This conference series was established in 2011 by the European corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) and the University of Tokyo in order to engage academics and practitioners in a constructive dialogue between the ECGI and Asia on issues of concern in the field of corporate governance. The ECGI Asia Corporate Governance Dialogue (EACGD) is supported by the Financial Research Center of the Japanese Financial Services Agency.
Information
07 July 2017
Registration & Coffee
Welcome - Simon Chesterman, Dean and Professor of Law, NUS Law
Opening Remarks - Gerard Hertig, Vice‐Chairman, European Corporate Governance Institute
Session 1 ‐ Agency Issues Revisited
Why do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law
Speakers:
We study how owners trade off the costs and bene ts of establishing a board in a historical setting, where boards are optional and authority over corporate decisions can be freely allocated across the general meeting, the board, and management. We nd that large owners and boards are substitutes and that boards exist in rms most prone to collective action problems. Boards monitor, advise, and mediate among shareholders, and these different roles entail different allocations of authority. Boards also arise to balance the need for small shareholder protection with the need to curb managerial discretion.
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Conference Documents
Hard and Soft Information: Firm Disclosure, SEC Letters, and the JOBS Act
Speakers:
Hard and Soft Information: Firm Disclosure, SEC Letters, and the JOBS Act
Speakers
Conference Documents
Panel Discussion 1
Moderator
Panelists
Lunch
Session 2 ‐ Investor Power
Contracting for Resilient Infrastructures
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Contracting for Resilient Infrastructures
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Conference Documents
Foreign Investor Voice in Japan: An Overview
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Foreign Investor Voice in Japan: An Overview
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Conference Documents
Panel Discussion 2
Moderator
Panelists
Coffee break
Session 3 ‐ The Role of Politics
Conceiving Corporate Governance for an Asian Environment
Speakers:
Conceiving Corporate Governance for an Asian Environment
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Conference Documents
China’s Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk
Speakers:
China’s Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk
Speakers
Conference Documents
Panel Discussion 3
Moderator
Panelists
Conclusions - Luh Luh Lan, NUS Law & NUS Business School
Speakers
Presentations
We study how owners trade off the costs and bene ts of establishing a board in a historical setting, where boards are optional and authority over corporate decisions can be freely allocated across the general meeting, the board, and management. We nd that large owners and boards are substitutes and that boards exist in rms most prone to collective action problems. Boards monitor, advise, and mediate among shareholders, and these different roles entail different allocations of authority. Boards also arise to balance the need for small shareholder protection with the need to curb managerial discretion.