Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance- Better Monitors or More Self-Dealing?

Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance- Better Monitors or More Self-Dealing?

  • 27 June 2006
  • Charlemagne Building, Brussels

Controlling shareholders have the potential to monitor managers better than do independent directors and the capital market. However, this response to the Berle-Means problem presents a different agency cost: the potential that the controlling shareholders will extract private benefits of control. Corporate governance rules and practices in the U.S. and in EU member states make it more or less difficult to accumulate a controlling position and are more or less rigorous in their policing of private benefits of control. This meeting examined the difference in regulatory strategy both across the Atlantic and within the EU. 

It took place at the Charlemagne Building, Brussels on Tuesday, 27th June 2006

 

This conference was supported by:

 

Telecom Italia

The European Commission

Goldman Sachs

 

   

Information

Address:
Charlemagne Building, Brussels
Contact:

Tuesday, 27th June 2006

08:00
- 08:30

Registration and coffee

08:30
- 09:00

Welcome

Speakers:
Lance Liebman
Alexander Schaub
09:00

Session 1 – The Economics of Large Shareholders and Regulation

10:30
- 11:00

Coffee

11:00

Session 2 – Keynote speech

11:00
- 12:00

Keynote speaker

Speakers:
Charlie McCreevy
12:00
- 13:30

Lunch

13:30

Session 3– Comparative Regulation

15:00

Session 4 – Keynote speech

15:00
- 16:00

Keynote speaker

Speakers:
Cynthia A Glassman
16:00
- 16:30

Coffee

16:30

Session 5 – Oxford Union-style debate

16:30
- 18:00

Motion: “This House believes it is acceptable to vest different classes of shares with different voting rights“

Speakers:
Laura Poots
Peter Montagnon
Roderick Munsters
Jacob Wallenberg
18:00

Session 6 – Summing up

18:15
- 19:15

Post-conference reception

Speakers

William Allen
Stephen Fraidin
Cynthia A Glassman
Lance Liebman
Charlie McCreevy
Peter Montagnon
Roderick Munsters
Laura Poots
David Reeb
Alexander Schaub
Jacob Wallenberg

Presentations

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Welcome

Time:
08:30h
- 09:00h

Speakers

Lance Liebman
Alexander Schaub
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Moderator

Time:
09:00h
- 10:30h

Speakers

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Briefings

Time:
09:00h
- 10:30h

Speakers

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Panel

Time:
09:00h
- 10:30h

Speakers

David Reeb

Keynote speaker

Charlie McCreevy
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Moderator

Time:
13:30h
- 15:00h

Speakers

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Briefings

Time:
13:30h
- 15:00h

Speakers

William Allen

Conference Documents

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Panel

Time:
13:30h

Speakers

Theodor Baums
Stephen Fraidin

Conference Documents

Keynote speaker

Cynthia A Glassman

Motion: “This House believes it is acceptable to vest different classes of shares with different voting rights“

Laura Poots
The late
Peter Montagnon
Roderick Munsters
Jacob Wallenberg
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Motion: “This House believes it is acceptable to vest different classes of shares with different voting rights“

Time:
16:30h
- 18:00h

Speakers

Laura Poots
Peter Montagnon
Roderick Munsters
Jacob Wallenberg
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Summing up

Time:
18:00h
- 18:15h

Speakers