Dual Class Shares

Silence Is Golden: The European Company Statute as a Catalyst for Company Law Arbitrage

The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firm Valuation

We examine U.S. dual and single class firms in 1980-2019 and document their valuation differences over their corporate life cycle. At the IPO, dual class...

The Rise of Dual-Class Stock IPOs

We create a novel dataset to examine the recent rise in dual-class IPOs. We document that dual-class firms have different types of controlling...

Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies

Corporate Control, Dual Class, and the Limits of Judicial Review

Companies with a dual-class structure have increasingly been involved in highprofile battles over the reallocation of control rights. Google, for...

Extending Dual Class Stock: A Proposal

The increasing use of dual class voting structures in public companies, and the frequency with which such structures contain sunset provisions, raises...

Dual-Class IPOs: A Solution to Unicorn Governance Failure

The conventional view of dual-class structures assumes that the alternative to a dual-class IPO is a single-class IPO, where shareholders' voting...

The Principle of Proportional Ownership, Investor Protection and Firm Value in Western Europe

Previous research initiated by Claessens et al. (2002) has established a value discount of disproportional ownership structures. Due to omitted...

The Sun Is Rising in the East: Dual-Class Shares and the Competitive Landscape of Technological Industries in Asia

There has recently been a relaxation of listing regulations to accommodate and attract firms going public with dual-class shares (DCS), notably in...

Changing Corporate Governance Norms: Evidence from Dual Class Shares in the U.K.

In the U.K., between 1955 and 1970, dual class shares quickly lost popularity without any regulatory intervention. The decline in the use of dual class...

London allowing dual class Premium listings: A Swedish commentary

In the UK Listing Review it is suggested that the London Stock Exchange should allow companies with dual class share (DCS) structures with...

Ousted

Founder-CEOs may hold power in a corporation in myriad ways: through managerial control, designating seats on the board, or holding significant voting...