Ownership, Takeovers and EU Law: How Contestable Should EU Corporations Be?
In this paper, I draw on economic theory of ownership structure; empirical research on ownership, value and takeovers; and comparisons to US law to argue...
Read moreIn this paper, I draw on economic theory of ownership structure; empirical research on ownership, value and takeovers; and comparisons to US law to argue...
Read moreMost listed firms have concentrated ownership structures. However this ownership type is problematic. A clinical analysis reveals that the corporate...
Read moreThis paper studies how managers react to shareholder empowerment vis-à-vis governance provisions. We show that a staggered legislative change that...
Read moreTwo prominent progressive senators, Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren, have recently proposed that employees should be allowed to elect 40 to 45...
Read moreWhen Roberta Karmel wrote the articles that are the subject of this symposium, she was skeptical of both the potential value of shareholder voting and the...
Read moreWe examine why institutional investors vote the way they vote on director elections, using a novel dataset on voting rationales provided by...
Read moreUsing a new dataset of corporate voting-rights from 1971 to 2015, we find that young dual-class firms trade at a premium and operate at least as...
Read morePassively managed index funds now hold over 30% of U.S. equity fund assets; this shift raises fundamental questions about monitoring and governance. We...
Read moreWe analyze over 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and portfolio firms, unobservable to outsiders. These meetings are...
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