³⁶ Some scholars have used private data from the large institutional investors and analytics providers that allocate capital to them,³⁷ and others have conducted surveys of the asset managers that sponsor them.³⁸ A second strand focuses on the smaller set of private-credit funds that are publicly traded business-development companies (“BDCs”), using these funds’ SEC filings to examine their behavior, as we do in Section III.B.³⁹ A third strand examines the characteristics of the loans extended by private-credit funds that adopt a direct-lending strategy.⁴⁰ A final strand ties the rise of direct lending to regulatory arbitrage around tighter bank regulation.⁴¹

³⁶ See Isil Erel, Thomas Flanagan & Michael S. Weisbach, *Risk-Adjusting the Returns to Private Debt Funds* 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 32278, 2024), <https://www.nber.org/papers/w32278> [<https://perma.cc/FGL6-7K83>].

³⁷ See Shawn Munday, Wendy Hu, Tobias True & Jian Zhang, *Performance of Private Credit Funds: A First Look*, J. ALT. INVS., Fall 2018, at 31.

³⁸ See Joern Block, Young Soo Jang, Steven N. Kaplan & Anna Schulze, *A Survey of Private Debt Funds* 1 (Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ., Working Paper No. 2023-10, 2023), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4336493> [<https://perma.cc/E5XW-CXF3>].

³⁹ See, e.g., Tetiana Davydiuk, Tatyana Marchuk & Samuel Rosen, *Direct Lenders in the U.S. Middle Market*, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568718> [<https://perma.cc/G7SC-PC2H>]; Tetiana Davydiuk, Tatyana Marchuk & Samuel Rosen, *Market Discipline in the Direct Lending Space*, 37 REV. FIN. STUD. 1190, 1191 (2024).

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Maria Loumioti, *Direct Lending: The Determinants, Characteristics and Performance of Direct Loans* 1-6 (May 2022) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3450841> [<https://perma.cc/2D6S-5T3Y>]; Young Soo Jang, *Are Direct Lenders More Like Banks or Arm’s-Length Investors?* 1-4 (Jan. 2024) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529656> [<https://perma.cc/4EH7-2GPR>]; Sergey Chernenko, Isil Erel & Robert Prilmeier, *Why Do Firms Borrow Directly from Nonbanks?*, 35 REV. FIN. STUD. 4902, 4905-06 (2022); Axel Buchner, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Armin Schwienbacher, *Private Equity Debt Funds: Who Wins, Who Loses?* 6 (May 21, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4118522> [<https://perma.cc/H9KE-RMRA>].

⁴¹ See, e.g., Chernenko et al., *supra* note 37, at 4906; Isil Erel & Eduard Inozemtsev, *Evolution of Debt Financing Toward Less-Regulated Financial Intermediaries in the United States* 2 (Fisher Coll. of Bus. Working Paper No. 2022-03-004, 2024), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4151880> [<https://perma.cc/M2GL-3VLE>]; Laura Fritsch, Wayne Lim, Alexander Montag & Martin C. Schmalz, *Direct Lending: Evidence from European and U.S. Markets*, 24 J. ALT. INV. 80 (2022); Sooji Kim, Matthew C. Plosser & João A.C. Santos, *Macroprudential Policy and the Revolving Door of Risk: Lessons from Leveraged Lending Guidance*, 34 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 17, 17 (2018); Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, *The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending* 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 32176, 2024), <https://www.nber.org/papers/w32176> [<https://perma.cc/HHM4-DCKQ>].

This Article departs from the extant literature by situating private credit within the broader context of how our capital markets are evolving. Viewed in isolation, private credit can be described simply as an alternative source of financing for borrowers ranging from small middle-market firms all the way to very large firms. As we discuss, the success of private credit likely rests on certain efficiencies gained when corporate debt is funded by a single lender using long-term, locked-in capital from institutional investors, rather than by a bank using short-term customer deposits or by dispersed, passive creditors in the debt markets.

Viewed within the overall evolution of the capital markets, however, private credit is the final major step in the extraordinary movement of firms and capital out of the public trading markets and into the hands of private investment funds—a trend that began only a few decades ago. As yet, this particular version of the story has no conclusion. We do not know whether private capital will render the public markets largely obsolete, other than for the very largest companies, or whether firms and investors will cycle endlessly between public and private capital as regulation, efficiencies, and pathologies in each market ebb and flow. If private credit does emerge as a clear victor in the long run, perhaps firms no longer require public disclosure or trading markets to function efficiently, thanks to the genius of the private-investment-fund structure. Alternatively, perhaps letting all of corporate finance “go dark” will result in misallocated capital and less productive firms in the long run. It is too early to know. In the meantime, we should keep a very close watch on private credit—the final piece of this puzzle.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys the evolution of corporate debt *prior to* the rise of private credit, whereby relationship lending by banks transformed into syndicated lending.

Part III describes the explosive rise of private credit and presents new data documenting it. A key challenge to understanding the phenomenon is that, by design, private-credit funds produce very little public information. To overcome that challenge partially, we have created new machine-reading models to examine evidence from one publicly visible slice of the market: the private-credit loans held by publicly traded BDCs. Among other findings, we show that, between 2010 and 2022, the assets deployed by private-credit BDCs have increased by a factor of more than ten, and the number of private-credit loans made by those funds grew from 1,395 to nearly 20,182.

Part IV considers the potential advantages of private credit relative to the public and quasi-public debt markets, focusing on the three key players in a private-credit transaction: the borrower, the debt investors, and the asset manager. Part V predicts the major consequences of the rise of private credit for corporate governance, corporate information production, and corporate finance. The Article then concludes.

II. A BRIEF (RECENT) HISTORY OF CORPORATE DEBT

After remaining stable in form for decades, if not centuries, the business of corporate lending changed dramatically in the last decade of the twentieth century. This Part describes how, from roughly 1990 to 2010, much of corporate borrowing went from private to quasi-public, from illiquid to liquid, from relationship-based to market-based, and from bank-originated to dispersed. We begin in Section II.A by describing the traditional bank-dominated world of corporate debt. Then, in Section II.B, we discuss how that world gave way to traded loans and a capital-market model for debt in the late twentieth century.

In Section II.C, we analyze the consequences of the shift from relationship lending by banks to quasi-public debt, with a focus on three consequences in particular. First, it allowed a much larger and more diverse group of investors to invest in corporate debt, which transformed corporate

governance. Second, the machinery of those debt markets produced a great deal of information about firms and disseminated it among dispersed investors, especially by making trading prices visible. Third, tradable debt reshaped the administration of bankruptcy law.

A. The Traditional Approach: Relationship Lending

Until recently, the story of commercial lending was a story about banks. Businesses that needed capital and chose to borrow money rather than bring on new owners had traditionally looked to banks as their direct or indirect source of funds.⁴² Firms come in different sizes, however, and the possible and desirable forms of debt financing for a very large, well-known company and for a small, family-owned business may differ greatly. As a result, debt financing was traditionally bifurcated into two distinct forms. Small private companies could only borrow from banks on a secured basis.⁴³ By contrast, large public companies could borrow cheaply by issuing unsecured bonds to the general public.⁴⁴ These large, public bond issuances were typically underwritten by major investment banks.⁴⁵

In both cases, therefore, banks were at the center of corporate debt: in the first case as the direct source of capital, and in the second as the intermediary between firms and the bondholders who were the source of capital. But few firms ever grow large enough to issue bonds publicly, so the vast majority of debt financing was provided directly by commercial banks under the first model.⁴⁶ This approach—whereby a business obtains most or all the debt capital that it needs from

⁴² See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., *The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks*, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 379 (2002).

⁴³ See William W. Bratton, *Bond and Loan Covenants, Theory and Practice*, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 461, 477-78 (2016).

⁴⁴ See Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, *A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds*, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 457-59 (1999).

⁴⁵ See *id.*

⁴⁶ See Douglas W. Diamond, *Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring*, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 393, 393 (1984).

a single bank—is often referred to as “relationship lending.”⁴⁷ For decades, banking regulation and scholarship centered on relationship lending as the paradigm of corporate debt.

As with all methods of financing, relationship lending should be thought of as a financing technology that arose to solve a particular problem: in this case, the problem of risky businesses that needed capital to grow but provided outsiders with little visibility into their business models.⁴⁸ Banks could provide the needed capital at an acceptable cost to the business by reducing the lending risk in three main ways: (1) using the bank’s expertise in commercial lending to screen and monitor the borrowing firm throughout the life of the loan (to ensure a creditworthy borrower); (2) taking a security interest in the firm’s assets (to maximize the chances of recovery if the borrower ended up in financial distress); and (3) imposing tight covenants on the borrowing firm in the loan or credit agreement (to limit moral hazard by the borrower once the loan was extended).⁴⁹

The basic paradigm of commercial banking in turn shaped the basic features of the loan market. By investing substantial time and resources in screening and monitoring a borrower, a bank acquired considerable private information about the borrower’s business and creditworthiness, giving the bank sufficient comfort to extend the loan.⁵⁰ The knowledge gleaned from the relationship was specific to that company and to that bank, however, and could not be credibly transferred to another lender.⁵¹ As a result, bank loans were traditionally *illiquid*: the bank would hold the loan to maturity, rather than selling some or all of it off to someone else. Bank loans were

⁴⁷ See Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, *Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game*, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 899, 913-14 (1994).

⁴⁸ See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, *An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting*, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473, 473-74 (1992).

⁴⁹ See Bratton, *supra* note 43, at 463, 470, 474.


⁵⁰ See Diamond, *supra* note 46, at 393.

⁵¹ See *id.* at 398.

also at the far “private” end of the spectrum between private and public capital: each loan created a bilateral, bespoke, and often long-term relationship between bank and borrower.⁵²

In sum, the characteristic features of relationship lending are (1) close interactions and sharing of information between the borrowing company and the bank over a long period of time; (2) secured debt; (3) tight covenants; (4) expert screening and monitoring by the bank; and (5) illiquidity.⁵³

Figure 1. Relationship Lending.



Of course, the dominance of banks in commercial lending presented a tradeoff. Firms and regulators had to weigh the advantages of banks’ expertise and bespoke tailoring of lending arrangements against the disadvantages of limited competition, opacity, and illiquidity. During the 1990s, however, the relationship-lending model was rapidly replaced by liquid, quasi-public lending markets; the decline of banks and the rise of passive, nonbank lenders; and dispersed ownership. This shift, described in the next Section, is the story of how the relationship lending model that characterized secured borrowing came to be supplanted by something that more closely resembled its opposite, namely public bonds.

⁵² *Id.* at 393.

⁵³ See YENER ALTUNBAS, BLAISE GANDANEZ & ALPER KARA, SYNDICATED LOANS: A HYBRID OF RELATIONSHIP LENDING AND PUBLICLY TRADED DEBT 100-104 (2006).

B. The Shift to Syndicated Lending and High-Yield Bonds—or “Quasi-Public” Debt

Financial innovation eventually upended the model of relationship lending that had endured for centuries, as the cloistered world of bank-dominated finance gave way to a more market-oriented and less clubby world of corporate debt. Over roughly the last four decades, a large swath of commercial lending has shifted from relationship lending to new debt markets, which came to be referred to as “syndicated lending” (for secured loans) and “high-yield bonds,” each of which we explain below. This transition has allowed large sums of capital to be deployed for corporate loans, resulting in a debt market that could accommodate more borrowers and more debt. Most importantly for our purposes, the transitions we describe in this Section pushed much of corporate borrowing from the private markets to quasi-public markets and toppled banks’ monopoly on commercial lending.

Crucial changes to both the supply and the demand for commercial loans drove the shift from relationship lending to debt markets. On the supply side, deregulation blurred the lines between commercial lending and investment banking, and bank capital requirements changed, incentivizing diversification and liquidity in bank portfolios.⁵⁴ This pushed banks to develop a lending structure in which they could sell off all or part of the loans that they had originated, as well as buy into loans that others had originated.⁵⁵ It also allowed nonbank investors to enter the business of making corporate loans.⁵⁶ On the demand side, the explosion of mergers and acquisitions that began with the 1980s buyout boom—much of it driven by the private-equity industry—created a need for massive, risky corporate debt that could be arranged relatively quickly

⁵⁴ See Wilmarth, *supra* note 4242, at 379.

⁵⁵ See Katerina Simons, *Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?*, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 45, 45.

⁵⁶ See *id.* at 45-46.

and subsequently traded.⁵⁷ This demand contributed to two major innovations in corporate debt: the “high-yield” (or “junk”) market for bonds and, eventually, syndicated loans for commercial lending.⁵⁸

High-yield bonds are simply notes—most often unsecured—that are issued by highly leveraged borrowers and traded in the capital markets.⁵⁹ These borrowers do not retain control over trading in these notes, and the bondholders are passive investors who have no relationship with the borrower.⁶⁰ While high-yield bonds innovated in developing a market for the debt of high-risk borrowers, they were not particularly innovative in terms of lending structure, given that they very closely resemble typical public bonds.⁶¹ Syndicated loans, on the other hand, represented a radical departure from traditional secured debt.⁶²

A syndicated loan is funded by a potentially large group of lenders, rather than a single bank.⁶³ The syndicated-loan market grew in tandem with the high-yield bond market, but was originally a world in which banks originated loans for other banks.⁶⁴ This changed in 1989, when a bank found itself in need of additional participants for a risky loan and began marketing it to insurance companies, and then, even more radically, to *nonbank* institutional investors such as loan mutual funds and securitization vehicles referred to as collateralized-loan-obligation (CLO)

⁵⁷ See Ulf Axelson, Per Strömberg & Michael S. Weisbach, *Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds*, 64 J. FIN. 1549, 1570 (2009) (explaining why private equity funds finance each acquisition of a portfolio company with considerable new debt).

⁵⁸ See Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, *Evolution of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets*, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 21, 22-23 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007).

⁵⁹ See GLENN YAGO, JUNK BONDS: HOW HIGH YIELD SECURITIES RESTRUCTURED CORPORATE AMERICA 20-26 (1991).

⁶⁰ For more on the history of the high-yield bond market, see *id.*

⁶¹ See Hendrik Bessembinder & William Maxwell, *Markets: Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market*, 22 J. ECON. PERSPS. 217, 217-24 (2008).


⁶² See Elisabeth de Fontenay, *Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market*, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 727 (2014).

⁶³ See Simons, *supra* note 5555, at 45.

⁶⁴ See Lee, *supra* note 8.

funds.⁶⁵ With syndicated lending, banks shifted from being loan *originators*, where their role is to monitor loans closely until maturity, to loan *underwriters*, where their role is to assemble and coordinate a large group of creditors and sell the loan to them. From the banks' perspective, the shift from relationship lending to syndicated lending is therefore a paradigm shift from "originate-to-hold" to "originate-to-distribute."⁶⁶

Figure 2. Syndicated Lending.



By the onset of the late-2000s global financial crisis, syndicated lending had grown to be a multitrillion-dollar market, exceeding the bond market as a source of debt finance for large corporations.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ See *id.* (discussing the need of Chemical Bank to find participants for a \$1.72 billion leveraged-buyout loan).

⁶⁶ See Vitaly M. Bord & João A. C. Santos, *The Rise of the Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Role of Banks in Financial Intermediation*, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REV., July 2012, at 21. One banker who worked in the space at the time of the transition notes: "The old saying was [that banks] weren't [now] in the storage business, they were in the moving business." Lee, *supra* note 8.

⁶⁷ See Seung Jung Lee, Lucy Qian Liu & Viktors Stebunovs, Risk-Taking and Interest Rates: Evidence from Decades in the Syndicated Loan Market 33 fig.1 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 17/16, 2017) (showing the syndicated-loan market far exceeding the corporate-bond market in 2006-2007).

The large lender groups characteristic of syndicated lending necessitated fundamental changes to the commercial-lending approach. Lenders became relatively more passive investors rather than active monitors.⁶⁸ Borrower covenants were loosened (and, in the case of maintenance covenants, largely abandoned) to avoid costly renegotiations of credit agreements.⁶⁹ Because these changes occurred during a period of declining and historically low interest rates, they were also accompanied by a surge in borrower bargaining power and control, a decline in underwriting standards, and a shift from lending against borrower assets to lending against borrower cashflows.⁷⁰

How did these large lending groups of nonbank investors become comfortable lending under this new structure? In effect, syndicated lending succeeded by changing the primary means of reducing lender risk: it substituted liquidity and diversification for the close borrower monitoring and tight covenants that had characterized relationship lending.⁷¹ Because syndicated loans could be traded in a liquid market, lenders could focus less on minimizing credit risk and more on simply ensuring that whatever credit risk a borrower presented was appropriately priced.⁷² In any event, the model was wildly successful and took the secured-debt markets from a model of private debt into a world of quasi-public debt. The combination of liquidity and large, diverse lending groups lowered the cost of debt capital, all else equal, allowing for more borrowing by more borrowers.⁷³ Most remarkably, with syndicated lending the commercial-loan market came to resemble its

⁶⁸ But see Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, *Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value*, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713 (2012) (showing that syndicated lenders take actions that change firm behavior in the wake of covenant defaults).

⁶⁹ See Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, *The Role of Private Equity Group Reputation in LBO Financing*, 96 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 306-09 (2010) (describing the rapid disappearance and loosening of financial covenants in leveraged loans).

⁷⁰ See Victoria Ivashina & Boris Vallee, *Weak Credit Covenants* 2 n.2, 9 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27316, 2020).

⁷¹ See Charles K. Whitehead, *The Evolution of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance*, 34 J. CORP. L. 641, 643 (2009).

⁷² See *id.* at 662.

⁷³ See Victoria Ivashina & David Scharfstein, *Loan Syndication and Credit Cycles*, 100 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 57, 57 (2010).

historical opposite, the bond market.⁷⁴ In both cases, corporate debt transformed into a liquid financial instrument, creditors became dispersed and passive, and the major banks' involvement was largely limited to assembling the creditor group and reading the markets—a stark departure from relationship lending. In retrospect, therefore, the late 2000s and early 2010s marked the historical high point of traded, dispersed leveraged credit.

C. Effects on Corporate Information and Bankruptcy

The shift from relationship lending to quasi-public debt did not just radically alter corporate finance. By dragging commercial lending into the trading markets and allowing more investors to participate, it had other profound but less-discussed impacts on firms and investment. In this Section, we discuss the consequences for (1) the level of information in the markets and (2) corporate distress and insolvency. We focus on these two additional features of dispersed, traded debt because the recent emergence of private credit calls each into question.

i. Corporate Information Production

First, firms that sought to borrow money from the syndicated-loan market generated significantly more information and disseminated it more widely than firms borrowing from a single bank. When a loan is expected to be syndicated, an investment bank typically conducts a process to find investors for the loan, which usually means sharing proprietary financial information.⁷⁵ The borrower may also need to obtain a credit rating, requiring the borrower to share additional information and the ratings agency to produce a rating for public consumption.⁷⁶ Additionally,

⁷⁴ See Hugh Thomas & Zhiqiang Wang, *The Integration of Bank Syndicated Loan and Junk Bond Markets*, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 299, 300–301, 306 fig.2 (2004).

⁷⁵ See Christophe J. Godlewski, *Duration of Loan Arrangement and Syndicate Structure* 6 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1152726 [<https://perma.cc/UDY3-UTKR>] (discussing the syndicated-lending “roadshow” process, which involves sharing an “information memorandum”).

⁷⁶ See Amir Sufi, *The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings*, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1659, 1662–63 (2009) (discussing the importance of bank credit ratings for borrowers).

research analysts have incentives to continue studying the company, as investors will trade the debt in an active secondary market even after the firm borrows the money.⁷⁷

The active secondary market in democratized debt produces information in other ways as well. Investors can learn about firms and their prospects by studying the record of trading prices, which also informs how investors think about other companies in the same industry or with similar characteristics.⁷⁸ Regulators, too, can observe these price signals and identify sources of risk. Moreover, trading in debt can create spillovers to trading in other securities, as investors use what they learn about the borrower to trade in the equity or debt market.⁷⁹

The debt markets created by the shift from relationship banking to loan syndication and high-yield bonds therefore generate and disseminate considerable information about U.S. companies to investors, the general public, and regulators. These markets cannot truly rival the public-securities markets, where corporate disclosure is mandated by law. Nor will the bonds, and especially loans, trade as actively as public equities, making the former markets less informationally efficient than the latter.⁸⁰ Nonetheless, we can fairly describe them as “quasi-public” by virtue of their capacity to produce information and to invite broad participation by investors.

⁷⁷ See Frank J. Fabozzi, Sven Klingler, Pia Mølgaard & Mads Stenbo Nielsen, *Active Loan Trading*, 46 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION art. no. 100868, at 1, 4 (2021) (describing the bank-loan trading market).

⁷⁸ For example, observers noted the fall in PG&E’s public bond prices as reflecting financial distress. See Allison McNeely, Claire Boston & Mark Chediak, *PG&E Gets Second Junk Grade After Moody’s Credit Downgrade*, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2019, 5:07 PM EST), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-10/pg-e-gets-second-junk-grade-after-moody-s-downgrades-on-wildfire> [<https://perma.cc/B565-MUCK>].

⁷⁹ See Victoria Ivashina & Zheng Sun, *Institutional Shock Trading on Loan Market Information*, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 284, 285 (2011) (discussing trading in the equity market based on information that investors learn in their capacity as lenders).

⁸⁰ See generally M. Konrad Borowicz, *The Mechanisms of Loan Market Efficiency*, 41 REV. BANK. FIN. L. 1 (2021-2022). (lower liquidity in the loan market reduces the relative informativeness of the record of past prices and the efficiency of the price signals that the markets produce).

ii. Corporate Distress and Bankruptcy

Perhaps the most important way that democratized debt finance has changed the life cycle of American corporations is through its impact on the process of financial distress. The days when large companies would simply call their relationship bank to discuss their financial troubles are long past. Instead, what has emerged is a market-based process for resolving financial distress.

As a threshold matter, the number of firms encountering financial distress is likely higher now than it was in earlier periods when debt was more precious. As secured debt became tradable and large pools of capital participated in the lending process, credit became more available. In response, and firms in certain industries have taken on higher and higher levels of debt, doing so for shareholder returns (that is, boosting risk and return), rather than operational reasons (like temporarily bridging low-cash periods).⁸¹ At the same time, as firms wind up filing for bankruptcy because of investor miscalculations about firms' debt capacity rather than deep failures at the core of their business models, the bankruptcy system has become more central to corporate finance.

Subsequently, when firms fall into financial distress, their tradable, dispersed debt complicates the bargaining environment. Investors and borrowers have devised increasingly intricate capital structures that go far beyond the simple model of a firm with a single bank lender.⁸² For example, a highly leveraged borrower may be financed with an elaborate combination of senior secured loans (divided into multiple facilities and multiple tranches, and with liens of different priority on the same collateral) and unsecured high-yield notes (both senior and subordinated). The proliferation and increasing complexity of debt has made resolving a firm's financial distress

⁸¹ See Axelson, Strömberg & Weisbach, *supra* note 57, at 1551.

⁸² See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Christina Scully, *J. Crew, Nine West, and the Complexities of Financial Distress*, 131 YALE L.J. F. 363, 363, 366 (2021).

costly. Complex capital structures with numerous creditors create collective-action problems and conflicting incentives, often leading to fierce intercreditor battles in distressed firms.⁸³

Given the complexity of distress, many investors who directly fund corporate loans at the origination stage often anticipate selling their claims if the firm falls into financial distress. Accordingly, a new industry of expert distressed investors emerged alongside the syndicated-loan market. These experts specialize in buying pieces of distressed loans, aggregating those pieces into larger “positions,” and then bargaining with the debtor to achieve investment goals.⁸⁴ The rise of expert distressed investors dramatically changed the contours of negotiations when firms fell into financial distress, as they brought a level of aggression and sophistication that was previously uncommon in the more genteel world of money-center banks.

Bankruptcy judges have reacted to the entrance of sophisticated and specialized distressed investors by dialing back traditional oversight and relying much more on “market checks.”⁸⁵ This is an important shift in the administration of bankruptcy law, which relies (as a matter of statutory design) on empowered federal judges and the adversarial system to work through questions. Claims trading has allowed activist distressed investors to pioneer tactics like aggressive bankruptcy-financing packages, specialized independent directors, and aggressive uses of

⁸³ See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, *Antibankruptcy*, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 692-93 (2010); Jared A. Ellias, *Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing*, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 493, 494-96 (2016); Ayotte & Scully, *supra* note 82, at 373-76; Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, *Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11*, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 512-13 (2009).

⁸⁴ See Victoria Ivashina, Benjamin Iverson & David C. Smith, *The Ownership and Trading of Debt Claims in Chapter 11 Restructurings*, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 316, 317 (2016) (describing claims trading); Jared A. Ellias, *The Law and Economics of Investing in Bankruptcy in the United States* 6 (Feb. 10, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3578170 (describing the rise of distressed-debt investors as part of the ecosystem of corporate finance); Jared A. Ellias, *Bankruptcy Claims Trading*, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 772, 795 (2018).

⁸⁵ For a discussion of different strategies investors have developed to break the bankruptcy regulatory paradigm, see generally Ken Ayotte & Jared Ellias, *Bankruptcy Teams* (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

settlement powers that reduce the bankruptcy judge's role from aggressive oversight to procedural box checking.⁸⁶

For an example of how judicial oversight has yielded to markets, consider the way bankruptcy law now treats a central question in most cases: how a restructuring should be financed.⁸⁷ In recent years, the lenders who fund reorganizations have used the loan contract essentially to dictate the outcome of the case, making both the economic terms of the loan and the contractual requirements extremely important.⁸⁸ For example, the drugstore chain Rite Aid filed for bankruptcy in 2023 with a financing package that required the company to explore selling certain assets and closing certain stores.⁸⁹ Bankruptcy law would seem to require rigorous judicial oversight of any proposed financing that provides the new lender with a senior claim to prebankruptcy creditors, as nearly all bankruptcy financings do.⁹⁰ A debtor is obligated to prove, among other things, that the proposed financing is the best possible loan the company could get and that the interests of the prebankruptcy creditors are protected.⁹¹ The problem, previously recognized by other commentators, is that it is very difficult to obtain the information necessary to satisfy these requirements, which provides the existing prebankruptcy creditor with near-monopoly power over the opportunity to lend.⁹²

⁸⁶ See, e.g., Jared A. Elias, Ehud Kamar & Kobi Kastiel, *The Rise of Bankruptcy Directors*, 95 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1089 (2023) (discussing the use of independent directors to shield conflicted transactions from judicial scrutiny).

⁸⁷ See Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Elias, *Bankruptcy Process for Sale*, 39 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 4-7 (2022); George G. Triantis, *A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing*, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 902-04 (1993).

⁸⁸ See Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, *Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider*, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1585-87 (2013).

⁸⁹ See Debtors' Motion for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (i) Authorizing the Debtors to (a) Obtain Postpetition Financing and (b) Utilize Cash Collateral, (ii) Granting Liens and Superpriority Administrative Expense Claims, (iii) Granting Adequate Protection, (iv) Modifying the Automatic Stay, (v) Scheduling a Final Hearing, and (vi) Granting Related Relief at 18, *In re Rite Aid Corp.*, No. 23-18993 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2023).

⁹⁰ See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (2024); Frederick Tung, *Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market Conditions, and the Financial Crisis*, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 651, 653 (2020).

⁹¹ See 11 U.S.C. § 364(d) (2024).

⁹² See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, *Loans to Chapter 11 Firms: Contract Design, Repayment Risk and Pricing*, 66 J.L. ECON. 465, 470 (2023).

Bankruptcy judges have made peace with this problem, in part because they can count on the active market in the claims of Chapter 11 debtors to bring interested investors to the table without the law needing to do very much.⁹³ There are three reasons for this. First, active trading means that, in theory, investors with the wherewithal to fund a reorganization process or to invest in the company could find a seat at the table by buying claims.⁹⁴ Second, by acquiring even a small amount of debt, an interested investor could gain a seat at the table during prebankruptcy talks, which would allow that investor to perform due diligence on the company and to consider providing financing.⁹⁵ Third, latent competition from other creditors means that the financing that a debtor presents to a bankruptcy judge is reasonably likely to be a good offer, making the approach of the bankruptcy courts—that is, permissive and quick approval of the debtor’s proposed financing package—a defensible one, even if not ideal. Brokerage desks at banks therefore play an important role in modern corporate restructuring by creating liquidity in the debt claims of firms prior to any Chapter 11 filing.⁹⁶

In other words, claims trading allowed bankruptcy law to be administered with the assumption that the investors who valued the debtor’s business the most highly would have a seat at the table for a restructuring process. Investors who did not want to finance a reorganization would sell their claims to those who did.⁹⁷ As a result, a judge could assume that a debtor who arrived in bankruptcy without financing to reorganize was truly hopeless and deserved to liquidate. And a judge could both trust that a proposed financing was commercially reasonable and assume

⁹³ See generally Jared A. Ellias, *Bankruptcy Claims Trading*, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 772 (2018) (arguing that bankruptcy claims trading has a minimal effect on bankruptcy governance).

⁹⁴ See generally Ivashina, Iverson & Smith, *supra* note 84 (arguing that claims trading during bankruptcy proceedings influences ownership concentration).

⁹⁵ See Frederick Tung, *Confirmation and Claims Trading*, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1684, 1686 (1996).

⁹⁶ Empirical research demonstrates that trading tends to increase creditor concentration, and this concentration amplifies the likelihood of liquidity at the end of the restructuring process. See Ivashina, Iverson & Smith, *supra* note 84, at 317.

⁹⁷ See Baird & Rasmussen, *supra* note 83, at 660 (discussing the mechanics of claims trading).

that investors would be in a position to propose restructuring transactions even without the support of the debtor’s management team. As such, the move to dispersed, tradable debt has contributed to a dramatic shift in the administration of the bankruptcy system and the broader machinery of debt restructuring.

III. THE RISE OF PRIVATE CREDIT

As quick as the transition from relationship lending to quasi-public markets was, the transition back to private debt has been even more rapid, courtesy of the rise of private credit. This Part first defines private credit and describes its basic features in Section III.A. In Section III.B, it presents data on certain private-credit loans, providing an indirect glimpse at an asset class known for its lack of data.⁹⁸

A. Overview

Over the 2010s, a small group of large asset managers began to raise massive funds for an investment strategy that is sometimes referred to as “direct lending” but is often described using a broader term that also encompasses other strategies: “private credit.”⁹⁹ In this Article, we use “private credit” to describe loans to companies that are originated and funded directly by an investment fund, without a bank or any other financial intermediary playing a role in the transaction.¹⁰⁰ A key feature of private credit is that the originating fund typically intends to hold


⁹⁸ See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 53 (Apr. 2024) (calling attention to the financial stability risks posed by private credit but lamenting that “the data needed to fully analyze these risks are unavailable”).

⁹⁹ See, e.g., Matt Wirz, *The New Kings of Wall Street Aren’t Banks. Private Funds Fuel Corporate America.*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2023, 9:00 AM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/finance/fed-rate-hikes-lending-banks-hedge-funds-896cb20b> [<https://perma.cc/3BPB-LDAC>]; Nicole Melwood & Vincent Kravec, *Private Credit Today*, COMMONFUND (Oct. 31, 2023), <https://www.commonfund.org/blog/private-credit-today> [<https://perma.cc/GLX9-GYEZ>].

¹⁰⁰ See *id.*

the loan to maturity, such that the loan is not designed with an eye towards trading.¹⁰¹ In its structure, then, private credit looks virtually identical to relationship lending as depicted in Figure 1 above, with a private investment fund substituting for the bank.

Figure 3. Recent Evolution of Corporate Debt



To be sure, private credit has existed in some form for several decades. Private investment funds and other nonbank lenders have long engaged in debt investing, including by making loans directly to corporations. For example, mezzanine debt funds—so named because they extend credit that sits between senior debt and equity in terms of risk, or “intermediate” capital—have long extended unsecured loans or issued notes to middle-market companies, while other types of investment funds and private-capital vehicles have purchased and held loans or high-yield bonds that were issued to large companies in underwritten offerings.

¹⁰¹ See Melwood & Kravec, *supra* note 99 (asserting that private credit resembles “a ‘storage business’ not a ‘moving business’”).

What distinguishes the contemporary incarnation of private credit is its size and scope.¹⁰² First, private investment funds are making vastly larger loans to companies and reaching far more borrowers than ever before. Accordingly, both the number of private-credit funds and their aggregate assets under management have grown exponentially. Second, the scope of these debt investments has changed. In prior decades, private credit might have represented a relatively insignificant share, if any, of a company's debt capital. For example, a private-credit fund might have been called in to lend a small amount to a company on a highly subordinated, unsecured basis—the last piece of the debt puzzle after the bulk of the company's debt was put into place by its senior lender, the bank. Today, however, the private-credit fund may be the company's primary or even sole lender and may have arranged the company's entire debt capital structure. For this reason, most direct loans by private-credit funds today are senior secured loans, which were formerly the sole province of banks.¹⁰³ Whereas private credit previously was a complement to bank loans, syndicated loans, or high-yield bonds, it is now a substitute for these sources of funding.

Essentially, a small club of private-credit asset managers raised an extraordinary amount of capital, enabling them to make very large, direct loans to corporations that in some case have pushed out commercial banks, the syndicated-loan market, and the high-yield-bond market.¹⁰⁴ While the total number of funds engaged in the industry is high, the small club of “elite” private-credit lenders includes names better known for their private-equity businesses, such as Apollo (which has raised \$268 billion in private-credit investment funds as of October 2023), Ares (\$241 billion), Blackstone (\$206 billion), and KKR (\$78 billion).¹⁰⁵ There are also many smaller funds

¹⁰² See Wirz, *supra* note 99.

¹⁰³ INT'L MONETARY FUND, *supra* note 98, at 65.

¹⁰⁴ See Lee, *supra* note 8.

¹⁰⁵ See Wirz, *supra* note 99.

whose fundraising does not reach the level of the titans but who also play a growing role in corporate credit provision. By some measures, private credit is now a \$1.5 trillion industry.¹⁰⁶ Although it is impossible to identify with perfect accuracy the size of the industry, many observers believe that the aggregate value of assets under management for private-credit strategies is now as large, and perhaps even larger, than the syndicated-loan market.

Why this shift began in the 2010s can be explained in large part by the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. In its aftermath, banks significantly retreated from originating corporate loans, particularly the riskiest ones. This was due, first, to the comparatively stringent regulatory regime applied to banks. Increased bank regulation in the wake of the global financial crisis chilled lending from regulated banks,¹⁰⁷ providing nonregulated investment firms with the opportunity to fill gaps left by banks, especially for midmarket borrowers.¹⁰⁸ While this shift is not solely attributable to regulatory changes, a key driver of growth in private credit has been an attempt by regulators to rein in the risks taken by commercial banks,¹⁰⁹ including by requiring banks to hold additional capital against commercial loans.¹¹⁰

Second, banks also retreated from corporate lending because the market began balking at the inherent risks of banks funding long-term loans with short-term customer deposits. By contrast, the asset managers who deploy private-credit strategies raise capital from outside investors to fund

¹⁰⁶ See Jodi Xu Klein, *The \$1.5 Trillion Private-Credit Market Faces Challenges*, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2023, 7:30 AM ET), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-1-5-trillion-private-credit-market-faces-challenges-1bb555ce> [<https://perma.cc/N7LJ-SCXM>].

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, *supra* note 38.

¹⁰⁸ See Isil Erel & Eduard Inozemtsev, *supra* note 38.

¹⁰⁹ See Evan Gunter, Abby Latour, Joe Maguire, Patrick Drury Byrne, Marina Lukatsky, Matt Carroll, Elizabeth Campbell, Sebnem Caglayan & Ramki Muthukrishnan, *Private Debt: A Lesser-Known Corner of Finance Finds the Spotlight*, S&P GLOB. (Oct. 12, 2021), <https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/featured/special-editorial/private-debt> [<https://perma.cc/E6R8-K97V>].

¹¹⁰ See Thomas Kennedy, Chris Seter, Jay Serpe & Rachel Cascio, *Can Private Credit Continue to Perform?*, J.P. MORGAN PRIV. BANK (Sept. 12, 2023), <https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/nam/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/can-private-credit-continue-to-perform> [<https://perma.cc/38AH-846G>].

loans to companies.¹¹¹ Like other private funds (e.g., private-equity funds and venture-capital funds), private-credit funds receive a large proportion of their capital from institutional investors, such as pension funds, endowments, foundations, and sovereign-wealth funds.¹¹² For example, in 2022, a \$2.35 billion Apollo direct-lending fund received a \$150 million investment from the

¹¹¹ See Kat Hidalgo, *How Private Credit Gives Banks a Run for Their Money*, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2023, 11:21 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-27/what-is-private-credit-and-how-does-it-work> [https://perma.cc/YA52-D7MW]. We can generalize the structure of these investment vehicles as following one of two standard forms. First, the traditional model is to put money in locked-up “draw down” vehicles with limited liquidity and fixed redemption times. In this fund structure, investors—known as limited partners—make a commitment to fund investments for a set number of years. As the asset managers—known as “general partners”—make investments, they “draw down” the capital—hence the name. At the end of the investment period, the general partners sell the assets and return the capital to the limited partners. See Andrew Snyder, Linge Sun & Nicholas Reade, *The Potential Trade-Offs of Private Market Fund Structures: Part One*, CAIS (Apr. 6, 2023), <https://www.caisgroup.com/articles/the-potential-tradeoffs-of-evergreen-fund-structures> [https://perma.cc/V4NE-65E3]. A new type of fund structure also plays an important role in the private-credit world, the so-called Business Development Company (BDC). BDCs are “evergreen” vehicles that have no fixed life. They raise equity commitments from limited partners and make investments with this money. Limited partners can redeem their investments by selling the equity to another investor or by selling the equity back to the BDC. Returns are distributed to limited partners in the form of dividends based on owning equity in the BDC. Just as public companies do not need to worry about investors pulling their capital at a fixed date, general partners in a BDC do not need to worry about limited partners pulling their money. As a result, BDCs are particularly attractive fund structures for private-credit strategies, where the asset manager intends to operate a lending business with no fixed time horizon. See *id.* BDCs have become particularly prominent after a 2018 spending bill increased BDCs’ ability to invest with borrowed money. See Cindy Ma, Timothy Kang & Chris Cessna, *Direct Lending Update – The Evolving BDC Environment Under 2:1 Leverage*, HOULIHAN LOKEY 1 (Oct. 22, 2018), <http://cdn.hl.com/pdf/2018/direct-lending-update-2018.pdf> [https://perma.cc/ULA6-E626]. As of today, there are two primary types of BDCs. See *An Introduction to Business Development Companies*, CAIS (Aug. 22, 2023), <https://www.caisgroup.com/articles/an-introduction-to-business-development-companies> [https://perma.cc/5A6H-J85L]. The first are publicly traded BDCs, closed-end funds that raise equity and provide debt financing to corporations. For example, Ares Capital Corporation trades on the NASDAQ and, as of October 20, 2023, has a market cap of \$10.5 billion. In recent years, asset managers have also utilized a nontraded BDC structure, the most famous of which is Blackstone Private Credit Fund (or “BCRED”), which manages approximately \$54 billion. See *Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED)*, BLACKSTONE (Nov. 30, 2023), <https://www.bcred.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/blackstone-secure/BCRED-Fact-Card.pdf?v=1706816140> [https://perma.cc/THN7-FYVU]. Nontraded BDCs get capital from institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals. See Kat Hidalgo, *supra* note 106. A key advantage of this structure is that general partners are not exposed to share-price volatility risk; therefore, they can raise new equity on terms they choose rather than what public markets decide. See Robin Blumenthal, Andy Thomson & Christopher Faille, *How Well Are BDCs Navigating the Challenges?*, PRIV. DEBT INV. (Mar. 1, 2023), <https://www.privatedebtinvestor.com/how-well-are-bdcs-navigating-the-challenges> [https://perma.cc/7QLD-2LSE]. Investors may be worse off in this structure, however, as they lose the benefit of easy liquidity and trading. Rather than trading their equity stakes on the secondary market, they must redeem their stakes during fixed windows dictated by the BDC. See *Blackstone’s Credit Fund Reaches Withdrawal Limit*, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2022, 8:12 PM), <https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/blackstones-credit-fund-reaches-withdrawal-limit-2022-12-07> [https://perma.cc/UH33-G52X].

¹¹² See Hidalgo, *supra* note 106. Interestingly, asset managers are also working to increase the proportion of capital they raise from retail investors. See Sujeet Indap, *Apollo Defends Push to Retail Investors Amid Blackstone Storm*, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2022), <https://www.ft.com/content/2084e80d-8bac-4c3a-89d5-0c3eace67e32> [https://perma.cc/KZ8P-FW5Q].

Indiana Public Retirement System and a \$100 million investment from the Ohio School Employees Retirement System.¹¹³ In another example, a \$1.2 billion Blue Owl direct-lending fund received a \$275 million investment from the Regents of the University of California.¹¹⁴ Yet unlike private-equity and venture-capital funds, private-credit funds can also have as major investors financial institutions—such as banks and insurance companies—that are restricted by regulation from owning equity in companies but are allowed to own corporate debt. Pension funds, insurance companies, and other institutional investors that invest their capital in private-credit funds have long-term horizons and so are typically content to make illiquid investments for long periods of time. Private-credit funds therefore “lock in” their investors’ capital for a decade or more. This “closed-end” fund structure with no redemption rights for investors was a natural fit for making medium- to long-term corporate loans in banks’ stead.

In a prototypical private-credit loan, the corporation’s ability to borrow is constrained by the lender’s appraisal of the firm and its future prospects.¹¹⁵ For example, consider a company that a lender believes is worth \$80 based on the company’s ability to earn money in the future.¹¹⁶ Most private-credit lenders may have an informal rule of only lending against a percentage of the value of that company—referred to as the ‘loan-to-value ratio’—of perhaps 50%.¹¹⁷ Thus, this company could borrow \$40 from a private-credit lender, and the loan would typically require the borrower to pledge a first lien on substantially all of its assets to the lender, providing the lender

¹¹³ See Apollo Origination Partnership Fund I, PITCHBOOK (search run for “Apollo Origination Partners Fund I”).

¹¹⁴ See Blue Owl First Lien Fund, PITCHBOOK (search run for “Owl Rock First Lien Fund”).

¹¹⁵ Lenders typically appraise companies using various methodologies that allow the lender to guess how much the firm would be worth if it was sold as an operating asset. While some firms are valued based on their liquidation value, most companies are appraised based on an educated guess about how much money the firm will generate using its assets. See generally Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, *Valuation Disputes in Corporate Bankruptcy*, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1825-30 (2018) (discussing methods of appraising large companies).

¹¹⁶ See *id.*

¹¹⁷ David Scigliuzzo & Michelle F. Davis, *Blackstone-Led Group Provides \$5 Billion of Debt for Zendesk*, BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2022, 7:36 PM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-24/blackstone-led-group-provides-5-billion-of-debt-for-zendesk> [<https://perma.cc/D829-MAH2>].

with the first claim on the firm in the event of a bankruptcy.¹¹⁸ The private-credit lender would make this loan hoping that, if something went wrong, the firm could be sold as a going concern. While comprehensive evidence on this point is hard to identify, it appears that a key aspect of private credit is making a “deeper loan”—a loan that has a higher loan-to-value ratio than traditional first-lien secured credit and is therefore riskier.¹¹⁹ In a sense, private-credit lending combines aspects of the traditional commercial-banking products of “first-lien loans” and mezzanine finance, where mezzanine lenders traditionally extended credit that came at a high interest cost and sat just above equity in the capital structure.¹²⁰

Another key aspect of the private-credit direct-lending strategy is fund-level debt, which industry participants call “back leverage.”¹²¹ Direct-lending investment vehicles can raise additional debt at the fund level alongside their equity. Because this debt is raised at the fund level, asset managers can borrow at investment-grade levels and then deploy their capital at a much higher return.¹²² For example, as of September 30, 2023, Ares Capital Corporation had \$11.5 billion in fund-level debt at a blended 4.7% interest rate against \$21.9 billion in loans outstanding.¹²³ This borrowing is supported by equity with a book value of about \$10.8 billion,

¹¹⁸ See generally Scott, *supra* note 7 (discussing the benefit of secured lending for the lender).

¹¹⁹ For private credit lenders, this loan product is called a “unitranche” loan. See Mark Vernallis, *Your Guide for Understanding Mezzazine [sic] and Unitranche Debt*, FOCUSCFO (Jan. 20, 2023), <https://www.focuscfo.com/blog/mezzazine-and-unitranche-debt-explained> [<https://perma.cc/RR7V-TKF5>].

¹²⁰ See *id.* The concept of mezzanine debt makes the most sense in light of a traditional paradigm of debt investments. In that paradigm, “debt” is usually secured debt where the lender takes on very little risk and assumes they will liquidate the firm’s collateral for a full or substantial recovery in the event of distress. “Equity” is risk capital, where an investor takes on a partner-like share in the enterprise, hoping to share in the business’ success if all goes well. Mezzanine debt falls between these two idealized investments, as it is debt – so it has priority over shareholders in a liquidation -- but risky debt that may not receive anything in a liquidation. See generally <https://www.bondcapital.ca/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/what-is-mezzanine-finance.pdf>.

¹²¹ *NXT Capital: Under the Hood of Fund-Level Leverage*, PRIV. DEBT INV. (Sept. 2, 2019), <https://www.privatedebtinvestor.com/nxt-capital-hood-fund-level-leverage> [<https://perma.cc/JXK5-GFSG>].


¹²² See Eric Platt, *Blackstone Borrows to Boost Lending Power of \$52bn Credit Fund*, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/32dbf11f-0254-496c-8c77-c813987febeb> [<https://perma.cc/L6P9-FG8A>].

¹²³ *Annual Report (Form 10-K)*, Ares Capital Corp. 81 (Feb. 7, 2023), <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1287750/000128775021000005/arccq4-202010k.htm> [<https://perma.cc/CW4M-XK2S>].

which is mostly raised from institutional investors. In effect, by borrowing at the fund level, private-credit asset managers are able to take investment-grade loans and deploy them into relatively illiquid and riskier situations and earn the difference between the cost of investment-grade credit and speculative illiquid debt.¹²⁴ Thus, to some extent, banks have not disappeared from corporate lending entirely in a private-credit structure; rather, they have shifted away from their traditional business of lending to companies, in favor of lending to the private-credit funds that now in turn lend to companies. This structure may offer banks a risk profile preferable to making loans themselves, as they can take portfolio risk and lend against a basket of assets as opposed to a single company's assets. As such, loans to private-credit funds offer relatively low administrative costs for banks seeking to diversify their credit exposure.

¹²⁴ See *How Debt Fund Managers Can Make Back Leverage Work Amid Volatility*, REAL EST. CAP. EUR. (Feb. 15, 2023), <https://www.recapitalnews.com/how-debt-fund-managers-can-make-back-leverage-work-amid-volatility> [<https://perma.cc/8C88-SXXM>].

Figure 4. Structure of a Private-Credit Fund



Over the years, direct lending has grown from highly bespoke opportunistic financing chiefly for middle-market borrowers into a new way to finance massive corporate transactions.¹²⁵ For example, in July 2021, Blackstone Credit committed \$1.8 billion of a \$2 billion first-lien term loan used for a shareholder dividend of a large education-software business.¹²⁶ As the size of the checks has grown, the market is gradually transitioning to feature more “club deals,” transactions where multiple private-credit asset managers join together to make a bigger loan than would

¹²⁵ See *Large Private Credit Transactions Are on the Rise with Blackstone at the Forefront of the Trend*, BLACKSTONE, <https://web.archive.org/web/20230331103110/https://www.bcred.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2021/09/Trend-Towards-Large-Private-Financings.pdf> [https://perma.cc/PW8Y-KR96].

¹²⁶ *Portfolio*, BLACKSTONE, <https://www.bcred.com/portfolio> [https://perma.cc/7UNY-AA2E] (discussing the Cambium transaction).

otherwise be possible.¹²⁷ For example, in 2023, Vista Equity, a private-equity sponsor, arranged a direct loan of \$4.8 billion from four different lenders to fund the acquisition of a financial-services company.¹²⁸

When discussing private credit, this Article mostly envisions the prototypical case of a closed-end, private investment fund that directly originates loans to companies and holds them to maturity. Yet we acknowledge the folly of generalizing about private credit, as the reality is far messier, and private credit itself is changing so rapidly. As this Article goes to print, we note five significant trends that may alter the future of the industry.

The first is the proliferation of smaller funds as new entrants move into the field.¹²⁹ While the same alternative asset managers that sponsor private-equity funds extend the majority of private-credit lending, a number of traditional asset managers and financial institutions have launched direct-lending funds to move into the space, underscoring the increasing centrality of private credit to corporate finance.¹³⁰ For example, Allianz, an insurance company, has launched a \$1.6 billion direct-lending fund.¹³¹ Wells Fargo has partnered with Centerbridge, a private-equity

¹²⁷ See Lisa Lee & John Sage, *Private Credit Loans Are Growing Bigger and Breaking Records*, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 17, 2023, 10:09 AM EDT), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-08-17/private-credit-loans-are-growing-bigger-and-breaking-records> [<https://perma.cc/888P-77SC>] (providing figures on financing raised for refinancing of a broadly syndicated loan to Finastra Group Holdings).

¹²⁸ See *id.*

¹²⁹ See Huw van Steenis, *Private Credit Boom Will Trigger a New Squeeze*, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/b8e151c7-7302-4464-bc49-5091df86ec40> [<https://perma.cc/9LW5-P532>].

¹³⁰ See *id.*

¹³¹ See Pablo Mayo Cerquerio, *Allianz Bolsters Private Credit Bet with New \$1.6 Bln Fund*, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2023, 12:38 PM EDT), <https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/allianz-bolsters-private-credit-bet-with-new-16-bln-fund-2023-08-18> [<https://perma.cc/U7SB-RBUN>].

fund known for distressed investing, to launch a \$5 billion direct-lending fund.¹³² In January 2023, JP Morgan announced a \$10 billion direct-lending fund.¹³³

Second, at the same time as the number of smaller funds is increasing, the largest funds are growing and becoming capable of making extraordinarily large loans.¹³⁴ For example, Apollo's private-credit business increased from \$75 billion in 2018 to \$268 billion in October 2023.¹³⁵ In the same period, Ares's private credit grew from \$75 billion to \$241 billion and Blackstone's private credit grew from \$64 billion to \$206 billion.¹³⁶

Third, at least some portion of the industry appears to be converging with practices more familiar in syndicated lending. Some investment banks are considering building trading businesses to promote liquidity in private-credit loans.¹³⁷ To support this effort, Moody's, a major ratings agency, plans to open a private-credit rating desk.¹³⁸ Finally, a commercial loan originated by a single private-credit fund may occasionally be refinanced in the quasi-public markets by a broad syndicate of lenders, depending on conditions in each market. To the extent these efforts are successful, they will erode some of the key features distinguishing private credit from syndicated finance.

¹³² See Matt Tracy & David French, *Wells Fargo Teams with PE Firm Centerbridge for \$5 Bln Lending Fund*, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2023, 10:36 PM EDT), <https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/centerbridge-teams-up-with-wells-fargo-launch-direct-lending-fund-2023-09-26> [<https://perma.cc/5ENA-RERA>].

¹³³ See *JPMorgan Begins Private Lending Drive with \$10 Billion—Source*, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2023, 12:25 AM EST), <https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/jpmorgan-begins-private-lending-drive-with-10-billion-source-2023-01-19> [<https://perma.cc/ZB9J-PT9U>].

¹³⁴ See Wirz, *supra* note 99.

¹³⁵ See *id.*

¹³⁶ See *id.*

¹³⁷ See Lisa Lee & Paula Seligson, *JPMorgan, Goldman Plan to Start Trading Private Credit Loans*, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2023, 10:51 AM EDT), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-29/jpmorgan-goldman-plan-to-start-trading-private-credit-loans> [<https://perma.cc/YC2T-FY67>].

¹³⁸ See Tatiana Bautzer, *Moody's Creates Private Credit Rating and Research Group*, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2023, 8:32 AM EST), <https://www.reuters.com/markets/moodys-creates-private-credit-rating-research-group-2023-11-06> [<https://perma.cc/MT2H-5BMH>].

Fourth, and similarly, syndicated lending appears to be winning back at least some of the market share it had been losing to private-credit, suggesting that the two forms of debt finance may be headed for a future of competition, coexistence and perhaps convergence.¹³⁹ Opinions on the future of this competition vary widely, with some attorneys skeptical that private-credit asset managers will cede much ground.¹⁴⁰

Fifth, although the private-credit industry benefits from the light-touch regulation that applies to investment funds offered only to institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals, it continues to push for greater access for retail investors (especially through BDCs, as discussed below). This could prompt more regulation in the long run. In their pursuit of retail investors, private-credit sponsors are even devising open-ended fund structures, thereby reintroducing some of the financial stability concerns that existed with bank loans.¹⁴¹

To summarize, private-credit asset managers are transforming the landscape for corporate debt, taking market share from commercial banks and the syndicated-lending and high-yield-bond markets, while also reaching new borrowers that these traditional intermediaries viewed as too risky.¹⁴² Private credit is split into two market segments: (1) an elite club comprised of a dozen or so massive asset managers who play an increasingly critical role in corporate finance and (2) a much larger number of smaller funds that are nonetheless able to make significant loans. Before the late-2000s financial crisis, these asset managers were far less important—their role was mostly

¹³⁹ See Telis Demos, Banks Fight Private Credit, WALL ST. J. (April 11, 2024), <https://www.wsj.com/finance/banking/banks-strike-back-against-private-credit-47de92eb>.

¹⁴⁰ See Dan Roe, *How to Win at Restructuring in the Gilded Age of Private Credit*, <https://www.law.com/njlawjournal/2024/08/19/how-to-win-at-restructuring-in-the-gilded-age-of-private-credit/> (August 19, 2024).

¹⁴¹ See Brooke Masters, Eric Platt and Will Schmitt, *Apollo and State Street Join Forces on Public-Private Credit Fund*, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2024), <https://www.ft.com/content/bc73a9f2-7603-4094-8f3e-7710928e044c>.

¹⁴² See Wirz, *supra* note 99.

to raise capital from institutional investors and put it to work in loans originated by traditional banks in syndicated loans.¹⁴³

B. Data

As we will discuss further in Part V, a defining feature of private credit—bemoaned by market participants, regulators, and the financial media alike—is the near-total absence of truly reliable and comprehensive data, both for the market in aggregate and for the individual loans made by private-credit funds.

In this Section, we employ an indirect method of gathering descriptive data for one portion of this elusive asset class. Specifically, we extract and analyze data from the public Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings of BDCs. BDCs are investment funds that are intended to lend primarily to “small, developing, financially troubled and middle market companies.”¹⁴⁴ Unlike private investment funds, public BDCs may take on retail investors, but they face mandatory-disclosure obligations under the Investment Company Act of 1940.¹⁴⁵ A small portion of the money that private-credit asset managers deploy to make loans is raised in the form of BDCs. BDCs are required to file certain information each quarter, such as their balance sheets and a summary of their investments; for BDCs that deploy direct lending, this means a list of borrowers

¹⁴³ *See id.*

¹⁴⁴ JENNIFER DALY, SHEEL PATEL, JACK FITZPATRICK & ZACHARY STROTHER, *Business Development Companies*, (2024), Westlaw 9-584-8625.

¹⁴⁵ *See* Tess Virmani, The ABCs of BDCs: A Primer on the PC Market’s SEC Registered Funds, <https://www.lsta.org/news-resources/the-abcs-of-bdcs-a-primer-on-the-pc-markets-sec-registered-funds-part-2/>.

and basic information about the loan.¹⁴⁶ We use these filings to learn more about the otherwise opaque world of private credit.¹⁴⁷

Two important qualifications are necessary before proceeding. First, as BDCs are only a small part of the private-credit world,¹⁴⁸ the story that these filings reveal may not fully represent the universe of all private credit. Second, as BDCs file information in similar, but not identical, formats, we were not able to recover information from all the BDC regulatory filings, which means that we have missing data. We deployed machine-reading algorithms that extracted some, but not all, of the information the BDCs provide to the SEC. Nonetheless, the study offers significant insight into the world of private credit and how it has changed over time.

We began by assembling a sample of documents filed by registered BDCs with the SEC. We downloaded documents filed between 2006 and mid-2023 and extracted information from the SEC files of 346 of the 400 BDCs flagged in our initial search with documents we could download from the SEC's website.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁶ See Evan M. Gunter, *Credit Trends: Business Development Companies' Assets Provide a Glimpse into the Private Credit Market*, S&P GLOB. (Oct. 2, 2023, 6:10 PM), <https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/231002-credit-trends-business-development-companies-assets-provide-a-glimpse-into-the-private-credit-market-12865113> [<https://perma.cc/CG2B-M9GP>].

¹⁴⁷ For excellent recent scholarship in financial economics that employs a similar strategy, see generally Tetiana Davydiuk, Tatyana Marchuk & Samuel Rosen, *Direct Lenders in the U.S. Middle Market*, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at, <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3568718> [<https://perma.cc/JC97-7LSY>], which uses firm-level data to document how BDC funding affects employment growth and patenting activity; and Tetiana Davydiuk, Tatyana Marchuk & Samuel Rosen, *Market Discipline in the Direct Lending Space*, 37 REV. FIN. STUD. 1190, 1197 (2023), which uses a hand-collected database of BDC investments to model employment growth.

¹⁴⁸ S&P estimates about ten percent of the private-credit assets under management of approximately \$1.5 trillion are invested in BDCs. See Gunter, *supra* note 146.

¹⁴⁹ We took multiple approaches to identify BDCs and downloaded all their filings for analysis. First, in May 2023, we searched all SEC files for Forms N-6F and N-54A, which identify BDCs. This is the criterion that the SEC uses to identify BDCs. See *Business Development Company Report*, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, <https://www.sec.gov/open/datasets-bdc> [<https://perma.cc/L2J6-ZAAS>]. This yielded an initial sample of 390 firms with filings between April 1, 1996 and May 5, 2023. We supplemented this initial, machine-identified list with a list of BDCs issued by the SEC, which is available on the SEC's website. See *id.* Doing so increased the sample size to 396. We then supplemented this list with a financial-data provider's list of public BDCs, dated as of July 8, 2019. See Sourav Srimal, *Full List of Public Business Development Companies (BDC)*, ADVANTAGEDATA (July 8, 2019, 10:45 AM), <https://think.advantagedata.com/full-bdc-list-public> [<https://perma.cc/EAT6-S8TP>]. This did not increase the sample size. We supplemented again with the list of BDCs in the S&P BDC index. See *S&P BDC*

Our sample consisted of 1,752 annual reports and 310 quarterly reports filed by these funds. From an initial corpus of 7,335 quarterly and annual reports, we first selected the annual reports and discarded any overlapping quarterly reports. In the absence of an annual filing from a fund in a specific year, we selected the quarterly report from the year that was most recently filed. We searched each filing for balance-sheet information and the schedule of investments that many of the private-credit funds presented, which described (in varying levels of detail) their investment portfolio. From those files, we machine-read information from 1,674 of 2,062 total reports (81% of them). Our machine-reading efforts produced 1,674 balance sheets and 1,253 schedules of investments.

We report four trends evident from aggregating the public filings. First, as Figure 5 shows, the total assets of the BDCs that engage in direct-lending strategies has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years.

Index, S&P GLOB., <https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-bdc-index/#overview> [https://perma.cc/SM9Q-GM38]. This yielded a final sample of 400. For 54 of the 400, we could not obtain any Form 10-Qs or 10-Ks from their online SEC files.

Figure 5. Total Reported Assets for BDCs Executing Private-Credit Investment Strategies, by Calendar Year.




Figure 5 reports the total assets under management for BDCs that report investments in corporate loans, by calendar year. These numbers were drawn from 1,674 filings from 346 issuers over the sample period.

Second, the filings also revealed significant growth in the number of loans outstanding in each calendar year, consistent with press reports about the increasing market share of private-credit asset managers in corporate loans. As Figure 6 shows, we observe 6,439 loans outstanding in 2014 and 20,182 in 2022, a more than threefold increase in nine years.

Figure 6. Number of Loans Outstanding by Calendar Year.




Figure 6 shows the number of loans outstanding in 1,253 annual and quarterly reports filed by 170 SEC-registered BDCs over the sample period, aggregated at the calendar-year level.

Third, as Figure 7 shows, for the 1,674 private-credit asset managers that use debt, the ratio of assets to liabilities over the sample period has remained at approximately three to one, suggesting that 25% or so of the capital invested in private-credit lending is borrowed money at the fund level, which industry participants call “back leverage.”¹⁵⁰ Importantly, for the 1,626 fund-years in the sample, 415 (or 25% of the fund-years in the sample) had no or minimal fund-level liabilities (defined as less than 1% of the total amount of assets). Fifty-six issuers (out of 170) had minimal fund-level liabilities in any year observed in the sample period.

¹⁵⁰ See *supra* note 121 and accompanying text.

Figure 7. Ratio of Assets to Liabilities for BDCs, by Year.




Figure 7 shows the ratio of assets to liabilities in 1,674 filings from 346 issuers over the sample period.

Fourth, as Figure 8 shows, the median balance-sheet value of the loans is relatively constant over the past ten years, suggesting that the size of the average loan has remained steady over the past ten years, even as the number of loans has exploded. The median loan is of a relatively modest size.

Figure 8. Box Plot of Par Value of Loans over Sample Period.




Figure 8 shows the change in loan par value over the sample period. For example, in 2022 the median loan size was approximately \$8.29 million with a twenty-fifth percentile of approximately \$3.46 million and a seventy-fifth percentile of approximately \$21.24 million.

IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE CREDIT

Why is private credit gaining so much ground in the corporate-debt markets, and why now? As we discussed in Part III, over the 2010s, private-equity firms began to emphasize an old strategy that suddenly presented new opportunities: making loans to corporations that they originated themselves. In this Part, we explain why the quasi-public syndicated-loan and high-yield-bond markets became, in many cases, less appealing than private credit. We focus on the advantages of private credit relative to syndicated lending from the perspective of the three key parties in the transaction: (1) the borrowers who receive direct loans from private-credit funds; (2) the debt investors who ultimately provide capital for direct loans by investing in private-credit funds; and (3) the asset managers who manage the private-credit funds and run the investment strategy. In

some cases, the advantages we describe are absolute; in other cases, they are relative to the state of play in the public and quasi-public debt markets. No single factor best explains the rise of private credit. Instead, as we explain, many aspects of this apparent return to private, relationship-based lending appeal to borrowers, investors, and the asset managers mediating their relationship.

C. Advantages for Borrowers

The private-credit borrowing process offers the corporations seeking loans at least five key advantages over borrowing in the public debt markets: speed, flexibility, trust, confidentiality, and price certainty. We explain each advantage in turn.

i. Speed

First, borrowers can obtain capital through private-credit asset managers far faster, on average, than they can through traditional syndicated loans.¹⁵¹ Loan syndications typically take at least ten to twelve weeks from launch to closing; for more complicated financings, the timeline may extend much longer.¹⁵² Private-credit asset managers, in contrast, can move significantly faster if warranted, because they are subject to fewer regulatory requirements and need not rely on other parties, such as credit agencies and other lenders, to close loans.¹⁵³ Private-credit asset managers already have committed capital to lend and do not need to raise money from investors for specific loans. For borrowers with an urgent need for capital, private credit offers a viable pathway to negotiating terms and receiving funds on a tight turnaround.

¹⁵¹ Goldman Sachs Exchanges, *The Boom in Private Credit*, GOLDMAN SACHS, at 2:06 (July 12, 2022), <https://www.goldmansachs.com/intelligence/podcasts/episodes/07-12-22-karoui-reynolds.html> [https://perma.cc/2SQD-VQ3G].

¹⁵² *What Is the Syndication Process?*, SEECE, <https://seece.org/knowledge-point/what-is-the-syndication-process> [https://perma.cc/292J-EFJD].

¹⁵³ See Gunter et al., *supra* note 109.

ii. Flexibility

Second, private-credit asset managers can offer loans to corporate borrowers on flexible, bespoke terms, because they do not need to produce a standardized product for syndication to groups of investors.¹⁵⁴ Unlike public-market investors, private-credit lenders do not require credit-rating assessments—which are heavily influenced by rigid cash-flow metrics—thus offering an avenue to access debt capital for borrowers with less-established financial histories.

iii. Easier renegotiation with a single lender

Third, borrowers can expect private-credit asset managers to be more willing and better able to negotiate with them in the event of financial trouble.¹⁵⁵ Syndicated loans, in contrast, are funded by fragmented and dispersed groups of investors, and borrowers can anticipate that the substantial trading in their loans will accelerate if they run into financial distress.¹⁵⁶ As a result, financial distress may lead a trusted investor to sell their position to a distressed-debt hedge fund, who may be a more challenging negotiating partner.¹⁵⁷ Private-credit lenders and borrowers, on the other hand, can cultivate a collaborative working partnership, which may benefit a borrower when faced with financial hardship during the loan term.¹⁵⁸ At the same time, as discussed in Part V, a single private-credit fund may have more bargaining leverage over a borrower in times of distress than would a potentially warring group of dispersed creditors.

¹⁵⁴ Goldman Sachs Exchanges, *supra* note 151, at 3:00.

¹⁵⁵ See Gunter et al., *supra* note 153 (noting the close relationship between lender and borrower in private-credit transactions).

¹⁵⁶ See Ellias, *Bankruptcy Claims Trading*, *supra* note 84, at 772-74.

¹⁵⁷ See, e.g., Baird & Rasmussen, *supra* note 83, at 666-71 (discussing the rise of distressed hedge funds); Jiang et al., *supra* note 30, at 554-56.

¹⁵⁸ Jessica Hamlin, *Private Equity Funds Fuel Growth in Private Credit*, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (Nov. 10, 2021), <https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/2bswsphkclc75samrsikg/portfolio/private-equity-funds-fuel-growth-in-private-credit> [<https://perma.cc/V6NG-JNSA>].

iv. Confidentiality.

A fourth benefit of private credit is the confidentiality that it offers borrowers relative to the lending process in the public market.¹⁵⁹ In a public-debt process, an investment bank must find investors for the loan, which typically requires sharing the borrower's proprietary financial information with a large group of potential lenders.¹⁶⁰ Public and quasi-public market borrowers usually have to disclose their financial information during the loan period to lenders, and even private information shared with syndicated lenders often finds its way into the public domain.¹⁶¹ Private-credit borrowers, on the other hand, share information with the private-credit asset manager alone.¹⁶² There is also no need to share information with a ratings agency, since private-credit loans, due to their lack of trading, are not typically rated.

Similarly, certain borrowers may benefit from the lack of trading in private credit, which further limits the market's insight into the borrower's financial performance. When the value of a borrower's public debt falls, the market may reasonably assume that the company is in financial distress.¹⁶³ But the market does not have the same level of access to private-credit valuations, as only the lender and borrower are privy to the loan performance. Without daily market-price signals, market analysts cannot easily look to private-loan valuations as a proxy for a borrower's health,

¹⁵⁹ Goldman Sachs Exchanges, *supra* note 151, at 3:30.

¹⁶⁰ See Godlewski, *supra* note 75, at 6 (discussing the syndicated-lending "road show" process, which involves sharing an "information memorandum").

¹⁶¹ See Benton Lewis, Christopher Machera and Samantha Patel, <https://www.bloomberglaw.com/external/document/X8GKQD10000000/m-a-professional-perspective-the-rise-of-private-credit-its-imp> ("While the financial information of a syndicated loan borrower is not required to be publicly available, financial statements and other reports delivered under the credit agreement governing a widely held loan are nonetheless often disclosed to trade publications such that competitors, customers, and suppliers have access to a company's financial performance data. Rating agency reports, including notices of downgrade, only exacerbate this distinction. It is far less common for a private credit borrower's financial information to be leaked to financial news organizations.")

¹⁶² See Kennedy et al., *supra* note 110.

¹⁶³ See, e.g., Harriet Clarfelt, *Credit Suisse Bonds Sink Further into Distress*, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/56108086-cdbf-4874-b827-4adec7f2cd4c> [<https://perma.cc/CX4Z-PNQ8>] (inferring corporate distress from Credit Suisse's bond prices).

which benefits borrowers that want to limit their public exposure and, in some cases, keep hostile acquirers and business competitors at bay.

v. Firmer lending terms

Fifth, private-credit asset managers are able to offer borrowers firm pricing conditions and terms without having to change that offer following investor feedback.¹⁶⁴ In a syndicated-lending process, the investment bank that is lead arranger may offer tentative terms to the borrower that may ultimately be changed after a lengthy investor-consultation process.¹⁶⁵ Private credit allows borrowers to negotiate and lock in their cost of debt directly with the eventual funder of the loan instead of an intermediary, providing certainty and, as mentioned above, speed.

D. Advantages for Debt Investors

In this Section, we summarize three features of private credit relevant to the debt investors who entrust private-credit asset managers with their money, which the asset managers then lend to corporations. These features can make private credit a more attractive option for debt investors than deploying their capital in the quasi-public debt markets. First, with private credit, debt investors reportedly receive better returns on their investment compared to investing in quasi-public debt.¹⁶⁶ Second, private-credit investors receive, on average, stronger contractual covenants than the quasi-public debt market currently offers.¹⁶⁷ Third, debt investors are protected from “creditor-on-creditor violence,” which has created risk and increased the monitoring costs associated with investing in public corporate debt.¹⁶⁸ We explain each benefit in turn.

¹⁶⁴ Goldman Sachs Exchanges, *supra* note 151, at 2:44.

¹⁶⁵ See Godlewski, *supra* note 75, at 6 (describing the investor consultation process).

¹⁶⁶ See *infra* Section III.B.i.

¹⁶⁷ See *infra* Section III.B.ii.

¹⁶⁸ See *infra* Section III.B.iii.

i. Attractive Risk-Adjusted Returns

Private-credit investing promises handsome returns with relatively low risk.¹⁶⁹ It is important to qualify this claim by noting that private credit is, by definition, private, so much of what we know about the economic rewards of the asset class relies on representations from the private-credit industry, which entails some bias. However, a review of the voluminous materials produced by the industry indicates that private credit is marketed as an opportunity to earn robust debt-investment returns¹⁷⁰ while providing “senior secured” status, which protects against downside risks in the event of bankruptcy.¹⁷¹

While not all pricing on private credit is public, asset managers have generally marketed low-double-digit returns for their private-credit investments.¹⁷² Investors in private-credit funds are thought to earn more than investors in quasi-public debt because of the illiquid nature of the asset class (and also as a reward for the other benefits that private-credit lenders provide to borrowers, which are described in greater detail below).¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ See Jeffrey Diehl, *Will Private Credit Returns Surpass Private Equity, Even as Risk Declines?*, ADAMS ST. PARTNERS (Feb. 22, 2023), <https://www.adamsstreetpartners.com/insights/will-private-credit-returns-surpass-private-equity> [<https://perma.cc/9SZN-X96E>] (discussing private-credit risk and reward).

¹⁷⁰ Underscoring the risk-reward pitch to investors, in September 2023, an executive in Blackstone’s private-credit business spoke publicly about his firm’s views on the opportunity that private credit presents: “Particularly in today’s elevated base rate environment—and given the senior-secured structure of many of our [private loans]—we believe it is currently the best risk-adjusted environment for this asset class in decades.” See Press Release, Blackstone, Blackstone Integrates Leading Credit and Insurance Businesses to Form Blackstone Credit and Insurance (BXCI) in Push Toward Next \$1 Trillion (Sept. 13, 2023), <https://www.blackstone.com/news/press/blackstone-integrates-leading-credit-and-insurance-businesses-to-form-blackstone-credit-and-insurance-bxci-in-push-toward-next-1-trillion> [<https://perma.cc/C5GA-TUX5>].

¹⁷¹ See Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED): *Institutional Caliber Private Credit for Income-Focused Investors*, BLACKSTONE, <https://www.bcred.com> [<https://perma.cc/2B58-XFHX>].

¹⁷² See Will Louch, *Private Equity Firms Pivot Away from Traditional Buyouts*, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/84409cde-1197-49c9-bf88-dbe371e44313> [<https://perma.cc/XPW3-6M58>].

¹⁷³ See *Across the Spectrum: Understanding Public and Private Credit*, PIMCO (Sept. 2020), <https://www.pimco.com.au/en-au/resources/education/across-the-spectrum-understanding-public-and-private-credit> [<https://perma.cc/XL7C-HWRZ>].

Illiquidity offers two key benefits for debt investors.¹⁷⁴ Most importantly, private-credit investors can charge borrowers a premium to compensate for liquidity risk.¹⁷⁵ Unlike syndicated loans and high-yield bonds, private-credit loans do not trade on secondary markets, making them difficult to offload on short notice. As such, private-credit lenders typically hold the loans to maturity—generally three to six years¹⁷⁶—because they have both the financial wherewithal and strategic mandate to hold illiquid assets. Investors in close-end private-credit funds typically do not have the right to demand their capital back on a moment’s notice, reducing the risk of a bank run on the asset manager and allowing the private-credit asset manager to manage the liquidity risk. To compensate for the liquidity risk, private-credit asset managers can charge borrowers an illiquidity premium.¹⁷⁷ Thus, although illiquidity poses risks, discussed below, private lenders can capture a return premium as compensation for assuming those risks.¹⁷⁸

There is no systematic way to compare loan by loan what a private-credit borrower pays for capital and what the same firm would have paid for syndicated financing. However, industry

¹⁷⁴ In recent years, a “secondaries” market has developed in private credit that provides some level of liquidity to debt investors in private-credit fund, but it does not compare favorably to the more liquid public-debt markets. See *Understanding and Investing in Private Equity Secondaries*, MORGAN STANLEY (Nov. 3, 2022), <https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/private-equity-secondaries-volatile-markets> [<https://perma.cc/H98R-A4ZN>]. In a secondaries market, a limited partner in a private-credit fund sells its investment to an investor who specializes in buying interests in private-credit funds. See *id.* In other words, the liquidity is at the level of the fund investment, not any specific loan. But the price for liquidity can be steep. One study of secondary-market sales from 2006-2014 revealed an average discount of fourteen percent of net asset value. See Taylor D. Nadauld, Berk A. Sensoy, Keith Vorkink, & Michael S. Weisbach, *The Liquidity Cost of Private Equity Investments: Evidence from Secondary Market Transactions*, 132 J. FIN. ECON. 158, 165 (2019). Excluding “fire sales” from 2007-2009 resulting from the financial crisis, the average discount on secondary-market sales was nine percent.

¹⁷⁵ See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, *The Pricing of Illiquidity as a Characteristic and as Risk*, 19 MULTINATIONAL FIN. J. 149, 150 (2015) (discussing the pricing of illiquidity).

¹⁷⁶ See Rorie A. Norton, *Forming Private Credit Funds: Key Differences in Fund Lifecycle and the Use of Subscription Facilities Versus PE Funds (Part One of Two)*, PRIV. EQUITY L. REP. 2 (May 12, 2020), <https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/7/v2/172012/051820-PELR-Breslow-Hunter.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/DD9M-54BL>].

¹⁷⁷ See *Private Debt Illiquidity Premium*, PEMBERTON CAP. ADVISORS LLP (June 2017), https://pembertonam.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/pemberton_perspectives_illiquidity_premium.pdf [<https://perma.cc/DVD8-KCEW>].

¹⁷⁸ See Joshua Anderson & Tom Collier, *Earning an Illiquidity Premium in Private Credit*, PIMCO (July 7, 2015), <https://www.advisorperspectives.com/commentaries/2015/07/07/earning-an-illiquidity-premium-in-private-credit> [<https://perma.cc/B3LB-K7MS>].

sources suggest that the annualized illiquidity premium is around an additional 1.5 to 3 percentage points above comparable traded syndicated loans.¹⁷⁹ An academic study recently came to similar conclusions, finding that private-credit loans are approximately 1.89 percentage points more expensive than syndicated loans for borrowers, a number that falls slightly to 1.61 percentage points with control variables.¹⁸⁰ Thus, the best evidence suggests that a loan that might cost a borrower 6% annual interest in the syndicated-loan market might cost 7.5% to 9% if borrowed from a private-credit asset manager, reflecting compensation for illiquidity risk (as well as the other potential benefits of private credit, discussed above).¹⁸¹

While the reported returns to private-credit investors are indeed alluring, it is unclear whether such returns are in fact market-beating, after adjusting for risk.¹⁸² As money continues to pour into private credit and new private-credit funds are continually formed, time will tell whether private credit continues to offer equity-like returns on a relatively safe debt investment, or only debt-like returns on an equity-like risk.

The second benefit of illiquidity is that it mitigates on-paper volatility.¹⁸³ Unlike traditional public debt, private-loan valuations are not marked-to-market daily because they do not trade openly on a secondary exchange.¹⁸⁴ Because of the infrequent valuations (discussed in Section IV.C), private credit offers a smoother day-to-day asset class to capital providers compared with

¹⁷⁹ James Keenan, *Private Credit: Evolution and Opportunity in Direct Lending*, BLACKROCK ALTERNATIVES 2 (Nov. 2022), <https://syncappartners.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/private-credit-evolution-and-opportunity-in-direct-lending.pdf> [https://perma.cc/F6CY-P7HR].

¹⁸⁰ See Young Soo Jang, *Are Direct Lenders More Like Banks or Arm's-Length Investors?* 22-24 (Jan. 24, 2024) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4529656> [https://perma.cc/RQ2T-HXB7].

¹⁸¹ See *id.*

¹⁸² See Isil Erel, Thomas Flanagan & Michael S. Weisbach, *Risk-Adjusting the Returns to Private Debt Funds* (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2024-03-006, 2024), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4771873 [<<https://perma.cc/CF69-9LSK>>].

¹⁸³ Matt Levine, *People Will Pay for Illiquidity*, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 1, 2022, 1:52 PM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-11-01/people-will-pay-for-illiquidity> [https://perma.cc/M4TV-F4KW].

¹⁸⁴ Randy Schwimmer, *What a Downturn Might Mean for Private Credit*, CHURCHILL FROM NUVEEN (Aug. 4, 2016), <https://www.churchillam.com/downturn-might-mean-private-credit/> [https://perma.cc/7VNV-6PM8].

public debt. Some investors value the smoothness of private funds because it alleviates concerns about timing the market and makes their investment performance look less volatile.¹⁸⁵

ii. Stronger Covenants

Relative to syndicated loans, private-credit loan contracts appear more likely to contain covenants protecting investors from borrower opportunism and providing the investor with options if the borrower's business deteriorates.¹⁸⁶ Loan covenants are specific promises that borrowers make in their loan contracts to take (or not to take) specific actions over the course of the loan term, in order to lower the risk that the borrower would not pay the lender back.¹⁸⁷ For example, a borrower may promise to maintain its business, to use the money from the loan for a specific purpose, not to sell any significant assets, or not to borrow additional money without prior permission.¹⁸⁸ A borrower's breach of a covenant may trigger a default, which allows a lender to use the threat of foreclosure to renegotiate the loan if foreclosure is not immediately warranted.¹⁸⁹

Over the past generation, investors in quasi-public debt have largely lost the ability to protect themselves with covenants as investor demand for debt investments has exceeded supply, giving borrowers the power to negotiate for more contractual freedom.¹⁹⁰ Private-credit investors

¹⁸⁵ Levine, *supra* note 183.

¹⁸⁶ See Baird & Rasmussen, *supra* note 83, at 1231 (discussing covenants generally). See generally Jang, *supra* note 180 (discussing the role of covenants in senior loans originated by direct lenders).

¹⁸⁷ See generally Thomas P. Griffin, Greg Nini & David C. Smith, *Losing Control? The Two-Decade Decline in Loan Covenant Violations*, J. FIN. (forthcoming), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277570> [<https://perma.cc/FDZ7-9W72>] (discussing the evolution of contractual covenants in the public loan market); Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, *On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants*, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 1117 (1979) (discussing the role of covenants in reducing conflicts between borrowers and lenders).

¹⁸⁸ See Greg Nini & David C. Smith, *Leveraged Finance* 44-45 (June 8, 2023) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4473729> [<https://perma.cc/ZGD2-TWP4>] (discussing the types of covenants commonly found in loan agreements).

¹⁸⁹ See generally Griffin et al., *supra* note 187 (discussing how lenders use covenants to monitor and discipline borrowers).

¹⁹⁰ See Bo Becker & Victoria Ivashina, *Covenant-Light Contracts and Creditor Coordination* 4 (Swed. House of Fin., Rsh. Paper No. 17-1, 2016), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2871887> [<https://perma.cc/N72G-9WC8>].

have, at the same time, protected themselves with strong covenants.¹⁹¹ Young Soo Jang studied a sample of direct loans to private-equity sponsors and found that private-credit asset managers were far more likely to benefit from certain types of covenants, as compared to public-debt investors.¹⁹²

Thus, loan covenants are, in this generation, a distinguishing feature of private-credit loans as compared to quasi-public debt.¹⁹³ Such control is far less common in the syndicated-loan market, which has, by and large, become a lending market that places very few ongoing financial requirements on borrowers.¹⁹⁴

iii. Protection from “Creditor-on-Creditor Violence”

Finally, private-credit investors benefit from the reduced need to monitor the opportunistic behavior of other debt investors in fractured loan syndicates. Over the past ten years, investors in the syndicated-debt market have bemoaned what has become known as “creditor-on-creditor violence,” or what one of us has called “bankruptcy hardball.”¹⁹⁵ In short, in the 2010s, members of loan syndicates developed a set of strategies that allowed majority investors in syndicated

¹⁹¹ Jang, *supra* note 180, at 2-3. Sengal Selassie, the CEO and Managing Partner of Brightwood Capital Advisors, LLC, a middle-market private-credit sponsor, explained the difference as follows: “Brightwood is typically lead in the majority of our deals, allowing us to control documents and put in strong downside protections including covenants that you typically won’t see in the public market or upstream deals.”

¹⁹² *Id.*

¹⁹³ See Griffin et al., *supra* note 187, at 7 (documenting the relationship between a decline in loan covenant violations and a shift toward private credit lending); Evan Gunter, Abby Latour, Joe Maguire, Patrick Drury Byrne, Marina Lukatsky, Matt Carroll, Elizabeth Campbell, Sebnem Caglayan & Ramki Muthukrishnan, *Private Debt: A Lesser-Known Corner of Finance Finds the Spotlight*, S&P GLOB. (Oct. 12, 2021), <https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/featured/special-editorial/private-debt> [https://perma.cc/JG3A-NEAP] (documenting the use of loan covenants in private credit lending).

¹⁹⁴ Some scholars have argued that the “covenant lite” trend is overstated, pointing out that revolving loans continue to have covenants. See Mitchell Berlin, Greg Nini & Edison G. Yu, *Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan Syndicates* 30 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 19-41, 2019), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3494154> [https://perma.cc/AAE9-EF78].

¹⁹⁵ See Jared A. Elias & Robert J. Stark, *Bankruptcy Hardball*, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 745, 759-62 (2020); see also Vincent S. J. Buccola, *Sponsor Control: A New Paradigm for Corporate Reorganization*, 90 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 (2023); Daniel B. Kamensky, *The Rise of the Sponsor-in-Possession and Implications for Sponsor (Mis)Behavior*, 171 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 28-31 (2024); Diane Lourdes Dick, *Hostile Restructurings*, 96 WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1336-37 (2021); Ayotte & Scully, *supra* note 82, at 371-73; Mitchell Mengden, *The Development of Collateral Stripping by Distressed Borrowers*, 16 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 56, 57-61 (2021).

loans—typically in collusion with the borrower—to engage in transactions that harmed minority investors.¹⁹⁶ This increased the need for investors to monitor and guard against value expropriation by fellow investors.¹⁹⁷

The private-credit structure protects investors from these “hardball” transactions in two ways. First, because the asset manager has governance rights over the loan, there is no structure that would allow some limited partners to harm other limited partners without the asset manager agreeing to do so, which would be highly unlikely and in violation of the asset manager’s fiduciary duties. Second, the asset managers who negotiate private-credit loans can include covenants that restrict borrower opportunism, including through transactions that have come to be associated with aggressive debt-market transactions.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ See, e.g., Jared A. Ellias & Elisabeth de Fontenay, *Law and Courts in an Age of Debt*, 171 U. PA. L. REV. 2025, 2036-46 (2023) (discussing the TPC Group “uptiering”).

¹⁹⁷ As one bankruptcy judge wrote in adjudicating a dispute between a majority group of syndicated lenders and minority lenders who were cut out of a lucrative opportunity, “There is nothing in the law that requires holders of syndicated debt to behave as Musketeers.” *In re TPC Grp. Inc.*, No. 22-10493, 2022 WL 2498751, at *12 (Bankr. D. Del. July 6, 2022); see also Samir D. Parikh, *Creditors Strike Back: The Return of the Cooperation Agreement*, 73 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 30-33 (2023) (discussing efforts by investors to reduce the likelihood of being on the wrong side of value expropriation).

¹⁹⁸ A common example of an aggressive borrower transaction that works to the detriment of existing lenders is the transfer of an asset to another corporate entity in order to either provide shareholders with a dividend or to create new collateral for a refinancing. For an example, consider the Neiman Marcus transaction discussed in Ellias et al., *supra* note 86, at 1099-1106, where the private-equity sponsor extracted what many considered to be Neiman Marcus’s best asset in hardball bargaining with creditors. In a review by Moody’s, all private-credit loans since 2022 prohibited borrowers from transferring intellectual property to unrestricted subsidiaries. Paula Seligson, *Private Credit Lenders Giving Up Protections to Win Bigger Deals*, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 26, 2023, 7:30 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-26/private-credit-lenders-giving-up-protections-to-win-bigger-deals> [<https://perma.cc/5ALQ-AN36>]. Just two out of three broadly syndicated loans contained similar protections. *Id.* Another dangerous borrower and cocreditor practice that private lenders can protect against is known as uptiering. See Vincent S.J. Buccola & Gregory Nini, *The Loan Market Response to Dropdown and Uptier Transactions*, J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4143928> [<https://perma.cc/84CN-Y2AK>]. Uptiering, like dropdowns, is a strategy that borrowers employ to issue more debt. However, rather than moving assets from one entity to another, a borrower instead persuades a bare majority of existing lenders—often by granting them additional benefits and favorable treatment vis-à-vis the other nonfavored lenders—to amend the loan agreement such that the borrower can permissibly issue new debt. *Id.* Dropdowns and uptiering drew widespread attention (and criticism) after J. Crew and Serta Simmons utilized these strategies in their recapitalizations within the past few years. See *id.* at 11-12, 16-17; Ayotte & Scully, *supra* note 82, at 372. Private lenders, concerned about the risks posed by these strategies, responded by inserting strict covenants to prevent their borrowers from partaking in these risky moves. As a result, private-credit loans are significantly less susceptible to lender-on-lender violence and thus require far less active monitoring of harmful borrower and co-lender behavior.

It is important to note that market dynamics are constantly changing, and many observers see private-credit covenants decreasing as lender competition and deal size increase.¹⁹⁹ In a prominent recent transaction, a private-equity-owned firm with private-credit lenders engaged in an aggressive transaction with its lenders, suggesting that private-credit investors may face similar risks to their public counterparties—but it is still too early to tell.²⁰⁰ As of now, however, the presence of strict covenants in private loans remains a differentiating factor from publicly traded secured debt.

E. Advantages for Asset Managers

Asset managers of all sizes benefit in four ways from deploying private-credit investment strategies. They benefit from attractive investment returns and fees; investment flexibility without the burdens of banking law; opportunities to earn returns to scale as they build larger funds; and reduced fire-sale risk because the debt does not trade and because they are very lightly regulated. We explain each benefit in turn.

i. Attractive Fee Structures

First, as discussed above in the capital-provider context, asset managers can earn their share of the handsome coupons that borrowers pay, as well as loan-level fees. While asset managers in

¹⁹⁹ Seligson, *supra* note 198.

²⁰⁰ This transaction is both unusual and difficult to explain. See David Brooke, Max Frumes & Shubham Saharan, *Private Credit-backed Pluralsight Looks to Try on a J. Crew-Style LME* (May 30, 2024), <https://9fin.com/insights/private-credit-backed-pluralsight-lme> [<https://perma.cc/4RZ4-46B9>] (noting that this transaction is “‘pretty unprecedented’ for a market that touts more stringent credit agreements compared to its public counterpart, especially when it comes to collateral leakage”). Commentators were puzzled by the maneuver, which may have been a bridge to a more typical lender debt-for-equity swap. One news source suggested that it might have been driven by, among other reasons, a desire to avoid marking down the Pluralsight loan that was held by different BDCs. Sami Vukelj, Shubham Saharan, Max Frumes & Rachel Butt, *Pluralsight Postmortem – More Than Meets the Eye?*, 9FIN (July 29, 2024), <https://9fin.com/insights/pluralsight-postmortem-eye> [<https://perma.cc/26BY-7AV8>]. A market participant wondered why the private-credit asset manager would hurt its reputation as a constructive counterparty for what appeared to be little gain. *Id.* The long-term consequences of this “hardball restructuring maneuver that breached protocol for private credit” remain to be seen. *Id.*

this space have a range of compensation arrangements, it is typical for them to follow the model of private-equity managers and earn roughly 15% to 20% of the investment profits (“carry”) above a certain return threshold (“hurdle”) of typically 7% to 8%.²⁰¹ In the private-credit context, therefore, asset managers earn profit by negotiating robust loan coupons and capturing deal fees. To be sure, these types of fees are a typical feature of any form of investment management, but they are also an important aspect of why private-credit strategies are attractive for asset managers.

Borrowers appear to pay a premium loan spread (the interest rate charged in excess of the base rate) for private-credit deals because of the flexibility, speed of execution, and other unique benefits that private credit offers.²⁰² Asset managers are able to capture their share of those gains, to the extent the profits of the fund exceed the hurdle rate.²⁰³

Large credit funds further enhance their loan-level returns by capturing loan fees that banks would otherwise claim in the syndicated-loan market. One common fee is the origination fee,²⁰⁴ which is typically paid up front to the lender as compensation for underwriting the loan,²⁰⁵ and usually sized to one to five percent of the loan amount.²⁰⁶ Other costs may include a prepayment

²⁰¹ See David Brooke & Andrew Hedlund, *U.S. Direct Lenders Modify Fee Structures as Private Lending Loses Luster*, YAHOO! FIN. (July 28, 2020), <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-direct-lenders-modify-fee-182201233.html> [<https://perma.cc/W8DV-S349>].

²⁰² See *supra* notes 151-165 and accompanying text.

²⁰³ Kat Hidalgo & Silas Brown, *Private Credit’s Lavish Profits Are Coming Under Scrutiny*, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2023, 7:00 AM), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-10-05/private-credit-s-lavish-profits-are-coming-under-scrutiny> [<https://perma.cc/APS9-GPCK>]. Private credit funds performed so strongly in 2023 that asset managers have quickly reached and surpassed their hurdle rates, leading many capital providers to seek to increase in their managers’ hurdle rates or peg them to central bank rates. *Id.*

²⁰⁴ See *How Can Private Credit Opportunities Generate Return for Investors?*, YIELDSTREET (July 12, 2022), <https://www.yieldstreet.com/resources/article/how-can-private-credit-opportunities-generate-return-for-investors> [<https://perma.cc/KKB6-NLQT>].

²⁰⁵ *An Introduction to Private Debt*, CAIS (May 27, 2022), <https://www.caisgroup.com/articles/giving-credit-to-private-debt> [<https://perma.cc/ZB4L-V4L8>].

²⁰⁶ *Ultimate FAQ: Private Credit Investments, What, How, Why, When*, FASTERCAPITAL (June 24, 2024), <https://fastercapital.com/content/Ultimate-FAQ-private-credit-investments--What--How--Why--When.html> [<https://perma.cc/464A-X84T>].

fee—intended to ensure a minimum return rate for the lender in case of early loan repayment—or an exit fee, which serves as a final charge levied at maturity.

Altogether, from 2012 to 2022, private-credit investments generated a three to six percent higher yield than broadly syndicated loans, producing valuable profits for asset managers.²⁰⁷ As discussed above, asset managers will further boost their rate of return via fund-level leverage—either through asset-backed credit facilities or subscription facilities and by using their loan portfolio as collateral.²⁰⁸

Thus, between the robust floating-rate coupons and loan-level fees (and the additional returns boost from fund-level leverage), private credit offers asset managers a highly profitable investment strategy. This sentiment was recently captured by private-equity titan and Blackstone founder Steve Schwarzman: “If you can earn 12 percent, maybe 13 percent . . . in senior secured bank debt . . . with almost no prospect of loss, that’s about the best thing you can do.”²⁰⁹

Asset managers can profit further through management fees. Asset managers typically charge annual management fees of one to two percent of investors’ committed capital.²¹⁰ By capitalizing on investors’ growing appetite for private-credit exposure, asset managers can expand the assets they manage to generate significant recurring management fees.²¹¹ Management fees represent a substantial source of income for asset managers. Blackstone, for example, generated

²⁰⁷ *Understanding Private Credit*, GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MGMT. INSIGHTS (Oct. 20, 2022), <https://am.gs.com/en-lu/advisors/insights/article/2024/understanding-private-credit> [<https://perma.cc/RDN6-UP94>].

²⁰⁸ See *supra* notes 107-110 and accompanying text; see also *NXT Capital: Under the Hood of Fund-Level Leverage*, PRIV. DEBT INV. (Sept. 2, 2019), <https://www.privatedebtinvestor.com/nxt-capital-hood-fund-level-leverage> [<https://perma.cc/L2VX-J362>].

²⁰⁹ Will Louch, *Private Equity Firms Pivot Away from Traditional Buyouts*, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/84409cde-1197-49c9-bf88-dbe371e44313> [<https://perma.cc/QZ7J-GLNU>].

²¹⁰ Larry Rothman, *Private Credit Fund Management Fees Increase*, PENSIONS & INVS. (Aug. 17, 2023, 12:59 PM), <https://www.pionline.com/interactive/private-credit-fund-management-fees-increase> [<https://perma.cc/NB8J-X6UL>].

²¹¹ Fareed Sahloul & Swetha Gopinath, *The Rise of Private Equity’s One-Stop Shops*, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6, 2023, 1:09 PM EDT), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2023-09-06/the-rise-of-private-equity-s-one-stop-shops> [<https://perma.cc/TNH3-3G77>].

\$5 billion of management and advisory fees through three quarters in 2023 alone, compared with \$1.4 billion of realized performance revenues (that is, carried interest) over the same time period.²¹² Private credit offers a path to expand massively this vital source of revenue for asset managers.²¹³

ii. Relationship Lending Without Banking-Law Limitations

Private-credit asset managers can invest strategically and with great flexibility, especially as compared to heavily regulated commercial banks, which face myriad restrictions in deploying capital.²¹⁴ Asset managers typically have the flexibility to invest anywhere along the capital structure—including senior secured, junior liens, large unitranche, and other types of loans—while also having the freedom to originate loans ranging in size from \$2 million to \$200 million.²¹⁵ Regulated commercial banks do not have nearly the same flexibility to put capital to work, and they must confront regulators and regulations that, since the late-2000s financial crisis, generally

²¹² See Press Release, Blackstone, Blackstone Reports Third Quarter 2023 Results (Oct. 19, 2023), https://s23.q4cdn.com/714267708/files/doc_financials/2023/q3/Blackstone3Q23EarningsPressRelease.pdf [<https://perma.cc/T72Q-KTUZ>].

²¹³ Recent moves by KKR and Carlyle to forgo carried interest and only charge management fees in their so-called “evergreen credit funds” signals the growing importance of aggregating capital to generate management-fee income. See Katharine Hidalgo & Silas Brown, *KKR and Carlyle Take No Carry on New Private Credit Funds*, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 11, 2023, 7:30 AM EDT), <https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-acquisitions/kkr-and-carlyle-take-no-carry-on-new-private-credit-funds> [<https://perma.cc/3LJ9-G8QW>].

²¹⁴ Private debt as an asset class expanded dramatically in the wake of the late-2000s financial crisis, as regulators in the United States and Europe rigorously tightened regulations through Dodd-Frank and Basel III, among other initiatives, which continue to limit commercial banks’ ability to lend. ARES CAP. CORP., *THE RISE OF PRIVATE MARKETS 6* (Feb. 2020), <https://www.arescapitalcorp.com/sites/default/files/2020-04/The-Rise-of-Private-Markets-Whitepaper-vF.pdf> [<https://perma.cc/YP97-5WMZ>]; see also Sayee Srinivasan & Jeff Huther, *The Basel III Endgame Proposal: Yet Another Gift to Private Credit Funds*, ABA BANKING J. (Nov. 3, 2023), <https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2023/11/the-basel-iii-endgame-proposal-yet-another-gift-to-private-credit-funds/> [<https://perma.cc/CL5Z-CSKG>] (discussing recently proposed Basel III banking regulations that will further shrink banks’ lending footprint while allowing private credit to expand).

²¹⁵ See Capital Allocators with Ted Seides, *The World of Private Credit at Ares*, YOUTUBE, at 36:40 (July 24, 2023), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eUC4dHaT3dw> [<https://perma.cc/UQP4-FMEC>].

have pushed the industry to take on less risk.²¹⁶ Likewise, investors in the syndicated-loan market do not typically have the opportunity to make the same sort of expansive investment opportunities.

For example, in 2018, a large private-credit asset manager originated multiple forms of debt capital in a single transaction with a childcare-software company. The private-credit asset manager provided a \$1.5 million first-lien senior secured revolving loan, a \$200,000 first-lien senior secured term loan, a \$32.4 million second-lien senior secured loan, and \$800,000 of equity.²¹⁷ Three years later, the asset manager injected an additional \$29 million of second-lien secured capital and \$100,000 of first-lien secured capital.²¹⁸

Presumably, this structure allowed the private-credit asset manager to obtain a risk and return profile that fit its investment criteria, without needing to incur the due-diligence costs associated with underwriting different companies. In this example, the asset manager established deep familiarity with a borrower's financial and operational profile from the first investment round in 2018,²¹⁹ which later gave it sufficient comfort to provide additional capital to the borrower. A private-credit asset manager's ability to hold equity positions in companies in addition to debt provides a unique opportunity to offset loan losses elsewhere in the firm's loan portfolio.²²⁰ The

²¹⁶ In the latest proposed revision to global banking rules, regulators are proposing a 21% increase in capital requirements for globally systemically important banks and a 10% increase for smaller banks, which will further inhibit commercial bank lending. See David Wessel, *What is Bank Capital? What is the Basel III Endgame?* BROOKINGS (Mar. 7, 2024), <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-is-bank-capital-what-is-the-basel-iii-endgame> [<https://perma.cc/7JTG-GKN9>]; see also Srinivasan & Huther, *supra* note 214 (explaining how increased capital requirements incentivize investment in private credit); *Basel III Endgame: The Next Generation of Risk-Weighted Assets*, PwC (Aug. 15, 2023), <https://www.pwc.com/us/en/industries/financial-services/library/basel-iii-endgame.html> [<https://perma.cc/3K2X-VQHM>] (predicting “globally systemically important banks experiencing an increase of 21% in capital requirements vs. 10% increase at regional banks”).

²¹⁷ See Ares Cap. Corp., *supra* note 123 (reporting Ares investments in Genesis Acquisition Co. and Genesis Ultimate Holding Co. between 2018 and 2021).

²¹⁸ *Id.*

²¹⁹ See *id.*

²²⁰ See Capital Allocators with Ted Seides, *supra* note 215, at 37:40.

asset manager here estimated that its equity investment in this company had increased in value by 75% since 2018.²²¹ Banks, by contrast, are restricted in their ability to hold equity in companies.

Further, without any intermediaries or other third parties like credit-rating agencies involved in the process, private-credit lenders have the flexibility to select opportunities that might otherwise score poorly under traditional valuation criteria.²²² For example, an asset manager might think highly of a small borrower with a weak cashflow profile because the company shows signs of strong future growth potential. Whereas the public-market intermediaries may decline to lend to such a borrower, a private-credit asset manager could still structure an attractive deal by allocating part of its investment into equity, thereby reducing the borrower's debt load while compensating the asset manager's investors for the credit risk.²²³

In addition to this flexibility, private-credit asset managers benefit from dramatically lower compliance costs relative to commercial banks because private-credit lenders are not subject to the same level of regulatory oversight as are commercial banks. According to one study, large banks report spending an average of \$10,000 per employee to maintain compliance with today's complex banking-regulation scheme.²²⁴ Total bank spending on regulatory compliance is estimated to have increased by 60% over pre-financial-crisis levels.²²⁵ As private-credit asset managers are not

²²¹ See Ares Cap. Corp., *supra* note 123.

²²² See Goldman Sachs Exchanges, *supra* note 142, at 3:19.

²²³ See Capital Allocators with Ted Seides, *supra* note 215, at 38:45 ("In a lot of our non-sponsored deals, what we find is we're the only real institutional capital.")

²²⁴ See Shakeel Lone, *The Creeping Cost of Compliance*, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2021, 7:23 PM EDT), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/servicenow/2021/10/21/the-creeping-cost-of-compliance/?sh=c655df356cca> [<https://perma.cc/WFD6-97WB>].

²²⁵ *Id.*

subject to these rules,²²⁶ they have a significant cost advantage in competing for opportunities with traditional lenders.²²⁷

iii. Earning Returns to Scale

Private credit also allows asset managers to earn returns to scale as they raise megafunds.²²⁸ In many investment strategies, investors must be cautious about raising more money than they can deploy in profitable investment opportunities.²²⁹ Private-credit asset managers, on the other hand, gain the ability to make larger loans as they scale, and a larger pool of capital also allows them to take on the more idiosyncratic risk associated with large loans.²³⁰ This is because the core investment product—a senior secured loan—is familiar to corporations and there is vast demand for this type of capital.²³¹ Historically, private-credit asset managers have raced to raise capital to meet this demand.²³² While it may one day change, for now the story of megafunds has been, as far as we can tell, a happy one.²³³

iv. Less Fire-Sale Pressure

²²⁶ See Laura Benitez, *Pimco Sounds Alarm on Under-Regulated Private Credit Markets*, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2023, 10:00 AM EDT), <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-02/pimco-sounds-alarm-on-under-regulated-private-credit-markets> [https://perma.cc/EQ6Z-GBTK].

²²⁷ See Srinivasan & Huther, *supra* note 214 (“Private credit funds operate outside the regulatory perimeter . . . Hence their competitive advantage over banks.”).

²²⁸ See Golub Capital, *Expert Q&A with David Golub: Scale Matters for Private Debt*, PRIV. DEBT INV., June 2023, at 17, 17, <https://golubcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Private-Debt-Investor-The-Decade-QA-with-David-Golub-1.pdf> [https://perma.cc/PDZ6-UUQC].

²²⁹ See *id.*

²³⁰ See *id.* at 17-18.

²³¹ See Sarah Limbach, *Credit Trends: Global State of Play: Debt Growth Diverging by Credit Quality*, S&P GLOB. RATINGS (Sept. 6, 2023), <https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/230906-credit-trends-global-state-of-play-debt-growth-diverging-by-credit-quality-12835732> [https://perma.cc/A4MW-T9WF].

²³² PITCHBOOK, GLOBAL PRIVATE DEBT REPORT 4 (2023).

²³³ Moreover, even the largest funds retain the flexibility to invest in smaller companies. Capital Allocators with Ted Seides, *supra* note 105, at 42:17. Note, however, that large credit funds may ultimately prefer to lend to large borrowers because they tend to be more resilient than smaller companies in withstanding economic headwinds. See *id.* at 39:38. For example, companies with \$100 million or more in EBITDA have grown earnings at more than 7 times faster while defaulting at a 5 times lower rate than companies that earn \$50 million in EBITDA or less. See Joe Zidle & Jonathan Bock, *Private Credit, Meet “Higher for Longer,”* BLACKSTONE MKT. VIEWS (Nov. 16, 2023), <https://www.blackstone.com/insights/article/private-credit-meet-higher-for-longer> [https://perma.cc/ELU3-YJ55].

Finally, the lack of trading in private-credit loans means that asset managers are less likely to engage in costly fire sales.²³⁴ While private-credit asset managers typically report investment valuations to their investors at specified intervals, these valuations need only be provided on a quarterly basis, and they leave significant room for the asset manager’s discretion. Notably, the asset managers analyze the loan values in-house, with review by an external auditor conducted just once a year.²³⁵ As a result, asset managers are less likely to be forced into selling their loans—perhaps at depressed prices—after a pricing change or a credit-rating downgrade, reducing the risk associated with investing in debt.²³⁶

V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISE OF PRIVATE CREDIT

The rise of private credit has not gone unnoticed. Market participants have marveled at the sheer amount of capital that has shifted to this asset class, while regulators and others have expressed some concern over the surge in corporate borrowing²³⁷ and the potential impact on banks from this major incursion into their traditional lending and underwriting businesses.²³⁸

²³⁴ See Schwimmer, *supra* note 184.

²³⁵ See Alicia McElhaney, *Everyone Wants to Know What Private Assets Are Really Worth. The Truth: It’s Complicated.*, INST. INV. (Dec. 14, 2022), <https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/2bstlvcy8lgwufev71kao/portfolio/everyone-wants-to-know-what-private-assets-are-really-worth-the-truth-its-complicated> [https://perma.cc/6NVB-GF8D].

²³⁶ See, e.g., Shohini Kundu, *The Externalities of Fire Sales: Evidence from Centralized Loan Obligations* 6-7 (Eur. Systemic Risk Bd., Working Paper No. 141, 2023), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4375357> [https://perma.cc/XEY2-VD9Z] (describing forced selling by investment entities organized as collateralized loan obligations). For example, CLO managers must adhere to covenants that outline strict interest and over-collateralization tests for the portfolio. See Laila Kollmorgen & Steven Oh, *Seeing Beyond the Complexity: An Introduction to Collateralized Loan Obligations*, PINEBRIDGE INV. (Jan. 18, 2022), <https://www.pinebridge.com/en/insights/clo-beyond-the-complexity> [https://perma.cc/8VA9-4XK3]. If the CLO fails any of the tests, then the manager is required immediately to retire the highest tranches to bring the portfolio into compliance. *Id.*

²³⁷ See, e.g., Michael J. Hsu, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at Vanderbilt University: Preventing the Next Great Blurring (Feb. 21, 2024).

²³⁸ See, e.g., Steven Kelly, *Does Private Credit Really Reduce Systemic Risk?*, WITHOUT WARNING (Jan. 17, 2024), <https://www.withoutwarningresearch.com/p/does-private-credit-really-reduce> [https://perma.cc/PYT8-HSJE]. For example, EU regulators have begun reining in this opaque asset class, with new rules aimed at curbing leverage among private credit funds by limiting the amount of borrowed money that they can invest. See Costas Mourselas &

Yet the commentary to date has missed what matters most about this development and has, if anything, understated its impact. The surge in private credit and direct lending represents far more than a simple change in the delivery of debt capital. Indeed, it represents a key turning point for corporate governance, corporate finance, and the resolution of financial distress. Properly understood, private credit both responds to and accelerates two fundamental trends in the capital markets. First, private credit represents perhaps the final major step toward investment funds owning most of U.S. firms' capital structure—both the equity and the debt. Second, private credit represents a critical milestone in the movement of firms and capital away from the public markets and into the private markets. These two developments have profound consequences, not only for firms and investors but also for economic growth and the functioning of the capital markets.

F. Corporate Governance: Investment Funds Own Everything

i. Corporate Equity in the Hands of Investment Funds

The last half-century has witnessed an extraordinary shift in how companies are governed and financed. The rise of investment funds has radically altered the behavior, and even the number,

Will Louch, *EU Tightens Rules on Leverage for Private Credit Funds*, FIN. TIMES (July 21, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/2ab74817-5b14-4110-9815-a7549621b521> [<https://perma.cc/4B3L-Q65C>]. In the United Kingdom, financial regulators have announced a sweeping review of private market valuations processes, concerned that the lack of daily mark-to-market valuations in private credit may mask initial signs of weakness in the sector. See Laura Noonan, *UK Regulator to Launch Review of Private Market Valuations*, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/ee008ac7-2f0f-4b65-a016-0e2ec00e8c26> [<https://perma.cc/4HA9-3NS3>]. And in the United States, the SEC recently voted to require asset managers to provide investors with more detailed quarterly reports on investment performance and expense disclosures. See Brooke Masters, *US Regulators Impose Tougher Disclosure Rules on Private Funds*, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2023), <https://www.ft.com/content/7b31f328-27b0-4a96-8477-1aa2b6bd3ae4> [<https://perma.cc/5Z4Y-KW6Z>]. Senators Sherrod Brown and Jack Reed recently warned of the risks associated with private credit, pointing to continuing regulatory uncertainty. See Press Release, Sen. Sherrod Brown, Brown, Reed Warn Regulators of Risks Posed by Private Credit Market (Nov. 29, 2023), <https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sherrod-brown-reed-warn-regulators-risks-posed-private-credit-market> [<https://perma.cc/J3YK-P4SS>].

of both public and private companies in the United States. This is because, over time, investment funds have come to own the largest share of the equity of large and middle-market companies.

An investment fund is simply a pool of capital that is raised from passive investors and used to make investments.²³⁹ The fund’s “investment manager” selects the fund’s investments and decides when and how the fund will deploy its capital.²⁴⁰ There are at least as many types of investment funds as there are asset classes, and within a given type, investment funds adopt myriad investment strategies. There are also regulatory distinctions among funds. “Registered” or “public” investment funds such as mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are permitted to raise capital from retail investors and are therefore very tightly regulated by the securities laws.²⁴¹ Among their numerous regulatory obligations, registered funds must invest almost exclusively in liquid instruments, including public-company equity and debt.²⁴²

Private investment funds, by contrast, largely set their own terms through negotiation with their investors and are very lightly regulated. In exchange for this generous regulatory treatment, private funds may raise capital only from institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals.²⁴³ They are permitted to make highly illiquid investments, such as acquiring large and even controlling stakes in private companies.²⁴⁴

Prompted by a revolution in corporate finance that favored passively diversifying one’s investments over trying to pick high-performing investments, investment funds have become an

²³⁹ See John Morley, *The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation*, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1235-36 (2014).

²⁴⁰ *Id.* at 1238-40.

²⁴¹ See Elisabeth de USCnay & Gabriel Rauterberg, *The New Public/Private Equilibrium and the Regulation of Public Companies*, 2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1199, 1216 n.62 (describing the numerous regulatory obligations applicable to registered funds).

²⁴² See I.R.C. § 851(b) (2024).

²⁴³ The Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 3, 54 Stat. 789, 797 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)), the federal securities statute that governs investment funds, exempts from public registration funds whose investors are large institutional investors and high-net-worth individuals.

²⁴⁴ See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, *Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity*, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 121, 123-25 (2009).

extraordinarily popular way for investors of all types and sizes to channel their savings to companies.²⁴⁵ Over time, this has dramatically changed the ownership of both public and private companies.

Fifty years ago, the stock of a typical public company would likely have been owned by a very large and dispersed set of shareholders, each holding only a small stake in the business. Many or most of these shareholders would have been unsophisticated retail investors holding their shares in the company directly, rather than through an intermediary. Historically, therefore, corporate law and corporate finance were consumed by the fear that self-interested corporate managers could harm firm value—whether through laziness, incompetence, or self-dealing—because dispersed, unsophisticated shareholders prone to collective-action and information problems would be powerless to stop them.²⁴⁶ This problem, referred to in corporate law as “the separation of ownership and control” and in financial economics as “managerial agency costs,” dominated corporate governance for nearly three quarters of a century.²⁴⁷

Today, rather than fret over weak shareholders dominated by strong managers, we grapple with concerns over excessive shareholder power.²⁴⁸ How did this happen? The answer is that the ownership of both public and private companies today is not just highly concentrated—it is concentrated *in the hands of investment funds*.

The largest share of the equity in *public* companies today is owned by registered investment funds—specifically, by massive “index” funds and other funds managed by a mere handful of

²⁴⁵ See WILLIAM A. BIRDTHISTLE, *EMPIRE OF THE FUND: THE WAY WE SAVE NOW* 5-9 (2016).

²⁴⁶ See Michael C. Jensen, *Eclipse of the Public Corporation*, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61-62.

²⁴⁷ See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, *THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY* 277-79 (1933); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, *Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure*, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (introducing the concept of managerial agency costs).

²⁴⁸ See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, *Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance*, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 769-70 (2017) (arguing that corporate-law scholarship has focused too much on the agency costs of corporate managers, when powerful shareholders also impose “principal costs”).

behemoth asset managers, such as Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street (the “Big Three”).²⁴⁹ Excessive managerial power in public companies has given way to undeniable shareholder power.²⁵⁰ As a result, corporate governance today debates whether these index-fund managers wield too much economic and political power.²⁵¹

The rise of investment funds has led to a similar result for the equity ownership of *private* companies. While registered funds are severely limited in their ability to invest in private companies,²⁵² private investment funds are not similarly constrained. This is because they are open only to high-net-worth individuals and institutional investors such as pension funds, endowments, foundations, sovereign-wealth funds, and so forth. Moreover, significant loosening of the securities laws applicable to private capital and private funds in the 1980s and 1990s has allowed private investment funds to grow extraordinarily large individually and to raise astronomical amounts of capital collectively.²⁵³ This in turn has allowed private funds to invest ever-greater amounts in private companies. In particular, private-equity funds and venture-capital funds taken together have become the primary source of outside equity capital for private companies.²⁵⁴

Considering these developments together points to the conclusion that, while comprehensive statistics are hard to find, the bulk of the *equity* of both public and private companies today may be held primarily by investment funds.

²⁴⁹ See Bebchuk & Hirst, *Big Three Power*, *supra* note 1, at 1550.

²⁵⁰ See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, *The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights*, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 889, 896 (2013).

²⁵¹ See *supra* note 1.

²⁵² See *supra* note 245.

²⁵³ See Elisabeth de Fontenay, *The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public Company*, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 448 (2017); Michael Ewens & Joan Farre-Mensa, *The Deregulation of the Private Equity Markets and the Decline in IPOs*, 33 REV. FIN. STUD. 5463, 5464 (2020).

²⁵⁴ See, e.g., Pollman, *supra* note 3, at 157; Kaplan & Strömberg, *supra* note 244, at 122.

ii. Corporate Debt Follows Suit

With the rise of private credit, the very same phenomenon is now occurring with the *debt* of U.S. firms. In lieu of high-yield notes or syndicated loans, companies are increasingly borrowing in the form of loans from private-credit funds, as we saw in Part III. More revolutionary still, as private-credit asset managers grow in size, even large firms can borrow entirely from a *single* private-credit fund.²⁵⁵ A large private company, for example, may have all its equity in the hands of a single private-equity fund, while all of its debt is held by a single private-credit fund. As a result, we are approaching a world in which most firms' capital structure—both the equity and the debt—may be funded and held entirely by private investment funds. This is a radically different way of owning companies.

What is this likely to mean for corporate governance? What do we know about the behavior of private investment funds generally and of private-credit funds in particular? Most private-credit funds are formed as private investment funds. They are also often sponsored by the same investment firms that sponsor private-equity funds. We therefore begin our inquiry with what is known about private investment funds, including and especially private equity.

There is now a large literature on the structure and behavior of private investment funds and their effect on the companies in which they invest.²⁵⁶ Private funds differ from retail-oriented registered funds such as mutual funds and ETFs in crucial ways. They are very lightly regulated, and they are actively managed.²⁵⁷ Their investment managers (sponsors) are incentivized to

²⁵⁵ See *supra* Section III.A.

²⁵⁶ For reviews of this literature, see, e.g., Tim Jenkinson, Hyeik Kim & Michael S. Weisbach, *Buyouts: A Primer* 97-106 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2021-18, 2022), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964770> [<https://perma.cc/7WQJ-HXKF>]; Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, *The Venture Capital Revolution*, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 145 (2001); Shai Bernstein, *The Effects of Public and Private Equity Markets on Firm Behavior*, 14 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 295 (2022); Martin Olsson & Joacim Tåg, *Private Equity, Layoffs, and Job Polarization*, 35 J. LABOR ECON. 697 (2017).

²⁵⁷ See Kaplan & Strömberg, *supra* note 244244, at 121-22.

generate high returns because of their compensation structure.²⁵⁸ Unlike managers of registered funds, managers of private funds typically take a large share of all profits from the fund's investments (say, twenty percent), which encourages them to take big risks and work for big gains.²⁵⁹ Finally, they have extraordinary discretion in their hunt for returns compared with both registered investment funds and public companies.

In practice, then, what would it mean for a firm if both its equity and its debt were held by a very small number of private investment funds? On the one hand, we should expect this to drive firms to operate with striking efficiency in generating returns for such funds' investors. Firms owned and financed entirely by private investment funds are likely to prioritize economic returns above all else, and they have the flexibility and resources to do so.²⁶⁰ Overall, this may be a positive development for the economy in terms of firm productivity and growth.

On the other hand, most private investment funds are not overly concerned with *how* their returns are generated, because they are less scrutinized than actors in the public and quasi-public markets. Therefore, the returns from such funds' increasing control of U.S. companies may come in part at the expense of noninvestor stakeholders or impose negative externalities, as compared to (1) other models of corporate ownership, such as public companies or family-owned private companies,²⁶¹ and (2) other models of corporate financing, such as bank loans or public and quasi-public debt. Private funds appear to be uniquely skilled at determining what particular combination of operational shifts, strategic moves, and capital-structure changes in their portfolio companies will yield the greatest returns for the fund, but there is no guarantee that these changes would

²⁵⁸ Axelson et al., *supra* note 5757, at 1551.

²⁵⁹ Victor Fleischer, *Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds*, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).

²⁶⁰ See Tim Jenkinson, Hyeik Kim & Michael S. Weisbach, *Buyouts: A Primer* 97-106 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2021-18, 2022), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3964770> [<https://perma.cc/7WQJ-HXKF>].

²⁶¹ See *id.* at 100-01.

maximize social welfare.²⁶² All else equal, a company owned and financed solely by private investment funds might be more likely to engage in anticompetitive behavior, to shrink consumer surplus, or to sell dangerous, addictive, or even illegal products than an otherwise comparable company, though the literature exploring these questions is still nascent.²⁶³

The shift from quasi-public debt to private credit could even alter the behavior of a company whose equity is already owned by a private equity fund. This is because the major investment banks that arrange quasi-public debt have far different reputational and other incentives than private-credit funds do, due to such banks' role in the financial system and their status as public companies. In recent years, these banks' investments have been highly influenced by societal pressure—albeit often in conflicting directions—on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues like climate policy and corporate diversity, equity, and inclusion. Thus, an increasing share of syndicated loans contain covenants and other terms tied to ESG factors, including at large companies such as Dell, Hewlett-Packard, and Lululemon.²⁶⁴ By contrast, private-credit funds that are private investment funds have a greater ability to evade public opinion.

Third, ownership of a firm's equity and debt by private investment funds contributes to the concentration of corporate power and wealth in a small number of hands. There is already growing concern over the power of the “Big Three” asset managers that collectively hold most of the equity

²⁶² See *id.* at 97-101.

²⁶³ See, e.g., Divya Kirti & Natasha Sarin, *What Private Equity Does Differently: Evidence from Life Insurance*, 37 REV. FIN. STUD. 201, 224-28 (2024); Peter Morris, Ludovic Phalippou & Betty Wu, *How Deadly Is Financial Leverage? Evidence from Care Homes During the COVID-19 Crisis* (Jan. 2022) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4017507> [<https://perma.cc/Y9P8-AJ46>]; Yasmin Rafiei, *When Private Equity Takes Over a Nursing Home*, NEW YORKER (Aug. 25, 2022), <https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/when-private-equity-takes-over-a-nursing-home> [<https://perma.cc/D83J-MHCX>]; Cameron McWhirter & Zusha Elinson, *The Selling of America's Most Controversial Gun*, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2023), <https://www.wsj.com/us-news/the-selling-of-americas-most-controversial-gun-3c86127f> [<https://perma.cc/76TG-WA9S>]; cf. Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, *Regulatory Entrepreneurship*, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 398-400 (2017) (discussing how “regulatory entrepreneurs”—startups that seek to change the law as part of their business plan—“strategically operat[e] in a zone of questionable legality or break[] the law until they can (hopefully) change it”).

²⁶⁴ Nakita Q. Cuttino, *Private Debt for Public Good*, 76 FLA. L. REV. 637, 637-38 (2024).

of U.S. public companies.²⁶⁵ Yet this problem has the potential to become even more severe with the rise of private credit—as private funds will now hold *both* parts of the firm’s capital structure and may continue to concentrate.

Fourth, we may worry about the resilience and long-term performance of firms whose only outside investors are private investment funds—all having the same life cycles, the same ultimate investors, the same decision-making by private-equity sponsors, the same liquidity constraints, and the same incentives. For example, both case law and academic research find that private investment funds’ limited lifespans, fundraising pressures, compensation schemes, and tax preferences affect what investments they make, when they make and exit them, and at what price they do so.²⁶⁶ Therefore, we may find that shocks to the U.S. economy are even more severe and more correlated when there is less diversity among owners of U.S. companies and less liquidity.

Fifth, the increasing ownership and financing of U.S. companies by private investment funds will ultimately shape the entire U.S. economy, because such funds can finance only certain types of firms and on particular terms. This is due to such funds’ (typically fixed) lifespans, their illiquidity, their incentives, and other features. For example, it is well recognized that venture-capital funds overwhelmingly invest in specific rapid-growth industries such as tech,²⁶⁷ while private-equity-buyout funds typically invest in mature companies that have positive and stable cash flows and can bear high debt loads.²⁶⁸ Companies and industries falling within such funds’ investment set therefore raise capital with ease, while others find capital to be scarce.

²⁶⁵ See sources cited *supra* note 1.

²⁶⁶ See, e.g., *In re PLX Tech. Inc. S’holders Litig.*, 2018 WL 5018535, at *1-3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018); *Firefighters’ Pension Sys. v. Found. Bldg. Materials, Inc.*, C.A. No. 2022-0466, 2024 WL 2795026, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2024); Alexander Ljungqvist, Matthew Richardson & Daniel Wolfenzon, *The Investment Behavior of Buyout Funds: Theory and Evidence*, 49 FIN. MGMT. 3, 3-5 (2020).

²⁶⁷ See Josh Lerner & Ramana Nanda, *Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation: What We Know and How Much We Still Need to Learn*, 34 J. ECON. PERSPS. 237, 238 (2020).

²⁶⁸ See Kaplan & Strömberg, *supra* note 244, at 129.

G. Corporate Information Production: Private Markets Cannibalize Public Markets

Private credit raises the prospect of a world in which consumers, most investors, the general public, and even regulators and policymakers know little about the governance, financial results, or prospects of most companies that sell the goods and services on which we rely. Indeed, private credit represents a major new milestone in the movement of firms and capital from the public and quasi-public markets to the private markets. A defining feature of recent history in the capital markets is the long-term decline in both the number of public companies and the share of capital raised in the public markets.²⁶⁹ More companies choose to remain private indefinitely or to defer their IPO for as long as possible. They are able to do this because raising capital in the private markets has never been easier or cheaper.²⁷⁰ Multibillion-dollar companies such as SpaceX, OpenAI, Publix, and PetSmart are private companies today, whereas decades ago they would almost certainly have had to go public to reach such valuations.

This matters because private companies behave very differently from public companies. They are subject to far fewer external constraints on their behavior: they disclose little to regulators and the general public under the securities laws; their governance is left almost entirely up to private ordering; they avoid the threat of class-action shareholder lawsuits; and their stock is not tracked by traders, analysts, or the media because it does not trade in a liquid market.²⁷¹ If one were skeptical that this could truly alter a firm's behavior, one need only compare the trajectory

²⁶⁹ See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, *The U.S. Listing Gap*, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 466 (2017); Xiaohui Gao, Jay R. Ritter & Zhongyan Zhu, *Where Have All the IPOs Gone?*, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1663, 1667-69 (2013).

²⁷⁰ See de Fontenay, *supra* note 253, at 448; Ewens & Farre-Mensa, *supra* note 253, at 5466.

²⁷¹ See de Fontenay, *supra* note 253, 466-67.

of X Corp. (formerly Twitter, Inc.) when it was still a public company and now that it is a private company owned primarily by Elon Musk.²⁷²

Of these distinctive features of private companies, the lack of disclosure is worth discussing in detail. A fundamental fact about private companies is that, in contrast to public companies, little information about them is available to outsiders. Unlike public companies, private companies are typically not required by law to disclose to the public or even to their own investors any of the following: their financial statements; conflicts of interest involving their managers or their insiders; the compensation of their managers and insiders; their corporate structure; their capital structure; the details of corporate transactions such as mergers and acquisitions and major equity and debt financings; the nature of their business and their assets; or their earnings projections and corporate strategy.²⁷³ Nor are they required to disclose major changes to the business, legal actions and regulatory risks, or other events affecting the company, no matter how significant.²⁷⁴

The shroud of secrecy surrounding private companies has not been impenetrable, however. Until now, information about many private companies—particularly the larger ones—could trickle out to the markets as a result of their debt financing.²⁷⁵ For example, only a decade ago, a large private-equity-owned company would typically finance itself with syndicated loans, high-yield bonds, or a combination of both.

A surprising feature of the capital markets is that private companies that choose to issue high-yield bonds file regular public disclosures with the SEC, similarly to public companies, due

²⁷² See Ann M. Lipton, *Every Billionaire is a Policy Failure*, 18 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 327, 373-387 (2024) (describing the radical changes in culture, strategy, and operations at X Corp. since Elon Musk took the company private).

²⁷³ See de Fontenay & Rauterberg, *supra* note 241, at 1212.

²⁷⁴ See *id.*

²⁷⁵ See *supra* Section II.C.i.

to long-standing practice in this market.²⁷⁶ Yet syndicated loans also generate important information that reaches a wide audience, even in the absence of public disclosure. Both types of quasi-public debt impose some information obligations on firms, typically by requiring that the company obtain audited financial statements and report certain material developments affecting it to investors. Furthermore, corporate borrowers of syndicated loans and high-yield bonds typically must agree to have their debt rated by a credit-rating agency, a process that yields additional information for the market.²⁷⁷

To be sure, this information is generally not disclosed to the general public, but instead to the large group of creditors that holds the company's debt. Nonetheless, because quasi-public debt is traded in a relatively liquid market, information available to creditors can indirectly inform the rest of the market through the pricing of the debt. Empirical evidence suggests that members of lender groups trade on the information they learn from their debt investments, meaning that even thinly traded syndicated loans likely produce information leakages that show up in market transactions and inform the public's view of the health of the economy.²⁷⁸ Finally, to the extent that banks are among a corporate borrower's creditors or underwriters, the information would also find its way into the hands of bank regulators.

Now, however, with the rise of private credit, corporate debt is increasingly held in purely private hands, even for some very large firms. As a result, the entire chain of ownership and investment from the company to the ultimate investor is private, on both the equity side and the

²⁷⁶ See Robert P. Bartlett, *Going Private but Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Firms' Going-Private Decisions*, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7, 9 (2009).

²⁷⁷ See Lawrence J. White, *Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies*, 24 J. Econ. Persp. 211 (Spring 2010) (discussing the role of credit ratings agencies in the debt markets).

²⁷⁸ See Victoria Ivashina and Zheng Sun, *Institutional Stock Trading on Loan Market Information*, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 284 (2011).

debt side. The consequences of this are significant and potentially troubling: a segment of the U.S. economy may simply go dark.²⁷⁹

In other words, for many or most U.S. companies, we may eventually have little or no information at all about the company itself, including its assets, size, governance, and valuation; the company's capital structure; the company's equity owners and creditors; the terms of the company's equity and debt; any transactions involving the company; and much more. We have not truly reckoned with what this means for economic output, capital allocation, and regulation in the U.S. economy, but the effects will be profound.

Perhaps the most obvious change is that corporate valuation may become increasingly difficult.²⁸⁰ By incorporating material information into trading prices, the public and quasi-public markets serve the crucial role of helping outsiders value firms.²⁸¹ In turn, this ensures that capital is allocated to its most efficient uses.²⁸² The rise of private credit and especially direct lending means that, going forward, opaque firms will from now on be held exclusively by private owners and private creditors, with no robust trading market to provide discipline and a measure of objectivity as to valuation. Firms will trade hands in transactions involving severe information asymmetries between buyers and sellers.²⁸³

²⁷⁹ Notwithstanding, we note that for smaller companies, private credit may, counterintuitively, make more information available to outsiders. This is because, as discussed, private credit not only substitutes for existing types of quasi-public debt such as syndicated loans and high-yield bonds, it also likely expands access to credit to *new* borrowers that previously did not take on any outside capital.

²⁸⁰ See INT'L MONETARY FUND, *supra* note 98, at 64 ("Private credit loans tend to suffer from stale valuations because of the absence of secondary markets, limited comparable transactions, and irregular appraisals.").

²⁸¹ See Holger Spamann, *Indirect Investor Protection: The Investment Ecosystem and Its Legal Underpinnings*, 14 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 16, 18 (2022).

²⁸² See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, *The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency*, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565-67 (1984).

²⁸³ See Ali Sanati & Ioannis Spyridopoulos, *Comparing Capital Allocation Efficiency in Public and Private Equity Markets* 36 (July 2, 2024) (unpublished manuscript), <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4403578> [<https://perma.cc/EZ32-4XW3>] (finding that capital is allocated substantially more efficiently in the public markets than in the private markets).

This opacity will likely have two consequences. First, we should expect more examples of wildly mistaken or misleading valuations of private companies—already a serious problem for the private markets.²⁸⁴ Second, we should also expect a greater incidence of corporate fraud, given that private companies that go dark are by definition subject to less scrutiny, oversight, and enforcement.²⁸⁵ Third, both corporate debt and equity will be less liquid, which has implications for the ultimate investors in these private funds.²⁸⁶ In sum, all of the advantages of market efficiency in the public and quasi-public markets are lost in a world in which everything is private all the way down. We do not yet know whether the advantages of potentially greater monitoring and flexibility from private capital are enough to offset this. We also do not yet know whether the market can adapt and solve its many information problems solely through private ordering, or whether, going forward, we should expect our economy to be more susceptible to large market distortions and the painful market corrections that eventually follow.

H. Corporate Distress and Bankruptcy: Private-Credit Lenders Will Make Their Mark

In this Section, we consider how the primary body of law regulating financial distress—bankruptcy law—should adapt to private credit transforming the debtor-creditor paradigm.

As depicted in Figure 9 below, our BDC data show that even with the accounting flexibility inherent in the structure, a significant portion of loans are held on the books of BDCs at levels

²⁸⁴ For example, when WeWork, a private company, sought to go public in 2019, public-market investors balked at its purported \$50 billion valuation, eventually causing it to abandon its IPO plans. See D Satish, *Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation Dilemma of WeWork (The We Company)*, 20 IUP J. ACCT. RSCH. & AUDIT PRACS. 496, 497 (2021).

²⁸⁵ See INT’L MONETARY FUND, *supra* note 98, at 65 (noting that the lack of market prices for corporate debt “can increase the potential for managerial manipulation”); see also Elizabeth Pollman, *Private Company Lies*, 109 GEO. L.J. 353, 354-58 (2020) (describing notable examples of fraud by private companies, such as Theranos); Verity Winship, *Private Company Fraud*, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 663, 669 (2020) (arguing that the decline of public companies reduces information needed to detect fraud); Brian J. Broughman & Matthew T. Wansley, *Risk-Seeking Governance*, 76 VAND. L. REV. 1299, 1303 (2023) (arguing that venture capitalist behavior follows a “risk-seeking model”).

²⁸⁶ See Jeff Schwartz, *The Twilight of Equity Liquidity*, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 532-34 (2012).

consistent with conventional metrics of financial distress. For example, in the 2022 sample, approximately 10% of loans were held at a fair value (for accounting purposes) equivalent to 70% or less of face value, suggesting that the borrowers were financially distressed.

Figure 9. The Proportion of Sample Loans Held at Discounts to Par Value.




Figure 9 above shows the proportion of loans in each sample year that are marked for accounting purposes at a fair value that is at a discount to the par value of the loan. For example, in the 2020 B-Cred 10-K, a loan to Polymer Additives, Inc. of \$29,752,000 was held at a fair value of \$24,248,000, indicating that the BDC viewed the fair value of the loan as much lower than its face value.

As a result, we anticipate that private credit will play a major role in corporate financial distress going forward. While we are still in the early stages of private credit, we see at this point three ways in which bankruptcy law may need to adapt. First, private-credit lenders will bring

different capabilities and incentives to pre-bankruptcy negotiations, shaping the population of Chapter 11 firms. In some cases, this may lead to a very fast workout and in others it may lead to a very delayed bankruptcy filing – which effect will dominate is not clear at this point. Second, in smaller and midmarket Chapter 11 cases, bankruptcy judges may now confront some sophisticated private-credit asset managers who are more eager to own assets—or to liquidate them—than the regulated banks that once provided credit to those companies. Third, in larger Chapter 11 cases where private-credit investors make loans that once would have been funded on the syndicated-loan market, the major shift may be the lack of claims trading, which might require judges to do more to promote disclosure and fair sales processes than the law currently provides for. The lack of claims trading may also mean that bankruptcy proceedings slow down, as bankruptcy judges may need to create space for exploring restructuring options and weighing different alternatives. We explain each of these issues in turn.

i. Private-Credit Lenders Bring New Capabilities and Incentives to Pre-Bankruptcy Workout Negotiations

Private-credit lenders bring different capabilities than other investors to the workout negotiations. Generalizing here is challenging, as not all private-credit funds are the same. However, as compared to traditional banks that lend to midmarket firms, many private-credit lenders are likely to have a greater range of capabilities. They are likely to be more active monitors of the borrower than traditional banks – perhaps even more so than syndicated lenders, who also engage in active monitoring²⁸⁷ -- which may allow them to quickly act to salvage investments, either by providing quick advice, or capital, or both. As compared to dispersed groups of corporate

²⁸⁷ See Greg Nini, David C. Smith and Amir Sufi, Creditor control rights, corporate governance and firm value, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1713 (2012).

bondholders or syndicated lenders, private credit lenders will suffer fewer coordination issues and as such will also be capable of quick actions.

However, in at least some cases, they will have strong incentives to give maturity-date extensions and forbearances to borrowers, even when those decisions may not be in the best interests of the corporation as a whole.²⁸⁸ Consider a corporation that is distressed. If the corporation owes money to a regulated bank, that bank will be required to assess potential loan losses and realize losses. The bank's workout decisions will come in the context of losses that regulators require the bank to account for. If the corporation owes money to investors in syndicated debts or bonds, those investors may be subject to rules that require them to mark liquid investments to market, which forces investors to take losses when the market price of liquid claims falls in value. If, instead, the corporation owes money to a private-credit lender, that lender can essentially choose when and where to take losses in many situations. As a result, private-credit lenders may simply delay taking losses to avoid informing limited partners of potential problems with their portfolio. A private lender can accomplish this by agreeing to extend the terms of repayment or by providing forbearances. As a result, the economy may have more so-called “zombie firms”—companies that have too much debt but that delay taking actions to reduce their debt,²⁸⁹ even though their debt forces the company to pass up profitable investment opportunities. As a result, the core business of these firms may erode, leaving little value for bankruptcy law to try to maximize.²⁹⁰ These zombie firms may encounter bankruptcy at a relatively late phase in their

²⁸⁸ A challenge to the generalizability of this prediction is that, as described below in Section V.C.ii, private-credit asset managers may also be *faster* in some cases to liquidate troubled firms, relative to what a mid-market commercial bank might have done. The prediction outlined here is likely to be true in some cases, but not in others; the average effect of the rise of private credit on the population of zombie firms remains to be seen.

²⁸⁹ See Edward I. Altman, Rui Dai & Wei Wang, *Global Zombie Companies: Measurements, Determinants, and Outcomes*, 55 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 723, 725 (2024).

²⁹⁰ Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, *Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy*, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 865 (2014).

financial distress, leaving bankruptcy judges with little to do other than preside over liquidations.²⁹¹

To be sure, not all private-credit lenders will have skill in monitoring borrowers and not all will have incentives to delay – but these are attributes of private-credit lending that make these types of lenders different from traditional banks, which may change the quantity and quality of firms that enter formal bankruptcy proceedings. At this point, it is not obvious exactly *how* the population of Chapter 11 debtors will change in the aggregate – will private-credit lenders that replace loan syndicates come to faster conclusions about troubled firms and act more decisively, or will we see a type of stalling bankruptcy not dissimilar from some of the recent liability management transactions? Will the incentive of private-credit lenders to delay be more important? The only certain thing is that the capabilities and incentives of private-credit lenders will soon be incredibly important for determining what firms file for Chapter 11 and how they look when they get there.

ii. More Aggressive Tactics in Smaller Cases

For smaller and mid-market cases, the arrival of private-credit lenders as a more sophisticated replacement for traditional commercial lenders, may confront borrowers with a very different contractual counterparty. The biggest change is that traditional commercial lenders like Citizens Bank are much less likely to deploy aggressive strategies than are private investment funds, which may be more sophisticated at dealing with bankruptcy. Regulated banks are generally forbidden by law from owning equity,²⁹² and banks and their employees rarely have strong incentives to act aggressively when borrowers run into trouble. Investment funds deploying

²⁹¹ *See id.*

²⁹² Mitchell Berlin, *Why Don't Banks Take Stock?*, BUS. REV., May/June 2000, at 3.

private-credit strategies, on the other hand, are not subject to significant limitations on equity ownership and can deploy aggressive strategies that look very much like those of “loan-to-own” lenders. To be sure, the private-credit space is diverse, and different asset managers have different levels of capabilities, but at least some of the larger ones offer workout capabilities and sophistication that are considerably higher than the median midmarket bank.

For an example of how this looks in practice, consider Red Lobster’s recent bankruptcy filing.²⁹³ In 2021, the restaurant chain borrowed more than \$250 million in senior secured private-credit term-loan debt from a major private-credit lender, Fortress Investment Group.²⁹⁴ When Red Lobster fell into distress, Fortress exercised its rights under its term-loan agreement to acquire shareholder voting power, which allowed the private-credit lender to replace the company’s managers and directors and acquire full control of the borrower prior to any bankruptcy filing.²⁹⁵

A law firm subsequently described the private-credit lender’s move as

short-circuit[ing] the traditional restructuring process. Rather than negotiate with their borrower on the terms of a forbearance or more holistic capital structure solution, certain middle-market private credit lenders have turned to previously underutilized provisions in security documents—the exercise of voting rights given to a collateral agent through a

²⁹³ See Gretchen Morgenson, *How Private Equity Rolled Red Lobster*, NBC NEWS (May 24, 2024, 12:00 PM EDT), <https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/private-equity-rolled-red-lobster-rcna153397> [<https://perma.cc/YT5Q-A3TY>]; see also *(Blood) Red Lobster*, PETITION (May 22, 2024), <https://petition.substack.com/p/red-lobster-bankruptcy> [<https://perma.cc/8GTN-FF7N>] (describing the fall of Red Lobster).

²⁹⁴ See Declaration of Jonathan Tibus in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Relief at 12, *In re Red Lobster Mgmt.*, No. 24-02486 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 19, 2024).

²⁹⁵ The lending structure worked as follows. Red Lobster had pledged the right to vote its shares—essentially, a pre-filled out shareholder voting card—to Fortress as part of the loan. When Red Lobster defaulted under the loan agreement, Fortress gained the right to use this voting card (or proxy) to replace the company’s board. See *id.* at 17.

voting proxy as part of the pledge of a borrower's equity, otherwise known as pledged equity proxy rights.²⁹⁶

In other words, the private-credit lender used a legal right that traditional lenders had previously hesitated to exercise even when they had the contractual right to do so. This type of legal creativity and aggressiveness may come to characterize an increasing proportion of major commercial bankruptcy cases as private-credit-backed firms make up an increasingly large share of Chapter 11 debtors.

iii. More Judicial Responsibility in Larger Cases

Finally, for larger Chapter 11 cases, the key change will be the absence of claims trading. As discussed above, the great trends in bankruptcy law have depended on an active market in corporate debt that may no longer be there. In a world without claims trading, the expert distressed investors who would finance a reorganization or purchase a company's assets may not already have a seat at the table. To the extent that the business would be more valuable alive than dead, the investors who might seek to save it may need time and the opportunity to perform due diligence.²⁹⁷

For example, bankruptcy lawyers have developed a practice of proposing restructuring plans to judges that have “toggle” features. In a toggle structure, the debtor proposes implementing

²⁹⁶ David Griffiths & Alex Cohen, *Pledged Equity Proxy Rights and the Rise of the Board Flip*, WEIL RESTRUCTURING (May 14, 2024), <https://restructuring.weil.com/corporate-governance/pledged-equity-proxy-rights-and-the-rise-of-the-board-flip> [<https://perma.cc/88AH-TDQA>].

²⁹⁷ We note that an appointment-trading market for some private-credit loans may be developing, but this is still a far cry from the liquidity that exists in the broadly syndicated loan market. *See, e.g.*, Carmen Arroyo & John Sage, *JPMorgan Sounds Out Buyers for Discounted Pluralsight Debt*, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2024, 2:04 PM EDT) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-08-08/jpmorgan-sounds-out-buyers-for-discounted-pluralsight-debt> [<https://perma.cc/6TBH-N4ZR>]. In particular, direct loans often require the consent of the debtor to trade, which syndicated loans typically do not. *See id.*

a restructuring transaction—for example, a debt-for-equity swap—while also leaving open the possibility that another investor might come in to buy the company at a higher price than the appraised value of the proposed plan of reorganization.²⁹⁸ For example, the retail giant JCPenney proposed a reorganization transaction to the bankruptcy judge and simultaneously sought permission to reimburse the due-diligence expenses of prospective buyers who might short-circuit the reorganization process with a higher bid.²⁹⁹ This process is designed to provide the bankruptcy judge with comfort that there is no “better deal” out there than the proposed Chapter 11 plan. However, this will work significantly worse for companies that, prebankruptcy, had both private-equity and private-credit loans, as prospective purchasers and financial intermediaries will be far less familiar with the assets.

As a result, bankruptcy judges may need to reorient bankruptcy law back toward its traditional role: promoting disclosure. In recent years, the disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code have fallen by the wayside as judges have deferred to “market terms” and have looked for serious flaws in deals crafted by private parties instead of using their position to create robust competition for financing opportunities and to protect the integrity of auction processes.³⁰⁰ In a world where single lenders have outsize power, the law should do more to check the power of lenders and police opportunism in insolvency.

CONCLUSION

Over the past ten years, private credit has grown from a relatively small part of the corporate credit markets to equal or perhaps surpass the aggregate size of the syndicated-loan and

²⁹⁸ See David M. Feldman & Michael S. Neumeister, *Sale Toggles in Chapter 11 Plan Processes*, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Nov. 2021), <https://www.financierworldwide.com/sale-toggles-in-chapter-11-plan-processes> [<https://perma.cc/7NN8-2NET>].

²⁹⁹ See *id.*

³⁰⁰ See Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, *Bankruptcy Process for Sale*, 39 YALE J. ON REGUL. 1, 4-5 (2022).

high-yield bond markets. As a result, commercial loans have moved from the quasi-public era to a new period of private relationship lending, where the information that public debt trading once provided about firms and industries is retreating from public view. This period has also witnessed the rise of powerful investment firms that are replacing traditional banks as the originators and underwriters of corporate loans. This shift has many contributing factors, and it raises significant questions about the future of corporate governance and corporate finance. Bankruptcy law, among other bodies of law, must soon respond to a world in which part of the once-roaring credit markets go dark.

about ECGI

The European Corporate Governance Institute has been established to improve *corporate governance through fostering independent scientific research and related activities*.

The ECGI will produce and disseminate high quality research while remaining close to the concerns and interests of corporate, financial and public policy makers. It will draw on the expertise of scholars from numerous countries and bring together a critical mass of expertise and interest to bear on this important subject.

The views expressed in this working paper are those of the authors, not those of the ECGI or its members.

ECGI Working Paper Series in Law

Editorial Board

Editor	Amir Licht, Professor of Law, Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
Consulting Editors	Hse-Yu Iris Chiu, Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation, University College London Martin Gelter, Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law Geneviève Helleringer, Professor of Law, ESSEC Business School and Oxford Law Faculty Kathryn Judge, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School Wolf-Georg Ringe, Professor of Law & Finance, University of Hamburg
Editorial Assistant	Asif Malik, ECGI Working Paper Series Manager

<https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers>

Electronic Access to the Working Paper Series

The full set of ECGI working papers can be accessed through the Institute's Web-site (<https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers>) or SSRN:

Finance Paper Series	http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Fin.html
Law Paper Series	http://www.ssrn.com/link/ECGI-Law.html

<https://ecgi.global/content/working-papers>