There are significant divergences in financial regulation despite the similarity of market failures
Blocks held by top US investors are larger than those held by the top European investors
Commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition
There are significant divergences in financial regulation despite the similarity of market failures
Blocks held by top US investors are larger than those held by the top European investors
Commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition
There are significant divergences in financial regulation despite the similarity of market failures
Blocks held by top US investors are larger than those held by the top European investors
Commentators should focus on how to improve the present regime of state competition
This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent...
Climate disasters propagate through common ownership networks. Institutional investors in firms hit by climate-related disasters are more likely to vote in favor of climate proposals at their other portfolio firms. This effect is...
Three main legal strategies are used globally to pursue ESG stewardship: stewardship codes, disclosure regulation, and fiduciary duties. In this paper, we compare these strategies focussing on the EU approach to ESG stewardship,...
What determines the effectiveness of corporate boards? Corporate legal scholars usually approach this question by focusing on directors’ incentives, such as counting how many directors are independent or whether the roles of the...
The conventional view of dual-class structures assumes that the alternative to a dual-class IPO is a single-class IPO, where shareholders' voting power aligns with their economic interests. However, more often than not, the...
The fall of fascism in Italy in 1943-1944 was followed by the issuance of laws and decrees that made former fascist politicians ineligible for political office. We use this setting as a quasi-natural experiment that exogenously...
Prior research has documented a carbon premium in realized returns, which has been assumed to proxy for expected returns and thus the cost of capital. We find that the carbon premium partially represents unexpected returns and thus...
Founder-CEOs may hold power in a corporation in myriad ways: through managerial control, designating seats on the board, or holding significant voting power, which can be amplified by dual-class structures with superior voting...
The largest institutional investors have solidified their status as “universal owners,” holding almost eighty percent of the U.S. stock market. The growing influence of these investors over the companies they invest in has...
This chapter deals with fundamental issues of corporate insolvency law. Particular attention is paid to the agency problems related to “bankruptcy governance” and how these are addressed in various jurisdictions....
We study the effect of firm-level political risk on wage theft. On one hand firms exposed to political risk might engage in wage theft to lower their expenses and to improve their financial flexibility. On the other hand, political risk...
Engage with global thought leaders & gain valuable insights on corporate purpose & modern capitalism at not one but THREE events! Join our 3-day event organised with Copenhagen Business School from 20-22 September 2023. ➡ Registrations are now open: (click on the events below to learn more) Day1️⃣: Young Scholars Workshop on Corporate Purpose | 20 September 2023 Day2️⃣: "Perspectives on Corporate Purpose" Conference |......
