Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control
If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at...
Read moreIf management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at...
Read moreWe develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates....
Read moreThis paper forms part of the proceedings for the 6th Annual Berle Symposium (2014), which focused on Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout?s 1999 Virginia Law...
Read moreWe study retail shareholder voting using a nearly comprehensive sample of U.S. ownership and voting records. Analyzing turnout within a rational...
Read moreWe document that the cross-sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously, both at the economy level and within industry and size...
Read moreWe study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards’...
Read moreThis paper links the CEO’s concerns for the current stock price to reductions in real investment. We identify short-term concerns using the amount of...
Read moreUsing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the impact of corporate governance reform on foreign exchange risk...
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