Working Paper
Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy
Evaluating agency theory and optimal contracting theory of corporate philanthropic activities, we find that as firms contribute more, corporate cash...
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Private Benefits of Corporate Philanthropy and Distortions to Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
We find that corporate giving represents a private benefit of control that distorts corporate investment and financing activity, consistent with free...
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Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals
Over 20 years, M&A contracts have more than doubled in size ? from 35 to 88 single-spaced pages in this paper?s font. They have also grown...
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Mandatory Governance Reform and Corporate Risk Management
Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the impact of corporate governance reform on foreign exchange risk...
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Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Complicating Corporate Governance Beyond Agency Costs
By the end of the twentieth century, the then-dominant literature on “law and finance” assumed that concentrated ownership was a product of...
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The Family Behind the Family Firm Premium: Agency Conflicts and Personal Financial Constraints
We relate the personal characteristics of the controlling family to the difference between the return on assets of all Norwegian family firms and...
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Mobility Restrictions and Risk-Related Agency Conflicts
Stricter enforcement of post-employment restrictions that strengthens trade secrets protection also limits CEOs’ alternative employment...
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Socially Responsible Firms
In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The...
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