Poison Pill

The Poison Pill In Japan: The Missing Infrastructure

Anti-Activist Poison Pills

Hedge funds have become active in corporate governance. They push for changes in strategy and the adoption of specific business plans. Their tactics...

The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with an Application to the European Union)

Takeover regulation should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow individual companies to decide the contestability of their...

Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat

This chapter reviews the single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has come to bear on management defense against a...

Creeping Acquisitions in Europe: Enabling Companies to Be Better Safe than Sorry

Creeping acquisitions - grabs of a company?s de facto control without the launch of a formal tender offer ? are an acquisition technique that presents...

The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?

Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance

The regulation of hostile takeovers constitutes an interesting corporate governance microcosm. It is an area where clear contrasts in approach,...

The Rise of Anti-Activist Poison Pills

We provide the first systematic evidence of contractual innovation in the terms of poison pill plans. In response to the increase in hedge fund activism,...

The Law and Finance of Anti-Takeover Statutes

Lawyers and financial economists have fundamentally different views of anti-takeover statutes. While corporate lawyers and academics generally...

Shadow Pills, Visible Pill Policy, and Firm Value

We analyze the impact of the right to adopt a poison pill – a “shadow pill” – on pill policy and firm value by exploiting the quasi-natural...