Corporate Governance and Control
Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of...
Read moreCorporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of...
Read moreWe study a wide-spread yet unexplored corporate governance phenomenon: the pledging of company stock by insiders as collateral for personal bank...
Read moreThis paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the channels through which blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate...
Read moreThis paper develops a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium. It explains how and why a voting premium emerges in the absence of...
Read moreTraditional theories argue that governance is strongest under a single large blockholder, as she has large incentives to undertake value-enhancing...
Read moreWe examine the governance implications of passive fund growth. In our model, investors allocate capital between passive funds, active funds, and...
Read moreBlockholder monitoring is central to corporate governance, but blockholders large enough to exercise significant unilateral influence are rare....
Read moreThis Article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should vote on behalf of their investors and when they should not. It argues...
Read moreConventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading an investor too thinly. We show that, when an investor owns multiple firms...
Read moreWill asset managers with large amounts of capital and high risk-bearing capacity hold large blocks and monitor aggressively? Both block size and...
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