Working Paper
How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?
We consider a model in which shareholders provide a risk-averse CEO with risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We show that the...
Read moreHow Large Is the Pay Premium From Executive Incentive Compensation?
We estimate the pay premium associated with CEO incentive compensation. Using explicit detailed U.S. CEO compensation contract data and simulation...
Read moreIncentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment
Concerned with excessive risk taking, regulators worldwide generally prohibit private pension funds from charging performance-based fees....
Read moreHow Important is Moral Hazard for Distressed Banks?
The moral hazard incentives of the bank safety net predict that distressed banks take on more risk and higher leverage. Since many factors reduce these...
Read moreGovernance through Shame and Aspiration: Index Creation and Corporate Behavior
After decades of de-prioritizing shareholders' economic interests and low corporate profitability, Japan introduced the JPX-Nikkei400 in 2014. The...
Read moreComplexity of CEO Compensation Packages
Despite claims that CEO compensation contracts are increasingly complex, little is known about the extent to which they are, what drives that...
Read moreGovernance, Risk Management, and Risk-Taking in Banks
This paper examines how governance and risk management affect risk-taking in banks. It distinguishes between good risks, which are risks that have an ex...
Read moreA Survey of Recent Evidence on Boards of Directors and CEO Incentives
This article surveys the recent literature on boards of directors and the interplay between director incentives and CEO incentives. The primary focus...
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